JUDGMENT D.N. Patel, J. - Letters Patent Appeal No. 567 of 2015 has been preferred by the original respondent against the judgment and order dated 12th August, 2015, passed by the learned single Judge in W.P.(L) No. 3462 of 2010, whereby the petition preferred by the respondent-Management was allowed and the award passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur in Reference Case No. 5 of 1998 was quashed and set aside. Hence, the original respondent-workman has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Factual Matrix: Present appellant was appointed as Assistant Manager in the year 1988. His appointment letter is at Annexure 1 to the memo of L.P.A. No. 567 of 2015. Thereafter, he was promoted as Dy. Manager (Security & Services) on 9th October, 1991 (Annexure 4 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal). His services have been terminated on 29th October, 1994. This was a termination simpliciter. No enquiry was conducted, no charge sheet was given. Industrial dispute was raised under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and under Section 10 of the said Act appropriate Government made a Reference to the Labour Court, Jamshedpur being Reference Case No. 5 of 1998. Terms of Reference read as under: Whether the termination of services of Shri Braj Bhushan Bansal, Workman of M/s. Usha Martin Industries Limited, Gamharia, West Singhbhum is justified. If not, what relief he is entitled to? Preliminary issue raised by the Management was that this employee is not a '' workman'' ? within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as the present appellant was employed in a managerial and administrative capacity. This issue was decided by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur vide Order dated 11th January, 2007 and on the basis of evidences of Management and workman side witnesses, Labour Court, Jamshedpur passed an award on 10th March, 2010. whereby the Reference was decided to the effect that termination of services of this '' workman- (present appellant) was illegal and order of termination dated 29th October, 1994 was quashed and set aside and 50% back wages was awarded to this appellant. whereby the Reference was decided to the effect that termination of services of this '' workman- (present appellant) was illegal and order of termination dated 29th October, 1994 was quashed and set aside and 50% back wages was awarded to this appellant. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the award dated 10th March, 2010 as well as being aggrieved by order dated 11th January, 2007 (order upon preliminary issue raised by the Management) passed by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur in Reference No. 5 of 1998, the Management preferred writ petition being W.P.(L) No. 3462 of 2010, which was allowed by the learned single Judge vide judgment and order dated 12th August, 2015. L.P.A. No. 567 of 2015 has been preferred by the said '' workman against the said order dated 12th August, 2015. Being aggrieved and feeling dissatisfied by the award dated 10th March, 2010 in Reference Case No. 5 of 1998, the '' workman has also preferred a writ petition, being W.P.(L) No. 5067 of 2010 because he was granted only 50% back wages. Thus, for getting full back wages, writ petition, being W.P.(L) No. 5067 of 2010 was preferred, but, as the writ petition preferred by the Management, being W.P.(L) No. 3462 of 2010 was allowed vide order dated 12th August, 2015 and the order dated 10th March, 2010 passed by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur in Reference Case No. 5 of 1998 was quashed and set aside, as a consequential effect the writ petition preferred by the '' workman for getting full back wages was also dismissed vide order dated 12th August, 2015. Hence, the workman has also preferred another Letters Patent Appeal, being L.P.A. No. 565 of 2015 against the said order. Thus, there are two Letters Patent Appeals preferred by the '' workman- , i.e. L.P.A. No. 567 of 2015 was preferred because the writ petition preferred by the Management was allowed and L.P.A. No. 565 of 2015 was preferred because writ petition preferred by the Workman for getting full back wages was dismissed. 3. Arguments canvassed by the counsel appearing for the Appellant (Original respondent in W.P.(L) No. 3462 of 2010): Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the appellant was appointed as Assistant Manager in the year 1988. 3. Arguments canvassed by the counsel appearing for the Appellant (Original respondent in W.P.(L) No. 3462 of 2010): Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the appellant was appointed as Assistant Manager in the year 1988. His services has been terminated in the year 1994 despite the fact that His services were already confirmed by the Management and later on he was given promotion also. Termination of the services of this appellant was without giving any reason and without giving any opportunity of being heard. Moreover, no enquiry was ever been conducted by the Management during pendency of the Reference before the Labour Court, Jamshedpur. It is also submitted by the counsel for the appellant that looking to the evidences on record, no error has been committed by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur while passing order dated 11th January, 2007 that this appellant is a '' workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and no error has been committed