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2018 DIGILAW 1074 (GUJ)

Shashikant Vasudevbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat

2018-09-10

C.L.SONI

body2018
JUDGMENT C.L. Soni, J. In these petitions, the Court is called upon to decide whether the word 'Person' used in section 63AB of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Act, 1948 ('the Act' for short) denotes only the natural person/individual human being or it also includes juristic/legal person like company, co-operative society etc. Such question has arisen in view the challenge made to the instructions dated 17.02.2018 issued by the Revenue Department of the State Government to all Collectors. In above instructions to the Collectors, it is stated that by amending Act 28 of 2015, Section 63AB is inserted in the Act, as per which when the transfer of the land in favour of such a person who is not an agriculturist and thereafter if the last transaction of the land is on or before 30.06.2015 in favour of the person who is agriculturist, then for use of such land only for agriculture purpose, the last transaction could be declared valid by charging 10% of Jantri value of the land. It is further stated that the above amendment is self explanatory as per which the person not an agriculturist that is to say non-agriculturist is considered to be an individual as per the Act and in such circumstances, before the last transaction, if the agricultural lands of Co-operative farming Society/Co-operative society/Company/Partnership were transferred to the agriculturists then in those cases such transactions could not be validated by taking 10% amount and if any such decisions are taken then they shall be treated contrary to law and shall be required to be cancelled. 2. By Gujarat Act No.28 of 2015, some provisions of the Act are amended and Section 63AB is inserted in the Act, which reads as under: 63AB. Last transaction if made to an agriculturist to be valid even if earlier transaction or transactions may be invalid. 2. By Gujarat Act No.28 of 2015, some provisions of the Act are amended and Section 63AB is inserted in the Act, which reads as under: 63AB. Last transaction if made to an agriculturist to be valid even if earlier transaction or transactions may be invalid. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 63, where the Mamlatdar suo moto or on the application of any person interested in the land, has reason to believe that, in the breach of the provisions of clause (a), (b) or (c) or subsection (1) of section 63, transfer of the land had taken place in favour of a person who was not an agriculturist, and that certain transaction or transactions have taken place thereafter and the person in whose favour the last transaction was made on or before the 30th June, 2015, is an agriculturist, he shall issue a notice to such person and shall give him an opportunity of being heard and also make an inquiry as he deems fit. (2) If the Mamlatdar comes to the conclusion that as a result of the last transaction in respect of such land, the person to whom such land was transferred is indeed an agriculturist, he shall call upon such person to pay to the State Government for the use of such land only for the agricultural purpose, the amount of ten per cent. of the prevailing Jantri and after such payment he shall declare, by an order, such last transaction to be valid irrespective of the fact that any one or more of such transactions was or were invalid and upon such order, no proceedings under section 84C shall be initiated and if already initiated shall be discontinued forthwith. 3. As defined in section 2(11) of the Act, the word 'person' includes a joint family. The same is the definition of 'person' given in section 2(21) of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 ('the Ceiling Act' for short). On the meaning and scope of the word 'person' used in the Ceiling Act while considering the applicability of meaning given in definition of 'person' in the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para-23 to 25 of its judgment in the case of Ramanlal Bhailal Patel and Others Vs. State of Gujarat, (2008) 5 SCC 449 as under : 23. State of Gujarat, (2008) 5 SCC 449 as under : 23. The word 'person' is defined in the Act, but it is an inclusive definition, that is "a person includes a joint family." Where the definition is an inclusive definition, the use of the word 'includes' indicates an intention to enlarge the meaning of the word used in the Statute. Consequently, the word must be construed as comprehending not only such things which they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. Thus, where a definition uses the word 'includes', as contrasted from 'means', the word defined not only bears its ordinary popular and natural meaning, but in addition also bear the extended statutory meaning (See S.K. Gupta v. K.P. Jain, following Dilworth vs. Commissioner of Stamps, vs. Middlesex County Council. 24. The ordinary, popular and natural meaning of the word 'person' is 'a specific individual human being'. But in law the word 'person' has a slightly different connotation, and refers to any entity that is recognized by law as having the rights and duties of a human being. Salmond defines 'person' as 'any being whom the law regards as capable of rights and duties' or as 'a being, whether human or not, of which rights and duties are the attributes' (Jurisprudence : 12th Edition Page 299]. Thus the word 'person', in law, unless otherwise intended, refers not only to a natural person (male or female human being), but also any legal person (that is an entity that is recognized by law as having or capable of having rights and duties). The General Clauses Act thus defines a 'person' as including a corporation or an association of persons or a body of individuals whether incorporated or not. The said general legal