JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. This Second Appeal under Sec. 100 of the C.P.C. is at the instance of the original defendants Nos. 1 to 6 and is directed against the judgment and order dated 31st March, 2018 passed by the 9th (Ad-hoc) Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Kutch at Bhuj in the Regular Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2015 arising from the judgment and decree dated 15th December, 2014 passed by the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Bhuj-Kutch in the Special Civil Suit No. 60 of 2000 filed by the respondent herein-original plaintiff for specific performance of contract based on an agreement of sale. 2. It appears from the materials on record that the plaintiff instituted a suit against the defendants, seeking specific performance of contract based on an agreement of sale dated 29th June, 1995, Exh. 112. The agreement of sale is with respect to the land bearing Revenue Survey No. 101, situated at village Bidada, Taluka : Mandvi, District : Kutch, admeasuring 4 acres and 9 gunthas. The suit property is recognized as "Shelorvadi". The suit property was purchased by the appellants herein-original defendants from one Mohanlal Dhanji Punja vide registered sale-deed dated 27th January, 1987. The land in question came to be converted to non-agricultural land vide order dated 6th January, 1988 passed by the Taluka Development Officer, Mandvi, Kutch. The original plaintiff decided to purchase the suit property and the defendants agreed to sale the suit property for a total sale consideration of Rs. 4,03,273/-. It is not in dispute that an amount of Rs. 10,011/- came to be paid to the defendants by the plaintiff towards the earnest money. 3. The original plaintiff received a notice dated 31st December, 1999, Exh. 125 from the defendants calling upon the plaintiff to perform his part of the obligation and get the sale-deed executed in his favour. The notice issued by the defendants to the plaintiff dated 31st December, 1999, Exh. 125, reads as under: : NOTICE : Reg. A.D. U.P.C. Date : 31-12-1999 To, Mr. 125 from the defendants calling upon the plaintiff to perform his part of the obligation and get the sale-deed executed in his favour. The notice issued by the defendants to the plaintiff dated 31st December, 1999, Exh. 125, reads as under: : NOTICE : Reg. A.D. U.P.C. Date : 31-12-1999 To, Mr. Dharmashi M. Savla, Vijya Construction, Bidada, 84, Leela Apartment, Road No. 9, Prabhat Colony, Shantacruz (East), MUMBAI-55 Subject :- To execute and register sale-deed in respect of the land bearing Revenue Survey No. 101, admeasuring acre 4-09 guntha, situated at moje Bidada, Taluka-Mandvi, District-Kachchh, known as Selorvadi, after converting the said land into non-agricultural purpose and creating therein 56 plots having area of 12033.02 sq.m. and total area including public purpose and roads being 17098-00 sq.m. This notice is issued to you as instructed by my client Mr. Patel Harji Shamji and Chhaganlal Naranbhai, Mandvi-Kachchh that, The land bearing Revenue Survey No. 101, admeasuring acre 4-09 guntha, situated at moje Bidada, Taluka-Mandvi, District-Kachchh, is under the possession and ownership of my client. The said land has been converted into non-agricultural purpose and different 56 plots have been created for the residential purpose therein. The area of land of the plots is 12033-02 sq.m. and total area of the land including public purpose and roads is 17098-00 sq.m. You have purchased the said land with absolute right from my client on 29-6-1995 by executing agreement of sale for Rs. 4,03,273/- (Four Lakh Three Thousand Two Hundred Seventy Three Only). After implementing the said agreement of sale, you have to execute sale-deed at your expenses by paying outstanding remaining amount to my client for the said land. You do not execute sale-deed by implementing earnest money deed despite frequent reminders having been given to you. I have given reply to your letter dated 15-10-1996 within eight days wherein you have been instructed to finalize about the land. As my client has not received full payment due to your indolent attitude and delay on your part, he has to face financial difficulty. Other deal made by my client is pending due to want of money, and time has passed due to your false promise. Consequently, period of 3 years for the earnest money deed executed for the said land has also expired. Other deal made by my client is pending due to want of money, and time has passed due to your false promise. Consequently, period of 3 years for the earnest money deed executed for the said land has also expired. You are informed through this notice that you will have to execute sale-deed in respect of open land out of the said land within 15 days without delay. If you do not implement the agreement of sale and got the sale-deed executed within aforesaid time-limit, my client will declare this deal void and forfeit the amount of earnest money deed. He will initiate legal action for compensation for financial loss and mental harassment suffered by him due to delay on your part. You will be liable for all the expenses for the same, which may be noted. You are requested to remit Rs. 500/- directly to my client towards expenses of this notice having been sent to you. Mandvi-Kachchh Date : 31-12-1999 Sd/- (illegible) (Ghanshyam K. Thakar) Advocate of Patel Harji Shamji and Patel Chhaganlal Naranbhai Residing at Mandvi-Kachchh" 4. The plaintiff, on receipt of the notice issued by the defendants, replied vide reply dated 15th January, 2000. The reply, Exh. 126, is as under: "Reply to the notice To, Mr. Ghanshyambhai K. Thakar Advocate of Patel Harji Shamji and Chhaganlal Naran. S.T. Road, MANDVI-KACHCHH 1. Notice dated 31-12-1999 sent by you to Mumbai, has been received on 4-1-2000. 2. Your notice lacks true, legal and sufficient details. Details of facts written therein have not been provided. We reserve right to give reply on receipt of adequate information. 3. Agreement of sale has been executed with your client on 29-6-1995 and we have paid token amount. As per the earnest money deed, you have not obtained and sent Advocate certificate that the titles of this land are clear and marketable. Moreover, some persons have encroached upon this land, which you have not got vacated. You have also not provided details as to how many encroachments are done, who has done this and in how much land. Therefore, send this information and after receipt of this, we will verify and give further reply. In addition, the land had to be measured in our presence in order to verify as to how many square meters of land is available at the site. Therefore, send this information and after receipt of this, we will verify and give further reply. In addition, the land had to be measured in our presence in order to verify as to how many square meters of land is available at the site. Because the deal of the land was done after deciding price at the rate of per meter so that money can be made after calculating as to how many square meter land is available. Moreover, this land was given N.A. permission on 6-2-1988 and the time-limit for the same is over and the construction cannot be legalized. Because N.A. land would be available for construction. However, construction cannot be carried out because you have not renewed the time-limit of construction from time to time. Therefore, such deficiencies have to be removed. 4. We have given public notice on 1-7-1995 to remove these deficiencies pertaining to earnest money deed and get the titles clear and due to this, objections regarding the ownership of land were received and we were informed regarding the same. However, you have not removed those objections till date and the onus of removing the deficiencies also remains on the head of your client. 5. Your client has not given us any written reply till today regarding our notice dated 15-10-1996, though I have sent reminder for the same on 6-8-1997. Your client has provided false information. Therefore, provide evidences regarding the same such as copy of reply and acknowledgment receipt given by me so that clarification can be given. 6. It is not true that the earnest money deed has not been enforced due to our fault. If your client has given intimation of removal of deficiencies, kindly provide the details of the same so that clarification can be given. 7. We were ready from the very beginning to comply with the terms of the agreement of sale, and therefore, the question of forfeiture of token money does not arise. Moreover, until the transaction done with us is not cleared, your client will not be able to sell this land to someone else. Such action in this respect will be viewed seriously and notice regarding the same shall be given in the newspapers at the cost and risk of your client. 8. We have kept the principle amount ready for enforcing this earnest money deed. Such action in this respect will be viewed seriously and notice regarding the same shall be given in the newspapers at the cost and risk of your client. 8. We have kept the principle amount ready for enforcing this earnest money deed. As the same is not enforced, we have not been able to invest this amount in other business. Therefore, we have incurred loss in interest amount. Kindly, take note and inform your client that he shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of 18% on that amount. 9. The warning given by you to initiate legal proceedings against us, is fictitious because your client is very well aware that the entire procedure is pending due to his fault and negligence, and therefore, your client will be responsible for the loss caused to us. 10. Take note that further reply shall be given after engaging Advocate once reply is received from you." 5. Six months, thereafter, the plaintiff instituted the suit for specific performance. The defendants appeared before the Civil Court and contested the suit by filing their written statement, Exh. 21. The defendants admitted having executed the agreement of sale, Exh. 112, but took the stance that the suit filed by the plaintiff for specific performance was time-barred, and even otherwise, the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. On these two grounds, the defendants prayed that the suit be dismissed. The trial Court, having regard to the pleadings of the parties, framed the following issues: "(1) Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant Nos. 1-2 had executed an Agreement of Sale in his favour on 29-6-1995 by deciding consideration of Rs. 4,03,273/-, and he had paid Rs. 10,011/- to the defendants towards the same. (2) Whether the plaintiff proves that the plaintiff had published a public notice with regard to the suit land as per the condition of the agreement of sale with the defendant Nos. 1-2 and objections and claims were received in response thereof? (3) Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant Nos. 1-2 had not obtained the title clearance by resolving the objections despite that they were informed about the claims received after publication of the public notice with regard to the suit land? 1-2 and objections and claims were received in response thereof? (3) Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant Nos. 1-2 had not obtained the title clearance by resolving the objections despite that they were informed about the claims received after publication of the public notice with regard to the suit land? (4) Whether the plaintiff proves that the agreement of sale of the suit land could not be implemented due to negligence and default of the defendants? (5) Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are liable to execute the sale-deed and to hand over the possession of the suit land to the plaintiff by recovering the remaining amount of the sale consideration from him? (6) Whether the defendants prove that the suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation? (7) Whether the defendants prove that the agreement dated 29-6-1995 executed with the plaintiff with regard to the suit land becomes invalid and inoperative? (8) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the relief as prayed for? (9) What Order and Decree?" 