JUDGMENT : Mohammad Rafiq, J. 1. This appeal has been filed by the accused-appellant Ramcharan challenging judgment and order dated 21.03.2016 passed by the Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Baran (for short ‘the trial court’) whereby the accused-appellant has been convicted for offence under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment and fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo one month’s simple imprisonment. 2. Facts of the case are that on 06.10.2010 at 9.10 P.M. a 'parcha bayan' was given by one Narendra Malav, H.C. 328, Police Line, Baran, to Station House Officer, Police Station Kotwali Baran, stating therein that when he was making entries in 'rojnamcha' at the Police Line, accused Ramcharan, who was constable, came there with rifle and fired at him. Bajrang Singh, H.C., and other staff members, were also present there. Accused had fired at him at 8.45 PM on that day with the intention to commit his murder. The injured sustained fire arm injuries. The injuries were on left ribs with exit wound on its right side with blood. The informant stated that as usual he was on night duty. Accused Ramcharan was also on duty as magazine guard. Accused Ramcharan entered his room stating that informant had made an adverse report in his service record 3-4 days ago and that he (accused) would finish him. The police, on the basis of 'parcha bayan', registered regular F.I.R. No.574/2010 (Exhibit P-42) and commenced investigation. Soon after giving 'parcha bayan' but before registration of F.I.R., the injured succumbed to injuries. Upon completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused-appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Baran, who committed the case to the Court of Sessions Judge, Baran, wherefrom the case was transferred to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Baran for trial. Since that Court was abolished later on, therefore, the case was made over to the Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Baran. Trial Court framed charge for offence under Section 302 IPC against the accused-appellant which he denied and claimed to be tried. Prosecution produced 31 witnesses and got 51 documents exhibited. Thereafter, the accused-appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein he stated that he was falsely implicated in the case. Trial Court framed charge for offence under Section 302 IPC against the accused-appellant which he denied and claimed to be tried. Prosecution produced 31 witnesses and got 51 documents exhibited. Thereafter, the accused-appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein he stated that he was falsely implicated in the case. Though no witness was produced in defence, but 12 documents were got exhibited. The trial court, on completion of trial, convicted the accused-respondent in the manner as indicated above. 3. Mr. A.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the accused-appellant has argued that rojnamcha entry (Exhibit P-38) of 19th September, 2010 has been produced by the prosecution to prove the motive of the appellant for opening fire at the deceased. Perusal of the aforesaid exhibit shows that if at all there could be any grievance, it would be against Heera Chand (P.W.26) who made the complaint. Therefore, the case of the prosecution that the deceased made adverse entry in the rojnamcha, is not substantiated. Many documents were said to be lying on the table of the deceased but none of them has been produced to prove that they pertained to the appellant. Bajrang Singh (P.W.2) has stated that he sent the deceased Narendra Malav in Chetak vehicle to the hospital, but no witness has come forward to say that he accompanied Narendra Malav in that vehicle and took him to hospital. Reliance has been wrongly placed by the trial court upon testimony of Ashok Kumar (P.W.6) and Jaswant Singh (P.W.7). According to Bajrang Singh (P.W.2), none of them was present at the time of incident in the police line. In fact, Bajrang Singh (P.W.2) has stated that both of them came after hearing sound of gun. Therefore, aforesaid two witnesses could not have been relied as eye witness. Shambhu Dayal (P.W.4), Hawaldar in Police Line, Baran has stated that he was in-charge of duties and according to him appellant Ramcharan was on duty from 3.00 to 6.00 P.M., but the learned trial court failed to appreciate that neither roll call register, nor any duty certificate has been produced. It is argued that learned trial court has not properly appreciated statement of Ashok Kumar (P.W.6) as to whether he was on