definition is, however, either modified or restricted or expanded in different statutes with reference to the object of the enactment or the context in which it is used. For instance, the definition of the word 'person' in Income Tax Act, is very wide and includes an individual, a Hindu Undivided Family, a company, a firm, an association of persons or body of individuals whether incorporated or not, a local authority and every other artificial juridical person. For instance, the definition of the word 'person' in Income Tax Act, is very wide and includes an individual, a Hindu Undivided Family, a company, a firm, an association of persons or body of individuals whether incorporated or not, a local authority and every other artificial juridical person. At the other extreme is the Citizenship Act, section 2(f) of which reads thus : "Person does not include any company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not." Similarly, the definition under Section 2(g) of Representation of the People Act 1950, is "person" does not include a body of persons. 25. Both definitions of the word 'person', in General Clauses Act and Ceiling Act, are inclusive definitions. The inclusive definition of 'person' in General Clauses Act applies to all Gujarat Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or the context. The inclusive definition of 'person' in section 2(21) of the Ceiling Act, does not indicate anything repugnant to the definition of 'person' in General Clauses Act, but merely adds 'joint family' to the existing definition. Therefore the definition of person in the Ceiling Act, would include the definition of person in section 3(35) of General Clauses Act. The resultant position can be stated thus : The definition of person in General Clauses Act, being an inclusive definition, would include the ordinary, popular and general meaning and those specifically included in the definition. The inclusive definition of 'person' in the Ceiling Act, in the absence of any exclusion, would have the same meaning assigned to the word in the General Clauses Act, and in addition, a joint family' as defined. Thus, the word 'person' in the Ceiling Act will, unless the context otherwise requires, refer to : (i) a natural human being, (ii) any legal entity which is capable of possessing rights and duties, including any company or association of persons or body of individuals (whether incorporated or not); and (iii) a Hindu Undivided Family or any other group or unit of persons, the members of which by custom or usage, are joint in estate and residence. 4. In the case of Karnataka Bank Ltd. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, (2008) 2 SCC 254 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para 41 to 43 as under:- 41. 4. In the case of Karnataka Bank Ltd. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, (2008) 2 SCC 254 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para 41 to 43 as under:- 41. Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 itself says that unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context the term person shall include any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. "The word includes is often used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute. When it is so used, these words and phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their nature and import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include." [See The Commissioner of Income-tax, Andhra Pradesh Vs. M/s Taj Mahal Hotel, Secunderabad] 42. In our considered opinion, the Legislature is not denuded of its competency to define the term person differently from the definition of that term in the General Clauses Act, 1897. There are many illustrations showing that the same words have been used in different senses in different context. It is not uncommon practice for the Parliament or State Legislature to define person in the Act and create an artificial unit by fiction. For instance, Section 2(31) of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 defines person, including (a) an individual, (b) a Hindu undivided family, (c) a Company, (d) a firm, (e) an association of persons or a body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, (f) a local authority and (g) every artificial juridical person, not falling within any of the preceding sub-clauses and the same is much wider than the term person as defined in the General Clauses Act. 43. The definition of person in Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act is undoubtedly illustrative and not exhaustive. The well known rule of interpretation regarding such inclusive definitions has always been to treat the other entities, who would not otherwise have come strictly within the definition, to be a part thereof, because of illustrative enactment of such definitions. The legislature is competent in its wisdom to define person separately for the purposes of each of the enactment and different from the one in the General Clauses Act and create an artificial unit. The legislature is competent in its wisdom to define person separately for the purposes of each of the enactment and different from the one in the General Clauses Act and create an artificial unit. The definition of person in the General Clauses Act would not operate as any fetter or restriction upon the powers of the State Legislature to define person and adopt a meaning different from as defined in the General Clauses Act. 5. In the case of State of Gujarat and Others Vs. Prathmesh Farms Pvt. Ltd. and Another, (2011) 1 GLR 159 , the Division Bench of this Court has considered the definition of 'person' given in the Act while examining the validity of the circular dated 23.11.1998 issued by the State Government and has held and observed in para-5,7,8,9,10.2 and 11 of its judgment as under: 5. After reference to several earlier circulars and