ORDER : This revision petition of wife and son arises out of the order dated 14.10.2010 in Criminal Miscellaneous No.375 of 2008 passed by the Judge Family Court, Belgaum. By the impugned order the trial Court has rejected the claim of the 1st petitioner for maintenance and granted maintenance of Rs.500/- per month to the 2nd petitioner till he attains majority. 2. The petitioners filed Criminal Miscellaneous No.375 of 2008 alleging that they are the wife and son of the respondent and after the marriage, respondent and his family members subjecting the 1st petitioner to physical and mental cruelty in connection with their unlawful demands, when she was 4 months pregnant, drove her out of the matrimonial home. They further contended that, after the respondent driving her from the matrimonial home she took shelter in her parental house and stayed with the 2nd petitioner. They contended that the respondent having sufficient means has willfully neglected to maintain them despite the issue of notice dated 09.11.2006 and has contracted the 2nd marriage. 3. The respondent contested the petition denying of allegations of cruelty, driving out the 1st petitioner from the matrimonial home. He contended that the 1st petitioner was nagging, non-cooperative, was insisting him to stay with her in her parental house and she herself has deserted him. He further contended that he was working as cleaner in truck and earning Rs.75/- per day and maintaining his old aged parents. He further contended that he cannot afford to pay separate maintenance to the petitioners. So far as the notice, he contended that he has issued a befitting reply to the same. 4. Petitioner got examined herself as PW-1. Respondent got examined himself as RW-1. Though, he examined RW-2 to substantiate his claim of willful desertion on the part of petitioner No.1, RW-2 did not tender himself for cross-examination. Therefore his evidence was discarded. On behalf of the petitioners, copy of the notice was marked as Ex.P-1. 5. 4. Petitioner got examined herself as PW-1. Respondent got examined himself as RW-1. Though, he examined RW-2 to substantiate his claim of willful desertion on the part of petitioner No.1, RW-2 did not tender himself for cross-examination. Therefore his evidence was discarded. On behalf of the petitioners, copy of the notice was marked as Ex.P-1. 5. The trial Court after hearing the parties, by the impugned order rejected the claim of the 1st petitioner and granted maintenance of Rs.500/- per month only to the 2nd petitioner on the following grounds : (i) During the conciliation proceedings before the Presiding Officer respondent offered to setup a separate house for the 1st petitioner, still she did not agree to join the respondent and father of the 1st petitioner refused to send her to the matrimonial home. (ii) Petitioners did not examine the father of the 1st petitioner to substantiate their contention that his several requests to the respondent to take back the 1st petitioner went in vain. (iii) Cruelty alleged by the petitioner is not proved. (iv) The 1st petitioner has failed to prove the willful negligence or refusal on the part of the respondent to maintain her. (v) The respondent earns only Rs.75/- per day, therefore award of Rs.500/- per month to the second petitioner is reasonable. 6. Sri. Abhisheka Patil for Sri. M.G. Naganuri the learned counsel appearing for petitioners seeks to assail the impugned order on the following grounds : (i) The proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C are not pari materia to the criminal cases and the moment of the petitioner/wife enters the witness box and states that she has no sufficient means and the husband failed and neglected to maintain her, it would be for the husband to prove otherwise ; (ii) The husband on receipt of the notice Ex.P-1 did not reply the same contraverting the allegations of cruelty, willful negligence to maintain the petitioners or his means. (iii) The trial Court’s reference in the impugned order regarding the conciliation proceedings which were conducted in the chamber of the Judge to base the same to decline the relief is total violation of Rule 8 of the Family Courts (Procedure) Rules, 1987. (iii) The trial Court’s reference in the impugned order regarding the conciliation proceedings which were conducted in the chamber of the Judge to base the same to decline the relief is total violation of Rule 8 of the Family Courts (Procedure) Rules, 1987. (iv) The finding of the trial Court that respondent’s income is Rs.75/- per day is unsustainable as the respondent had not denied the claim made in the notice Ex.P-1, that he owns two immoveable properties and operating taxi and earns Rs.5,000/- per month. (v) Regarding the procedure of acceptance of evidence by the family Court in the proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C raised for the first time before this Court he submitted that the proceedings before the Family Court are civil in nature and Section 10(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (for short ‘Act’) empowers the Family Court to adopt its own procedure in deciding the truth of the matter. 