JUDGMENT : This appeal has been preferred against the award in OP(MV) No.2306/1995 of the II Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kozhikode by the injured. The appellant sustained injuries in a motor accident who filed a petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short 'Act') and the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.3,750/-. Being aggrieved by that, injured preferred this appeal. 2. It would be relevant and useful to mention the facts leading to this accident. The appellant's case in the lower court was that on 14.09.1995 at 11.45 pm, he was returning to his house after purchasing vegetables, when reached near Sree shine stationery shop, an auto rickshaw KL- 11/B-1378 driven in a rash and negligent manner knocked down the appellant. As a result, he sustained serious head injury, immediately, he was removed to General Hospital, Calicut, after discharging from the hospital, he continued his treatment. Due to the injuries on occipital region he developed stroke and was finally disabled, the Medical Board assessed 40% permanent disability. The insurer admitted the insurance of the vehicle. The claimant examined PW1 and his documents were marked as Exts.A1 to A15. Respondents did not adduce any evidence. 3. Adv. R. Bindu Sasthamangalam, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the appellant sustained serious injuries which resulted in Hemiplegia. The Medical Board assessed 40% permanent disability, which was not admitted by the Tribunal. The restriction provided under Section 173(2) will not apply to serious injuries like Hemiplegia where the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal awarded amount less than ten thousand rupees and it is applicable to such cases where a person sustains minor injuries. If the quantum of compensation is inadequate or excessive, that is a good ground to interfere under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by way of appeal. The amount in dispute in the appeal means all amount granted as part of the award which includes the cost and interest on the compensation till the making of the award. 4. Adv. Smt. P.A. Reziya, the learned counsel appearing for the insurer contended that no appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal under Section 173(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees. 4. Adv. Smt. P.A. Reziya, the learned counsel appearing for the insurer contended that no appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal under Section 173(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees. This court cannot ignore the legislative wisdom and policy with regard to filing of appeals, as the right of appeal is not a vested right, but it is a creature of the statute. Hence this appeal is not maintainable. 5. Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 reads as follows: “173. Appeals.- (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court : Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entrained by the High Court unless he has deposited with it twenty - five thousand rupees or fifty per cent. Of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court : Provided further that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. (2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees”. According to the Section 173(1), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court subject to the provisions of sub-section 2 of Section 173 of the Act. Section 173(2) would show that no appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees. 6. The short question raised in this appeal is whether “the amount in dispute in the appeal” means the “award amount”, alone or it includes 'interest' accrued on the amount and 'cost' ? 6. The short question raised in this appeal is whether “the amount in dispute in the appeal” means the “award amount”, alone or it includes 'interest' accrued on the amount and 'cost' ? Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 permits any person aggrieved by an award to prefer an appeal to the High Court subject to the restriction provided under sub-section (2) of the Act. Therefore the 'judgment' or 'award' is appealable against the verdict of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal provided Rule 396(2) of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989, requires the memorandum to be accompanied with certified copy of the award. The High Court has the power to scrutinise an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 at the threshold to satisfy itself that there is a prima facie case made out or to dismiss the appeal if such prima facie case is not made out. The Motor Vehicles Act is aimed to provide relief by way of compensation to the injured or the legal representatives of the deceased in the given situation. The exercise of power by the High Court should not be exerted in order to circumvent the statutory provision contained in a particular act. Sub section (2) of Section 173 clearly lays down that no appeal shall lie against any award of a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand. The 'amount in dispute' means the amount actually in dispute which is the 'amount awarded' by the tribunal without interest and cost. 7. Every word which the legislature has used under Section 173 of the Act have to be given its proper and effective meaning, as the Legislature uses no words without purpose and meaning. The theory that the statute must be read as a whole is equally applicable to different parts of the same section. The section must be construed as a whole whether or not one of the parts is a saving clause or not. Apex court in The State of Bihar v. Hira Lal Kejriwal & Anr. ( AIR 1960 SC 47 ) held that “it is not permissible to omit any part of it, the whole section should be read together”. In this context, it is better to refer the Division Bench decision of this court reported in Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. ( AIR 