6. The issues framed by the trial Court, referred to above, came to be answered as under: "(1) In the affirmative (2) In the affirmative (3) In the affirmative (4) In the affirmative (5) In the affirmative (6) In the negative (7) In the negative (8) In the affirmative (9) As per the final order" 7. The trial Court, upon appreciation of the oral as well as the documentary evidence, allowed the suit and granted the decree for specific performance, as prayed for by the plaintiff. The defendants, being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, preferred the Regular Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2015 in the District Court of Kutch at Bhuj. The Regular Civil Appeal filed by the original defendants failed and the appeal came to be dismissed by the lower appellate Court, thereby affirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. The defendants, being dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the lower appellate Court, dismissing the first appeal, have come before this Court with this second appeal under Sec. 100 of the C.P.C. 8. The defendants, being dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the lower appellate Court, dismissing the first appeal, have come before this Court with this second appeal under Sec. 100 of the C.P.C. 8. The following questions have been formulated as the substantial questions of law in the memorandum of the Second Appeal: "(i) Whether appellate Court can decide the appeal, without framing the issues and the point of determination, as envisaged under Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908? (ii) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the trial Court can pass any decree against defendant Nos. 3 to 6 in absence of any pleadings in the plaint and in absence of any prayer made against such defendant Nos. 3 to 6? (iii) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the suit for specific performance is maintainable after a period of three years from the date of cause of action has arisen and whether the decree of specific performance can be passed relying upon unregistered agreement to sell in view of provision of Sec. 17 of the Registration Act? (iv) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is open for the trial Court to pass decree of specific performance in absence of any evidence laid by the plaintiff to show his readiness and willingness to pay the remaining amount of consideration and also his capacity to pay such amount?" 9. Mr. Dev Patel, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants-original defendants put forward two-fold submissions. His first submission is that the suit should have been dismissed as time-barred and his second submission is that there is no evidence to suggest or establish that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. To substantiate his submission with regard to the limitation, the Counsel has placed reliance on Art. 54 of the Limitation Act. According to the learned Counsel, way back in the year 1995 itself, the plaintiff had realized that the performance of the contract has been refused, and therefore, within three years from 1995, the suit should have been filed. To substantiate his submission with regard to the limitation, the Counsel has placed reliance on Art. 54 of the Limitation Act. According to the learned Counsel, way back in the year 1995 itself, the plaintiff had realized that the performance of the contract has been refused, and therefore, within three years from 1995, the suit should have been filed. The learned Counsel submitted that no specific date has been fixed in the agreement of sale with regard to the execution of the sale-deed, and therefore, the period of limitation for the plaintiff to file a suit for specific performance would commence from the date he comes to know that the performance has been refused. Within three years from that particular date, the suit has to be filed. According to the learned Counsel, the notice issued by his clients in the year 1999, cannot be the point of start of the limitation for the purpose of filing the suit for specific performance. So far as the second submissions is concerned, according to the learned Counsel, the plaintiff failed to discharge his part of the obligations, and in such circumstances, the plaintiff has not been able to prove or establish that all throughout, he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 10. In the course of the hearing of this second appeal, the learned Counsel also touched the issue with regard to Sec. 17 of the Registration Act. According to the learned Counsel, a suit for specific performance of contract, based on an unregistered agreement of sale is not maintainable in law. In the last, the learned Counsel submitted that the appellate Court has not complied with the mandatory provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 of the C.P.C., and therefore, the matter should be remanded to the first appellate Court to hear the first appeal afresh after framing the points for determination. 11. On the other hand, this second appeal has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Mehul S. Shah, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-original plaintiff. According to Mr. Shah, no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the two Courts below. According to Mr. Shah, none of the questions formulated in the memorandum of the second appeal, could be termed as the substantial questions of law. According to Mr. According to Mr. Shah, no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the two Courts below. According to Mr. Shah, none of the questions formulated in the memorandum of the second appeal, could be termed as the substantial questions of law. According to Mr. Shah, all the questions, formulated, are questions of fact. Mr. Shah submitted that the concurrent findings recorded by the two Courts below do not deserve to be disturbed. He would submit that the relief of specific performance is discretionary in nature and the Courts below have exercised their discretion in accordance with law. He would submit that as soon as his client received the notice in the year 1999, a reply was given to the same, and immediately thereafter, the suit came to be filed. The suit could be said to be within the period of limitation and his client was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. He would submit that the issue with regard to readiness and willingness is a question of fact and this Court need not go into this issue in a second appeal filed against the concurrent findings of the two Courts. 12. Having heard the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether any substantial question of law is involved in this second appeal. Unregistered agreement of sale and Sees. 17 and 49 of the Registration Act: 13. Let me first consider the issue with regard to Sees. 17 and 49 of the Registration Act. According to the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, Sec. 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 (as amended by the Gujarat Act 7 of 1982), which makes the instruments which purport or operate to effect any contract for transfer of immovable property compulsorily registrable by adding Clause (aa) therein. In such circumstances, according to the learned Counsel, the suit for specific performance, based on an unregistered agreement of sale, is not maintainable. This contention is devoid of any merit. The answer to this contention is found in Sec. 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, which I reproduce below to appreciate its full effect: "49. In such circumstances, according to the learned Counsel, the suit for specific performance, based on an unregistered agreement of sale, is not maintainable. This contention is devoid of any merit. The answer to this contention is found in Sec. 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, which I reproduce below to appreciate its full effect: "49. No document required by Sec. 17 (or any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882) to be registered shall: (a) affect any immovable property comprised therein; or (b) confer any power to adopt, or (c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power... unless it has been registered: (PROVIDED that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by this Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1982, to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1977, or as evidence of part performance of a contract for the purpose of Sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1982, or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument)." The proviso to Sec. 49 of the Registration Act makes it abundantly clear that the suit of the plaintiff would not fall on the ground of compulsory registration introduced by amendment to Sec. 17 by Gujarat Act 7 of 1982. 14. In the aforesaid context, the Supreme Court, in the case of S. Kaladevi v. V.R. Somasundaram, 2010 (5) SCC 401 , has held thus: "10. Section 17 of the 1908 Act is a disabling Section. The documents defined in Clauses (a) to (e) therein require registration compulsorily. Accordingly, sale of immovable property of the value of Rs. 100 and more requires compulsory registration. Part X of the 1908 Act, deals with the effects of registration and non-registration. 11. Section 49 gives teeth to Sec. 17 by providing effect of non-registration of documents required to be registered. Section 49 reads thus: "49. Effect of non-registration of documents required to be registered. 100 and more requires compulsory registration. Part X of the 1908 Act, deals with the effects of registration and non-registration. 11. Section 49 gives teeth to Sec. 17 by providing effect of non-registration of documents required to be registered. Section 49 reads thus: "49. Effect of non-registration of documents required to be registered. No document required by Sec. 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be registered shall (a) affect any immovable property comprised therein, or (b) confer any power to adopt, or (c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it has been registered: Provided that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by this Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (1 of 1877), or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument." 12. The main provision in Sec. 49 provides that any document which is required to be registered, if not registered, shall not affect any immovable property comprised therein nor such document shall be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property. The proviso, however, would show that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by the 1908 Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered may be received as an evidence to the contract in a suit for specific performance or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. By virtue of the proviso, therefore, an unregistered sale-deed of an immovable property of the value of Rs. 100 and more could be admitted in evidence as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance of the contract. Such an unregistered sale-deed can also be admitted in evidence as an evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered document. 