ORDER : 1. By way of this writ petition, the plaintiff of a suit for specific performance [O.S. No.73 of 2013 in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Muddebihal], has questioned the order dated 02.03.2015 passed on an interlocutory application [I.A. No. I], whereby the prayer made by the respondent Nos.2 to 17 seeking to be impleaded as party defendants in the said suit has been allowed by the Trial Court on the ground that they are necessary parties to the suit. 2. In the suit aforesaid, the plaintiff-petitioner has sought a decree against the sole defendant-respondent No. 1 for specific performance of the agreement for sale dated 16.10.2008 in respect of the suit land which, according to the plaintiff-petitioner, was allotted to the husband of the defendant in family partition under the registered partition deed dated 27.10.1970; and the defendant, being the sole heir, succeeded to the suit land on the demise of her husband on 18.09.2002. The plaintiff has alleged that the suit land was agreed to be sold by the defendant-respondent No. 1, as being the absolute owner thereof, for a consideration of Rs.10,00,000/-; and the plaintiff petitioner paid an amount of Rs.5,75,000/-towards earnest money. It is alleged that when the plaintiff-petitioner insisted on the defendant-respondent No. 1 to receive the balance consideration and to execute the sale deed, she avoided and finally refused to do so on 23.10.2013. 3. Interestingly, the defendant, in her written statement, has admitted the relevant plaint averments and has agreed to receive the balance amount of Rs.4,25,000/-and to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff-petitioner. Subsequently, on 01.01.2014, the parties filed a compromise petition under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC. 4. As things stood thus, on the same day, i.e., on 01.01.2014, the applicants-respondent Nos.2 to 17 filed I.A. No. I in this suit, seeking impleadment as defendants, while alleging that they were co-sharers in the property in question; that the plaintiff and defendant have colluded to dupe them; and that the partition deed was ‘false’ and ‘baseless’ that had never been acted upon. 5. The Trial Court has purportedly accepted the contentions canvassed on behalf of the applicants; and has allowed the application for impleadment by the impugned order dated 02.03.2015. The relevant part of order as passed by the Trial Court shall be referred hereafter, a little later. 6. 5. The Trial Court has purportedly accepted the contentions canvassed on behalf of the applicants; and has allowed the application for impleadment by the impugned order dated 02.03.2015. The relevant part of order as passed by the Trial Court shall be referred hereafter, a little later. 6. Assailing the order aforesaid, learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner has strenuously argued that intervention of third parties in a suit for specific performance to adjudicate upon their alleged title to the suit property is outside the scope of the suit; and on the settled legal principles, the applicants-respondent Nos. 2 to 17 could not have been joined as parties to this suit. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to and relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal & Others: (2005) 6 SCC 733 . 7. Per contra, while supporting the order impugned, learned counsel for the applicants-respondent No. 2 to 17 has argued that the suit schedule property having not been partitioned and the applicants being the co-sharers therein, have rightly been ordered to be impleded as parties to this suit. It has also been argued that the defendant has colluded with the plaintiff as is apparent from the admission made in the written statement and compromise deed presented before the Court; and in the given circumstances, the applicants were required to join the suit so as to protect their interest in the suit property. Learned counsel has attempted to distinguish the decision in Kasturi (supra) with the submissions that therein, the proposed interveners were not the members of the family and were not the co-sharers and hence, they were treated to be the persons claiming adverse to the title of the vendor. Learned counsel for the contesting respondents has relied upon the decisions of Supreme Court in Sumtibai & Others v. Paras Finance Co. and others: (2007) 10 SCC 82 and Thomson Press (India) Limited v. Nanak Builders and Investors Private Limited & others: (2013) 5 SCC 397 . Learned counsel for the parties have also referred to the decision of Supreme Court in Mumbai International Airport Private Limited v. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited and Others: (2010) 7 SCC 417 . 8. Learned counsel for the parties have also referred to the decision of Supreme Court in Mumbai International Airport Private Limited v. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited and Others: (2010) 7 SCC 417 . 8. Having given anxious consideration to the rival submissions and having examined the record, this Court is unable to approve the order impugned; and in the given set of facts and circumstances, it appears just and proper that the application moved by the applicants-respondent Nos. 2 to 17 be restored for reconsideration of the Trial Court. 