1960 SC 47 ) held that “it is not permissible to omit any part of it, the whole section should be read together”. In this context, it is better to refer the Division Bench decision of this court reported in Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd v. Narayani Amma ( 1984 KLT 410 ), which reads as follows: “On the words "the amount in dispute in the appeal" we might refer to State of Maharashtra v. Mishrilal Tarachand Lodha & Others, AIR 1964 SC 457 . In that case the respondent defendant filed an appeal in the High Court valuing the claim for purposes of jurisdiction and court fee at the principal amount in the plaint but ignoring the future interest decreed by the Trial Court. The question before the Supreme Court was whether this was correct and in accordance with the expression "amount or value of the subject matter in dispute" in Art.1 of schedule I of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959. The appeal memorandum did not deal with the award or rate of pendente lite interest. The amount on this account, the Supreme Court held, did not form the amount of the subject matter in dispute and that what the respondent did was correct. It is true that the Supreme Court was concerned with the amount of court fee but the decision helps to understand the content of the expression "amount in dispute". In the course of the decision the Supreme Court referred to a Privy Council case, Doorga Doss Chowdry v. Ramanauth Chowdry, 8 Moo. Ind. Appeal 262, which held that costs of a suit are not part of the subject matter in dispute in the relevant provisions relating to the grant of leave by the High Court to appeal to the Privy Council. Ind. Appeal 262, which held that costs of a suit are not part of the subject matter in dispute in the relevant provisions relating to the grant of leave by the High Court to appeal to the Privy Council. The Privy Council Said: ".......if they were allowed to be added to the principal sum claimed, it would be in the power of every litigant, by swelling the costs, to bring any suit up to the appeal able value." After quoting this passage the Supreme Court commented: "It may also be said that a litigant's conduct may lead to a protracted trial and consequently to the increase in the amount of pendente lite interest which may raise the value of the subject matter in dispute in appeal to the appeal able value".” A reading of the Section 173(2) shows that if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees, no appeal shall lie and it does not include interest and cost. Apex court in Mishrilal Tarachand Lodha' case (supra), held that the amount in dispute in the appeal is the amount actually in dispute, which does not include future interest. If that be the position, whatever be the interest and cost added in a case for preferring an appeal and bring any award up to the appealable value, which may lead to protracting the proceedings for preferring an appeal and consequently increase the amount for taking jurisdiction to prefer an appeal, which is against the provisions of Section 173(2). If such contention was permitted to be taken under Section 173(2), it would be inconsistent with the legislative object introduced under that Section. If such an interpretation is given under Section 173(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, it would be a proceeding equal to increasing the jurisdiction, ignoring the statutory restriction provided therein. In order to avoid such confusion in the statute, it has consequently given a check and balance for preferring an appeal. 8. A single judge of this court in Ajesh Alex v. John ( 2006 (4) KLT 828 ) held as follows: “The use of the term "the amount in dispute in the appeal" in sub-s.2 of S.173 is the clear expression of the legislative intent that the limit prescribed by sub-s.2 of S. 173 is not confined to the compensation determined in terms of S.168. In an appeal under S. 173 by a person liable under the award of the Tribunal he would be entitled to challenge the compensation fixed under S.168, the order for interest, costs, compensatory costs, etc. Since an award is a direction to pay, the amount due by way of interest till the date of award will also form part of the amount due as on the date of award. The right of appeal under S. 173 springs on the pronouncement of the award and therefore, if a debtor under the award is the appellant and if he challenges the award as a whole, the amount in dispute in the appeal will be the entire amount that he would be liable to pay, if he satisfied the award of the Tribunal as on the date of its pronouncement. Therefore, the phrase "the amount in dispute in the appeal" takes within its sweep all amounts granted as part of an award. So much so, the amount in dispute in the appeal. for the purpose of S. 173, would be the entire amount a person is liable to pay under the award as on the date of the award and which he disputes in the appeal. This will necessarily include the quantum of compensation fixed, the interest accrued till the 1 and awarded by the Tribunal, as also any costs or compensatory costs or any other amounts awarded and payable under the award as on the date of the award. Therefore, the only way of construing the term "the amount in dispute in the appeal" in sub-s. 2 of S. 173 is that it takes within it, any amount awarded as costs and the interest accrued on the compensation, till the date of making of the award. (para. 4)”. The above decision shows that if the award amount inclusive of costs and interest accrued till the date of award comes to ten thousand rupees or above, then an appeal would lie. If such principle is adopted, it is against the legislative expression provided under Section 173(2). In an appeal under S. 173 by a person liable under the award of the Tribunal, he would be entitled to challenge the compensation fixed under S.168, the order for interest, costs, compensatory costs, etc. If