ORDER : 1. The present review application has been filed for review/recall of the judgment and order dated 14.03.2018 passed in W.P. (C) No. 1234 of 2017 by which the writ petition was disposed of as not maintainable at that stage, giving liberty to the petitioner to file an appeal in terms of section 60 of Bihar and Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act, 1914 (as adopted by the State of Jharkhand). 2. The fact of the case, in nutshell, is that the petitioner and Jharkhand State Food And Civil Supplies Corporation Limited, Sahibganj entered into an agreement for milling of paddy by lifting it from the LAMPS and production of custom milled rice. The petitioner lifted some quantity of rice from the LAMPS, Pakur and supplied the custom milled rice to the Food Corporation of India, Pakur however the same was rejected. Thereafter, the petitioner did not lift the paddy from LAMPS alleging the poor quality of the paddy. After the inquiry, The District Cooperative Officer, Pakur vide letter no. 381 dated 20.09.2016 requested the Joint Secretary, Food, Public Distribution and Consumer Department, Government of Jharkhand to permit Pakur LAMPS to sell the remaining paddy grains for the purpose of returning the fund to the State Government. The Secretary, Food, Public Distribution Department vide letter no. 4226 dated 20.10.2016 directed the Deputy Commissioner of all districts in the State of Jharkhand including Pakur district to take all steps for realization of the amount given to LAMPS for purchase of paddy grains. Thus, so far as Pakur district is concerned, a certificate proceeding vide Certificate Case No. 46 of 2016-17 was initiated and the order of realization of an amount of Rs.47,13,630/- was passed against both the LAMPS, Pakur and the present petitioner. 3. A writ petition being W.P.(C) no. 1234 of 2017 was filed by the present petitioner challenging the initiation of certificate proceeding. During the pendency of the writ petition, the order dated 01.08.2017 was passed by the Additional Collector cum Certificate Officer, Pakur (respondent no. 3) in Certificate Case no. 46 of 2016-17 which was also subsequently challenged by filing I.A No. 6592 of 2017. 4. 1234 of 2017 was filed by the present petitioner challenging the initiation of certificate proceeding. During the pendency of the writ petition, the order dated 01.08.2017 was passed by the Additional Collector cum Certificate Officer, Pakur (respondent no. 3) in Certificate Case no. 46 of 2016-17 which was also subsequently challenged by filing I.A No. 6592 of 2017. 4. The said writ petition was disposed of with the following observations:- “I find force in the said submission of the learned G.A. It appears that another writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 5773/2016 filed by Pakur Large Area Multi Purpose Society (LAMPS) Ltd. Pakur, through its member secretary-cum-manager, Shyamal Kant Saha, who is the co-certificate debtor in Certificate Case No. 46/2016-17, has already been disposed of by a coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 17.08.2017 in view of availability of the efficacious remedy for redressal of the grievance by way of filing of appeal under section 60 of the Act, 1914. The present writ petition, which is arising out of the similar transaction, cannot be entertained on merit at this stage. Accordingly, to maintain parity between two sets of certificate debtors, though both may have their own contentions against the action of the State-respondents, it seems appropriate that the petitioner should avail the statutory remedy of appeal before the appellate authority in terms with Section 60 of the Act, 1914. The present writ petition is thus not maintainable at this stage. However, it is observed that if the petitioner files an appeal under section 60 of the Act, 1914 by 30th April, 2018, no coercive action shall be taken against the petitioner for realization of the dues. If the petitioner files an application for stay in the said appeal, the appellate authority shall consider the same and pass appropriate order in accordance with law at the earliest. The appellate authority shall also consider the application for condonation of delay keeping in view of the fact that the present writ petition remained pending before this Court for about a year. It is, however, made clear that this Court has not expressed any view on the merit of this case and the appellate authority shall decide the appeal preferred by the petitioner on its own merit considering the relevant facts and the law.” 5. It is, however, made clear that this Court has not expressed any view on the merit of this case and the appellate authority shall decide the appeal preferred by the petitioner on its own merit considering the relevant facts and the law.” 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Certificate proceeding being Certificate Case No. 46 of 2016-17, which was initiated for recovery of the alleged loss equal to the price of paddy, was not maintainable as the said amount cannot be termed as ‘public demand’ within the meaning of Bihar & Orissa Public Demand and Recovery Act, 1914 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1914). If the original proceeding itself is not maintainable, the remedy does not lie in filing appeal as the appeal would equally be not maintainable. Neither there was any demand raised against the petitioner nor the petitioner could have been made liable to pay the price of paddy or any loss caused to the government as there was no privity of contract between the petitioner and the State Government with regard to the safe custody of paddy or storing of the same. The petitioner was simply required to mill the paddy received from the LAMPS and supply the same to Food Corporation of India and admittedly there was no complaint that the petitioner had not fulfilled its contractual obligations. It is further submitted that the case of Pakur LAMPS (W.P.(C) No. 5773 of 2016) was different from the case of the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner puts reliance on a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Namit Sharma reported in (2013) 10 SCC 359 . Learned counsel also puts reliance on a judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Canara Bank Vs. N.G. Subbaraya Shetty & Anr., 2018(3) JLJR (SC) 115 (Civil Appeal No. 4233 of 2018). 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. All the grounds raised in the present review application were already agitated at the time of hearing of the writ petition i.e. W.P.(C) no. N.G. Subbaraya Shetty & Anr., 2018(3) JLJR (SC) 115 (Civil Appeal No. 4233 of 2018). 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. All the grounds raised in the present review application were already agitated at the time of hearing of the writ petition i.e. W.P.(C) no. 1234 of 2017, however this court did not entertain the said contentions in view of the fact that in a similar matter being W.P. (C) No. 5773 of 2016, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court had not entertained the writ petition giving liberty to the petitioner of that case to file appeal under section 60 of the Act, 1914. 8. In the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aibam Pishak Sharma, reported in (1979) 4 SCC 389 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “3. ……… It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.” (emphasis supplied) 9. In the case of Parsion Devi and others Vs. Sumitri Devi and others, reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: 9. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.” (emphasis supplied) 9. In the case of Parsion Devi and others Vs. Sumitri Devi and others, reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: 9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”. 10. In the case of Haryana State Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Mawasi and others, reported in (2012) 7 SCC 200 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 27. The aforesaid provisions have been interpreted in several cases. We shall notice some of them. In S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, this Court referred to the judgments in Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai and Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Sing and observed: “19. Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or reconsideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Sing that an order made by the Court was final and could not be altered: (Rajunder Narain Rae case, MIA p. 216) ‘… nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, errors have been introduced, these courts possess, by common law, the same power which the courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in. … The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The Lords have, however, gone a step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects, in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies.’ Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under: ‘It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard.’ Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. Our Constitution-makers who had the practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order 40 had been framed empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The expression, ‘for any other sufficient reason’ in the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of court. The court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice.” 28. In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, the three-Judge Bench referred to the provisions of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure, which was similar to Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and observed: “32. … It is needless to emphasise that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order 47 Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order 47 Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely, (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, and (iii) for any other sufficient reason. It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words ‘any other sufficient reason’ must mean ‘a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule’. (See Chhajju Ram v. Neki.) This conclusion was reiterated by the Judicial Committee in Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi v. Parath Nath and was adopted by our Federal Court in Hari Sankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter, FC at pp. 110-11. The learned counsel appearing in support of this appeal recognises the aforesaid limitations and submits that his case comes within the ground of ‘mistake or error apparent on the face of the record’ or some ground analogous thereto.” 29. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P., another three-Judge Bench reiterated that the power of review is not analogous to the appellate power and observed: “11. … A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. We do not consider that this furnishes a suitable occasion for dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any great detail, but it would suffice for us to say that where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions, entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out.” 30. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, this Court answered in affirmative the question whether the High Court can review an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution and proceeded to observe: “3. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, this Court answered in affirmative the question whether the High Court can review an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution and proceeded to observe: “3. … But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.” 32. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, the Court observed: “9. … An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC … A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be ‘an appeal in disguise’.” 33. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India, R.P. Sethi, J., who concurred with S. Saghir Ahmad, J., summarised the scope of the power of review in the following words: “56. … Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised.” 34. In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik, the Court observed: “13. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised.” 34. In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik, the Court observed: “13. … The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing ‘on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason’. The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict.” 35. In State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta, the Court considered the question whether a Tribunal established under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 can review its decision, referred to Section 22(3) of that Act, some of the judicial precedents and observed: “21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court earlier. 22. The term ‘mistake or error apparent’ by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. 22. The term ‘mistake or error apparent’ by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision.” 11. It has consistently been held in the aforesaid judgments that a review petition cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, even after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the original order was made. It may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any such analogous ground. 12. I have perused the judgment of Namit Sharma (supra.) as has been relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Para 21 of the said judgment reads as under:- “21. Review of a judgment or order of this Court under Article 137 of the Constitution is confined to only errors apparent on the face of the record as provided in Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966. A three-Judge Bench of this Court has held in CST v. Pine Chemicals Ltd. that if a reasoning in the judgment under review is at variance with the clear and simple language in a statute, the judgment under review suffers from a manifest error of law, an error apparent on the face of the record, and is liable to be rectified. Hence, in these review petitions, we have to decide whether the reasoning and directions in the judgment under review is at variance with the clear and simple language employed in the different provisions of the Act and accordingly whether the judgment under review suffers from manifest errors of law apparent on the face of the record.” 13. I have also perused the judgment of N.G. Subbaraya Sheety (supra.) wherein it has been held that an erroneous decision of jurisdiction issue is not a binding precedence to create a res- judicata as against the petitioner. However, in the present case, the petitioner has not brought on record any new fact, rather has reiterated the grounds already agitated in the writ petition. The argument of learned counsel for the review petitioner is not acceptable in view of the fact that no manifest error of law appears on the face of the order dated 14.03.2018 passed in W.P.(C) no. 1234 of 2017. Thus, the judgments relied upon by the petitioner are not applicable in the facts and circumstance of the present case. It is a case where this Court refrained from entertaining the writ petition on merit at that stage with a view to maintain parity between two sets of certificate debtors and thus, the petitioner was directed to avail statutory remedy of appeal before the appellate authority in terms with Section 60 of the Act, 1914. It is a well settled principle of law that appeal is continuation of suit and the power of the appellate court is co-extensive with that of the trial court. What could be done by the trial court in the proceeding of a suit, can always be done by the appellate court in the interest of justice. Thus, I do not find any force in the submission of the review petitioner that there is any apparent error in the order dated 14.03.2018 passed by this Court in W.P. (C) No. 1234 of 2017. 14. For the reasons as aforesaid, the present civil review is dismissed. 15. Consequently I.A. No. 4049 of 2018 also stands dismissed.