9. In the case of Kasturi (supra), the Supreme Court has, in relation to the question of necessary and proper parties in a suit for specific performance, laid down the law in no uncertain terms that,- “6. In our view, a bare reading of this provision namely, second part of Order I Rule 10 sub-rule (2) of the CPC would clearly show that the necessary parties in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale are the parties to the contract or if they are dead their legal representatives as also a person who had purchased the contracted property from the vendor. In equity as well as in law, the contract constitutes rights and also regulates the liabilities of the parties. A purchaser is a necessary party as he would be affected if he had purchased with or without notice of the contract, but a person who claims adversely to the claim of a vendor is, however, not a necessary party. From the above, it is now clear that two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question who is a necessary party. Tests are-(1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party.” (underling supplied for emphasis) 10. In the case of Sumtibai (supra), the Supreme Court has explained and distinguished the decision in Kasturi (supra) to hold that if a party could show a fair semblance of title or interest, he could file an application for impleadment. The Supreme Court has observed, inter alia, as under: “14.… we are of the opinion that Kasturi case is clearly distinguishable. The Supreme Court has observed, inter alia, as under: “14.… we are of the opinion that Kasturi case is clearly distinguishable. In our opinion it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that whenever a suit for specific performance is filed by A against B, a third party C can never be impleaded in that suit. In our opinion, if C can show a fair semblance of title or interest, he can certainly file an application for impleadment. To take a contrary view would lead to multiplicity of proceedings because then C will have to wait until a decree is passed against B, and then file a suit for cancellation of the decree on the ground that A had no title in the property in dispute. Clearly, such a view cannot be countenanced.” 11. Noticeable it is that in the case of Sumtibai (supra), the question essentially had arisen in the backdrop of the proceedings that the legal representatives of the defendant in the suit for specific performance, on being substituted in the suit after the demise of original defendant, sought permission to file additional written statement that was declined by the Trial Court and the High Court. The Supreme Court did not approve of such an approach, even if the earlier application made by such legal representatives for impleadment had been rejected. The Supreme Court observed that every party to the case has a right to file the written statement; and as to whether the legal representatives of the original defendant were co-owners or not as alleged, would be the question for determination later but, their right to take the defence by way of filing additional written statement, could not be denied. It was in the given context that the 3-Judge Bench decision in Kasturi (supra) was distinguished. Noticeable it is that in this very case of Sumtibai, the Supreme Court has pointed out that the essence of a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from various observations; and that every judgment is qualified by the particular facts. Noticeable it is that in this very case of Sumtibai, the Supreme Court has pointed out that the essence of a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from various observations; and that every judgment is qualified by the particular facts. In the said case of Sumtibai, the Supreme Court also noticed prima facie material on record that the purchaser of the property in dispute was not the original defendant alone, but also his sons and hence, it was observed that such sons of the defendant cannot be taken as mere busybodies or interlopers having no semblance of title. 12. The decision in the case of Thomson Press (supra) related to the impleadment of a transferee/purchaser pendente lite and it was held that such a person may be impleaded in the pending suit for specific performance. Such impleadment has been found justified, inter alia, with reference to the aforementioned principles enunciated in the case of Kasturi. 13. It is, therefore, apparent that in view of the different fact situations, the aforesaid decisions in Sumtibai and Thomson Press cannot be considered making out a case for impleadment of respondent Nos.2 to 17 in the present suit, for they are seeking to set up the title adverse to the claim of vendor, i.e., the defendant-respondent No.1. 