100 and more could be admitted in evidence as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance of the contract. Such an unregistered sale-deed can also be admitted in evidence as an evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered document. When an unregistered sale-deed is tendered in evidence, not as evidence of a completed sale, but as proof of an oral agreement of sale, the deed can be received in evidence making an endorsement that it is received only as evidence of an oral agreement of sale under the proviso to Sec. 49 of the 1908 Act." 15. In K.B. Saha & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Development Consultant Ltd., 2008 (8) SCC 564 , the Supreme Court noticed the following statement of Mulla in his Indian Registration Act (7th Edn., at page 189); "The High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay, Allahabad, Madras, Patna, Lahore, Assam, Nagpur, Pepsu, Rajasthan, Orissa, Rangoon and Jammu & Kashmir; the former Chief Court of Oudh; the Judicial Commissioners Court of Peshawar, Ajmer and Himachal Pradesh and the Supreme Court have held that a document which requires registration under Sec. 17 and which is not admissible for want of registration to prove a gift or mortgage or sale or lease is nevertheless admissible to prove the character of the possession of the person who holds under it." 16. The Supreme Court, then culled the following principles: "1. A document required to be registered, if unregistered is not admissible into evidence under Sec. 49 of the Registration Act. 2. Such unregistered document can however be used as an evidence of collateral purpose as provided in the proviso to Sec. 49 of the Registration Act. 3. A collateral transaction must be independent of, or divisible from, the transaction to effect which the law required registration. 4. A collateral transaction must be a transaction not itself required to be effected by a registered document, that is, a transaction creating, etc. any right, title or interest in immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards. 5. If a document is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, none of its terms can be admitted in evidence and that to use a document for the purpose of proving an important Clause would not be using it as a collateral purpose. 5. If a document is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, none of its terms can be admitted in evidence and that to use a document for the purpose of proving an important Clause would not be using it as a collateral purpose. To the aforesaid principles, one more principle may be added, namely, that a document required to be registered, if unregistered, can be admitted in evidence as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance." 17. A learned Single Judge of this Court, in the case of Nitinkumar Laxmidas @ Lakhubhai v. Smt. Savitaben Pranshanker, 1996 (1) GLH 224 , has observed as under; "At the hearing of this Appeal From Order, Mr. S.M. Shah, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants pointed out to the Court that true it is that an agreement to sale is required to be registered as per amended Sec. 17 of the Gujarat Act No. 7 of 1982, but, as per the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kaushik Rajendra Thakore v. Allied Land Corporation, reported at 1987 (1) GLH (UJ) 22, a view is taken by the Court that since there is no corresponding amendment in Sec. 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, the suit of the plaintiff would not fall on the ground on non-registration of agreement to sale which is otherwise compulsorily required to be registered by amendment of Sec. 17. This position of law having been well settled by the Division Bench of this Court, the trial Court was in error in holding that it would not act upon such agreement of sale." 18. Thus, what is laid down in the above decision is that while a document which is required to be registered is unregistered, it is not admissible in evidence under Sec. 49 of the Registration Act, but such unregistered document can, however, be used as an evidence of collateral purpose as provided in the proviso to Sec. 49 of the Registration Act. When an unregistered sale-deed is tendered in evidence, not as evidence of a completed sale, but as proof of an oral agreement of sale, the deed can be received in evidence making an endorsement that it is received only as evidence of an oral agreement of sale under the proviso to Sec. 49 of the Registration Act. 19. When an unregistered sale-deed is tendered in evidence, not as evidence of a completed sale, but as proof of an oral agreement of sale, the deed can be received in evidence making an endorsement that it is received only as evidence of an oral agreement of sale under the proviso to Sec. 49 of the Registration Act. 19. Adverting to the facts of the present case, the plaintiff has instituted the suit on the basis of an unregistered agreement of sale executed by the defendants/original owners in his favour. The execution of such unregistered agreement of sale has not been disputed by the other side though various other contentions have been taken on the merits of the case. Therefore, when the execution of such agreement of sale has not been disputed, the trial Court rightly negatived the contention canvassed on behalf of the defendants that the suit for specific performance of a contract, based on an unregistered agreement of sale, is not maintainable. This aspect has also been rightly looked into by the lower Appellate Court. Article 54 of the Limitation Act: 20. The above takes me to consider whether the suit filed by the plaintiff for specific performance could be said to be time barred. Article 54 of the Limitation Act provides for the period of limitation of three years for the specific performance of the contract. Article 54 of the Limitation Act is quoted hereunder: "54. For specific performance of a contract. Three years. The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused." 21. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is clear, that the time for filing a suit for specific performance is three years which begins to run from the date fixed for the performance of the agreement and, if no such date is fixed, then the period begins when the plaintiffs have notice that the performance has been refused by the defendants. 22. In Virendra Kumar v. Daya Nand, 1982 AWC 176 , the Allahabad High Court held as under: "Article 54 of the Limitation Act prescribes a period of three years for filing a suit for specific performance of contract of sale. 22. In Virendra Kumar v. Daya Nand, 1982 AWC 176 , the Allahabad High Court held as under: "Article 54 of the Limitation Act prescribes a period of three years for filing a suit for specific performance of contract of sale. The period of limitation of three years commences to run from the date fixed for the performance in the agreement or, if on such date is fixed, when the plaintiff had notice that performance is refused. It is not in dispute that the agreement did not fix any date or time for performance. The date of agreement is irrelevant for the purpose of computing the period of limitation. For this purpose, two dates are material, namely, the date fixed for performance or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. From this point of view, the plaint was defective. It was very inartistically drafted. It neither mentioned whether a date was fixed for performance of contract nor did it specially mention the date when the notice of performance was refused." 23. From the aforesaid, it is clear, that for the purpose of institution of a suit for specific performance, two dates are material, namely, the date fixed for specific performance of agreement and if such date is not fixed, in that event, the date when the plaintiffs had notice that the performance was refused. Consequently, the date of the execution of the agreement is immaterial. What is material is, the date of the refusal of the performance of the agreement of the defendants. 24. In K.S. Vidyanandam v. Vairavan, reported in 1997 (3) SCC 1 , the Supreme Court observed that even though the time is not the essence of the contract of the sale in immovable properties and the suit can be filed within a period of three years provided under Art. 54 of the Limitation Act, but it should be performed within a reasonable time, having regard to the terms of the contract prescribing the time-limit, the Supreme Court observed thus: "It has been consistently held by the Courts in India, following certain early English decision, that in the case of Agreement of Sale relating to immovable property, time is not the essence of the contract unless specifically provided to that effect. The period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing a suit is three years. The period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing a suit is three years. From these two circumstances, it does not follow that any and every suit for specific performance of the agreement (which does not provide specifically that time is of no essence of the contract) should be decreed provided it is filed within the period of limitation notwithstanding the time-limits stipulated in the agreement for doing one or the other thing by one or the other party. That would amount to saying that the time-limits prescribed by the parties in the agreement have no significance or value and that they mean nothing. Even, where time is not of the essence of the contract, the plaintiff must perform his part of the contract within a reasonable time and reasonable time should be determined by looking at all the surrounding circumstances including the express terms of the contract and the nature of the property. While exercising its discretion, the Court should also bear in mind that when the parties prescribe certain time-limits for taking steps by one or the other party, it must have some significance and that the said time-limits cannot be ignored altogether on the ground that time has not been made the essence of the contract (relating to immovable property). In the case of urban properties in India, it is well-known that their prices have been going up sharply over the last few decades-particularly after 1973. Court cannot be oblivious to this reality. It is not possible to agree with the decision of the Madras High Court if the said decision is understood as saying that the said factor is not at all to be taken into account while exercising the discretion vested in the Court by law. The rigor of the rule evolved by Courts that time is not of the essence of the contract in the case of immovable property-evolved in times when prices and values were stable and inflation was unknown-requires to be relaxed, if not modified, particularly in the case of urban immovable property. It is high time, the Courts do so." 25. The meaning of the expression "date fixed for the performance" has to be understood in the context of the agreement, the obligations undertaken by the respective parties in the agreement. In the case on hand, no date has been fixed for the performance. It is high time, the Courts do so." 25. The meaning of the expression "date fixed for the performance" has to be understood in the context of the agreement, the obligations undertaken by the respective parties in the agreement. In the case on hand, no date has been fixed for the performance. However, even if a date is fixed initially for the performance of the contract, and if the performance itself is dependent on the discharge of several other obligations undertaken by the promisor himself, what should happen is also a question which, at times, the Courts below are called upon to answer. If in a given case, the promisor himself has not performed the obligations undertaken by him so as to enable the specific enforcement of the agreement, is it open for him to contend that whether he performs his part or not and whether or not the agreement has become enforceable or not, the limitation starts once the date fixed is over. The answer to this question has to be in the negative. If the conduct of the parties reveals that the promisor took time to complete his part of the obligations, then it cannot be said that the time fixed for performance of the contract would have the effect of setting the period of limitation to run. 26. I fail to understand, on what basis, the contention with regard to limitation has been raised by the appellants herein. The cause of action for the plaintiff to file the suit is the notice issued by the defendants, Exh. 125 dated 31st December, 1999, referred to above. 