7. In support of his contentions he relies upon the following judgments : (1) Iqbal Bano Vs. State of U.P. and another, (2007) 6 SCC 785 . (2) Rajathi Vs. C.Ganesan (1999) 6 SCC 326 . (3) Smt. Channakha & Others. Vs. Mahantappa, 2006 (4) Crimes 692. (4) Balan Nair Vs. Bhavani Amma Valsalamma and Others, AIR 1987 Ker 110 . (5) Aniket Subhash Tupe Vs. Mrs. Piyusha Aniket Tupe and another, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 601. (6) Bhuwan Mohan Singh Vs. Meena and Others, (2015) 6 SCC 353 . (7) Shamima Farooqui Vs. Shahid Khan, (2015) 5 SCC 705 . (8) Vijay Kumar Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 196. (9) Aruna Choudhary Vs. Sudhakar Choudhary, 2004 (2) M.P.L.J. (10) S.A.L. Narayan Row and Another Vs. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas and Another and connected matter, AIR 1965 SC 1818 . (11) State of Punjab Vs. Naib Din (2001) 8 SCC 578 . (12) Sarswati v. Narayan, 2015 SCC OnLine Raj 9135. (13) K.A. Abdul Jaleel Vs. T.A. Shahida, (2003) 4 SCC 166 . (14) Jagdish Prasad Vs. IVth Addl. Session Judge, Varanasi and others, 1995 SCC OnLine All 138. (15) Sri. K. Manjunath Reddy Vs. Smt.Latha A.C, Criminal Petition No.1726 of 2016 D.D. 01.08.2016. (16) Badshah Vs. Urmila Badshah Godse and another, (2014) 1 SCC 188 . (17) Rajendra Prasad Gupta Vs. Prakash Chandra Maishra and another, (2011) 2 SCC 705 . (18) Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh Vs. (15) Sri. K. Manjunath Reddy Vs. Smt.Latha A.C, Criminal Petition No.1726 of 2016 D.D. 01.08.2016. (16) Badshah Vs. Urmila Badshah Godse and another, (2014) 1 SCC 188 . (17) Rajendra Prasad Gupta Vs. Prakash Chandra Maishra and another, (2011) 2 SCC 705 . (18) Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and Others and connected matter, (1990) 3 SCC 682 . (19) B.N. Nagarajan Vs. Venkataramanappa (Since Deceased) by his L.Rs, (2013) 2 AIR Kant R 652. 8. Per Contra, Sri. Sharad V. Magadum the learned counsel for the respondent seeks to sustain the impugned order on the following grounds : (1) In the proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C the affidavit evidence is not acceptable. (2) The wife herself is guilty of desertion. (3) The petitioners failed to prove the alleged 2nd marriage of the respondent (4) The petitioners did not adduce any concrete evidence of proof of the income of respondent, his contention of earning Rs.75/- per day by driving profession is rightly accepted by the trial Court. 9. In support of his contentions he seeks to rely on the following judgments : (1) Gayathri Vs. Ramesh, ILR 1993 KAR 1857 (DB). (2) Shri. Ujwal S/o. Manikchand Shaha Vs. Smt. Bharati W/o. Ujwal Saha and another, RPFC No.100134 of 2015, 06.04.2018, 2018(4) KLJ 308. (3) Nand Lal Misra, Vs. Kanhaiya Lal Misra, AIR 1960 SC 882 (DB). (4) Smt. Sunanda and Anr. Vs. Bharat Naik, ILR 2011 KAR 1040. (5) Bombay High Court judgment in Mr. Anil Ambashankar Joshi Vs. Mrs.Reena Anil Joshi and another, Writ Petition No.4243 of 2015 D.D. 05.12.2016. (6) Rama Prasanna Tiwari Vs. Smt. Ashima and Anr. 2005 (2) MPHT 192 . (7) S.A.L. Narayan Row and Anr. Vs. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas and Anr and connected matter AIR 1965 SC 1818 . (8) S. Sethurathinam Pillai Vs. Barbara Alias Dolly Sethurathinam, 1971 (3) SCC 923 . (9) Sathyabhama and etc. Vs. Ramachandran and etc. 1997 CRI. L. J. 4306. (10) Peter P.O. Vs. Sara, AIR 2007 KERALA 81. (11) Rajasthan High Court (DB) Judgment in Lalit Shanker Vs. Smt.Sunder Bai, Criminal Revision Petition No.177/2012 D.D. 11.09.2013. (12) Mrs. Komal S.Padukone Vs. Principal Judge, Family Court, Bangalore City and Another, AIR 1999 Kant 427. (13) Kerala High Court Judgment in Sindhu P.K. Vs. Sunil Kumar P.A and another, RP.No.507 of 2014® in OP (FC). 4076/2013 D.D. 26.06.2014. (11) Rajasthan High Court (DB) Judgment in Lalit Shanker Vs. Smt.Sunder Bai, Criminal Revision Petition No.177/2012 D.D. 11.09.2013. (12) Mrs. Komal S.Padukone Vs. Principal Judge, Family Court, Bangalore City and Another, AIR 1999 Kant 427. (13) Kerala High Court Judgment in Sindhu P.K. Vs. Sunil Kumar P.A and another, RP.No.507 of 2014® in OP (FC). 