duty or not. No duty register has been produced to prove so. It is argued that learned trial court has not properly appreciated statement of Ashok Kumar (P.W.6) as to whether he was on duty or not. No duty register has been produced to prove so. In cross-examination, Ashok Kumar (P.W.6) stated that he was on duty as Coath Assistant on 06.10.2010 in Police Line, Baran, but no document has been produced to prove that he actually was on duty at the relevant time. According to Jaswant Singh (P.W.7), no duty register has been produced to prove that he was present in the police line at the relevant time. Conviction of the accused-appellant has thus been recorded on the basis of sketchy and uncorroborated evidence. 4. Learned counsel for the accused-appellant further argued that alleged parcha bayan (Exhibit P-35) of the deceased cannot be said to be a dying declaration because law in this regard is well settled that dying declaration is a statement, which the injured makes in the eminent danger of life. Reliance in this connection has been placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shaikh Bakshu & Others Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 11 SCC 269 . It is argued that dying declaration/parcha bayan does not carry any evidentiary value because no fitness certificate was obtained from the doctor and parcha bayan was not recorded as per requirement of Rule 6.22 of the Rajasthan Police Rules. Statement of Pratap Rao (P.W.16), who recorded parcha bayan (Exhibit P-35) that it contained signature of doctor from place E to F has been belied/contradicted by Subhash Chandra (P.W.30), constable, who was accompanying him. This witness in the cross-examination has categorically stated that parcha bayan (Exhibit P-35) does not contain signature of any doctor. But when Pratap Rao (P.W.16) was confronted with parcha bayan in cross-examination, he denied the knowledge and stated that he did not know as to whose signature was there from place E to F. Moreover, the prosecution has not disclosed name of any such doctor, who allegedly signed parcha bayan. There is no evidence that the deceased was in a fit condition immediately after receiving fire arm injury to give the statement. In fact, Gyan Chand (P.W.29), Investigating Officer has himself in examination-in- chief admitted that condition of the deceased was quite critical and he was not in a position to give statement and therefore he did not record his statement. In fact, Gyan Chand (P.W.29), Investigating Officer has himself in examination-in- chief admitted that condition of the deceased was quite critical and he was not in a position to give statement and therefore he did not record his statement. The incident took place on 06.10.2010, but the deceased died on 22.10.2010. Learned counsel in this connection referred to post mortem report (Exhibit P-51) to argue that primary cause of death of the deceased was not fire arm injury, but it was opined to be septicemia as a result of ante mortem injury to transverse colon, left kidney, vertebra and spinal cord. Learned counsel in this respect referred to statement of Dr. Rakeah Sharma (P.W.31) and Dr. J.P. Yadav (P.W.28). Statement of Pratap Rao (P.W.16) under Section 161 Cr.P.C. (Exhibit D-5) was recorded belatedly on 14.11.2010, with delay of one month and eight days. Statement of wife of the deceased, Indra Devi (P.W.-24) also cannot be relied. She stated that her husband used to tell that it was Ramcharan, who had opened fire at him because he (deceased) made an adverse entry against him in the rojnamcha. Her statement also cannot be relied because the incident took place on 06.10.2010 but her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was recorded with huge delay of near about 2 months on 03.12.2010. 5. Learned counsel argued that after the parcha bayan was recorded, an additional line was inserted therein by interpolation that the accused opened fire at the deceased at 8.45 P.M. by rifle in the police line. It is argued that nothing prevented the prosecution to get the dying declaration of the deceased recorded by a Judicial Magistrate as the deceased survived for as long as 16 days after the incident. The deceased could survive for as long as 16 days and he did not die due to the gun fire injury, but his death was occasioned due to septicemia that was developed because the family members of the deceased had taken him to private hospital, i.e. Sudha Hospital, without recommendation or permission of the doctors treating him in the MBS Hospital, Kota. Learned counsel for the accused-appellant in support of his arguments relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Mallapati Sivaiah Vs. Sub Divisional Officer, Guntur, A.P., AIR 2008 SC 19 and judgments of this Court in Bashir Shah & Others Vs. Learned counsel for the accused-appellant in support of his arguments relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Mallapati Sivaiah Vs. Sub Divisional Officer, Guntur, A.P., AIR 2008 SC 19 and judgments of this Court in Bashir Shah & Others Vs. State of Rajasthan, 1994 (2) WLC 371 ; Padam Chand Vs. State of Rajasthan, RLW 2006 (4) Raj 3229. 