ORDER : 1. The petitioner – Smt. Thayamma D/o. Munipoojappa, the Legal Representative of the Original Grantee now represented by her own Legal Representatives, Smt. Lakshmamma D/o. Late Thayamma and others had filed this Writ Petition in this Court on 02/02/2012 questioning the impugned Order passed by the Assistant Commissioner Annexure B dated 25/06/2008 and the Order passed by the Deputy Commissioner Annexure A dated 07/01/2012 by which they refused to set aside the sale made long ago in favour of persons belonging to non-SC/ST category. 2. Both the Authorities had rejected the Application of the Legal Representatives of the Grantees questioning the sale made in favour of the private Respondents, Smt. Siddamma and others. The said sale in question had taken place way back in the year 1952, but the challenge was laid for the first time in the year 2007. 3. The reasons assigned by the Deputy Commissioner in the impugned Order are quoted below for ready reference:- “ORDER : I have carefully examined the records and considered the contentions putforth on both sides. In the instant case, it is an admitted fact by the Appellant that, the land in S.No.81/2 (New No.81/P2) measuring 2A.00 situated at Kithiganur village, Bidarahalli Hobli, previously in Hoskote Taluk and now in Bangalore East Taluk was granted in favour of her husband’s grandfather Shri Chinna @ Chinnappa as per the Order No.B2.DD.76/36-37 dated 13.5.1937 and it was for the first time alienated under the registered Sale Deed No.337/46-47 dated 20-7-1946. And subsequently, the land has been alienated from one hand to the other under the registered Sale Deeds dated 8.6.1996, 16.12.971, 28.9.1973 and 6.7.1984. As could be seen from the certified copy of the Saguvali Chit for the years 1936-37, there are entries to the effect that Shri Chinna has been granted 2A.00 of land in S.No.81 situated in Kithiganur village, previously in Hosakote Taluk as per DD No.40/36-37 dated 3.7.1937 by virtue of the Deputy Commissioner’s Order No.B2.DD.76/36-37 dated 13.5.1937. However, the said land has been alienated for the first time under the registered Sale Deed No.337/46-47 dated 29.7.1946. The Assistant Commissioner, Bangalore North Sub-Division, Bangalore having held the inquiry into the matter relying on the decision reported in ILR 2004 KAR 3298, 2004(3) KCCR.1471 (DB) (Mariyappa vs. Dr. However, the said land has been alienated for the first time under the registered Sale Deed No.337/46-47 dated 29.7.1946. The Assistant Commissioner, Bangalore North Sub-Division, Bangalore having held the inquiry into the matter relying on the decision reported in ILR 2004 KAR 3298, 2004(3) KCCR.1471 (DB) (Mariyappa vs. Dr. N. Thimmarayappa and others) in which it is held that in the absence of any rules as on the date of the grant (i.e., during the year 1936-37) authorizing the officer to impose any such conditions restraining alienation, the transaction in question (during the year 1947) is not hit by Section 4 of the Act, has rejected the claim of the Appellant for restoration of the land in question. In regard to the contention on behalf of the Appellant that though the land was alienated for the first time under the Sale Deed dated 29.7.1946, since there were subsequent alienations from one hand to the other, the subsequent alienees cannot claim perfection of their right and title over the land in question by ‘adverse possession’ for more than 30 years of prescriptive period against the State is concerned, it would be relevant to refer to the decision reported in 2006(1) AIR R 143 (K.P. Ravindra Reddy vs. State of Karnataka and others), in which it is held that : Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (Act 2 of 1978) Section 4 – Limitation Act (36 of 1963) Art.64 – Perfection of title by adverse possession – Appellant claiming under first purchaser in whose favour was first sale by grantee in 1948 – First sale took place before 1.1.1949 i.e., more than 30 years prior to date on which provisions of Act came into force – Sale cannot be invalidated by applying provisions of Act – Appellant subsequent purchaser in continuous possession and enjoyment of granted land for period of more than 30 years – Can claim adverse possession against the Government – Also can perfect title against Government”. In the instant case admittedly the land was granted during the year 1936-37, but it has been sold for the first time on 29.7.1946 and that therefore applying the tacking principle since the very first alienation itself was during the year 1946, the alienees have perfected their right and title over the land in question by ‘adverse possession’ for more than 30 years of prescriptive period against the State as on 1.1.1979 the date on which the Act came into force. Added to this, according to the decision reported in 1993(3) Kar.L.J.346 (DB) (V. Muniswamy vs. Deputy Commissioner, Kolar and others) : Section 4 and 5: Adverse possession – Only those transfers of land which have taken place on or before 1.1.1949 having completed 30 years prior to 1.1.1979 are saved from the proceedings under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. Hence, relying on the above decision also, since the first transaction has taken place during the year 1946 itself having completed 30 years as on 1.1.1979, the alienations of the land in question under subsequent sale deeds are not hit by the provisions of Act. In these circumstances, none of the contentions putforth on behalf of the Appellant stand to reason, they are untenable and cannot be accepted. For the foregoing reasons, there is no reason to interfere with the Order of the Assistant Commissioner, Bangalore North Sub Division, Bangalore in No.K.SC.ST.137/ 2007-08 Dated 25-6-2008 and it is liable to be upheld. Accordingly, it is upheld. In the result, the Appeal is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the Appeal is dismissed. Endorse the parties. Order pronounced in open Court on this the 7th day of January 2012. Sd/- (M.K. Aiyappa) Deputy Commissioner Bangalore District.” 4. The impugned Orders cannot be sustained in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vivek M. Hinduja and others Vs. M. Ashwatha and others decided on 06/12/2017 in Civil Appeal No.2166/2009, in which it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that a very belated action to challenge the sale made in favour of the non SC/ST category of persons cannot be entertained by the Authorities as being in contravention of the provisions of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘PTCL Act’ for short). 