4076/2013 D.D. 26.06.2014. (14) Punjab-Haryana High Court Judgment in Gurtej Singh Vs. Balwinder Kaur, CRM-M-1798-2012 (O & M) D.D. May 1, 2013. (15) Dr. Vijay Laxmi Sadho Vs. Jagdish, AIR 2001 SC 600 . 10. Having regard to the rival contentions, the point that arises for consideration is “whether the trial Court was justified in rejecting the claim of the wife for maintenance and awarding only Rs.500/- per month to the 2nd petitioner?” 11. There is no dispute that the marriage of the 1st petitioner and the respondent was solemnized on 12.10.2002 at Belagavi and the 2nd Petitioner is born out of the said wedlock. At the time of the filing the petition he was aged 4 years. Respondent also did not dispute that since the time of the birth of the 2nd petitioner, both petitioners are residing in the parental house of the 1st petitioner. The respondent has not initiated any legal action seeking restitution of conjugal rights or custody of the child. 12. The respondent has not challenged the award of the maintenance to the 2nd petitioner. Therefore, the finding of negligence on the part of the respondent in maintaining the 2nd petitioner has attained finality. He does not dispute the service of notice Ex.P-1. Though he said that he issued befitting reply to Ex.P-1, he failed to substantiate said contention. REGARDING VALIDITY OF ACCEPTANCE OF EVIDENCE BY WAY OF AFFIDAVIT: 13. For the first time before this Court, the learned counsel for the respondent vehemently contends that the acceptance of evidence by way of affidavit in the proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C is bad in law. The respondent has not challenged the order on such ground. At the earliest point of time he did not object adopting such procedure. Before the trial Court, the petitioners as well as the respondent have filed their examination-in-chief by way of affidavit. The respondent did not object the same before the trial Court. Therefore, such objection before this Court for the first time is only to take an unfair advantage. 14. Before the trial Court, the petitioners as well as the respondent have filed their examination-in-chief by way of affidavit. The respondent did not object the same before the trial Court. Therefore, such objection before this Court for the first time is only to take an unfair advantage. 14. Apart from that, these were not the proceedings before a Magistrate under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. The proceedings were filed before the Family Court. Section 10 of the Act deals with the procedure to be adopted by the Family Court which reads as follows : “10. Procedure generally : (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908) and of any other law for the time being in force shall apply to the suits and proceedings (other than the proceeding under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) before a Family Court and for the purpose of the said provisions of the Code, a Family Court shall be deemed to be a Civil Court and shall have all the powers of such Court. (2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or the rules made there under, shall apply to the proceedings under Chapter IX of that Code before a Family Court. (3) Nothing in sub section (1) or subsection (2) shall prevent a Family Court from laying down its own procedure with a view to arrive at a settlement in respect of the subject matter of the suit or proceedings or at the truth of the facts alleged by the one party and denied by the other.” 15. Relying on Section 10(2) and the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Gayathri’s case and Single Bench judgments of this Court in Smt. Sunanda’s case and Shri Ujwal’s case, learned counsel for the respondent contends that Section 10(2) of the Act is not subject to Section 10(3) of the Act. In this regard he also relied on the Judgments of High Court of Bombay in Anil Ambashankar Joshi’s case and Kerala High Court in Satyabhama’s case, Peter P.O’s case, Madhyapradesh High Court in Lalitshankar’s case referred to supra. 16. Per contra, Sri. In this regard he also relied on the Judgments of High Court of Bombay in Anil Ambashankar Joshi’s case and Kerala High Court in Satyabhama’s case, Peter P.O’s case, Madhyapradesh High Court in Lalitshankar’s case referred to supra. 