6. Mr. Sonia Shandilya, learned Public Prosecutor opposed the appeal and argued that allegation against the accused-appellant in the parcha bayan of the deceased was quite specific that when the deceased was making entries in the rojnamcha register, accused-appellant suddenly came there and opened fire at him. Proceedings drawn on the parcha bayan by the police also corroborated this wherein it has been mentioned that accused during interrogation told that it was deceased, who made an adverse entry against him in the rojnamcha 3-4 days ago, therefore, he opened fire at him. Learned Public Prosecutor referred to statement of Pratap Rao (P.W.16), Assistant Sub Inspector of Police, who recorded parcha bayan and also statement of Gyanchand (P.W.29), Investigating Officer. She also relied on the statement of Indra Devi (P.W.24), wife of the deceased, who has stated that during treatment her husband used to often tell her that Ramcharan opened fire arm at him as he made an adverse entry against him in the rojnamcha. Reliance has also been placed on the statement of Shubham Malav (P.W.12) son of the deceased that whenever Narendra gained consciousness, he used to tell that it was Ramcharan, who opened fire at him because he was annoyed for the adverse entry made against him in the rojnamcha by the deceased. Learned Public Prosecutor has heavily relied on the testimony of Bajrang Singh (P.W.2), who has stated that immediately on hearing sound of fire, he rushed towards the rojnamcha room and caught hold of accused Ramcharan, who had by then already loaded second round and was about to fire again. Had he not caught hold of him, he would have certainly opened second fire. Ashok Kumar (P.W.6) has also stated that upon hearing sound of fire, he went towards rojnamcha room. He saw that Bajrang Singh (P.W.2) had caught hold of Ramcharan and Jaswant Singh (P.W.7) with great efforts could snatch the rifle from his hands. Had he not caught hold of him, he would have certainly opened second fire. Ashok Kumar (P.W.6) has also stated that upon hearing sound of fire, he went towards rojnamcha room. He saw that Bajrang Singh (P.W.2) had caught hold of Ramcharan and Jaswant Singh (P.W.7) with great efforts could snatch the rifle from his hands. He saw Narendra, who was lying unconscious on the chair and was bleeding profusely while crying, “Mar dala re Mar dala re” 7. Learned Public Prosecutor also referred to statement of Nand Singh (P.W.22), Head Constable, who stated that on hearing sound of fire he along with Ashok Kumar rushed towards rojnamcha room and saw that Bajrang Singh (P.W.2) had over powered Ramcharan from behind and Ashok had snatched rifle of Ramcharan. Similar statement was made by Gyanendra Singh (P.W.17); Ramkishan (P.W.19); Laxman Singh (P.W.20) and Ashok Kumar (P.W.21). Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that statements of all these witnesses by virtue of doctrine of resgestae would be admissible in the evidence in terms of Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act. Learned Public Prosecutor in support of her arguments relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in V.K. Mishra & Another Vs. State of Uttarakhand & Another, (2015) 9 SCC 588 ; judgments of this Court in Kalu & Others Vs. State of Rajasthan, 2014 (4) WLC (Raj.) 474; Hari Ram @ Hari Singh & Another Vs. State of Rajasthan, 2014 (4) WLC (Raj.) 663; Bariyam Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan, 2014 (4) WLC (Raj.) 680; Bisawan Vs. State, 2012 (1) WLC (Raj.) 759; Mukesh Vs. State, 2012 (1) WLC (Raj.) 767; Vikas Matoliya Vs. State of Rajasthan through Public Prosecutor, 2017 (2) WLC (Raj.) 415. 8. We have given our anxious consideration to rival submissions and carefully perused the material on record. 