resolutions, the impugned circular dated 23.11.1998, inter alia, stated: (free English translation) - It has come to the notice of the Government that some private companies have purchased agricultural lands for agricultural use after obtaining permission under section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1948. Against purchase of land by private limited companies for agricultural use, it is submitted that agricultural lands are being purchased by private limited companies and corporate bodies for speculative purposes. Thus the above facts came to the notice of the State Government. The purpose of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1948 is to ensure holding of agricultural land by tenants, labourers and agricultural land holders. Agriculturist as defined in sec.2 (2) of the Act means a person who cultivates land personally; and under section 2 (6) to cultivate personally means to cultivate land on one's own account by one's own labour, or by the labour of any member of one's family, or under the personal supervision of oneself or any member of one's family by hired labour or by servants on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share. According to section 2 (5), to cultivate with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions means to till or husband the land for the purpose of raising or improving agricultural produce, whether by manual labour or by means of cattle or machinery, or to carry on any agricultural operation thereon. According to section 2 (5), to cultivate with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions means to till or husband the land for the purpose of raising or improving agricultural produce, whether by manual labour or by means of cattle or machinery, or to carry on any agricultural operation thereon. Since the word person is defined in section 2 (11) of the Act, its definition as given in the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 could not be applied and a company constituted as a juristic person under the Companies Act cannot be considered to be an agriculturist. Having regard to this legal provision, there is no provision under section 63 of the Act for acquisition of agricultural land by companies as nonagriculturist. The District Collectors, Prant Officers, Taluka Mamlatdars and Agricultural Tribunals have to proceed accordingly, keeping in view the aforesaid provisions. 7. It was argued by learned A.G.P., appearing for the appellant, that the scheme and provisions of section 63 of the Act clearly conveyed the policy of the legislature, which was to prohibit transfer of agricultural land in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist. An exception could be made from the embargo by obtaining permission, with such conditions as may be prescribed, from the Collector or an officer authorised in that behalf. However, that exception is subject to the proviso that such permission cannot be granted where the land is being sold to a person who is not an agriculturist for agricultural purpose, if annual income of such person from other sources exceeds 5000 rupees. Therefore, it clearly emerges that even the Collector or an officer authorised in that behalf has no power to permit sale of agricultural land to a person who is not an agriculturist for agricultural purpose, if the annual income of the buyer from other sources exceeds 5000 rupees. Agriculturist, by its definition means, a person who cultivates land personally; and to cultivate personally, the buyer must be cultivating the land on one's own account or by hired labour under the supervision of himself or any member of his family. The heading of section 63 viz. Transfers to non-agriculturists barred also clearly indicates the policy of prohibiting transfer of agricultural land to non-agriculturists, except where such transfer is permitted under the exceptions provided by the proviso. 8. The heading of section 63 viz. Transfers to non-agriculturists barred also clearly indicates the policy of prohibiting transfer of agricultural land to non-agriculturists, except where such transfer is permitted under the exceptions provided by the proviso. 8. In view of the express legal provisions of the Act enacted with the express objects, inter alia, of regulating and imposing restrictions on transfer of agricultural lands could hardly accommodate a juristic person or a company as an agriculturist. According to the clear definitions, a legal person cannot cultivate land personally by its own labour or under personal supervision of itself or its family members. Therefore, the word person defined in section 2 (11) to include a joint family, cannot be allowed an expansive interpretation so as to include a legal person in the context of the provisions of section 63 of the Act. 9. As against the above reading of the relevant legal provisions in the impugned circular, learned single Judge appeared to have unnecessarily strayed into reference to the provisions of the Bombay General Clauses Act 1904, the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act 1961 and the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960. 