16. Per contra, Sri. Abhisheka Patil, learned counsel for the petitioners relying on the Judgments of the Supreme Court in Iqbal Banu’s case, Vijaykumar Prasad’s case, Badshah’s case referred to supra contends that the Act being a social justice legislation, when there is possibility of two constructions the Courts have a duty to give purposive interpretation to achieve the constitutional vision of social justice giving special protection and benefits to the vulnerable group. He further submits that in Iqabal Banu’s case and Vijaykumar Prasad’s case the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C are civil in nature and those judgments have to be followed in interpreting Section 10 of the Act. 17. In Badshah’s case referred to supra while dealing with the proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows : “13.3. Thirdly, in such cases, purposive interpretation needs to be given to the provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C. While dealing with the application of a destitute wife or hapless children or parents under this provision, the Court is dealing with the marginalized sections of the society. The purpose is to achieve “social justice” which is the constitutional vision, enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of India. The Preamble to the Constitution of India clearly signals that we have chosen the democratic path under the rule of law to achieve the goal of securing for all its citizens, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. It specifically highlights achieving their social justice. Therefore, it becomes the bounden duty of the courts to advance the cause of the social justice. While giving interpretation to a particular provision, the court is supposed to bridge the gap between the law and society. 14. Of late, in this very direction, it is emphasized that the courts have to adopt different approaches in “social justice adjudication”, which is also known as “social context adjudication” as mere “adversarial approach” may not be very appropriate. There are number of social justice legislations giving special protection and benefits to vulnerable groups in the society. Prof. 14. Of late, in this very direction, it is emphasized that the courts have to adopt different approaches in “social justice adjudication”, which is also known as “social context adjudication” as mere “adversarial approach” may not be very appropriate. There are number of social justice legislations giving special protection and benefits to vulnerable groups in the society. Prof. Madhava Menon describes it eloquently : “It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that ‘social context judging’ is essentially the application of equality jurisprudence as evolved by Parliament and the Supreme Court in myriad situations presented before courts where unequal parties are pitted in adversarial proceedings and where courts are called upon to dispense equal justice. Apart from the social-economic inequalities accentuating the disabilities of the poor in an unequal fight, the adversarial process itself operates to the disadvantage of the weaker party. In such a situation, the Judge has to be not only sensitive to the inequalities of parties involved but also positively inclined to the weaker party if the imbalance were not to result in miscarriage of justice. This result is achieved by what we call social context judging or social justice adjudication.” 15. The provision of maintenance would definitely fall in this category which aims at empowering the destitute and achieving social justice or equality and dignity of the individual. While dealing with cases under this provision, drift in the approach from “adversarial” litigation to social context adjudication is the need of the hour. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18. The court as the interpreter of law is supposed to supply omissions, correct uncertainties, and harmonise result with justice through a method of free decision – libre recherché scientifique i.e. “free scientific research”. We are of the opinion that there is a non-rebut table presumption that the legislature while making a provision like Section 125 Cr.PC, to fulfil its constitutional duty in good faith, had always intended to give relief to the woman becoming “wife” under such circumstances. This approach is particularly needed while deciding the issues relating to gender justice. We already have examples of exemplary efforts in this regard. Journey from Shah Bano to Shabana Bano guaranteeing maintenance rights to Muslim women is a classical example.