by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur in quashing and setting aside the order of termination dated 29th October, 1994. It is also submitted by the counsel for the appellant that without assigning any reason and without giving any opportunity of being heard, services of this appellant cannot be terminated. These aspects of the matter have been properly appreciated by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur. It is also submitted by the counsel for the appellant that while exercising powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, it is unwarranted that the learned single Judge would re-appreciate the evidences before the Labour Court, Jamshedpur. This aspect of the matter has not been appreciated by the learned single Judge, hence, judgment and order dated 12th August, 2015, passed by the learned single Judge, in WP. (L) No. 3462 of 2010 as well as the order passed in W.P.(L) No. 5067 of 2010 deserves to be quashed and set aside. The Labour Court ought to have awarded full back wages to this appellant because there was no fault lying on the part of the present appellant and his services have been terminated without assigning any reason and without giving any opportunity of being heard. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the officer, who has terminated the services of this appellant vide order dated 29th Octbber, 1994, had no power, jurisdiction and authority to do so. 4. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the officer, who has terminated the services of this appellant vide order dated 29th Octbber, 1994, had no power, jurisdiction and authority to do so. 4. Arguments canvassed on behalf of the counsel appearing for the respondent (original petitioner in W.P.(L) No. 3462 of 2010): Counsel appearing for the Management submitted that this appellant is not a '' workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Looking to the appointment letter dated 9th April, 1988, which is at Annexure 1 to the memo of the L.P.A. No. 567 of 2015, he was appointed as Assistant Manager (Security & Services) and when he was informed that his services were no longer required vide order dated 29th October, 1994, at that point of time also this appellant was working as Dy. Manager (Security & Services). Thus, it is submitted by the counsel appearing for the respondent-Management that those employees who are working in Managerial capacity are not working within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is further submitted by counsel for the respondent that as per Clause 7 of the appointment letter, services of the appellant can be terminated by the Management and in presence of this Clause also no illegality has been committed by the Management in terminating the services of this appellant even after confirmation of his services. The only condition attached to termination of service is to give one month notice or one month salary in lieu of Notice. It is submitted by counsel for the respondent-Management that confirmation is not such a barrier that this appellant is immune to termination from services. It is further submitted by counsel appearing for the respondent that there is no stigma attached with the termination of the services of this appellant by the respondent-Management and therefore, there was no need for any enquiry to be held, whatsoever. It is further submitted that looking to the evidences of the Management witnesses, i.e. M1, M2, M3 and M4, it appears that they have clearly stated and narrated the duties which this appellant was performing and they are of managerial and administrative capacity. It is further submitted that looking to the evidences of the Management witnesses, i.e. M1, M2, M3 and M4, it appears that they have clearly stated and narrated the duties which this appellant was performing and they are of managerial and administrative capacity. These aspects of the matter was not appreciated by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur and hence, no error has been committed by-the learned single Judge while deciding W.P.(L) No, 3462 of 2010 and hence; L.P.A. No. 567 of 2015 may not be entertained by this Court. It is further submitted by counsel appearing for the respondent-Management that there is even a documentary evidence produced by the Management (marked as Exhibit M), which has not been denied by the '' employee'' ?, which reveals that this appellant was working in a Managerial capacity because Exhibit M discloses a report of the appellant against one security guard for initiating disciplinary action against him. It is also submitted by the counsel for the respondent that back wages cannot be given automatically just upon arguing. Nothing has been mentioned in the award dated 10th March, 2010 as to whether this appellant was gainfully employed from 29th October, 1994 till the date of award. Not a single witness has given the evidence about this aspect of the matter that this appellant was not gainfully employed from the date of his termination till the date of award and hence, no back wages can be given to this appellant. Even otherwise also, this appellant has crossed the age of superannuation, i.e. 60 years, in the year 2010, hence, no question of reinstatement arises. It is submitted that all these aspects of the matter have been properly appreciated by the learned single Judge while dismissing W.P.(L) No. 3462 of 2010 vide Order dated 12th August, 2015 and hence, L.P.A. No. 567 of 2015 may not be entertained by this Court. It is further submitted that the consequential order 12th August, 2015 passed in W.P.