5. 5. The relevant extract of the said judgment dated 06/12/2017 is quoted below for ready reference:- “4. Arguments have been addressed before us at length on whether the present appellants had perfected their titles on the date of the coming into force of the Karnataka Act. We are not inclined to go into this question because the instant matters can be decided on an aspect settled by this Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav and Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. and Ors., and Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs. State of Karnataka and Anr. In these two decisions, one of which arose under the Karnataka Act, this Court has held that the authorities entrusted with the power to annul proceedings purported to have been made by the original grantees, must exercise their powers to do so, whether on an application, or suo motu, within a reasonable time since no time is prescribed by law for taking such action. In the decided cases, action had been initiated after about 20 to 25 years of the coming into force of the Karnataka Act. 5. In the present cases, it is undisputed that the action had been initiated after almost 20 years from the coming into force of the Karnataka Act. In principle, we do not see any reason why the delay in the present cases should be considered to be reasonable. There is no material difference between the period of delay in the present cases and he decided cases. 6. Relying on some observations in the case of Manchegowda and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka and Ors. and Sunkara Rajayalakshmi & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, Shri Sunil Fernandes, learned counsel on the respondents’ side submitted that the outer limit for initiating action should be 30 years. 7. We, however, find that the observations in those cases are not apposite and are made with reference to the period of prescription in respect of Government properties under the Limitation Act, 1963. 8. It was also submitted on behalf of the respondents that Section 4 of the Karnataka Act proprio vigore annuls a transfer made in contravention of itself. Therefore, it makes no difference if the proceedings are initiated even after 20 to 25 years. 9. We do not find it possible to accede to this submission. 8. It was also submitted on behalf of the respondents that Section 4 of the Karnataka Act proprio vigore annuls a transfer made in contravention of itself. Therefore, it makes no difference if the proceedings are initiated even after 20 to 25 years. 9. We do not find it possible to accede to this submission. This Court in the case of Board of Trustees of Port of Kandla vs. Hargovind Jasraj and Anr., reiterated the necessity of an order of a competent Court or Tribunal before which the impugned order can be declared as null and void. The Court relied on the oft-quoted passage in Smith Vs. East Elloe Rural District Council which reads as under: “…An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders.’ [Smith Case, AC pp.769-70]. [emphasis supplied] This must be equally true even where the brand of invalidity is plainly visible: for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the Court. The necessity of recourse to the Court has been pointed out [sic] repeatedly in the House of Lords and Privy council without distinction between patent and latent defects [Ed. Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, Edn. 1994.” In the case of Pune Municipal Corporation vs. State of Maharashtra, this Court reproduced the following observation with regard to the declaration of orders beyond the period of limitation as invalid: “39. Setting aside the decree passed by all the courts and referring to several cases, this Court held that if the party aggrieved by invalidity of the order intends to approach the Court for declaration that the order against him was inoperative, he must come before the Court within the period prescribed by limitation. ‘If the statutory time of limitation expires, the Court cannot give the declaration sought for’.” [emphasis supplied] 10. We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations. It is, however, necessary to add that where limitation is not prescribed, the party ought to approach the competent Court or authority within reasonable time, beyond which no relief can be granted. ‘If the statutory time of limitation expires, the Court cannot give the declaration sought for’.” [emphasis supplied] 10. We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations. It is, however, necessary to add that where limitation is not prescribed, the party ought to approach the competent Court or authority within reasonable time, beyond which no relief can be granted. As decided earlier, this principle would apply even to suo motu actions. 11. We find from the impugned judgments that the High Court has not given due regard to the period of time within which the action was taken in the present cases. The competent authorities in all these cases had declined relief to the respondents and had refused to annul the transfers. In the circumstances, the impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Court are set aside. 12. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed.” 6. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties, this Court is of the opinion that even though the reasons assigned by the Authorities below, viz. the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner for rejecting the Application of the Legal Representatives of the Grantees are different but the fact remains that the sales made in favour of the non-SC/ST category persons were challenged after a highly belated period of more than 50 years. Such a challenge on any ground could not have been sustained by the Authorities below, in view of the aforesaid binding legal precedent from the Apex Court in the case of Hinduja’s case (supra). 7. Therefore, in any case, the writ petition of the present petitioners - LRs. of the Grantees does not deserve to be entertained by this Court. 8. The present writ petition thus found to be devoid of merit is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.