27. In my view, the trial Court has rightly observed that upto 1999, negotiations between the parties were in progress. Both the sides kept on throwing blame on each other. According to the plaintiff, he kept on calling upon the defendants to perform their part of the obligations, whereas the defendants kept on finding fault with the plaintiff. Ultimately, the last notice issued by the defendants in the year 1999 led the plaintiff to believe that the defendants were not inclined to execute the sale-deed. By any stretch of imagination, it is not possible to take the view that the plaintiff had realized, way back in the year 1996, that the defendants had refused the performance of the contract. 28. By any stretch of imagination, it is not possible to take the view that the plaintiff had realized, way back in the year 1996, that the defendants had refused the performance of the contract. 28. Thus, in view of the above, the contention canvassed on behalf of the appellants that the suit filed by the plaintiff was not within the period of limitation is without any merit and not accepted. Issue of readiness and willingness: 29. I also do not find any merit in the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants that the plaintiff failed to establish his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. This, essentially, is a question of fact. There are concurrent findings of the Courts below in favour of the plaintiff in this regard. I see no good reason to disturb the concurrent findings. 30. Ready and willingness are to be gathered from the evidence of the parties and the capacity to pay. The plaintiff claiming the relief of specific performance, is not required to exhibit the currency notes to show his ready and willingness. He should be capable and should have the capacity to pay on demand the sale consideration whether from his account or after arranging the same from reliable sources. The law does not impose an obligation on a party requiring it to exhibit its mean by physical demonstration. Suffices it to say for a party that it possess and/or is capable of gathering sufficient means to perform its part of the contract by paying the balance sale consideration. Readiness and willingness have various ingredients and one of them is that party to an agreement should be able to fulfill its obligations in regard to payment of the sale consideration. The purchaser need not establish that he had the required money with him or arrangements have been made for financing the transactions. What is required of him is to show that he was ready and willing to fulfill his terms of the agreement. A party would be well within its rights to say that he was in a position to arrange the payment of the requisite amount within the prescribed time. Demonstrable possession of means is no sine qua non to satisfy the principle of ready and willingness. A party would be well within its rights to say that he was in a position to arrange the payment of the requisite amount within the prescribed time. Demonstrable possession of means is no sine qua non to satisfy the principle of ready and willingness. Every action follows its prescribed course and so does a buyer should be able to show before the Court that he either possesses or can arrange the requisite funds for payment of the balance sale consideration within the stipulated period. Obviously the fruits of this act fall in favor of the party only on completion of the act in accordance with the directions of the Court founded on the agreement between the parties. Fieri non debuit sed factum valet would normally apply to this aspect of ready and willingness on the part of the claiming party. In the case of Mulla Badruddin v. Master Tufail Ahmed, the Court held as under: "In the case reported in Bank of India v. J.A.H. Chinoy, AIR 1950 PC 90 , in the context of the plaintiff being ready and willing to perform his part of the contract though it was stated by plaintiff No. 1 that he was buying for himself and that he had no sufficient ready money to meet the price and that no arrangements had been made for finding it at the time of repudiation, but when it was further made clear that he was in a position to arrange the payment of requisite amount, it was observed by their Lordship : but in order to prove himself ready and willing a purchaser has not necessarily to produce the money or to vouch a concluded scheme for financing the transaction. The question is one of fact and in the present case the appellate Court had ample material on which to found the view it reached." 31. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the trial Court failed to frame a specific issue on the question of readiness and willingness. The argument, though appears to be negatived, but on deeper scrutiny, is found to be devoid of any substance. It is true that no specific issue in that regard has been framed by the trial Court, but Issue No. 8 has been framed that whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree of specific performance which would also include the readiness and willingness. It is true that no specific issue in that regard has been framed by the trial Court, but Issue No. 8 has been framed that whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree of specific performance which would also include the readiness and willingness. Even, otherwise, if the parties are aware that what they have to face in the trial and they led their evidence accordingly, merely non-framing of a particular issue would not be fatal. Plea of being bona fide purchasers of the property for value without notice: 32. The subsequent purchasers of the property have come forward with the case that they are the bona fide purchasers of the suit scheduled property for a valuable consideration in good faith without notice of the earlier agreement of sale and they are protected under Sec. 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. I take notice of the fact that the trial Court has not framed any issue in this regard. 33. In the aforesaid context, I may refer to and rely upon a Supreme Court judgment in the case of R.K. Mohammed Ubaidullah v. Hajee C. Abdulwahab (D.) by L.Rs., 2000 AIR SCW 4794. The Supreme Court, after examining Sec. 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, held that: "This protection is in the nature of exception to the general rule. Hence, the onus of proof of good faith is on the purchaser who takes the plea that he is an innocent purchaser. Good faith is a question of fact to be considered and decided on the facts of each case." 34. The Supreme Court in a judgment reported in the case of Jagan Nath v. Jagdish Rai, AIR 1998 SC 2028 , held that: "it is well settled that initial burden to show that the subsequent purchaser of suit property covered by earliest suit agreement was a bona fide purchase for value without notice of the suit agreement squarely rests on the shoulders of such subsequent transferee." 35. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court as aforesaid, the burden is upon the original defendants Nos. 3 to 6 to prove that they are the bona fide purchasers of the property for value without notice. Both the Courts have held that the defendant Nos. 3 to 6, i.e., the appellant Nos. 3 to 6 herein have failed to lead any evidence in this regard. 3 to 6 to prove that they are the bona fide purchasers of the property for value without notice. Both the Courts have held that the defendant Nos. 3 to 6, i.e., the appellant Nos. 3 to 6 herein have failed to lead any evidence in this regard. On the contrary, the two Courts below have rightly relied upon the admission on the part of the original defendant Nos. 1 and 2, i.e., the owners of the property that before executing the sale-deed in favour of the defendants Nos. 3 to 6, they were informed about the agreement of sale with the plaintiff. Discretion as to decreeing specific performance: 36. Let me now consider whether the trial Court was justified in passing a decree for specific performance. 37. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, provides as follows: "20. Discretion as to decreeing specific performance:- (1) The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a Court of appeal. (2) The following are cases in which the Court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance- (a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage, over the defendant; or (b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff; (c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance. Explanation 1 :- Mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of Clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of Clause (b). Explanation 1 :- Mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of Clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of Clause (b). Explanation 2 :- The question whether the performance of a contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the meaning of Clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship has resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract. (3) The Court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific performance. (4) The Court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the other party." 38. The relief of specific performance having its roots in equity, the Specific Relief Act, 1963, has preserved the discretion of the Court not to grant the relief even though the agreement is specifically performable in law. The only fetters imposed by the statute on the exercise of the discretion are that the discretion must not be exercised arbitrarily, but soundly and reasonably and guided by judicial principles. The phrase "capable of correction by a Court of appeals" has been inserted possibly to indicate the necessity for the trial Court to state the reasons for exercising its discretion in a particular way. The circumstances when specific performance mentioned in the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 20 cannot be granted are not expressly exhaustive. They indicate the situations in which the Court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. However, certain considerations have been excluded as relevant factors. These are contained in Explanations 1 and 2 to the Section as well as in Sec. 20(4). It is to be noticed that each of these exclusions are preceded by the word "mere". The word "mere" in the context means "sole". In other words, any one of those factors by itself would not justify the exercise of discretion against granting specific performance. It is to be noticed that each of these exclusions are preceded by the word "mere". The word "mere" in the context means "sole". In other words, any one of those factors by itself would not justify the exercise of discretion against granting specific performance. The factors cumulatively or with other factors may form the basis of a decision not to grant specific performance. 39. Hardship of the defendant may be one of the grounds which may be taken into consideration for exercising its discretion by the Court in refusing to grant a decree for specific performance of contract. 40. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act embodies a Common Law that is grant of a decree for specific performance of a contract is a discretionary one. The Court may, in a given situation, take into consideration the subsequent events. 41. Long years have been passed by in the case on hand and the trial Judge does not seem to have taken this fact into consideration while granting the decree for specific performance. 