14. In the case of Mumbai International Airport (supra), the Supreme Court has dealt with a variety of aspects relating to exercise of discretion by the Court under Rule 10(2) of Order I CPC for impleadment of a party to the suit by way of illustrations; and has also pointed out that in essence, there was no divergence in the two decisions in Kasturi and Sumtibai (supra). The illustrations and observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Mumbai International Airport could be taken note of as under: “24. We may now give some illustrations regarding exercise of discretion under the said sub-rule. 24.1 If a plaintiff makes an application for impleading a person as a defendant on the ground that he is a necessary party, the court may implead him having regard to the provision of Rules 9 and 10(2) of Order I. If the claim against such a person is barred by limitation, it may refuse to add him as a party and even dismiss the suit for non-joinder of a necessary party. 24.2 If the owner of a tenanted property enters into an agreement for sale of such property without physical possession, in a suit for specific performance by the purchaser, the tenant would not be a necessary party. But if the suit for specific performance is filed with an additional prayer for delivery of physical possession from the tenant in possession, then the tenant will be a necessary party insofar as the prayer for actual possession. 24.3 If a person makes an application for being impleaded contending that he is a necessary party, and if the court finds that he is a necessary party, it can implead him. If the plaintiff opposes such impleadment, then instead of impleading such a party, who is found to be a necessary party, the court may proceed to dismiss the suit by holding that the applicant was a necessary party and in his absence the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief in the suit. 24.4 If an application is made by a plaintiff for impleading someone as a proper party, subject to limitation, bona fides, etc., the court will normally implead him, if he is found to be a proper party. On the other hand, if a non party makes an application seeking impleadment as a proper party and the court finds him to be a proper party, the court may direct his addition as a defendant; but if the court finds that his addition will alter the nature of the suit or introduce a new cause of action, it may dismiss the application even if he is found to be a proper party, if it does not want to widen the scope of the specific performance suit; or the court may direct such applicant to be impleaded as a proper party, either unconditionally or subject to terms. For example, if D claiming to be a co-owner of a suit property, enters into an agreement for sale of his share in favour of P representing that he is the co-owner with half-share, and P files a suit for specific performance of the said agreement of sale in respect of the undivided half-share, the court may permit the other co-owner who contends that D has only one-fourth share, to be impleaded as an additional defendant as a proper party, and may examine the issue whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the agreement in respect of half a share or only one-fourth share; alternatively the court may refuse to implead the other co-owner and leave open the question in regard to the extent of share of the defendant vendor to be decided in an independent proceeding by the other co-owner, or the plaintiff; alternatively the court may implead him but subject to the term that the dispute, if any, between the impleaded co-owner and the original defendant in regard to the extent of the share will not be the subject-matter of the suit for specific performance, and that it will decide in the suit only the issues relating to specific performance, that is, whether the defendant executed the agreement/contract and whether such contract should be specifically enforced. 25. In other words, the court has the discretion to either allow or reject an application of a person claiming to be a proper party, depending upon the facts and circumstances and no person has a right to insist that he should be impleaded as a party, merely because he is a proper party. 26. If the principles relating to impleadment are kept in view, then the purported divergence in the two decisions will be found to be non-existent. The observations in Kasturi and Sumtibai are with reference to the facts and circumstances of the respective cases. In Kasturi this Court held that in suits for specific performance, only the parties to the contract or any legal representative of a party to the contract, or a transferee from a party to the contract are necessary parties. In Sumtibai this Court held that a person having semblance of a title can be considered as a proper party. Sumtibai did not lay down any proposition that anyone claiming to have any semblance of title is a necessary party. In Sumtibai this Court held that a person having semblance of a title can be considered as a proper party. Sumtibai did not lay down any proposition that anyone claiming to have any semblance of title is a necessary party. Nor did Kasturi lay down that no one, other than the parties to the contract and their legal representatives/transferees, can be impleaded even as a proper party.” 