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. This approach is particularly needed while deciding the issues relating to gender justice. We already have examples of exemplary efforts in this regard. Journey from Shah Bano to Shabana Bano guaranteeing maintenance rights to Muslim women is a classical example.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. In Iqbal Banu’s case referred to supra the Hon’ble Supreme Court relying on its earlier judgment in Vijaykumar Prasad’s case held as follows : “10. Proceedings under Section 125 CrPC are civil in nature. Even if the Court noticed that there was a divorced woman in the case in question, it was open to it to treat it as a petition under the Act considering the beneficial nature of the legislation. Proceedings under Section 125 CrPC and claims made under the Act are tried by the same court. In Vijay Kumar Prasad v. State of Bihar it was held that proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. are civil in nature. It was noted as follows: “14. The basic distinction between Section 488 of the old Code and Section 126 of the Code is that Section 126 has essentially enlarged the venue of proceedings for maintenance so as to move the place where the wife may be residing on the date of application. The change was thought necessary because of certain observations by the Law Commission, taking note of the fact that often deserted wives are compelled to live with their relatives far away from the place where the husband and wife last resided together. As noted by this Court in several cases, proceedings under Section 125 of the Code are of civil nature. Unlike clauses (b) and (c) of Section 126(1) an application by the father or the mother claiming maintenance has to be filed where the person from whom maintenance is claimed lives.”” 19. In the judgments of this Court and the other High Courts relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, acceptance of the evidence by way of affidavit was held impermissible for the reason that Section-10(2) of Family Courts Act says that the provisions of Code of Criminal procedure and the rules made there under shall apply to the proceedings under Chapter-IX of the Code before the Family Court. 20. 20. Section 125 of Cr.P.C falls under Chapter-IX of Cr.P.C. Section 126(2) prescribed the procedure of recording the evidence in a case under Section 125 of Cr.P.C and said that the same shall be in the manner prescribed for the summons cases. Chapter-XX of Cr.P.C. deals with trial of the summons cases by the Magistrate. Section 254 of Cr.P.C covered under Chapter-XX of Cr.P.C. says that the Magistrate shall take evidence of the witnesses. 21. Thus, the aforesaid procedure of requiring the Magistrate to record the evidence of the witnesses was prescribed essentially for the reason of treating the proceeding under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. as a criminal proceeding. However, The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal Banu’s case and Badshah’s case held that the proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. are civil in nature. Having regard to the said judgment the rigors of Section 10(2) of Family Court’s Act got diluted. 22. Basically the right of maintenance of wife, children and parents is a civil right arising out of the family relationships. The perusal of scheme of Chapter-IX of the Criminal procedure Code which is captioned as “ORDER FOR MAINTENANCE OF WIVES, CHILDREN AND PARENTS” shows that the power of granting such relief and enforcement of such order was conferred on the Magistrate to avoid delay attached to procedural rigidity in pleadings, leading evidence and execution in a civil litigation. 23. The perusal of Chapter-IX of Cr.P.C containing Section 125 to 128 shows that the said Chapter is made a self contained scheme in all respects. Section 125(1) of Cr.P.C deals with the right of the victim as a substantive provision. It also empowers the Magistrate to grant interim maintenance. 24. Section 125(2) of Cr.P.C deals with the power of the Magistrate for granting maintenance from the date of the application or order and costs. Section 125(3) of Cr.P.C. deals with the power of the Magistrate to enforce the order of maintenance, by issuing fine levy warrant, arrest warrant and warrant of detention and by sentencing. Section 125(4) and (5) of Cr.P.C. deal with the power of the Magistrate regarding cancellation of the maintenance order. 25. Section 126 of Cr.P.C. deals with the procedure for recording evidence, to pass an exparte order, to set aside the exparte order and order with regard to costs. Section 127 of Cr.P.C. deals with the power of the Magistrate to alter the allowance granted. 