42. In Spry on Equitable Remedies, it is stated: "On principle, indeed, Courts of equity must take account of all the circumstances known to exist at the time when an order is sought as well as of circumstances likely to occur subsequently, when they are called upon to decide whether the effect of ordering specific performance will be to cause such great hardship as to account to an injustice. There is no sufficient reason why a cause of hardship should be ignored merely because it did not exist at the time when the material contract was entered into. Certainly, the fact that it has occurred subsequently may be a matter of weight, and if it appears that the parties contemplated that events might occur such as have in fact occurred the alleged causes of hardship will usually be of little importance indeed. But this is not to say that they are irrelevant or that sometimes they may not be decisive so as to incline the balance of justice against the grant of relief. Fortunately, however, this matter does not depend solely on principle, for there may be "found various decisions where events occurring after the date of entry into the agreement in question have been treated as relevant". Fortunately, however, this matter does not depend solely on principle, for there may be "found various decisions where events occurring after the date of entry into the agreement in question have been treated as relevant". Furthermore, it will subsequently be seen that any hardship of the defendant, if specific performance were ordered, must be weighed against the inconvenience or hardship which would be caused to the plaintiff if specific performance were refused. And in determining how great any such hardship or inconvenience to the plaintiff will be once again events and probable events as known at the date of the hearing are taken into account and there is no arbitrary restriction or limitation to events taking place at the time of entry into the material agreement. It must not be forgotten that as soon as it is shown that damages and other legal remedies are inadequate an applicant will be held prima facie entitled to specific performance of a valid and enforceable agreement. Specific performance will not be refused merely because inconvenience or even hardship to the defendant would be caused thereby. But if the hardship suffered by the defendant, if specific enforcement took place, would be so much greater than the detriment which would be suffered by the plaintiff if he were confined to his remedy at law that it would be unreasonable and oppressive to grant relief, specific enforcement will be denied." 43. In S.G. Banerjee's Specific Relief Act, 10th Edn. at page 357, it is stated: "It is almost universally recognised that specific performance of a contract should not be granted, if in the circumstances of a case, it is inequitable to do so. The Clause follows and gives statutory recognition to the universal rule. It enacts that where the defendant enters into the contract under circumstances, which, though they do not render the contract voidable, yet make it inequitable to enforce specific performance, the Court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. What would or would not be inequitable would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the each case." 44. In Om Prakash v. Amarjit Singh, reported in 1988 Supp. SCC 780, the law is stated in the following terms: "This is a suit for specific performance on an agreement to sell. The grant of relief is discretionary. What would or would not be inequitable would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the each case." 44. In Om Prakash v. Amarjit Singh, reported in 1988 Supp. SCC 780, the law is stated in the following terms: "This is a suit for specific performance on an agreement to sell. The grant of relief is discretionary. The Court after consideration of all relevant circumstances must be persuaded to exercise its equitable and discretionary jurisdiction in favour of specific enforcement. The jurisdiction is subject to all the conditions to which all discretionary jurisdictions are subject. There are certain personal bars to relief. Respondent 1, who was the plaintiff in the suit, did not enter the box and tender evidence. The subject-matter of the suit is a small piece of property of 68 sq.yds. and is said to be the only worldly goods of the appellant." 45. It is a settled principles of law that the provisions of Sec. 20 of the Specific Relief Act is not exhaustive. The same has to be considered and read with the Sec. 14 thereof. It is further well settled that the plaintiff does not have an absolute right to obtain a decree for specific performance of contract. 46. In Yohannan v. Harikrishnan Nair, reported in AIR 1992 Ker. 49 , it is stated: "The cases in which the Court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance has been enumerated in sub-sec. (2). They are : (a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not avoidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant, or (b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff, (c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance." 47. The discretion of the Court in the matter, thus, is not confined within the four corners of Sec. 20 of the Act. "39. In Dr. S.C. Banerjee's Specific Relief Act, 10th Edn. at page 326, the law is stated in the following terms: The discretion is guided by judicial principles. The discretion of the Court in the matter, thus, is not confined within the four corners of Sec. 20 of the Act. "39. In Dr. S.C. Banerjee's Specific Relief Act, 10th Edn. at page 326, the law is stated in the following terms: The discretion is guided by judicial principles. The expression means that discretion is not to be arbitrarily exercised, but must be based on sound, reasonable and judicial principles, that is, the discretion must not be dependent upon the mere pleasure of the Judge, but must be sound and reasonably guided by judicial principles. The Court must grant or withhold relief according to the circumstances of each particular case, when the general rules and principles do not furnish an exact measure of justice between the parties." 48. In granting or withholding the relief, the Court should take the following circumstances, conditions and incidents into consideration: "(1) The contract must be certain, unambiguous and upon a valuable consideration; (2) The contract must be perfectly fair in all its parts; (3) The contract must be free from any fraud, misrepresentation, imposition or mistake; (4) The contract must not impose an unconscionable or hard bargain; (5) The performance of the contract must not impose any hardship on the defendant, such as he could not foresee; (6) The contract must be capable, of specific execution through a decree of the Court." 49. The appeal Court should not interfere with the judgment of the trial Court only because it is not right but when it is clearly wrong. Even in regular suits, the appeal Courts are loath to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the trial Court on the basis of oral evidence. (See : Ratanlal Nahata v. Nandita Bose, reported in 1997 (1) CHN 392). 50. There is no dispute that an order of specific performance is a discretionary one. In an appeal against such an order, the appellate Court generally does not interfere with the discretion exercised by the trial Judge unless it appears that while exercising such discretion the trial Judge has wrongly applied the principles for grant of such discretion or unless it is established that such discretion has been unreasonably or capriciously used. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of Supreme Court in Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Federation Ltd. v. Sunder Bros of Delhi, reported in AIR 1967 SC 249 . In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of Supreme Court in Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Federation Ltd. v. Sunder Bros of Delhi, reported in AIR 1967 SC 249 . In that decision, the Supreme Court was dealing with an appeal against an order granting stay in exercise of power under Sec. 34 of the Arbitration Act, which is undoubtedly a discretionary power. While discussing the scope of the said appeal the Apex Court held that where the discretion vested in the Court has been exercised by the lower Court, the appellate Court would be slow to interfere with the exercise of its discretion. In dealing with the matter raised before it at the appellate stage, the appellate Court would not be justified in interfering with the discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it might have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial Court reasonably, and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate Court could have taken a different view may not justify such interference with the trial Court's exercise of discretion. If it appears to the appellate Court that in exercise of its discretion the trial Court had acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored the relevant fact, then it would be open to the appellate Court to interfere with the trial Court's exercise of discretion. 51. Let me now look into Sec. 16 of the Specific Relief Act. Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act provides that specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person (b) who has become incapable of performing or violates any essential term of the contract that remains to be performed on his part or willfully acts at variance with or in subversion of the relation intended to be established by the contract, or (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him other than the terms performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Clause (c) has since been explained : (i) that it is not essential where the contract involves payment of money, to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in Court except when so directed by the Court; and (ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of readiness and willingness to perform the contract according to its true construction. 52. A plain reading of Sec. 16 of the Specific Relief Act makes it clear that in order to obtain specific performance of a contract, the plaintiff has to show that he has not violated any essential term of the contract that on his part remains to be performed or that he has not acted willfully at variance with or in subversion of the relation intended to be established by the contract and that he has averred and proved that he has performed and was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract to be performed by him unless prevented or waived by the defendant. The ingredients may be specified thus : (1) the plaintiff has become incapable of performing any part of the contract that remains to be performed by him; or (2) he has violated any essential term of the contract that remains to be performed by him; or (3) he acts in fraud of the contract; or (4) he willfully acts at variance with the relation intended to be established by the contract; or (5) he willfully acts in subversion of the relation intended to be established by the contract; or (6) he fails to aver that he has performed the essential terms of the contract to be performed by him; or (7) he was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract to be performed by him; or (8) he was prevented by the defendant from performing any part of the contract; or (9) the defendant had waived performance of any part of the contract; and (10) he has to prove the conditions contained in (6) to (8). According to the explanation, much readiness and willingness to perform the contract must be according to the true construction of the contract. 53. The King's Bench in Rookey's case, 77 ER 209 : 1597 (5) Co. Rep. According to the explanation, much readiness and willingness to perform the contract must be according to the true construction of the contract. 