15. It is noticed in the present case that the decision of Supreme Court in Kasturi (supra) and another decision of this Court were cited before the Trial Court, which were distinguished on the ground that the defendant of the present suit is the aunt of the proposed defendants and in the referred judgments, the parties were not related to the plaintiffs. Then, what has been observed in the order impugned is rather difficult to be taken in comprehension. Probably, the view had been that joining the applicants would help the Court to determine the title to the suit property and no injustice would be caused to the plaintiff. The observations of the Trial Court, when reproduced verbatim, read as under:- “11.… In this suit defendant No.1 is the aunt of proposed defendants. But in the above said judgments the parties are not related to plaintiffs. Therefore, above said judgments Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka are not applicable. As per the contents and taken by the proposed defendants there is no partition as per the law and some persons were not parties to the said partition deed. Partition deed is concocted and created one and till today entries in ROR defendants name mentioned all these shows that yet there is no partition amongst the parties. Such being the case defendant No.1 is no right to execute sale deed. Until proposed defendants share determined by the court. It is not disputed by the plaintiff proposed defendants are related to defendant No.1. When proposed defendants have denied the partition deed made in the year 1970-71. Then without determination of their rights defendant No.1 cannot sale the said property. Even by impleading the proposed defendants No.2 to 17 no hardship will cause to plaintiff or defendant No.1. If the proposed defendants came in the suit then we came to know proposed defendants have no right in the suit property. Then they will out from the suit. Then without determination of their rights defendant No.1 cannot sale the said property. Even by impleading the proposed defendants No.2 to 17 no hardship will cause to plaintiff or defendant No.1. If the proposed defendants came in the suit then we came to know proposed defendants have no right in the suit property. Then they will out from the suit. If they are entitled their rights in the suit and also their share in the suit. If the application is not allowed then suit of the plaintiff may be decreed as defendant No.1 admitted the contents of plaint. And also filed the compromise petition. If the petition allowed and defendant executes register sale deed then proposed defendants rights will be defeated. Therefore, at this stage this court feels that I.A. filed by the proposed defendant No.2 to 17 rejects. Then more hardship or loss causes to proposed defendants. If the I.A. is allowed no injustice cause to the plaintiff nor defendant No.1. Therefore, I.A. No. is hereby allowed in the interest of justice and equity.” (sic) 16. Apart that it is difficult to make out even a proper meaning and import of the afore-quoted passage, whatever is observed therein does not appear to be in conformity with law. The strange observations in the order impugned are to the effect that upon joining of the proposed defendants, the Court would come to know if they had no right in the suit property and then they will go out from the suit; and other way round, if the compromise petition is allowed and the defendant executes the sale deed, the rights of the applicants would be defeated. In essence, these observations are nothing but of converting the suit for specific performance into that of a dispute of title inter se the defendant and the applicants. 17. As noticed, ordinarily, the dispute inter se the defendants regarding title to the suit property is outside the scope of the suit for specific performance. It is apparent that the Trial Court has fallen too short of examining the ratio of the cited decisions. This is apart from the basic failing that the impugned order, on its very frame and contents, has left so much to be desired. It is definitely expected of the Trial Court to express its findings and observations in a comprehensible manner while conveying the meaning intended to be conveyed. This is apart from the basic failing that the impugned order, on its very frame and contents, has left so much to be desired. It is definitely expected of the Trial Court to express its findings and observations in a comprehensible manner while conveying the meaning intended to be conveyed. Having regard to the circumstances, without further comments, it appears just and proper that while setting aside the order impugned, the application moved by the applicants-respondent Nos. 2 to 17 be restored for reconsideration of the Trial court. 18. Accordingly and in view of the above, this writ petition is allowed in the manner and to the extent that the impugned order dated 02.03.2015 is set aside; and the application I. A. No. 1 is restored for reconsideration of the Trial Court in accordance with law, while keeping in view the observations foregoing. No costs.