25. Section 126 of Cr.P.C. deals with the procedure for recording evidence, to pass an exparte order, to set aside the exparte order and order with regard to costs. Section 127 of Cr.P.C. deals with the power of the Magistrate to alter the allowance granted. Section 128 of Cr.P.C. speaks of granting free copy of the order to the petitioner and enforcement of the same in any place where the respondent resides. 26. Under these provisions, Magistrate is conferred with the amazing powers of granting substantive rights of altering, canceling and executing his own order which could be done otherwise in any other cases or law by way of an appeal, review and execution case. Thus, it is clear that though the provisions regarding maintenance are incorporated in the Criminal Procedure Code, they are in essence to grant civil remedy. 27. Section 10 of the Act has to be read in the context of the scheme of Chapter-IX of the Cr.P.C. vis-à-vis the Act. The very preamble of the Act states that the Act provides for Family Courts with a view to promote conciliation and secure speedy settlement of disputes relating to family affairs and matters connected therewith. It appears that is why Section 10(1) and 10(2) make themselves subject to any other provisions of the Act which means Section 10(3) also. 28. Whereas, Sub-Section 3 of Section 10 says that nothing in Sub Section 1 and 2 of the said Section shall prevent the Family Court from laying down its own procedure with a view to arrive at the truth of the facts alleged by one party and denied by the other. The purpose of recording evidence is to arrive at truth of the facts which could be by receiving the evidence by way of affidavit. 29. In Shri.Ujwal’s case relied upon by the respondent’s Counsel, the Judgment of Supreme Court in Badshah’s case was not referred. Having regard to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Badshah’s case referred to supra Section 10(2) and (3) have to be interpreted to serve the purpose of the Act as aforesaid for giving special protection to the vulnerable groups namely abandoned wife, children and parents. Having regard to the aforesaid Judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the other judgments of this Court and the other High Courts relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, cannot be followed. Having regard to the aforesaid Judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the other judgments of this Court and the other High Courts relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, cannot be followed. Under the circumstances, the contention of the respondent that acceptance of the examination-in-chief evidence of the witnesses by the trial Court is illegal is rejected. CONFIDENTIALITY OF STATEMENTS MADE IN CONCILIATION PROCESS : 30. The trial Court says that in the conciliation proceedings first petitioner did not agree to join the respondent and her father refused to send her to the matrimonial home. The trial Court relies upon such statements to pass the impugned order. 31. Rule 8 of the Family Courts (Procedure) Rules, 1987 (for short, ‘Rules 1987’) framed by the High Court of Karnataka in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 21 of the Act, mandates that information gathered by the Counsellor in the course of attempts for reconciliation shall be treated as confidential. In fact Rule 7 provides for conciliation efforts by the Family Court. 32. Rules 7 and 8 of Rules 1987 read as follows: “7. Reconciliation: (1) The Court shall make every effort for bringing about reconciliation or settlement between the parties in the first instance in every case where it is possible to do so consistent with the nature and circumstances of the case in such manner as deem fit, with the help of counsellors nominated by the Court. 8. Confidential Information: Information gathered by the Counsellor in the course of attempts for reconciliation shall be treated as confidential. The Counsellor shall not disclose to others or be compel led to disclose such information.” 