(L) No. 5067 of 2010 rejecting the writ petition of the appellant is also in consonance with the evidences on record and hence L.P.A. No. 565 of 2015 also may not be entertained by this Court. 5. It is further submitted that the consequential order 12th August, 2015 passed in W.P.(L) No. 5067 of 2010 rejecting the writ petition of the appellant is also in consonance with the evidences on record and hence L.P.A. No. 565 of 2015 also may not be entertained by this Court. 5. Reasons: Having heard counsels appearing for both sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and evidences on record and also looking to the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, we see no reason to entertain L.P.A. No. 567 of 2015 and consequently we see no reason to entertain L.P.A. No. 565 of 2015 also for the following facts, reasons, evidences on record and judicial pronouncements: (I) This appellant was appointed as Assistant Manager (Security & Services) with effect from 9th April, 1988 (Annexure 1 to the memo of the Letters Patent Appeal). Clause 7 of the appointment letter reads as under: '' 07. Four services will initially be on probation for a period of one year subject to extension at the discretion of the Management by the Company. During the probationery period your services can be terminated without any notice and without assigning any reasons therefore. After confirmation of your probationery period, the services would be terminable on one month''s notice on either side. The Company may however at this discretion pay one month''s salary in lieu of the period of one month''s notice.'' ? This appellant was confirmed in the services on 27th November, 1989 and he was further promoted vide order dated 9th October. 1991 on the post of Dy. Manager-Security & Services. (II) It further appears from the evidences on record that the services of this appellant was terminated on 29th October, 1994 vide order at Annexure 5 to the memo of L.P.A. No. 567 of 2015. Looking to the order of termination, it appears that it is a termination simpliciter and in consonance with clause 7 of the appointment letter. One month salary has also been given because he was confirmed in the services. (III) Industrial dispute was raised by this appellant and ultimately, appropriate government made a Reference to the Labour Court, Jamshedpur being Reference Case No. 5 of 1998. One month salary has also been given because he was confirmed in the services. (III) Industrial dispute was raised by this appellant and ultimately, appropriate government made a Reference to the Labour Court, Jamshedpur being Reference Case No. 5 of 1998. Preliminary issue was raised by the Management that this appellant was working in a managerial and administrative capacity:and hence, he is not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and hence, no industrial dispute can be raised by him and neither the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are applicable nor the reference is tenable at law. Evidences were taken and on the basis of evidences on record, Labour Court, Jamshedpur passed an order dated 11th January, 2007 (Annexure 8 to the memo of the Letters Patent Appeal No. 567 of 2015) to the effect that this appellant is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This order was challenged along with the final order dated 10th March, 2010 passed by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur by the Management before the learned single Judge. Labour Court, Jamshedpur passed an order on 10th March, 2010 quashing and setting aside the order dated 29th October, 1994 mainly on the ground that no enquiry was conducted, no opportunity of being heard was given to the workman and the order for reinstatement with 50 % back wages was passed. (IV) Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 reads as under:-'' 2(s) '' workman'' ? (IV) Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 reads as under:-'' 2(s) '' workman'' ? means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection ivith, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person- (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957(62 0/1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison, or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding [ten thousand rupees] per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly ofamanagerial nature.]'' ?, (Emphasis supplied) (V) Looking to the evidences led by the Management and workman before the Labour Court, Jamshedpur in the preliminary issue, it appears that the Management has examined as many as four witnesses. Looking to their evidences, it appears that they have clearly narrated that this appellant was employed as Assistant Manager and was promoted as Dy. Manager before his services were terminated. The nature of duty of this appellant are following: (i) To distribute the security work amongst the security guards (ii) To supervise and manage the services rendered by the security guards (iii) To sanction leave and over time wages to the security guards Appointment letter dated 9th April, 1988 reflects that this appellant was employed as Assistant Manager. Exhibit M is one of the documents the Management has produced, which disclosed a case of one security guard against whom disciplinary action was to be initiated on the report of the appellant. Looking to the promotion given to this appellant, it