53. The King's Bench in Rookey's case, 77 ER 209 : 1597 (5) Co. Rep. 99, it is said: "Discretion is a science, not to act arbitrarily according to men's will and private affection: so the discretion which is exercised here, is to be governed by rules of law and equity, which are to oppose, but each, in its turn, to be subservient to the other. This discretion, in some cases follows the law implicitly, in others or allays the rigour of it, but in no case does it contradict or overturn the grounds or principles thereof, as has been sometimes ignorantly imputed to this Court. That is a discretionary power, which neither this nor any other Court, not even the highest, acting in a judicial capacity is by the constitution entrusted with." 54. The Court of Chancery in Attorney General v. Wheat, 1759 (1) Eden 177 : 28 ER 652, followed the Rookey's case, 77 ER 209 : 1597 (5) Co. Rep. 99 and observed: "The law is clear and Courts of equity ought to follow it in their judgments concerning titles to equitable estates; otherwise great uncertainty and confusion would ensue. And though proceedings in equity are said to be secundum discretionem boni vin, yet when it is asked, vir bonus est quis? The answer is, qui consulta partum, qui leges juraq servat. And as it is said in Rookee's case, 1597 (5) Co. Rep. 99, that discretion is a science not to act arbitrarily according to men's will and private affection : so the discretion which is exercised here, is to be governed by rules of law and equity, which are to oppose, but each in its turn, to be subservient to the other. This discretion, in some cases follows the law implicitly, in others or allays the rigour of it, but in no case does it contradict or overturn the grounds or principles thereof, as has been sometimes ignorantly imputed to this Court. That is a discretionary power, which neither this nor any other Court, not even the highest, acting in a judicial capacity is by the constitution entrusted with. This description is full and judicious, and what ought to be imprinted on the mind of every Judge." 55. That is a discretionary power, which neither this nor any other Court, not even the highest, acting in a judicial capacity is by the constitution entrusted with. This description is full and judicious, and what ought to be imprinted on the mind of every Judge." 55. In Satya Jain v. Anis Ahmed Rushdie, 2013 (8) SCC 131 , at page 145, the Supreme Court observed: "40. The discretion to direct specific performance of an agreement and that too after elapse of a long period of time, undoubtedly, has to be exercised on sound, reasonable, rational and acceptable principles. The parameters for the exercise of discretion vested by Sec. 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 cannot be entrapped within any precise expression of language and the contours thereof will always depend on the facts and circumstances of each [pic] case. The ultimate guiding test would be the principles of fairness reasonableness as may be dictated by the peculiar facts of any given case, which features the experienced judicial mind can perceive without any real difficulty. It must however be emphasised that afflux of time and escalation of price of property, by itself, cannot be a valid ground to deny the relief of specific performance. Such a view has been consistently adopted by this Court. By way of illustration, opinions rendered in P.S. Ranakrishna Reddy v. M.K. Bhagyalakshmi, 2007 (10) SCC 231 and more recently in Narinderjit Singh v. North Star Estate Promoters Ltd., 2012 (5) SCC 712 may be usefully recapitulated." 56. In Nirmala Anand v. Advent Corpn. (P) Ltd., 2002 (8) SCC 146 , at page 150, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court on a similar issue held as under: "6. It is true that grant of decree of specific performance lies in the discretion of the Court and it is also well settled that it is not always necessary to grant specific performance simply for the reason that it is legal to do so. It is further well settled that the Court in its discretion can impose any reasonable condition including payment of an additional amount by one party to the other while granting or refusing decree of specific performance. Whether the purchaser shall be directed to pay an additional amount to the seller or converse would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a case. Whether the purchaser shall be directed to pay an additional amount to the seller or converse would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a case. Ordinarily, the plaintiff is not to be denied the relief of specific performance only on account of the phenomenal increase of price during the pendency of litigation. That may be, in a given case, one of the considerations besides many others to be taken into consideration for refusing the decree of specific performance. As a general rule, it cannot be held that ordinarily the plaintiff cannot be allowed to have, for her alone, the entire benefit of phenomenal increase of the value of the property during the pendency of the litigation. While balancing the equities, one of the considerations to be kept in view is as to who is the defaulting party. It is also to be borne in mind whether a party is trying to take undue advantage over the other as also the hardship that may be caused to the defendant by directing specific performance. There may be other circumstances on which parties may not have any control. The totality of the circumstances is required to be seen." 57. In V. Pechimuthu v. Gowrammal, 2001 (7) SCC 617 , at page 629, the Supreme Court held as under: "25. Counsel for the respondent finally urged that specific performance should not be granted to the appellant now because the price of land had risen astronomically in the last few years and it would do injustice to the respondent to compel her to reconvey property at prices fixed in 1978. 26. The argument is specious. Where the Court is considering whether or not to grant a decree for specific performance for the first time, the rise in the price of the land agreed to be conveyed may be a relevant factor in denying the relief of specific performance. (See: K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan, 1997 (3) SCC 1 ). But in this case, the decree for specific performance has already been passed by the trial Court and affirmed by the first appellate Court. The only question before us is whether the High Court in second appeal was correct in reversing the decree. Consequently, the principle enunciated in K.S. Vidyanadam, 1997 (3) SCC 1 ) will not apply." 58. But in this case, the decree for specific performance has already been passed by the trial Court and affirmed by the first appellate Court. The only question before us is whether the High Court in second appeal was correct in reversing the decree. Consequently, the principle enunciated in K.S. Vidyanadam, 1997 (3) SCC 1 ) will not apply." 58. In a judgment dated 22-9-2014 delivered in the Civil Appeal No. 9047 of 2014 titled K. Prakash v. B.R. Sampath Kumar, reported in AIR 2015 SC 9 , the Supreme Court observed that: "17. The principles which can be enunciated is that where the plaintiff brings a suit for specific performance of contract for sale, the law insists a condition precedent to the grant of decree for specific performance that the plaintiff must show his continued readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract in accordance with its terms from the date of contract to the date of hearing. Normally, when the trial Court exercises its discretion in one way or other after appreciation of entire evidence and materials on record, the appellate Court should not interfere unless it is established that the discretion has been exercised perversely, arbitrarily or against judicial principles. The appellate Court should also not exercise its discretion against the grant of specific performance on extraneous considerations or sympathetic considerations. It is true, as contemplated under Sec. 20 of the Specific Relief Act, that a party is not entitled to get a decree for specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. Nevertheless, once an agreement to sell is legal and validly proved and further requirements for getting such a decree is established then the Court has to exercise its discretion in favour of granting relief for specific performance. 19. Subsequent rise in price will not be treated as a hardship entailing refusal of the decree for specific performance. Rise in price is a normal change of circumstances, and therefore, on that ground a decree for specific performance cannot be reversed. 20. However, the Court may take notice of the fact that there has been an increase in the price of the property and considering the other facts and circumstances of the case, this Court while granting decree for specific performance can impose such condition which may to some extent compensate the defendant-owner of the property. 20. However, the Court may take notice of the fact that there has been an increase in the price of the property and considering the other facts and circumstances of the case, this Court while granting decree for specific performance can impose such condition which may to some extent compensate the defendant-owner of the property. This aspect of the matter is considered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Nirmala Anand v. Advent Corporation (P) Ltd., 2002 (8) SCC 146 ." 59. The equitable discretion to grant or not to grant a relief for specific performance also depends upon the conduct of the parties. The necessary ingredient has to be proved and established by the plaintiff so that discretion would be exercised judiciously in favour of the plaintiff. At the same time, if the defendant does not come with clean hands and suppresses material facts and evidence and mislead the Court then such discretion should not be exercised by refusing to grant specific performance. 60. In my view, the trial Court rightly exercised its discretion in favour of the plaintiff and passed the decree for specific performance. All the relevant aspects of the matter were reconsidered by the lower appellate Court, and the lower appellate Court thought fit to affirm the findings recorded by the trial Court. Order 41, Rule 31 of the C.P.C. 61. So far as the contention with regard to Order 41, Rule 31 C.P.C. is concerned, the same does not merit any consideration. 62. An appellate judgment is expected not merely to deal with the materials and the evidence on record, but also to deal with the judgment of the trial Court insofar as it is assailed in the appellate Court. It is only in very rare cases that some criticism is not levelled or cannot be levelled against the judgment of a trial Court. In order that the higher Tribunals may be satisfied and the judgment of the appellate Court may not be assailed on the ground of lack of application of mind, it is expedient that the appellate judgment must indicate the points which were raised or formulated in the appeal and the arguments which were urged for or against the same and the criticisms which were levelled against the reasoning adopted by the trial Court. The judgment of an appellate Court must show that the Court had applied its mind to the facts in controversy. But it cannot be contended that in every such case, a remand must be made and the second appellate Court has no jurisdiction to decide the appeal. There are several cases in which the High Courts do find that on material questions the lower Court has either not applied its mind or omitted to record its decision. Such questions usually do arise specially in Second Appeals. It is a well settled law that in such a situation the second appellate Court itself determines the question. This is specifically provided for by Sec. 