ORDER : The present Criminal Revision Petition has been filed by the petitioners challenging the judgment passed by LIX Additional City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bangalore City (CCH-60) in Crl. Appeal No.419/2018 dated 21/07/2018, whereunder the order dated 28.12.2017 passed by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore City in Crl.Misc. No.3380/2017 has been set aside and I.A.No.3 filed under Section 91 of Cr.P.C is disposed of with liberty to the petitioners to file such application before the learned Magistrate. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the marriage between the petitioner No.1 and the respondent solemnized on 15.04.2001 at New Delhi. Out of their wedlock, a son was born on 12.02.2003. They lived together in United States of America till September, 2007 and thereafter, the petitioner No.1 sought for dissolution of marriage by filing a petition in M.C.No.68/2016 under Section 13 (1) (ia) & (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Thereafter, a criminal case was also filed contending that the respondent has committed domestic violence against her and her son and abandoned minor child and they have been thrown out from the matrimonial house in the year 2007-08 and now they are surviving by borrowing hand loans and residing with the father of petitioner No.1 in a rented house. It is further contended that the petitioner No.1 has no source of her own and as per interim order of the Court, an amount of Rs.30,000/-was granted in this behalf. It is further contended that the petitioners have taken the house on rent till April 2018 on monthly rent of Rs.19,000/-and an application came to be filed for alternative accommodation or to pay rent for the present accommodation of the petitioner No.1 and her son. 3. The respondent objected the said application by filing objections contending that he has no income. He has borrowed the amount from his friends and relatives. Under these grounds, he prayed to dismiss the application. 4. After considering the proposition of law, the Court below had allowed the application in part and directed the respondent-husband to pay the interim monthly rent of Rs.19,000/-as alternative accommodation to the present accommodation of the petitioners from the date of filing of this application till the date of disposal of the main petition. 5. 4. After considering the proposition of law, the Court below had allowed the application in part and directed the respondent-husband to pay the interim monthly rent of Rs.19,000/-as alternative accommodation to the present accommodation of the petitioners from the date of filing of this application till the date of disposal of the main petition. 5. Thereafter, the respondent-husband preferred Crl.A.No.419/2018 before the LIX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore and the said Court allowed the appeal and set-aside the impugned order. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioners are before this Court. 6. I have heard the petitioner No.1 who is party-in-person and also the learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 7. It is the contention of the petitioners that the wider interpretation has to be given to the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short ‘Act’). As per Section 19 of the Act, she is entitled to an alternative accommodation or a separate residence or a rental in this behalf. It is also the contention of the petitioners that though an interim maintenance of Rs.30,000/-was granted and therein the rental amount has been also calculated in this behalf while giving maintenance amount, but the rental amount which is fixed is not sufficient and the said order of the Court is not satisfying the provisions of Section 19 of the Act. It is further contention of the petitioners that petitioner No.1 has no source of income for her and she has taken a house on monthly rent of Rs.19,000/-and as such, she is entitled to the said amount in this behalf. On these grounds, she prayed that order of the First Appellate Court is not sustainable in law. Without considering the facts and circumstances, the Court below has passed the order. She further submitted that much prejudice has been caused to her and her son and without considering the status of the petitioner No.1 and her son, First Appellate Court passed the impugned order. She has further submitted that duty cost upon the respondent-husband to make her to live with dignity and status of the petitioner No.1 and her son. On these grounds, she prayed to allow the petition. 8. She has further submitted that duty cost upon the respondent-husband to make her to live with dignity and status of the petitioner No.1 and her son. On these grounds, she prayed to allow the petition. 8. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that in W.P.No.15406/2017 connected with W.P. No.20884/2017, this Court by order dated 27.07.2017 by considering the order of trial Court awarded an amount of Rs.30,000/-towards eternal and as such, the petitioners are not having any grudge or ground to contend that she is entitled to rent amount. It is further submitted that because of various cases pending against the respondent, he has lost his job and now, he is jobless and not having any income and unable to pay any amount. He further submitted that order, which has been passed by this Court by granting Rs.30,000/-has not been challenged. Under such circumstances, she has no right to file a fresh application in this behalf. He also submitted that the order passed by the trial Court is not in accordance with law and as such, the First Appellate Court has set-aside. On these grounds, he prays to dismiss the petition. 9. I have carefully and cautiously gone through the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent and petitioners party-in-person. 10. Before going to consider the issues in question, I feel it is just and proper to extract Section 19 of the Act, which reads as under: “19. On these grounds, he prays to dismiss the petition. 9. I have carefully and cautiously gone through the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent and petitioners party-in-person. 10. Before going to consider the issues in question, I feel it is just and proper to extract Section 19 of the Act, which reads as under: “19. Residence orders.