33. By bringing whatever was allegedly transpired during the course of conciliation the learned Judge of the Family Court has infringed Rule 8 of Rules 1987. Whenever something is said against the interest of one party, such party shall have right of cross-examination of the maker of such statement. In this case the Judge in the judgment brings in his al leged personal knowledge gained in conciliation proceedings. The petitioners had no opportunity to cross-examine, the Judge on such al leged information divulged during the conciliation. Therefore there is violation of principles of natural justice. Hence, order of dismissal of the petition based on such ground is unsustainable. REGARDING FAILURE OF THE PETITIONER IN PROVING WILFULL NEGLIGENCE : 34. The petitioners had no opportunity to cross-examine, the Judge on such al leged information divulged during the conciliation. Therefore there is violation of principles of natural justice. Hence, order of dismissal of the petition based on such ground is unsustainable. REGARDING FAILURE OF THE PETITIONER IN PROVING WILFULL NEGLIGENCE : 34. The trial Court says that though petitioners contended that despite several requests of first petitioner and her father the respondent refused to take the petitioners to his fold, but petitioners have failed to examine first petitioner’s father. 35. It is true that first petitioner has not chosen to examine her father, but she entered the witness box and stated that the respondent willfully failed and neglected to maintain them and has abandoned them. It is to be noted that the respondent did not initiate any legal proceedings seeking restitution of conjugal rights against the first petitioner or seeking custody of the second petitioner. 36. What is the burden of proof regarding the failure or willful negligence on the part of the husband in case under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. is enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajathi v. C. Ganesan (1999)6 SCC 326 . Paragraph 7 of the said judgment reads as follows : “In the present case the wife alleged that her husband had contracted a second marriage on 4-1-1990. She filed a complaint for an of fence under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code. It is stated that the complaint was dismissed and the husband was acquitted. The High Court took this circumstance against the wife and adversely commented on her refusal to live with her husband. The High Court, it would appear, lost sight of the fact how it would be difficult for the wife to prove the second marriage. This Court has held that to prove the second marriage as a fact essential ceremonies constituting it must be proved and if the second marriage is not proved to have been validly performed by observing essential ceremonies and customs in the community conviction under Section 494 IPC ought not to be made. The fact, however, remains in the present case that the husband is living with another woman. The Proviso to sub-section (3) would squarely apply and justify refusal of the wife to live with her husband. The fact, however, remains in the present case that the husband is living with another woman. The Proviso to sub-section (3) would squarely apply and justify refusal of the wife to live with her husband. There can be, however, other grounds for the wife to refuse to live with her husband, e.g., if she is subjected to cruelty by him. It was a case where the husband neglected or refused to maintain his wife. The High Court did not consider the question if the husband was having sufficient means. It rather unnecessarily put the burden on the wife to prove that she was unable to maintain herself. The words "unable to maintain herself" would mean that means available to the deserted wife while she was living with her husband and would not take within itself the efforts made by the wife after the desertion to survive somehow. Section 125 is enacted on the premise that it is the obligation of the husband to maintain his wife, children and parents. It will, therefore, be for him to show that he has no sufficient means to discharge his obligation and that he did not neglect or refuse to maintain them or any one of them. The High Court also observed that the wife did not plead as to since when she was living separately. This is not quite a relevant consideration. Even though the wife was unable to prove that the husband had remarried, yet the fact remained that the husband was living with another woman. That would entitle the wife to live separately and would amount to neglect or refusal by the husband to maintain her. The Statement of the wife that she was unable to maintain herself would be enough and it would be for the husband to prove otherwise.” (Emphasis supplied) 37. The reading of the above said judgment makes it clear that the statement of the wife that she was unable to maintain herself and her husband has refused to maintain herself and her son itself discharges her burden of proof. Therefore it is for the respondent to prove that he has not refused or neglected to maintain his wife and child. 