10.2 Obviously, reliance by the respondent on the above judgment is misplaced and actually undermines the case of the respondent. Besides that, the Tenancy Act and the Ceiling Act, though dealing with agricultural land, have totally different purposes and the context in which the word person is used in various provisions thereof is equally different. While the avowed object of the Ceiling Act is to place restrictions upon holding of agricultural land in excess of certain limits, the object of the Tenancy Act, inter alia, is to regulate and restrict transfer of agricultural lands held by agriculturists, agricultural labourers and artisans to non-agriculturists or for non-agricultural purpose. Besides that, the clear restrictions contained in section 63 of the Tenancy Act prohibits, subject to the exceptions, transfer of agricultural land to non-agriculturists (for agricultural purpose), which has to exclude legal persons or bodies incorporate, who, in the nature of things, cannot personally cultivate land as per definition of that phrase in the Act. The phrase if actual income of such person from other sources exceeds 5000 rupees attaching to the transferee entity cannot be applied to make a person agriculturist who cannot be an agriculturist. The phrase if actual income of such person from other sources exceeds 5000 rupees attaching to the transferee entity cannot be applied to make a person agriculturist who cannot be an agriculturist. The definition of person in the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 will obviously be repugnant in the context of provisions of Section 63 of the Act, and, therefore, it could not be read as incorporated in the definition of person in the Act. It may be pertinent to note here that the restriction on transfer of agricultural land to non-agriculturist, under the pain of invalidation of such transfer, as envisaged in the provisions of Section 63 of the Act, is different from and totally unrelated to the legal capacity of a body corporate to hold agricultural land. Even if it were held in a particular context that a juristic person could legally hold or own agricultural land, it cannot be construed as a licence to transfer the land to such artificial person in spite of its incapacity to personally cultivate the land as required under the Act. 6. Some provisions of the Act, where the word 'person' is used, are as under:- (a) Section 32P provides for resumption and disposal of land by the Collector, not purchased by the tenant. The direction for disposal of land to person in order of priority includes cooperative farming society, members of which are agricultural labourers, landless persons or small holders or combination of such persons and co-operative farming society of agriculturists, and other co-operative farming society. (b) Section 63AA provides for sale of land for bona-fide industrial purpose, which, as provided therein, could be permitted in certain cases. The word 'person' used therein is referred as purchaser and such purchaser could be a company as defined in Clause (20) of Section 2 of the Companies Act, 2013, as per the proviso to clause (c) of sub-section (1). (c) Section 63AD, which provides for imposition of penalty on the person in whose favour transfer of land is in breach of provisions clause (a), (b), (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 63 and for restoration of land along with rights and interest therein to the position in which it was immediately before such transfer. (c) Section 63AD, which provides for imposition of penalty on the person in whose favour transfer of land is in breach of provisions clause (a), (b), (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 63 and for restoration of land along with rights and interest therein to the position in which it was immediately before such transfer. (d) Section 70 speaks about the duties of Mamlatdar, one of which, as provided therein, to decide whether a person is an agriculturist and whether the person is or was a tenant or a protected tenant or a permanent tenant. It also provides to decide under Section 84B or 84C whether transfer or acquisition of land is invalid and to dispose of land as provided in Section 84C. (e) Section 83A and Section 84 read as under:- 83A. Restriction on acquiring land by transfer which is invalid.- (1) No person shall acquire land by transfer where such transfer or acquisition is invalid under any of the provisions of this Act. (2) Any person who acquires land in contravention of sub-section (1) shall in the event of the transfer or acquisition being decided or declared invalid, be liable to suffer, the consequences under section 84 or 84C as the case may be. 84. Summary eviction.- Any person unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of any land- (a) the transfer (or acquisition) of which either by the act or parties or by the operation of law is invalid under the provisions of this Act. (b) the management of which has been assumed under the said provisions or (c) to the use and occupation of which he is not entitled under the said provisions and the said provisions do not provide for the eviction of such person, may be summarily evicted by the Collector. (f) Section 84B provides for the powers of the Mamlatdar to declare the transfer or acquisition of the land by issuing notice to the transferor, transferee or person acquiring such land as invalid if transfer or acquisition of land is found to be in contravention of Sections 63 and 64 as it stood before the commencement of the Amending Act, 1955 or is insistent with any of the provisions of the Act as amended by Act of 1955. 7. 7. In the first five matters (Special Civil Application No.9086 of 2017 to Special Civil Application No.9090 of 2017) filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioners have sought direction to forthwith issue Non-Agriculture (NA) permission in respect of the land in question (which is different in each petition) without insisting to undergo any other formality under the guise of the resolution dated 07.02.2017 ( the instructions dated 17.2.2017) and to hold and declare that the above instructions cannot be made applicable retrospectively to the case of the petitioners. 8. As stated in the petitions, the petitioners purchased the lands in question at different times but much before 30th June, 2015 from the co-operative societies. But, at the time of processing their applications for NA permission, consent of the petitioners was taken to deposit 10% premium amount in the context of Section 63AB of the Act and then notice was issued to them by the Mamlatdar and the petitioners have deposited such amount. 