9. Parcha Bayan (Exhibit P-35) of the deceased is quite brief and runs into only five lines wherein the deceased Narendra Malav stated that when he was making entries in the rojnamcha as usual, the accused-appellant came to rojnamcha room with his rifle and opened fire at him. Bajrang Singh (P.W.2), head constable was present there at that time. Accused fired at him at 8.45 P.M. by rifle with an intention to murder him. Bajrang Singh (P.W.2), head constable was present there at that time. Accused fired at him at 8.45 P.M. by rifle with an intention to murder him. Pratap Rao (P.W.16), Assistant Sub Inspector, who recorded parcha bayan of the deceased, has stated in the court that while he was on patrolling along with Subhash, Constable, he received wireless information that an incident of opening fire by gun has taken place in the police lines. He thereafter immediately went to the hospital where the deceased Narendra Malav was brought in seriously injured condition in a Chetak vehicle. He got him admitted at bed no. 2 of emergency ward. He recorded his parcha bayan (Exhibit P-35) in the presence of duty doctor. His signatures were there from place A to B, signatures of Narendra from place C to D and signatures of doctor from place E to F. Police proceedings were drawn from place G to H, on which his signatures were from place A to B and signatures of the deceased were from place C to D. Since Narendra Malav could make his signatures twice on the parcha bayan, it would be clear that he was quite conscious and in the proceedings drawn on parcha bayan by Assistant Sub Inspector, he mentioned that on being asked, Narendra has again told that the accused opened fire at him at 8.45 P.M. saying that he was annoyed for adverse entry made against him 3-4 days ago and that he would now kill him. Saying so, he opened fire at him from the rifle. In cross-examination, of course, this witness stated that he was not aware that what was the name of doctor, who put his signatures from place E to F in the parcha bayan, but this discrepancy will not make that much difference on the reliability of the parcha bayan, as the law by now is well settled that if the dying declaration inspires confidence, mere fact that it was recorded without fitness certificate being obtained cannot be a reason to discard the same. Be it noted that as regards second line in parcha bayan, which according to the defence, was inserted subsequently, Pratap Rao (P.W.16) has sufficiently clarified that while he was recording parcha bayan, 2-3 doctors were checking the deceased by rolling his body over the bed to check the injuries and he had to therefore stop for about two minutes and thereafter he completed parcha bayan by writing this second additional line. He started at 9.19 P.M. and concluded in about ten seconds. He denied the suggestion that the deceased was not in a condition to speak. 10. In fact, Investigating Officer took possession of 303 bore rifle from Bajrang vide Exhibit P-2, who had snatched the same from accused Ramcharan and Ram Swaroop (P.W.1) and Alok (P.W.3) are attesting witness thereof. Bajrang Singh (P.W.2), Head Constable has corroborated aforesaid parcha bayan and stated that he was on duty in the night from 8.00 P.M. to 8.00 A.M. Ramcharan was on duty from 3.00 A.M. to 6.00 A.M. This witness reached on duty at 7.30 P.M. At that time, Narendra Malav was making entries in the rojnamcha. He (this witness) was assigned duty to attend telephonic calls in the room adjacent to rojnamcha room. At about 8.45 P.M. while he was listening to telephonic calls, suddenly he heard sound of fire. He rushed towars rojnamcha room and caught hold of Ramcharan from behind. Before that, Ramcharan had already loaded second round. Had he not caught hold of him, he would have opened second fire at the deceased. First fire hit his chest. He dragged Ramcharan out of the room. Ashok Kumar (P.W.6) has also corroborated testimony of Bajrang Singh (P.W.2). He too stated that when he rushed towards rojnamcha room after hearing sound of fire, he saw that Bajrang, Head Constable had caught hold of Ramcharan from behind. Ramcharan was carrying a rifle in his hand and Jaswant Singh with great efforts snatched it from him. Narendra was lying on the chair in unconscious condition and bleeding profusely. He was uttering, “Mar dala re Mar dala re”. Jaswant Singh (P.W.7) has also stated that he was on duty in the wireless room and Bajrang was on duty in telephone room. When he heard sound of sudden fire at about 8.45 P.M., he came rushing towards gate. He saw that Bajrang Singh had caught hold of Ramcharan from behind. He was uttering, “Mar dala re Mar dala re”. Jaswant Singh (P.W.7) has also stated that he was on duty in the wireless room and Bajrang was on duty in telephone room. When he heard sound of sudden fire at about 8.45 P.M., he came rushing towards gate. He saw that Bajrang Singh had caught hold of Ramcharan from behind. Ramcharan had rifle, which Bajrang took in his control. Ashok was also with him. Narendra uttered 2-3 times that “Mar dala re Mar dala re” and then became unconscious. 