—(1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of section 12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order— (a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household, whether or not the respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household; (b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household; (c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides; (d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing off the shared household or encumbering the same; (e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the shared household except with the leave of the Magistrate; or (f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require: Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against any person who is a woman. (2) The Magistrate may impose any additional conditions or pass any other direction which he may deem reasonably necessary to protect or to provide for the safety of the aggrieved person or any child of such aggrieved person. (3) The Magistrate may require from the respondent to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for preventing the commission of domestic violence. (4) An order under sub-section (3) shall be deemed to be an order under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and shall be dealt with accordingly. (5) While passing an order under subsection (1), sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), the court may also pass an order directing the officer in charge of the nearest police station to give protection to the aggrieved person or to assist her or the person making an application on her behalf in the implementation of the order. (5) While passing an order under subsection (1), sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), the court may also pass an order directing the officer in charge of the nearest police station to give protection to the aggrieved person or to assist her or the person making an application on her behalf in the implementation of the order. (6) While making an order under subsection (1), the Magistrate may impose on the respondent obligations relating to the discharge of rent and other payments, having regard to the financial needs and resources of the parties. (7) The Magistrate may direct the officer in-charge of the police station in whose jurisdiction the Magistrate has been approached to assist in the implementation of the protection order. (8) The Magistrate may direct the respondent to return to the possession of the aggrieved person her stridhanor any other property or valuable security to which she is entitled to.” 11. It is not in dispute that the petitioner No.1 is wife of respondent and petitioner No.2 is son of petitioner No.1 and respondent. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner No.1 and respondent resided at Gurgoan and thereafter, the respondent had thrown them out of the said house and in this behalf, cases are also pending. A harmonious construction of above provision of law shows that women is protected from removing her from shared household and she has right to reside in the alternative residence and Magistrate can pass residence order under the Act. Further reading of the Section clarifies that petitioner-wife is entitled to secure same level of living standard as the petitioner enjoyed in the shared household. Keeping in view of the above said aspect, let me consider the contention of the parties. It is the contention of the petitioners that she has been thrown out and as such she sought for residence as an alternative accommodation or else that he has to pay monthly rent of Rs.19,000/-. It is her case that she and her son are residing in a rented house at Electronic City on monthly rent of Rs.19,000/-. Though responded filed objection but he has not denied the said fact. It is her case that she and her son are residing in a rented house at Electronic City on monthly rent of Rs.19,000/-. Though responded filed objection but he has not denied the said fact. As could be seen from the Section 19 of the Act, it indicates that the Magistrate can pass an order under the said Act for alternative residence sought against the husband or that accommodation to the victim of domestic violence and that she is also entitled to secure some standard of living in which she has shared the residential house. As could be seen from the object of the Act, it provides effective and speedy protection to the women, who are victim of domestic violence. The said provision of the Act has to be read with flexibility and not in a restricted way. By close reading of the Section that the petitioners are having a right of residence or provision for residence may be made by either giving a lump sum in money or property in lieu thereof. In the present case, though the respondent contended that this Court in W.P. No.15406/2017 has examined issues in question and after considering the facts and circumstances of the case, that an amount of Rs.18,000/-has been granted inclusive of rent. But in the said decision, it is not specifically stated with regard to residential accommodation with which the petitioners are now intending to sought for. In the said writ petition, issue was regarding fixing the maintenance and amount granted under Section 24 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. But Section 19(f) gives a separate right to women to file such application. It is well settled principle of law that right of residence which a wife undoubtedly has does not mean the right to reside in a particular property. It may, of course, mean the right to reside in a commensurate property. But it can certainly not translate into a right to reside in a particular property. In order to illustrate this proposition, we may take an example of a house being allotted to a high functionary and high profile people and other class of people, that is not the only ground that the Court has to consider in this behalf. Keeping in view the status of parties and other things, Court has to award rental and other accommodational things as per Section 19 of the Act. Keeping in view the status of parties and other things, Court has to award rental and other accommodational things as per Section 19 of the Act. It is apparent that Section 19 of the Act is intending to strike a balance between the rights of wife, children and if they claim a shared residence, then under such circumstances they can, but if they want to reside separately, then under such circumstances respondent is liable to pay additional maintenance including the rental in this behalf. Keeping in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, after considering the order of the trial Court, the First Appellate Court without properly considering the proposition of law and other aspects has allowed the appeal in Cri. Appeal No.419/2018 dated 21.07.2018 and has set-aside the impugned order passed in Crl. Misc.No.3380/2017 dated 28.12.2017 only on the ground that an enquiry has to be held in this behalf. But as could be seen from the order of the lower Court, it has perused the rent receipt and other records and admittedly they resided even in foreign country etc., But by going through the objection of the respondent, he has contended that he has no income to pay. But when respondent was present before the Court, he submitted that now he has started his own software company and may take some time to settle. Enquiry used in The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 does not mean that evidence has to be lead in this behalf. Even, respondent-husband has not requested the trial Court that he intends to lead evidence. But he has argued the case through his counsel. Trial Court after considering all the aspect has rightly passed the order. First Appellate Court without properly considering the said aspects has passed the impugned order which is not sustainable in law. In that light, impugned judgment passed by LIX Additional City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bangalore City (CCH-60) in Crl. Appeal No.419/2018 dated 21.07.218 is hereby set-aside by confirming the order of the Court below. Criminal Revision Petition is allowed. In view of disposal of Criminal Revision Petition, IA Nos 1/2018, 2/2018 and 3/2018 are disposed of as they do not survive for consideration.