38. Apart from that, wife and son filed the petition alleging that respondent willfully failed and neglected to maintain. Trial Court upheld such contention of the son. The said finding has attained finality. Therefore it is for the respondent to prove that he has not refused or neglected to maintain his wife and child. 38. Apart from that, wife and son filed the petition alleging that respondent willfully failed and neglected to maintain. Trial Court upheld such contention of the son. The said finding has attained finality. Having accepted son’s contention, strangely Trial Court rejects the wife’s contention. Under the circumstances the finding of the trial Court that the case of the petitioners that respondent refused and failed to maintain them is not proved due to non-examination of the father of the first petitioner is unsustainable. REGARDING MAINTENANCE : 39. The trial Court rejects to grant maintenance to the first petitioner and grants maintenance of only Rs.500/- per month to the second petitioner on the ground that first petitioner is guilty of willful desertion and respondent earns only Rs.75/- per day from his avocation of driver. 40. In Ex.P-1 the notice petitioners claimed that respondent was working as private car driver and mechanic and also engaged in battery charging work and his monthly income is Rs.5,000/-. That was as on 09.11.2006. They also contended that the family of the respondent owns house comprising five rooms with open space worth to Rs.4,00,000/- to Rs.5,00,000/- and they have built a new house worth Rs.2,00,000/-. 41. It is true that petitioners have not produced any records in proof of the occupation of the respondent and his family owning house properties, but the respondent admits that petitioners issued notice Ex.P-1 imputing such income from said sources and possession of such properties. Though the respondent contended that he has issued a befitting reply to Ex.P-1 he did not produce any such reply. 42. Petitioners contended that the respondent did not issue any reply to Ex.P-1. If at al l the respondent had issued any reply certainly he could have produced proof of such issuance of the reply. Therefore, it leads to the inference that the respondent admitted that he is doing the profession of car driver, mechanic and engaged in battery charging work and his family owns two houses. 43. Even though there is no evidence of proof of the family properties generating any income, it becomes clear that the respondent has a shelter for himself. The petitioners are without any shelter and they are under the mercy of the father of first petitioner. 43. Even though there is no evidence of proof of the family properties generating any income, it becomes clear that the respondent has a shelter for himself. The petitioners are without any shelter and they are under the mercy of the father of first petitioner. Under the circumstances, rejection of first petitioner’s claim for maintenance imputing her willful desertion is unsustainable. 44. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the income of Rs.5,000/- was in the year 2006 and now as per the cost index the salary of the unskilled labourers is also increased and the respondent’s salary from his occupation of driver is also increased, therefore, Rs.3,000/- p.m. as claimed by them be awarded. 45. The respondent not denying the claim made in the notice that he was earning Rs.2,500/- per month in the year 2006 amounts to his admission. The petition was filed in the year 2008. Therefore the trial Court should have granted at least 1/3rd of such income of the respondent to each of the petitioners. Therefore, the revision petition is al lowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 14.10.2010 passed by the Judge, Family Court, Belgaum, in Crl. Misc. No.375/2008 is hereby set aside. The petition filed by the petitioners under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. in Crl. Misc. No.375/2008 is hereby partly al lowed. Respondent is hereby directed to pay maintenance of Rs.1,500/- p.m. to the first petitioner from the date of petition till her life time and Rs.1,500/- p.m. to the second petitioner from the date of petition till he attains majority. If at all there is revision in the income of the respondent, it is open to the petitioners to apply under Section 127 of Cr.P.C. for alteration of the allowance. Liberty is reserved to the petitioners accordingly.