11. Gyanendra Singh (P.W.17) was also constable posted in the Police Line, Baran. He stated that Laxman, Ramcharan and Ramkishan were on duty with him on that day from 12.00 A.M. to 3.00 A.M. and duty of Ramcharan was from 3.00 A.M. to 6.00 A.M. They went for obtaining the weapons at 6.00 P.M. and then the entries were made in the rojnamcha. He after taking meals went to sleep, but suddenly when he heard sound of fire about 8.45- 9.00 P.M., he rushed towards rojnamcha room. He saw that Bajrang Singh had caught hold of Ramcharan from behind and Jaswant Singh and Ashok were trying to snatch rifle from him. Narendra was lying on the chair and bleeding profusely. Statements similar to that of Gyanendra Singh (P.W.17) have been given by Ram Kishan (P.W.19); Laxman Singh (P.W.20); Ashok Kumar (P.W.21); Nand Singh (P.W.22). These witnesses arrived at the scene of occurrence immediately after first fire and by that time the accused had already loaded second round and was about to again open fire. They not only saw the accused aiming rifle at deceased but when the accused was about to open second fire, but also Bajrang Singh (P.W.2) over power him by catching him from behind and Jaswant Singh (P.W.7) and Ashok Kumar (P.W.6) snatching rifle. Testimony of these witnesses to this effect would therefore be admissible in evidence according to Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act being the evidence of res-gestae. 12. The Supreme Court in Krishan Kumar Malik Vs. State of Haryana (2011) 7 SCC 130 held as under: “Section 6 of the Act has an exception to the general rule where-under, hearsay evidence becomes admissible. 12. The Supreme Court in Krishan Kumar Malik Vs. State of Haryana (2011) 7 SCC 130 held as under: “Section 6 of the Act has an exception to the general rule where-under, hearsay evidence becomes admissible. But as for bringing such hearsay evidence within the ambit of Section 6, what is required to be established is that it must be almost contemporaneous with the acts and there could not be an interval which would allow fabrication. In other words, the statements said to be admitted as forming part of res gestae must have been made contemporaneously with the act or immediately thereafter.” 13. The Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra Vs. Kamal Ahmed Mohammed Vakil Ansari & Ors., AIR 2013 SC 1441 held as under: “In our considered view, the test to determine admissibility under the rule of “res gestae” is embodied in words “are so connected with a fact in issue as to form a part of the same transaction”. It is therefore, that for describing the concept of “res gestae”, one would need to examine, whether the fact is such as can be described by use of words/phrases such as, contemporaneously arising out of the occurrence, actions having a live link to the fact, acts perceived as a part of the occurrence, exclamations (of hurt, seeking help, of disbelief, of cautioning, and the like) arising out of the fact, spontaneous reactions to a fact, and the like. It is difficult for us to describe illustration (a) under Section 6 of the Evidence Act, specially in conjunction with the words “are so connected with a fact in issue as to form a part of the same transaction”, in a manner differently from the approach characterized above.” 14. The Supreme Court in Sukhar Vs. State of U.P., (1999) 9 SCC 507 in para 6 held as under: “6. Section 6 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule where under the hearsay evidence becomes admissible. But for bringing such hearsay evidence within the provisions of Section 6, what is required to be established is that it must be almost contemporaneous with the acts and there should not be an interval which would allow fabrication. The statements sought to be admitted, therefore, as forming part of res gestae, must have been made contemporaneously with the acts or immediately thereafter. The statements sought to be admitted, therefore, as forming part of res gestae, must have been made contemporaneously with the acts or immediately thereafter. The aforesaid rule as it is stated in Wigmore’s Evidence Act reads thus: “Under the present exception [to hearsay] and utterance is by hypothesis, offered as an assertion to evidence the fact asserted (for example that a car brake was set or not set), and the only condition is that it shall have been made spontaneously, i.e. as the natural effusion of a state of excitement. Now this state of excitement may well continue to exist after the exciting fact has ended. The declaration, therefore, may be admissible even though subsequent to the occurrence, provided it is near enough in time to allow the assumption that the exciting influence continued.” 