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and by the provisions contained in Order 41, Rule 25. There is no reason why unless there are strong reasons for not doing so, this Court should not follow the principles underlying these provisions of law even in a case which discloses that the lower Court had not discharged its duty of applying its mind to the determination of all the points in controversy. 63. Order 41, Rule 31 C.P.C. provide guidelines for the appellate Court as to how the Court has to proceed and decide the case. The provisions should be read in such a way as to require that the various particulars mentioned therein should be taken into consideration. Thus, it must be evident from the judgment of the appellate Court that the Court has properly appreciated the facts/evidence, applied its mind and decided the case considering the material on record. It would amount to substantial compliance of the said provisions if the appellate Court's judgment is based on the independent assessment of the relevant evidence on all important aspects of the matter and the findings of the appellate Court are well founded and quite convincing. It is mandatory for the appellate Court to independently assess the evidence of the parties and consider the relevant points which arise for adjudication and the bearing of the evidence on those points. Being the final Court of fact, the first appellate Court must not record mere general expression of concurrence with the trial Court judgment rather it must give reasons for its decision on each point independently to that of the trial Court. Thus, the entire evidence must be considered and discussed in detail. Being the final Court of fact, the first appellate Court must not record mere general expression of concurrence with the trial Court judgment rather it must give reasons for its decision on each point independently to that of the trial Court. Thus, the entire evidence must be considered and discussed in detail. Such exercise should be done after formulating the points for consideration in terms of the said provisions and the Court must proceed in adherence to the requirements of the said statutory provisions. (Vide : Thakur Sukhpal Singh v. Thakur Kalyan Singh, AIR 1963 SC 146 ; Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124 : G. Amalorpavam v. R.C. Diocese of Madurai, 2006 (3) SCC 224 ; Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Santosh Kumari, 2007 (8) SCC 600 : and Gannmani Anasuya v. Parvatini Amarendra Chowdhary, AIR 2007 SC 2380 ) 64. In the case of B.V. Nagesh v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy, reported in JT 2010 (10) SC 551, while dealing with the issue, the Supreme Court held as under: "The appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial Court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case therein is open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate Court, must therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate Court. Sitting as a Court of appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. [Vide : Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, 2001 (3) SCC 179 and Madhukar v. Sangram, 2001 (4) SCC 756 ]" 65. In the case of G. Amalorpavam v. R.C. Diocese of Madurai, reported in 2006 Law Suit (SC) 178, the Supreme Court held as under: "8. [Vide : Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, 2001 (3) SCC 179 and Madhukar v. Sangram, 2001 (4) SCC 756 ]" 65. In the case of G. Amalorpavam v. R.C. Diocese of Madurai, reported in 2006 Law Suit (SC) 178, the Supreme Court held as under: "8. The question whether in a particular case there has been a substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure has to be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered in each case. Non-compliance with the provisions may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void, and may be ignored if there has been substantial compliance with it and the second appellate Court is in a position to ascertain the findings of the lower appellate Court. It is no doubt desirable that the appellate Court should comply with all the requirements of Order 41, Rule 31 Code of Civil Procedure. But if it is possible to make out from the judgment that there is substantial compliance with the said requirements and that justice has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient. Where the appellate Court has considered the entire evidence on record and discussed the same in detail, come to any conclusion and its findings are supported by reasons even though the point has not been framed by the appellate Court there is substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the judgment is not in any manner vitiated by the absence of a point of determination. Where there is an honest endeavour on the part of the lower appellate Court to consider the controversy between the parties and there is proper appraisement of the respective cases and weighing and balancing of the evidence, facts and the other considerations appearing on both sides is clearly manifest by the perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate Court, it would be a valid judgment even though it does not contain the points for determination. The object of the rule in making it incumbent upon the appellate Court to frame points for determination and to cite reasons for the decision is to focus attention of the Court on the rival contentions which arise for determination and also to provide litigant parties opportunity in understanding the ground upon which the decision is founded with a view to enable them to know the basis of the decision and if so considered appropriate and so advised to avail the remedy of second appeal conferred by Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 9. At this juncture it would be relevant to note what this Court said in Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124 , it was noted as follows: "........It is not the duty of the appellate Court when it agrees with the view of the trial Court on the evidence either to restate the effect of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice." 10. The view was reiterated in Santosh Hazari v. Purshottam Tiwari (Deceased) by L.Rs., 2001 (3) SCC 179 . It was held with reference to Girijanandini Devi's case, AIR 1967 SC 1124 , as follows: "........The appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial Court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate Court, must therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate Court. The task of an appellate Court affirming the findings of the trial Court is an easier one. The appellate Court agreeing with the view of the trial Court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124 . We would, however, like to sound a note of caution. We would, however, like to sound a note of caution. Expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage adopted by the appellate Court for shirking the duty cast on it. While writing a judgment of reversal the appellate Court must remain conscious of two principles. Firstly, the findings of fact based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial Court must weigh with the appellate Court, more so when the findings are based on oral evidence recorded by the same Presiding Judge who authors the judgment. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate Court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. As a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial Court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the appellate Court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact. Madhusudan Das v. Narayanibai, 1983 (1) SCC 35 . The rule is and it is nothing more than a rule of practice that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lie, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact. Sarju Pershad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1951 SC 120 Secondly, while reversing a finding of fact the appellate Court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial Court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the Court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate Court had discharged the duty expected of it. We need only remind the first appellate Courts of the additional obligation cast on them by the scheme of the present Sec. 100 substituted in the Code. The first Appellate Court continues, as before, to be a final Court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. We need only remind the first appellate Courts of the additional obligation cast on them by the scheme of the present Sec. 100 substituted in the Code. The first Appellate Court continues, as before, to be a final Court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first appellate Court is also a final Court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate Court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one." 66. Let me also refer to and rely upon a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court, in the case of Durga Thathera v. Narain Thathera, reported in AIR 1931 All. 597, held as under: "20 The question whether in a particular case there has been a substantial compliance with the provisions of Rule 31 is a (different one depending on the nature of) the judgment delivered in each case. A Non-compliance with the strict provisions of this rule may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void, and the irregularity may be ignored if there has been a substantial compliance with it and the second appellate Court is in a position to ascertain the findings of the lower appellate Court. Our attention has not been drawn to any reported case of this Court after the passing of the new Code, in which the case of Samin Hasan has been followed. Our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative." 67. I may also refer to a three-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Thakur Sukhpal Singh v. Thakur Kalyan Singh, reported in 1962 Law Suit (SC) 165 : [ AIR 1963 SC 146 ], held as under: "It is urged that the judgment of the appellate Court has to state the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision, and these the appellate Court cannot do till it has gone through the record and considered the entire matter on record including the judgment under appeal. These matters have to be in the judgment when points in dispute between the parties are raised before the appellate Court. If no such points are raised for consideration the appellate judgment cannot refer to the points for determination in its judgment, and when there be no points raised for determination, there can possibly be no decision thereon and no reasons for such decision. Such is the position when the appellant does not address the Court and does not submit anything against the decision of the Court below. The memorandum of appeal does contain the grounds of objection to the decree appealed from, without any argument or narrative as laid down in sub-rule (2) of Rule 1, Order 41. Such grounds cannot take the place of the points for determination contemplated by Rule 31. Not unoften certain grounds of objection raised in the memorandum of appeal are not argued or pressed at the hearing and in that case such grounds cannot be taken to be the points for determination and are rightly not discussed in the judgment at all. It is for the appellant to raise the points against the judgment appealed from. He has to submit reasons against its correctness. He cannot just raise objections in his memorandum of appeal and leave it to the appellate Court to give its decision on those points after going through the record and determining the correctness thereof. It is not for the appellate Court itself to find out what the points for determination can be and then proceed to give a decision on those points. 