such principle is adopted, it is against the legislative expression provided under Section 173(2). In an appeal under S. 173 by a person liable under the award of the Tribunal, he would be entitled to challenge the compensation fixed under S.168, the order for interest, costs, compensatory costs, etc. There is no dispute for challenging the rate of interest or cost by filing appeal under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, but, the phrase "the amount in dispute in the appeal" means the amount granted as part of an award. The amount in the appeal for the purpose of S. 173(1), would be the amount a person is liable to pay under the award. This indicate the pecuniary limit of the person for preferring an appeal alone as stated in Narayani Amma's case (supra), not otherwise. Therefore, the value of subject matter disputed in appeal to the appealable value is the 'award amount' excluding 'interest' and 'cost'. While facing this problem in Narayani Amma's case (supra), the Court was conscious of the dividing line, interalia it has not diverted its attention from the language used in the statutory provision and encouraged an approach not intended by the legislature. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by Legislature itself. 9. The principle of interpretation of statue has been considered by the three judge bench of the apex court in Mukund Dewangan v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. ( 2017 (3) KLT 1000 ) which reads as follows: “25. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P Singh, it has been observed that a statute is an edict of a legislature and the conventional way of interpreting or construing a statute is to seek the intention of its maker. The duty of the judicature is to act upon the true intention of the legislature - men's or sentential logic. If a statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation, the Court has to choose that interpretation which furthers the intention of the legislature as laid down in Venkataswamy Naidu R. v. Narasram Naraindas ( AIR 1966 SC 361 ) and District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. (2001) 7 SCC 358 ). If a statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation, the Court has to choose that interpretation which furthers the intention of the legislature as laid down in Venkataswamy Naidu R. v. Narasram Naraindas ( AIR 1966 SC 361 ) and District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. (2001) 7 SCC 358 ). Lord Cranworth L.C. In Jane Straford Boyse v. John T.Rossborough 10 ER 1192 (HL) has observed: “There is no possibility of mistaking midnight for noon, but at what precise moment Twilight becomes darkness is hard to determine." As observed in Muray v. Foyle Meats Ltd. ((1999) 3 AII.ER 769), faced with such problems, the Court is also conscious of a dividing line, but Court has to be conscious not to divert its attention from the language used in the statutory provision and encourage an approach not intended by the legislature. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by Legislature itself, as held in Kannai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan (AIR 1967 SC 907). Each word, phrase or sentence is to be construed in the light of the general purpose of the Act itself as held in Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras ( AIR 1953 SC 274 ), Girdharilal & Sons v. Balbir Nath Mathur ( (1986) 2 SCC 237 ) and Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia (1988) 4 SCC 284 ). 26. It was held in Reserve Bank of India v. Pearless General Finance and Investment Co. ( (1987) 1 SCC 424 ) that interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say that if the text is the texture, context is what gives colour. Neither of them can be ignored. Both a important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say that if the text is the texture, context is what gives colour. Neither of them can be ignored. Both a important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. In Atmaram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia ( (1988) 4 SCC 284 ) the Court has referred to "Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England", and it has been observed that the fairest and rational method for interpreting a statute is by exploring the intention of the legislature through the most natural and probable signs which are 'either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequence, and the facts and reasons of law'. The correct interpretation is one that best harmonises the words with the object of the statute. A right construction of the Act can only be attained if the whole object and scope together with circumstances in which it is enacted are taken into consideration. Lord Porter in Bhagwan Baksh Singh (Raja) v. Secretary of State ( AIR 1940 PC 82 ) has further referred that the statute has to be read as a whole in context. So as to arrive at the meaning of a certain provision in a statute, it is not only legitimate but proper to read that provision in its context. The context here means the statute as a whole, the previous state of law, other statutes in pari materia, the general scope of the statute and the mischief that was intended to remedy as observed in R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka (1992) 1 SCC 335 ), Powdrill v. Watson ((1995) 2 All ER 65), R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Exparte Daly ((2001) 3 AlI ER 433) and a decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd.& Ors. (2001) 4 SCC 139 ). To ascertain the meaning of a clause, the Court must look at the whole statute at what precedes and at what succeeds and not merely at the clause itself as observed in Queen v. Eduljee Byramjee (1946) 3 MIA 468 and National insurance Co. Ltd. v. Anjana Shyam & Ors. (2007 (3) KLT 993 (SC) (2007) 7 SCC 445 ). To ascertain the meaning of a clause, the Court must look at the whole statute at what precedes and at what succeeds and not merely at the clause itself as observed in Queen v. Eduljee Byramjee (1946) 3 MIA 468 and National insurance Co. Ltd. v. Anjana Shyam & Ors. (2007 (3) KLT 993 (SC) (2007) 7 SCC 445 ). It was also observed that the same word by the author may mean one thing in one context and another in a different context. For this reason, the same word used in different sections of a statute or even when used at different places in the same clause or section of the statute may bear different meanings. The conclusion, that the language used by the legislature is plain or ambiguous can only be arrived at by studying the statute as a whole. Every word and expression which the legislature uses have to be given its proper and effective meaning, as the Legislature uses no expression without purpose and meaning. The principle that the statute must be read as a whole is equally applicable to different parts of the same section. The section must be construed as a whole whether or not one of the parts is a saving clause or a proviso. It is not permissible to omit any part of it, the whole section should be read together as held in The State of Bihar v. Hira Lal Kejriwal & Anr. ( AIR 1960 SC 47 ). 27. The author has further observed that the courts strongly lean against a construction which reduces the statutes to a futlity as held in M. Pentiah & Ors Muddala Veeramallappa ( AIR 1961 SC 1107 ) and Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam & Ors. (1989) 3 SCC 709 ). When the words of a statute are clear or unambiguous ie. they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences as held in Nelson Motis v. Union of India & Anr. (1992) 4 SCC 711 ), Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit & Ors v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2001) 4 ScC 534 and Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta (2005 (1) KLT 443 (SC) = (2005)25 SCC 271 ). (1992) 4 SCC 711 ), Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit & Ors v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2001) 4 ScC 534 and Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta (2005 (1) KLT 443 (SC) = (2005)25 SCC 271 ). It is also a settled proposition of law that when the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute arises for the Act speaks for itself as held in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Vijay Anand Maharaj ( AIR 1963 SC 946 ). 28. In Crawford v. Spooner (1846) 6 Moo. PC 1) which has been referred to in Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar & Ors. ( AIR 1953 SC 148 ) it has been held that “the Court cannot aid the Legislature's defective phrasing of an Act or add K.L.T11-9-2017 and amend or, by construction, make up deficiencies which are left in the Act." In British India General Insurance Co. Ltd. v Captain Itbar Singh & Ors, ( AIR 1959 SC 1331 ) while construing S.96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, this Court refused to add the word 'also' after the words 'on any of the following grounds'. It was observed that the rule of interpretation does not permit the Court to do unless the section, as it stands, is meaningless or is of doubtful meaning. While interpreting Section 621-A(1) of Companies Act, 1956 in VLS Finance Ltd. v. Union of India (2013 (2) KLT SN 115 (C. No.146) SC (2013)6 SCC 278 ) this Court held that the Court must avoid rejection or addition of words and resort to that only in exceptional circumstances. 29. The words cannot be read into an Act, unless the clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. It is one of the principles of statutory interpretation that may matter which should have been, but has not been provided for in a statute, cannot be supplied by courts, as to do so will be legislation and not construction as held in Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun-Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. ( AIR 1933 PC 63 ) Kamalrajan Roy v. Secretary of State (AIR 1938 PC 281) and Karnataka State Financial Corporation v. N Narsimahaiah (2008 (2) KLT SN 10 (C.No. 11) SC= (2008) 5 SCC 176 ). The court cannot supply casus omissus. 10. Ltd. ( AIR 1933 PC 63 ) Kamalrajan Roy v. Secretary of State (AIR 1938 PC 281) and Karnataka State Financial Corporation v. N Narsimahaiah (2008 (2) KLT SN 10 (C.No. 11) SC= (2008) 5 SCC 176 ). The court cannot supply casus omissus. 10. To understand the meaning of the Section, the court must look at the whole meaning of the words and not at the split portion of it. By exploring the intention of the legislature through the natural words, its effect and consequences, then only the fairest and rational method of interpretation is possible. The proper interpretation is one that best corresponds the words with the object of the statute. A right formation of the Act can only be achieved if the whole object and scope together with circumstances under which it is enacted are taken into consideration. From the aforesaid principles, it is apparent that plain and simple meaning has to be given to S.173(2). When the legislature has not amended the section, this court cannot re-write S.173(2). The plain and literal interpretation of existing provisions shows award amount alone excluding interest and cost. When legislature has not amended the aforesaid section, it is not for the Court to legislate by making insertion in S.173(2). What has not been provided in the statute with a purpose, cannot be supplied by the courts. In other words, interpretation as suggested by appellant would mean rewriting of the section, which is not permissible in the light of the aforesaid discussion. Once the legislature in its wisdom has thought it fit that no appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal, if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than Rs.10,000/-, this court cannot lend its aid to the petitioner to circumvent the statutory bar by enabling it to question the award