Mahendra Ram v. C. M. D. , Tata Steel Ltd. , Jamshedpur
2018-05-11
ANIL KUMAR CHAUDHARY
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : I.A. No. 1766 of 2018 Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners. No one turned up on behalf of opposite parties inspite of repeated calls. 2. Perusal of the record reveals that this interlocutory application has been filed with a prayer to condone the delay of 1442 days in filing civil miscellaneous petition No.472 of 2017, which has been filed with a prayer to restore the first appeal No. 29 of 2009 and the interim application filed therein to their original file. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the first appeal No. 29 of 2009 was listed on 29.11.2013. As inspite of repeated calls no one turned up for the parties to the appeal the said appeal as well as the interim application therein were dismissed for non-prosecution. It is further submitted, that the learned lawyer earlier appearing for the petitioners-appellants did not inform the petitioners about the dismissal of the appeal and the petitioners remained ignorant about the same till September, 2017 and only in September, 2017 when they enquired the matter from reliable sources, the appellants came to know about the dismissal of the said appeal and after obtaining the certified copy, the petitioners-appellants engaged a new set of lawyers and have filed the petition for restoration of the said first appeal No. 29 of 2009 along with the interim application to their original file. It is also submitted that the petitioners-appellants have a very good case and unless the delay is condoned, they will be highly prejudiced. 4. Though no one turns up on behalf of the respondent-opposite parties but perusal of the record reveals that the respondent-opposite parties have filed a counter-affidavit against this interlocutory application wherein inter alia they have referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Basawaraj & Another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81 wherein in paragraph No. 15, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has summarized the law relating to condonation of delay in exercise of power under Section 5 of Limitation Act as under :- "15.
The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No Court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the Court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the Legislature." (Emphasis Supplied) 5. So, in Basawaraj (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the law that in case a party to a legal proceeding fails to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the prescribed period, the delay in filing the application is not to be condoned under any circumstances, not even by putting any condition whatsoever. But the Supreme Court has certainly not debarred the Courts from condoning any time period of delay whatsoever, if the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed period. It is also a settled principle of law that no straightjacket formula to determine as to whether a cause assigned by a party for delay in filing an application is a sufficient cause or not and the same is to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case. 6. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 has held as under :- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2.
6. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 has held as under :- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented appeals from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. 7. In the case of Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom Perinade Village v. Bhargavi Amma (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. reported in 2008 AIR SCW 6025 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the practice and procedure followed in High Courts regarding listing of appeals and has taken judicial note of fact that unlike in sub-ordinate Courts, in the High Court, dates of hearing are not periodically fixed and when the appeal is admitted by the High Court, the counsel inform the parties that they will get in touch as and when the case is listed for hearing.
There is nothing the appellant is required to do during the period between admission of the appeal and listing of the appeal for arguments (except filing paper books or depositing the charges for preparation of paper books wherever necessary), by observing thus in paragraphs 9 and 10 : "9. Let us next also refer to some of the special factors which have a bearing on what constitutes sufficient cause, with reference to delay in applications for setting aside the abatement and bringing the legal representatives on record. 10. The first is whether the appeal is pending in a Court where regular and periodical dates of hearing are fixed. There is a significant difference between an appeal pending in a subordinate Court and an appeal pending in a High Court. In lower Courts, dates of hearing are periodically fixed and a party or his counsel is expected to appear on those dates and keep track of the case. The process is known as 'adjournment of hearing'. In fact, this Court in Ram Charan (supra) inferred that the limitation period for bringing the legal representative might have been fixed as 90 days keeping in mind the adjournment procedure :- "The Legislature might have expected that ordinarily the interval between two successive hearings of a suit will be much within three months and the absence of any defendant within that period at a certain hearing may be accounted by his counselor some relation to be due to his death or may make the plaintiff inquisitive about the reasons for the other party's absence." In contrast, when an appeal is pending in a High Court, dates of hearing are not fixed periodically. Once the appeal is admitted, it virtually goes into storage and is listed before the Court only when it is ripe for hearing or when some application seeking an interim direction is filed. It is common for appeals pending in High Courts not to be listed at all for several years. (In some Courts where there is a huge pendency, the non-hearing period may be as much as 10 years or even more). When the appeal is admitted by the High Court, the counsel inform the parties that they will get in touch as and when the case is listed for hearing.
(In some Courts where there is a huge pendency, the non-hearing period may be as much as 10 years or even more). When the appeal is admitted by the High Court, the counsel inform the parties that they will get in touch as and when the case is listed for hearing. There is nothing the appellant is required to do during the period between admission to the appeal and listing of the appeal for arguments (except filing paper books or depositing the charges for preparation of paper books wherever necessary). The High Courts are overloaded with appeals and the litigant is in no way responsible for non-listing for several years. There is no need for the appellant to keep track whether the respondent is dead or alive by periodical enquiries during the long period between admission and listing for hearing. When an appeal is so kept pending in suspended animation for a large number of years in the High Court without any date being fixed for hearing, there is no likelihood of the appellant becoming aware of the death of the respondent, unless both lived in the immediate vicinity or were related or the Court issues a notice to him informing the death of the respondent. (Emphasis Supplied) 8. In the light of the settled principle of law as discussed above let me examine whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the cause shown for the delay in filing the application for restoration of the appeal and the interlocutory application is a sufficient cause. As already indicated above, the case of the petitioners is that, the earlier advocate did not intimate them about the dismissal of the appeal. It is apparent from the record that the petitioners have changed their earlier lawyer. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is a fact that appeals are kept pending in suspended animation for a large number of years in the High Court without any date being fixed for hearing. So under such circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is sufficient cause for the delay which has occurred in filing the petition for restoration of first appeal No. 29 of 2009 to file. Accordingly, the delay of 1442 days in filing this appeal is condoned but in the circumstances subject to payment of costs of Rs.
So under such circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is sufficient cause for the delay which has occurred in filing the petition for restoration of first appeal No. 29 of 2009 to file. Accordingly, the delay of 1442 days in filing this appeal is condoned but in the circumstances subject to payment of costs of Rs. 5,000/- to be paid by the petitioners-appellants to the respondents within four weeks through their lawyer appearing in record, failing which, this conditional order of condonation of delay shall not be given effect to and the instant interlocutory application and consequently the civil miscellaneous petition shall stand dismissed being barred by limitation. 9. In case, the petitioners file the proof of deposit of Rs.5,000/- towards costs to the respondents through their lawyer appearing in record, list this civil miscellaneous case No. 472 of 2017 for hearing in the next week after payment of costs. 10. This interlocutory application stands disposed of accordingly. I.A. disposed of.