6. The Privy Council observed in Ml. Fakrunisa v. Moulvi Izarus: "In every appeal it is incumbent upon the appellants to show some reason why the judgment appealed from should be disturbed; there must be some balance in their favour when all the circumstances are considered, to justify the alteration of the judgment that stands. Their Lordships are unable to find that this duty has been discharged." With respect, we agree with this and hold that it is the duty of the appellant to show that the judgment under appeal is erroneous for certain reasons and it is only after the appellant has shown this that the appellate Court would call upon the respondent to reply to the contention. It is only then that the judgment of the appellate Court can fully contain all the various matters mentioned in Rule 31, Order 41. 7. Court observed in Sengram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, 1755 (2) SCR 1: "Now, a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: ......... Too technical construction of Section that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation, should therefore, be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it." The provisions of Rule 31 should therefore be reasonably construed and should be held to require the various particulars to be mentioned in the judgment only when the appellant has actually raised certain points for determination by the appellate Court, and not when no such points have been raised as had been the case in the present instance when the appellant did not address the Court at all. 8. The provisions of Rule 30, Order 41 support our construction of Rule 31. This rule reads: "The appellate Court, after hearing the parties or their pleaders and referring to any part of the proceedings, whether on appeal or in the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, to which reference may be considered necessary, shall pronounce judgment in open Court, either at once or on some future day of which notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders. It is to be noticed that this rule does not make it incumbent on the appellate Court to refer to any part of these proceedings in the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred. The appellate Court can refer, after hearing the parties and their pleaders, to any part of these proceedings to which reference be considered necessary. It is in the discretion of the appellate Court to refer to the proceedings. It is competent to pronounce judgment after hearing what the parties or their pleaders submit to it for consideration. The appellate Court can refer, after hearing the parties and their pleaders, to any part of these proceedings to which reference be considered necessary. It is in the discretion of the appellate Court to refer to the proceedings. It is competent to pronounce judgment after hearing what the parties or their pleaders submit to it for consideration. It follows therefore that if the appellant submits nothing for its consideration, the appellate Court can decide the appeal without any reference to any proceedings of the Courts below, and in doing so, it can simply say that the appellants have not urged anything which would tend to show that the judgment and decree under appeal were wrong." 9. In this connection, reference may be made to the provisions of Sec. 423, Criminal Procedure Code, which provides the procedure to be followed by the appellate Court in disposing of criminal appeals. The relevant portion of its sub-sec. (1) is: "The appellate Court shall then send for the record of the case, if such record is not already in Court. After perusing such record, and hearing the appellant or his pleader, if he appears, and the Public Prosecutor, if he appears, and in case of an appeal under Sec. 411A, sub-sec. (2), or Sec. 417 the accused, if he appears, the Court may, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering dismiss the appeal, or may..." The appellate Court is thus enjoined to pass the final order in the appeal after it had perused the record and heard the appellant or his pleader and the Public Prosecutor. The perusal of the record is enjoined on the Court. The Court cannot dispose of the appeal merely after hearing the appellant or his pleader and the Public Prosecutor. It has to peruse the record. In this respect, these provisions are different from the provisions of Rule 30, Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Legislature specifically requires the perusal of the record by the appellate Court before deciding the appeal. It does not so provide in Rule 30, Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. The view that we take, also finds support from the object which the Legislature probably had in providing that the judgment must contain the matters mentioned in Rule 31. It does not so provide in Rule 30, Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. The view that we take, also finds support from the object which the Legislature probably had in providing that the judgment must contain the matters mentioned in Rule 31. The object seems to be that the parties should know for what reasons the decision has gone against them, and thereby, be in a position to decide whether they should go up in appeal or revision against the judgment. If they do not know the decision and the reasons there for, they cannot make up their mind, and even if they have no intention to go up in appeal, they may not even be satisfied about the Court considering the matter for determination properly. 11. Another object can be that the second appellate Court or the revision Court be in a position to know why the Court below came to a certain conclusion. Such knowledge is undoubtedly of great assistance to the Court. If therefore, no contention is raised by the appellant in the first appellate Court, no question of raising any contention in the next appellate Court arises, and therefore, the necessity of writing a complete judgment contemplated by Rule 31 does not arise." 68. Thus, the principle discernible from the case-law referred to above, is that whether in a particular case there has been a substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 of the C.P.C. has to be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered. Non-compliance with the provisions by itself would not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void. If it is possible to make out from the judgment that there is substantial compliance with the said requirements and that justice has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient. The judgment of the appellate Court should reflect an honest endeavour to consider the controversy between the parties and that there is proper appraisement of the respective cases and weighing and balancing of the evidence, facts and the other considerations. If all relevant aspects of the matter are gone into by the appellate Court and discussed properly, then the same would be a valid judgment even though it may not have framed the points for determination. 69. If all relevant aspects of the matter are gone into by the appellate Court and discussed properly, then the same would be a valid judgment even though it may not have framed the points for determination. 69. It does not appear to me in the present case that the judgment of the lower appellate Court is open to that criticism. The lower appellate Court has discussed all the points raised on behalf of both the sides as well as he has considered whole evidence on record in details. The issues framed by the trial Court have also been discussed in the judgment and on this score only, the judgment of the lower appellate Court cannot be said to be bad in law. 70. I may also refer to and rely upon a decision of this Court in the case of Kikubhai Parshottambhai Patel v. Babubhai Vallabhbhai Patel, reported in 2005 (1) GLH 602 . The relevant observations are as under: "17. Another point which is canvassed by Mr. Shah, learned Advocate of defendants, is that under Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code, the appellate Court must have framed points for determination. According to this Court, the said contention is also without substance. In the case of Dumala Vighpara Gram Panchayat (supra), this Court has held that serious issues tried by trial Court were required to be enquired into and scrutinised by appellate Court. In that case, instead the appellate Court merely considering that there was an earlier suit in which the permission for construction was granted decided the appeal in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, the case was remitted to the trial Court. The said judgment is of no assistance to the case of the defendants. Furthermore, the said judgment does not lay down an absolute proposition of law that non-framing of points for determination in appeal by the first appellate Court vitiates the well reasoned judgment delivered by the first appellate Judge, and hence, the same cannot be considered as a substantial question of law. 18. In the case of Navinchandra Nathalal Doshi (supra) this Court has held that all the Courts, including the appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court, are required to frame appropriate points for determination at the time of deciding such appeal. 18. In the case of Navinchandra Nathalal Doshi (supra) this Court has held that all the Courts, including the appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court, are required to frame appropriate points for determination at the time of deciding such appeal. When the appellate Court is deciding an appeal under the Bombay Rent Act, it is necessary to comply with the provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code, which also require that the points for determination are framed by the Court. The appellate Court, therefore, should take appropriate care in all such cases to frame appropriate points for determination. In fact, it is the duty of the appellate Court to see that such points for determination are framed. In the said decision, this Court has also held that simply because the appellate Bench has not framed the points for determination, that itself cannot vitiate the judgment of the appellate Bench on the aforesaid point. This judgment is squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case and is the complete answer to the contentions raised by Mr. M. Shah, learned Advocate of the defendants. It is true that in this judgment it has been held that it is the duty of the appellate Court to see that points for determination are framed. However, the said judgment has also laid down the proposition that non-framing of points for determination, that itself cannot vitiate the judgment of the appellate Court. 19. One more contention advanced by Mr. Shah, learned Advocate of the defendants, is that Rule 414 of the Civil Manual also stipulates that the appellate Court should frame points for determination in appeal as framed in the trial Court but in instant case since the appellate Court has not framed points for determination and since there is a breach of the provisions of Rule 414 of the Civil Manual committed by the first appellate Judge, this matter requires consideration and this being a substantial question of law, the appeal requires to be admitted. This Court finds no substance and merit in the aforesaid contention raised by Mr. Shah. This Court finds no substance and merit in the aforesaid contention raised by Mr. Shah. According to this Court, Rule 414 of the Civil Manual is based on Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code and since this Court has held that non-framing of points for determination by itself would not vitiate the well reasoned judgment of the appellate Court, the aforesaid contention is also required to be rejected and accordingly, it is also rejected." 71. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in this Second Appeal. 72. In the result, this Second Appeal fails and is hereby rejected.