15. The Supreme Court in Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao and Anr. Vs. State of A.P., (1996) 6 SCC 241 considering the law embodied in Section 6 of the Evidence Act held as under: “15.The principle of law embodied in Section 6 of the Evidence Act is usually known as the rule of res gestae recognised in English law. The essence of the doctrine is that a fact which, though not in issue, is so connected with the fact in issue ‘as to form part of the same transaction’ that it becomes relevant by itself. This rule is, roughly speaking, an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The rationale in making certain statement or fact admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act is on account of the spontaneity and immediacy of such statement or fact in relation to the fact in issue. But it is necessary that such fact or statement must be a part of the same transaction. In other words, such statement must have been made contemporaneous with the acts which constitute the offence or at least immediately thereafter. But if there was an interval, however slight it may be, which was sufficient enough for fabrication then the statement is not part of res gestae.” 16. In other words, such statement must have been made contemporaneous with the acts which constitute the offence or at least immediately thereafter. But if there was an interval, however slight it may be, which was sufficient enough for fabrication then the statement is not part of res gestae.” 16. The Supreme Court in Rattan Singh v. State of H.P., (1997) 4 SCC 161 examined the applicability of Section 6 of the Evidence Act to the statement of the deceased and held as under: “[T]he aforesaid statement of Kanta Devi can be admitted under Section 6 of the Evidence Act on account of its proximity of time to the act of murder. Illustration 'A' to Section 6 makes it clear. It reads thus: ‘(a) A is accused of the murder of B by beating him. Whatever was said or done by A or B or the bystanders at the beating, or so shortly before or after it as to form part of the transaction, is a relevant fact.’ (emphasis supplied) Here the act of the assailant intruding into the courtyard during dead of the night, victim's identification of the assailant, her pronouncement that appellant was standing with a gun and his firing the gun at her, are all circumstances so intertwined with each other by proximity of time and space that the statement of the deceased became part of the same transaction. Hence it is admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act.” 17. Evidence of aforesaid witnesses, who were on duty in the Police Line, Baran at the time of incident provides corroboration to the version disclosed by the deceased in his dying declaration when he was in serious condition but was fully conscious. This finds corroboration also from the statements of few other witnesses, which we shall discuss presently. 18. Indra Devi (P.W.24), wife of the deceased has stated that immediately after the deceased was taken to hospital in seriously injured condition, police personnel had taken her to the hospital at Baran. Other family members were also there. Her husband at that was talking to them. Thereafter, he was taken to Government Hospital, Kota. Even there, he was talking. He told her that since he had made an adverse entry against Ramcharan, he had threatened to kill him and had in fact opened fire at him with intention to kill him. Other family members were also there. Her husband at that was talking to them. Thereafter, he was taken to Government Hospital, Kota. Even there, he was talking. He told her that since he had made an adverse entry against Ramcharan, he had threatened to kill him and had in fact opened fire at him with intention to kill him. He told the same to her in the presence of his brother. He remained hospitalised in government hospital for about seven days. Initially, his condition improved but thereafter, it deteriorated and therefore, they shifted him to Sudha Hospital where he died. Shubham Malav (P.W.12) son of the deceased has also stated that he stayed with his father in Government Hospital, Kota. Whenever he would gain consciousness, he used to tell that