appears that he was also promoted to the post of Deputy Manager-Security & Services. Exhibit M is one of the documents the Management has produced, which disclosed a case of one security guard against whom disciplinary action was to be initiated on the report of the appellant. Looking to the promotion given to this appellant, it appears that he was also promoted to the post of Deputy Manager-Security & Services. Thus, looking to the evidences on record, it is explicitly clear that this appellant employee was not a workman within the meaning of 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. All employees of an industry are not workmen within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This aspect of the matter was not properly appreciated by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur while delivering award dated 11th January, 2007 which is at Annexure 8 to the memo of L.P.A. No. 567 of 2015 and no error has been committed by the learned single Judge in appreciating the duties of this appellant, which is managerial and administrative in nature. (VI) Moreover, it further appears from the evidences, on record that termination order of the respondent Management dated 29th October, 1994 (Annexure 5 to the memo of L.P.A. No. 567 of 2015)) is a termination simpliciter and no stigma has been attached. Thus, it cannot be said that it is a punitive termination. On the contrary the termination is in consonance with Clause 7 of the appointment letter, As per Clause 7 of the appointment letter, even after confirmation of the services of this appellant as Assistant Manager after giving one Notice or one month''s salary in lieu of the period of one month''s notice, his services can be brought to an end. Thus, on the basis of the evidences on record, both oral as well as documentary, no error has been committed by the learned single Judge while quashing and setting aside the order 10th March, 2010 passed by the Labour Court in Reference Case No. 5 of 1998 as well as no error has been committed by the learned single Judge while quashing Order dated 11th January, 2007 (Annexure 8 to the memo of the L.P.A. No. 567 of 2015) passed by the Labour Court in Reference Case No. 5 of 1998. (VII) Moreover, it appears that mechanically 50% back wages has been awarded by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur. (VII) Moreover, it appears that mechanically 50% back wages has been awarded by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur. Nothing has been brought on record and no question has been asked to any of the witnesses as to whether this appellant was gainfully employed from 29th October, 1994 till the award was passed by the Labour Court. It is the duty of the appellant to bring on record, if he is asking for full back wages, the fact that he is not gainfully employed. There is not an iota of evidence brought on record by this appellant that he was not gainfully employed from 29th October, 1994 till the date of award i.e. on 10th March, 2010. It appears that just upon arguing the Labour Court, Jamshedpur has mechanically passed an award of 50% back wages, which deserves to be quashed and set aside. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned single Judge while deciding W.P.(L) No. 3462 of 2010 as well as W.P.(L) No. 5067 of 2010 vide order dated 12th August, 2015. (VIII) It has been held by Hon''ble the Supreme Court in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Virendra Kumar Jayantibhai Patel, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 650 : ( AIR 1997 SC 3002 ) as under: '' 4. High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are entitled to issue directions, writs and orders for correcting the record of the inferior courts or tribunals. It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot convert itself into a court of appeal and assess the sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence in support of the finding of fact reached by the competent courts or the tribunals, but this, however, does not debar the High Court from its power to enquire whether therejs any evidence in support of a finding recorded by the inferior court or tribunal. It is well established that there is a difference between a finding based on sufficiency or adequacy of evidence and a finding based on no evidence. If the finding of fact recorded by the tribunal is based on no evidence, such a finding would suffer from error of law apparent on the face of record. It is well established that there is a difference between a finding based on sufficiency or adequacy of evidence and a finding based on no evidence. If the finding of fact recorded by the tribunal is based on no evidence, such a finding would suffer from error of law apparent on the face of record. As noticed earlier the award of the Tribunal and circulars issued in pursuance thereof by the Corporation were not applicable to the case of the respondent and if these materials are excluded, the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent is a workman entitled to permanent status in the service of the Corporation is rendered without any evidence and exposed to the vice of error apparent on the face of record. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court fell into error in dismissing the writ petition holding that the finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal does not call for interference.'' ? (Emphasis supplied) (IX) It has been held by Hon''ble the Supreme Court in Seema Ghosh v. Tata Iron & Steel Co., reported in (2006) 7 SCC 722 : ( AIR 2006 SC 2936 ) as under: '' 30. The above judgment is not only distinguishable on facts as well as on law. We have elaborately dealt with the events which led to the constitution of the Medical Board for determining the age of the workman. The workman did not challenge the opinion of the Medical Board constituted by the management for determining the age of the workman and the management permitted the workman to work till his attaining the age of retirement. Therefore, the workman in the present case is estopped from challenging the correctness of the opinion of the Medical Board after his retirement. This apart, the school leaving certificate which was produced by the workman was forwarded to the DEO, Dacca for verification who informed the management that the certificate is not genuine. The workman was to superannuate in the year 1986 but on the basis of assessment of age made by the Apex Medical Board, he was allowed to continue till 13-9-1987. At that stage, the workman did not challenge the decision of the Medical Board. The workman was to superannuate in the year 1986 but on the basis of assessment of age made by the Apex Medical Board, he was allowed to continue till 13-9-1987. At that stage, the workman did not challenge the decision of the Medical Board. It is only after enjoying the benefits given to the workman and after availing the benefits, the workman raised a dispute after his retirement in pursuance of which the Labour, Court has passed the award. The High Court has not given any undue credence to the evidence of the management or wrongly relied upon the one-sided testimony of the management as alleged by the appellant. We have already noticed that the findings arrived at by the Labour Court are nothing but perverse against the facts and it passed the award in favour of the workman on totally misplaced sympathy. In our opinion, both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench are right and within their jurisdiction in reassessing and revaluing the weight of the evidence in the case recorded by the Labour Court by which the High Court came to the concusion that the workman was not entitled to any relief. When the judgment of the Labour Court is perverse and against the facts and records, the High Court is entitled to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 and to interfere with the perverse finding and set aside the same. 31. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal filed by the wife of the workman has not force and merit or substance and, therefore, is liable to be dismissed and accordingly we do so by affirming the well considered judgment of the learned single Judge of the High Court and as affirmed by the Division Bench. No costs.'' ? (Emphasis supplied) (X) It has been held by Hon''ble the Supreme Court in Atlas Cycle (Haryana) Limited v. Kitab Singh, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 573 : ( AIR 2013 SC 1172 ), as under: '' 15. We are satisfied that the learned single Judge thoroughly analysed all the aspects and arrived at a correct conclusion. It is settled law that when the Labour Court arrived at a finding overlooking the materials on record, it would amount to perversity and the writ court would be fully justified in interfering with the said conclusion. We are satisfied that the learned single Judge thoroughly analysed all the aspects and arrived at a correct conclusion. It is settled law that when the Labour Court arrived at a finding overlooking the materials on record, it would amount to perversity and the writ court would be fully justified in interfering with the said conclusion. We are conscious of the fact that the High Court exercising writ of certiorari jurisdiction would not permit to assume the role of the appellate court, however, the Court is well within its power to interfere if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal/Labour Court had erroneously refused to admit the admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted any inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding, the writ court_would be justified in exercising its remedy. In other words, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. 16. On going through the entire reasoning of the Labour Court, materials placed and stand taken by the workman and the management, we are satisfied that the learned single Judge was fully justified in interfering with the conclusion arrived at by the Labour Court which has been rightly affirmed by the Division Bench. Consequently, the appeal of the management fails and the same is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 10,000.'' ? (Emphasis supplied) 6. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, no error has been committed by the learned single Judge while dismissing W.P.(L) No. 3462 of 2010 vide judgment and order dated 12th August, 2015 and no error has been committed by the learned single Judge while dismissing W.P.(L) No. 5067 of 2010 vide consequential order dated 12th August, 2015. we see no reason to take any other view than what has been taken by the learned single Judge. 7. There is no substance in L..P.A. No. 567 of 2015, which is dismissed. Consequentially, L.P.A. No. 565 of 2015 is also dismissed. IA. No. 1405 of 2017. I.A. No. 5514 of 2017 8. In the light of final order passed in L.P.A. No. 567 of 2015, these interlocutory applications also stand dismissed.