collaterally on technical grounds. It is an admitted fact that this court cannot sit in judgment over the legislative wisdom and policy in, regard to filing of appeals, more so when it is remembered that right of appeal is not a vested right or a constitutional right but a creature of the statute. There is no inherent right of appeal from the original forum unless such a right is created by the statute which creates the forum. There is no inherent right of appeal from the original forum unless such a right is created by the statute which creates the forum. In other words, right of appeal is a creature of statute and it is for the legislature to provide or not to provide appeal. The legislature can also impose conditions for the maintainability of an appeal. Similarly, the legislature can create a total bar of appeal under certain circumstances. In the light of the express statutory bar under Section 173(2) of the Act, interalia, the law settled in Narayani Amma's case (supra) by the division bench of this court, the decision in Ajesh Alex (supra) is not good in law in interfering with the award by way of appeal on technical reasons. 11. Another question that has to be considered in this context is that if the quantum of compensation is inadequate or excessive whether that is a good ground to interfere by way of appeal. In permanent disability cases, the Tribunal has to award just amount as compensation to the victim. [Apex court settled the above Principle in the following decisions: Yadava Kumar v. D.M. National Insurance Co. Ltd. ( 2010 (8) Scale 567 ), Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar [ 2010 (12) Scale 265 , Aravind Kumar Misra v. New India Assurance Company Ltd ( 2010 (10) Scale 298 )]. At the same time, if the findings of the Tribunal are utterly perverse or the Tribunal has misdirected itself on points of law, no doubt this Court can and will interfere in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. This court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction will certainly interfere with the impugned award, provided that sufficient grounds are made out in notwithstanding the finality clause. The ground usually urged in support of such interference are illegality and irregularity in the proceedings of the Tribunal, jurisdictional error or defect or the order being not in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure resulting in miscarriage of justice. Appellant in this case sustained serious injuries and is permanently disabled, but Tribunal had declined to accept the disability certificate and awarded a meagre amount. He is a manual labourer and the sole breadwinner of his family, who was aged 33 years at the time of accident, hence he is entitled to get just amount as compensation. Appellant in this case sustained serious injuries and is permanently disabled, but Tribunal had declined to accept the disability certificate and awarded a meagre amount. He is a manual labourer and the sole breadwinner of his family, who was aged 33 years at the time of accident, hence he is entitled to get just amount as compensation. The restriction provided under Section 173(2) will not apply where the claimant sustains serious injuries like Hemiplegia and the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal awarded amount less than ten thousand rupees which amounts to an illegality to interfere. If the quantum of compensation is inadequate or excessive, that is a good ground to interfere under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by way of appeal. No reasons were given by the Tribunal for its non acceptance of the disability certificate. There was no discussion whether the permanent disability has prevented him from continuing his avocation. The Doctor was examined as PW1 in this case to prove the disability, but the insurer contended in the lower court that the evidence of PW1, itself, is not sufficient to assess the disability at 40% and accordingly the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal observed that in the absence of convincing evidence, the appellant is not entitled to get higher amount as compensation. Both parties admitted that the injured is suffering from various ailments and is disabled. In this context this court is of the view that the injured is entitled to get just amount as compensation. 12. Apex court in Nagappa Mahadev Doddaamani v. New India assurance company Ltd and Another ( 1998 9 SCC 271 ) held that: “It is settled that in appeal interference is made with quantum of compensation only on the ground of inadequacy or the same being too excessive, as the case may be.” The victim sustained serious injuries and is permanently disabled, therefore, he is entitled to get just amount as compensation. It is settled law that in appeal, interference can be made with quantum of compensation only on the ground of inadequacy or the same being too excessive, as the case may be. Obviously, the illegality committed by the Tribunal is a reasonable ground to interfere in this appeal ignoring the statutory limits provided under Section 173(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Obviously, the illegality committed by the Tribunal is a reasonable ground to interfere in this appeal ignoring the statutory limits provided under Section 173(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. In view of Nagappa's case (supra), the High Court can admit such appeal and exercise its discretion for awarding just amount as compensation. In the circumstance, the award of the Tribunal is set aside and the case is remitted to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. Both parties are directed to appear before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal on 08.04.2019. On such appearance the Tribunal shall consider the disability certificate and after giving opportunity to both parties, dispose the matter as per law within three months from the date of their appearance.