since he entered an adverse entry in the rojnamcha against him, Ramcharan opened fire at him. He has also stated that her mother also stayed there in the hospital. The deceased remained hospitalised in MBS Hospital, Kota from 06.10.2010 to 13.10.2010 and thereafter, since his condition deteriorated, he was shifted to Sudha Hospital, Kota. Jagdish Chandra (P.W.25) brother-in-law of the deceased has also stated that on hearing about unfortunate incident around 10.00 P.M. on 06.10.2010, he rushed to Government Hospital, Baran where he learnt that the deceased has been referred to Kota. Then he reached MBS Hospital, Kota. At that time, the deceased was being operated upon. Then he was shifted to ICU. When the deceased gained consciousness, he enquired from him as to why accused had fired at him. He told that accused fired at him because he entered an adverse entry against him in the rojnamcha. Suresh Chand (P.W.27) has also made similar statement. 19. Even if therefore, parcha bayan of the deceased is not taken as dying declaration, there is ample and overwhelming evidence on record to show that that it was none other than the accused-appellant, who opened fire at the deceased with the intention to kill him. 20. Coming now to the submission that fire arm injury was not primary cause of death, but it was owing to septicemia, which caused death of deceased, we may in this connection refer to injury report of the deceased (Exhibit P-39), according to which following injuries were sustained by the deceased: “1. 20. Coming now to the submission that fire arm injury was not primary cause of death, but it was owing to septicemia, which caused death of deceased, we may in this connection refer to injury report of the deceased (Exhibit P-39), according to which following injuries were sustained by the deceased: “1. Firearm wound (wound of entry) inverted edger, abrasion and grease collar present around wound in the size of 1 x 1 cm x cavity deep on left lateral side of lower part of chest wall at (10th inter crustal shape). 2. Firearm wound (would of exit) everted edges torn tissues protruded bleeding present in the size of 5 x 2 cm x cavity deep on right posto lateral surface of abdomen above gliac creast.” Surgeon, who operated upon the deceased has made the following note: “Firearm injury along with bullet entry wound left (Lt) lower chest, rib # (fracture), Bullet track going infra paritoneally, spleenic flexure of colan shattered, left kidney laceration, bullet track went through colon to retro paritoneally posterior to vertebra to right posterior supra gluteal/lower back” Even at that time, the opinion that was given was that injury no. 1 and 2 were dangerous to life. Eventually, when the deceased died on 22.10.2010, his body was subjected to post mortem, report of which is Exhibit P- 51. According to post mortem report (Exhibit P-51), the deceased sustained following external injuries: “1. wound in healing process and cavity deep on left lat. Aspect of chest 13 cm below left nipple. 2. wound in the size of 1 cm in healing process and cavity deep on left lat. Aspect of chest 4 cm below injury no. 1. 3. Wound in healing process in the size of 1 cm deep muscle on left shoulder. 4. Stitched wound 20 cm in mid of abdomen (Operative wound). 5. Two Stitched wounds each 5 cm long on left side of abdomen. 6. Stitched wound 4 cm long on right side of abdomen. 7. Wound in the size of 6.4 cm x cavity deep which was in healing process on left side of waist. 8. Abrasion 4x1/2 cm on right side of chest. 9. Tracheostomy wound in lower part of neck.” 21. As per post mortem report (Exhibit P-51), the deceased sustained following internal injuries: “1. Fracture of L-2 to L-5. 2. Contusion and swelling on L-2 to L-5 in spinal cord. 8. Abrasion 4x1/2 cm on right side of chest. 9. Tracheostomy wound in lower part of neck.” 21. As per post mortem report (Exhibit P-51), the deceased sustained following internal injuries: “1. Fracture of L-2 to L-5. 2. Contusion and swelling on L-2 to L-5 in spinal cord. 3. Fracture of 10th rib of left side. 4. Stitched wound in the length of 2 cm on diaphragm. 5. Stitched wound in the length of 15 cm in peritoneum. 6. Pus and blood present in abdomen cavity. Wound in the size of 4 cm in transverse colan. 7. wound in the size of ½ cm which was in healing process on upper part of kidney having clotted blood all around.” 