ORDER : 1. The petitioner-Purchaser belonging to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe category has challenged the impugned orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Chikkaballapur as well as the Deputy Commissioner, Chikkaballapur under Sections 4 and 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the PTCL Act’ for short). 2. The prayers made in the writ petition are quoted below for ready reference: “WHEREFORE, the Petitioner above named humbly prays that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to call for records in Appeal R.A./SCST/47/2013-14, before the Deputy Commissioner, i.e., the First Respondent, and to (a) Issue a Writ of certiorari or such other writ/s quashing the order Dated: 29.02.2016 in R.A./SCST/47/201314 i.e., Annexure-‘H’ passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Chikkaballapura i.e., the First Respondent. (b) Issue a Writ of certiorari or such other writ/s quashing the order Dated 17.01.2014 in PTCL (Chi)/80/201112 i.e., Annexure-‘F’ passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Chikkaballapura i.e., the Second Respondent. (c) To award costs and grant such other relief, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit under the circumstances of the case in the interests of justice and equity.” 3. The relevant dates in the present case as submitted by learned counsel for petitioner are quoted below for ready reference: Sl.No. Transaction Date 1. The land was granted In favour of Mr. V. Thimmaiah 09.05.1950 2. Mr. V. Thimmaiah sold the said property In favour of Veerappa @ Erappa 18.06.1959 3. The said Mr. Veerappa @ Erappa executed a Deed of Gift In favour of Mr. K.V. Narayanaswamy 06.10.2005 4. Mr. K.V. Narayanaswamy in turn sold the land to the petitioner 11.05.2006 5. An Application was filed by the respondent under Sec. 4 & 5 of the PTCL Act before the Assistant Commissioner, Chikkaballapur 16.12.2011 4. The issue regarding the remedy availed by the persons belonging to Scheduled Caste under PTCL Act at a belated stage is no longer resintegra and is covered by the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court including the latest judgment in the case of Vivek M. Hinduja and Others Vs. M. Ashwatha and Others in Civil Appeal No.2166/2009. The relevant portion of the said judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is quoted below for ready reference: “4. M. Ashwatha and Others in Civil Appeal No.2166/2009. The relevant portion of the said judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is quoted below for ready reference: “4. Arguments have been addressed before us at length on whether the present appellants had perfected their titles on the date of the coming into force of the Karnataka Act. We are not inclined to go into this question because the instant matters can be decided on an aspect settled by this Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav and Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. and Ors., and Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs. State of Karnataka and Anr. In these two decisions, one of which arose under the Karnataka Act, this Court has held that the authorities entrusted with the power to annul proceedings purported to have been made by the original grantees, must exercise their powers to do so, whether on an application, or suo motu, within a reasonable time since no time is prescribed by law for taking such action. In the decided cases, action had been initiated after about 20 to 25 years of the coming into force of the Karnataka Act. 5. In the present cases, it is undisputed that the action had been initiated after almost 20 years from the coming into force of the Karnataka Act. In principle, we do not see any reason why the delay in the present cases should be considered to be reasonable. There is no material difference between the period of delay in the present cases and he decided cases. 6. Relying on some observations in the case of Manchegowda and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka and Ors. and Sunkara Rajayalakshmi & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, Shri Sunil Fernandes, learned counsel on the respondents’ side submitted that the outer limit for initiating action should be 30 years. 7. We, however, find that the observations in those cases are not apposite and are made with reference to the period of prescription in respect of Government properties under the Limitation Act, 1963. 8. It was also submitted on behalf of the respondents that Section 4 of the Karnataka Act proprio vigore annuls a transfer made in contravention of itself. Therefore, it makes no difference if the proceedings are initiated even after 20 to 25 years. 9. We do not find it possible to accede to this submission. 8. It was also submitted on behalf of the respondents that Section 4 of the Karnataka Act proprio vigore annuls a transfer made in contravention of itself. Therefore, it makes no difference if the proceedings are initiated even after 20 to 25 years. 9. We do not find it possible to accede to this submission. This Court in the case of Board of Trustees of Port of Kandla vs. Hargovind Jasraj and Anr, reiterated the necessity of an order of a competent Court or Tribunal before which the impugned order can be declared as null and void. The Court relied on the oft-quoted passage in Smith Vs. East Elloe Rural District Council which reads as under: “…An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders.’ [Smith Case, AC pp.76970] [emphasis supplied] This must be equally true even where the brand of invalidity is plainly visible: for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the Court. The necessity of recourse to the Court has been pointed out [sic] repeatedly in the House of Lords and Privy council without distinction between patent and latent defects Ed. Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, 7th Edn. 1994.” In the case of Pune Municipal Corporation vs. State of Maharashtra, this Court reproduced the following observation with regard to the declaration of orders beyond the period of limitation as invalid: “39. Setting aside the decree passed by all the courts and referring to several cases, this Court held that if the party aggrieved by invalidity of the order intends to approach the Court for declaration that the order against him was inoperative, he must come before the Court within the period prescribed by limitation. ‘If the statutory time of limitation expires, the Court cannot give the declaration sought for’.” [emphasis supplied] 10. We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations. It is, however, necessary to add that where limitation is not prescribed, the party ought to approach the competent Court or authority within reasonable time, beyond which no relief can be granted. ‘If the statutory time of limitation expires, the Court cannot give the declaration sought for’.” [emphasis supplied] 10. We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations. It is, however, necessary to add that where limitation is not prescribed, the party ought to approach the competent Court or authority within reasonable time, beyond which no relief can be granted. As decided earlier, this principle would apply even to suo motu actions. 11. We find from the impugned judgments that the High Court has not given due regard to the period of time within which the action was taken in the present cases. The competent authorities in all these cases had declined relief to the respondents and had refused to annul the transfers. In the circumstances, the impugned judgment[s] and order[s] passed by the High Court are set aside. 12. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed.” 5. Since the impugned orders passed by the Authorities below, namely, the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Chikkaballapur are in conflict with the legal position settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Sale in question has been challenged after 52 years of the first Sale made on 18.06.1959 and after 32 years of the Act coming into force in the year 1978, the present Writ Petition of the purchaser deserves to be allowed. The same is accordingly allowed and the impugned orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Chikkaballapur at Annexure-‘F’ dated 17.01.2014 and the Deputy Commissioner, Chikkaballapur-Annexure-‘H’ dated 29.02.2016 are set aside. No order as to costs.