22. The post mortem report (Exhibit P-51) indicates that the deceased had fracture of vertebra L-2 to L-5. There was contusion and swelling in spinal cord and L-2 to L-5. There was also fracture of 10th rib of left side. Cause of death was opined to be septicemia which was developed as a result of ante mortem injury to transverse colon, left kidney, vertebra and spinal cord. These injuries clearly show that his condition was through out critical due to the fire opened by the accused-appellant upon the deceased resulting into aforesaid injuries. 23. The Supreme Court in Antram Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 13 SCC 356 held that there is no hard and fast rule that in every case where the death is eventually occasioned by septicemia that developed as consequence of fatal injury, the injury should not be taken as the primary cause of death and septicemia rather than the injury should be taken as the primary cause of death and had the proper medical care been given, the deceased could have survived. Nagpur High Court in Salebhai Kadarali Vs. Emperor, AIR 1949 Nag 19 held that the offence amounted to murder even though death was ultimately due to supervention of gangrene and paralysis of intestines. The Nagpur High Court while holding so relied upon judgment of Lahore High Court in Lal Singh Vs. Emperor, AIR 1938 Lah 31. 24. Nagpur High Court in Salebhai Kadarali Vs. Emperor, AIR 1949 Nag 19 held that the offence amounted to murder even though death was ultimately due to supervention of gangrene and paralysis of intestines. The Nagpur High Court while holding so relied upon judgment of Lahore High Court in Lal Singh Vs. Emperor, AIR 1938 Lah 31. 24. In view of the law discussed above, we are of the considered opinion that even if a supervening factor causes death and the supervening factor is a necessary consequence of the injury caused by the accused, it must be held that the act of the accused itself caused the death of the victim. There is ample evidence in the present case to hold that septicemia was the direct consequence of the firm arm injuries caused to the deceased as the deceased sustained fracture of vertebra L-2 to L-5; contusion and swelling in spinal cord around those vertebras; fracture of 10th rib of left side leading to damage to left kidney and transverse colon. 25. Delay in recording of statements of some of prosecution witnesses namely Pratap Rao (P.W.16) and Indra Devi (P.W.24) under Section 161 Cr.P.C. in the facts of the present case do not make their testimony unreliable and the delay, if at all was there, the same has to be viewed in the facts of the present case. 26. While an offence to be murder punishable under Section 302 IPC has to fall in anyone of the clauses of Section 300 IPC but at the same time, it should not fall in anyone of five exceptions thereto. Offence of murder postulates that it must have been committed with the intention or knowledge described in anyone of four Clauses of Section 300 IPC. As per medical evidence on record, the deceased had fracture of vertebra L-2 to L-5. There was contusion and swelling on his spinal cord around L-2 to L-5. There was also fracture of 10th rib of left side. Cause of death was opined to be septicemia which was developed as a result of ante-mortem injuries to transverse colon, left kidney, vertebra and spinal cord. First clause of Section 300 IPC inter alia provides that culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death. Cause of death was opined to be septicemia which was developed as a result of ante-mortem injuries to transverse colon, left kidney, vertebra and spinal cord. First clause of Section 300 IPC inter alia provides that culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death. Tested on this requirement of law, the fatal injury by opening of fire by the accused which directly hit into the chest of the deceased was certainly inflicted with the intention of causing death. In the present case, injury report of the deceased (Exhibit P-39) was prepared when he was admitted in the hospital in seriously injured condition and the same has been proved by Dr. Jagdish Prasad Yadav (P.W.28). Post mortem report of the deceased (Exhibit P-51) has been proved by Dr. Rakesh Sharma (P.W.31). As per the testimony of prosecution witnesses as also medical evidence on record, intention of the accused-appellant in the present case was indeed to cause death of the deceased Narendra Malav. 27. Judgments cited by learned counsel for the accused-appellant are distinguishable on the facts of the present case and therefore they are of no help to the accused-appellants. 28. In view of above discussion, there is no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. Judgment and order dated 21.03.2016 passed by the trial court is affirmed.