9. In the last petition (Special Civil Application No.13789 of 2017) filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the petitioners have made following prayers:- (a) admit and allow the captioned petition; (b) issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ/order or direction by quashing and setting aside the order dated 20.03.2017 passed by the Collector, Ahmedabad vide CB/__/NA/Oganaj/S.no.1160/1 etc./SR-644/2016; direct the Collector to grant the Non Agriculture use permission without considering the administrative instructions dated 17.02.2017, issued by the Revenue department, State of Gujarat, vide GNT-302013-1536-Z; (c) quash and set aside the administrative instructions dated 17.2.2017, issued by the Revenue department, State of Gujarat, vide GNT-302013-1536-Z; ALTERNATIVELY Declare that the administrative instructions dated 17.02.2017, issued by the Revenue department, State of Gujarat, vide GNT-302013-1536-Z applies prospectively and hence it would not apply to the case of the petitioners; (d) Grant any other relief as deemed fit in the interest of justice. (e) stay the implementation of administrative instructions dated 17.02.2017, issued by the Revenue Department, State of Gujarat vide GNT-302013-1536-Z; during the pendency of the captioned petition. 10. As stated in the last petition, the petitioners are the agriculturists and they have purchased the lands in question from the co-operative society by registered sale deed on 2.12.2010, i.e. before June 2015. (e) stay the implementation of administrative instructions dated 17.02.2017, issued by the Revenue Department, State of Gujarat vide GNT-302013-1536-Z; during the pendency of the captioned petition. 10. As stated in the last petition, the petitioners are the agriculturists and they have purchased the lands in question from the co-operative society by registered sale deed on 2.12.2010, i.e. before June 2015. In this case, the Mamlatdar passed order after conducting inquiry under Section 63AB validating the sale transaction in favour of the petitioners on payment of 10% premium amount and such order was reviewed and confirmed by the Deputy Collector. 11. Learned advocate Mr. Shital Patel appearing for the petitioners in first five petitions and learned advocate Ms. Trusha Patel appearing for the petitioners in the last petition submitted that though the petitioners are the agriculturists, in whose favour the last transactions for sale of the lands in question had taken place much before 30.6.2015, the petitioners are being denied N A permission for their lands relying on the impugned instructions dated 17.2.2017 They submitted that by giving fanciful meaning to the word 'person' used in section 63AB of the Act, the impugned instructions are issued whereby the benefits available under section 63AB and right to hold agriculture lands as agriculturist are sought to be taken away. They submitted that though the legislature clearly intended to treat the last transaction of sale in favour of the agriculturist, if taken place on or before 30.6.2015, as valid, the instructions dated 17.2.2017 would nullify the legislative wisdom by applying meaning to the word 'person' contrary to the context of the provisions of section 63AB of the Act. They submitted that the definition of 'person' in the Act is inclusive and therefore, the person in whose favour the sale transaction had taken place prior to last sale transaction in favour of the agriculturist, was juristic person, the benefits under Section 63AB would still be available if last sale transaction is before 30.6.2015 and in favour of the agriculturist. They submitted that what is conferred by the statutory provisions cannot be taken away by any circular, resolution or the administrative instructions from any department of the Government. They submitted that what is conferred by the statutory provisions cannot be taken away by any circular, resolution or the administrative instructions from any department of the Government. They submitted that the impugned instructions dated 17.2.2017 are in contravention and ultra vires to the statutory provisions of Section 63AB, and could not be relied against the petitioners, who are the agriculturists, to consider sale transactions in their favour invalid and to deny the grant of NA permission to them. They submitted that insertion of Section 63AB in the Act is in line with the intent and purpose of the Act, which is primarily to ensure that only agriculturist can hold agricultural land and therefore, the legislature in its wisdom decided to validate the last sale transactions made on or before 30.6.2015, if in favour of the agriculturists. It is their further contention that since as agriculturists, the petitioners purchased the lands in question before 30.6.2015, their entitlement to get their transactions validated under section 63AB of the Act could not be taken away by retrospectively applying the instructions dated 17.2.2018. They have taken the Court to relevant provisions of the Act and the Gujarat Land Revenue the Rules, 1972 ('the Rules') to submit that the definition of the word 'person' in the Act is since inclusive, the meaning of the word 'person' is to be understood in the context in which it is used in Section 63AB of the Act. 12. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms. Nisha Thakore appearing in the first five petitions and learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms. Sangeeta Vishen appearing in the last matter submitted that Section 63AB is inserted in furtherance of the object and purpose of the Act to see that only individual agriculturists are permitted to hold the agricultural lands. They submitted that Section 63AB of the Act permits validation of only those transactions which are between natural/individual human beings who are non-agriculturists and agriculturists. They submitted that Section 63AB of the Act cannot be pressed in to service for validating any transaction for the land in connection with which earlier sale transaction was from juristic person in favour of individual agriculturist as Section 63AB is not inserted for the benefit of juristic person. They submitted that Section 63 of the Act mandates that no sale, transfer, gift, etc. They submitted that Section 63 of the Act mandates that no sale, transfer, gift, etc. shall be valid in favour of a person who is not agriculturist, and since the juristic person cannot be the agriculturist, the word 'person' will carry the same connotation when used in section 63AB of the Act to mean individual human being especially when Section 63 AB is to validate only those transactions which were in breach of section 63 of the Act. They submitted that the Act provides for summary eviction of the person and vesting of the land from such person to the State if transfer of land in favour of such person is invalid under the Act and therefore, the word 'person' used in Section 63AB could not be read to include juristic person, like the company, co-operative society, etc., otherwise such juristic person would get undue benefits which the legislature has not intended. They submitted that if earlier transaction was in favour of juristic person in breach of section 63 of the Act, the State could exercise its power of summary eviction of such person and of vesting the land with it, as only those invalid transactions in favour natural persons are covered under sections 63AB of the Act. They submitted that in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Prathmesh Farms Pvt. Ltd. holding that the word 'person' used in Section 63 would mean only natural person, no other meaning could be assigned to the word 'person' used in Section 63AB of the Act. They submitted that the State has since inception of the Act interpreted and understood the word 'person' used in Section 63 as only natural person/ individual human being which was accepted by the Division Bench of this Court when the circular dated 23.11.1998 issued by the State Government was challenged and the same meaning is to be taken for Section 63AB. They submitted that in the spirit, object and the purpose of the Act, the impugned instructions (which as stated by Learned AGP Ms. They submitted that in the spirit, object and the purpose of the Act, the impugned instructions (which as stated by Learned AGP Ms. Vishen are dated 18.02.2018) were issued to ensure that word 'person' used in Section 63AB is understood as only natural/individual human being and no legal or juristic person gets the benefits of the provisions of Section 63AB of the Act and therefore, impugned instructions cannot be said to be either contrary to the provisions of section 63AB of the Act or ultra vires to the Act. They therefore urge that the Court may not accept the challenge made to the impugned instructions and may not grant any relief to the petitioners in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. 13. The Court, having heard learned advocates, finds that the main object and purpose of the Act, is to ensure full efficient use of land for agriculture and to regulate and impose restrictions on the transfer of agricultural lands, dwelling houses, etc. appurtenant thereto belonging to or occupied by agriculturist, agricultural labourers. To achieve such avowed object, the legislature has barred transfer of any land or interest therein by Section 63 of the Act to any person who is not an agriculturist or who being an agriculturist cultivates personally land not less than the ceiling area either as owner or tenant or who is not an agricultural labourer. 14. In the case of Prathmesh Farma Pvt. Ltd., the Court considered the definition of 'person' as given in the Act while examining the challenge made to the circular dated 23.11.1998 in context of Section 63 of the Act. By circular dated 23.11.1998, instructions were issued to all the Collectors to hold that the permission cannot be granted under the Act for transferring the agricultural lands to companies as they are not natural persons. The circular dated 23.11.1998 was issued as the Government noticed that the private companies purchased the agricultural lands for agricultural use after obtaining permission under Section 63 of the Act and having regard to the provisions of Section 63 prohibiting the transfer of the agricultural land to non-agriculturist, the Government banned purchase of the agricultural lands by the companies and issued instructions to the Collectors to take action accordingly. 15. Section 63 of the Act bars transfer of agricultural lands to the person who is not an agriculturist. 15. Section 63 of the Act bars transfer of agricultural lands to the person who is not an agriculturist. The word 'agriculturist' is defined in sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act, which means that a person who cultivates land personally is the agriculturist. The phrase 'to cultivate personally' is also defined in sub-section (6) of Section 2 of the Act, which reads as under: "to cultivate personally" means to cultivate land on one's own account- (i) by one's own labour, or (ii) by the labour of any member of one's family, or (iii) under the personal supervision of oneself or any member of one's family, by hired labour or by servants on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share. In the context of definition of 'agriculturist' in sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act, the Court, in Prathmesh Farma Pvt. Ltd., read and construed the meaning of the word 'person' used in Section 63 not to include the company as the company would not fall within the meaning of phrase "to cultivate personally" given in sub-section (6) of Section 2 of the Act. In para-8 of its judgment, as reproduced above, the Court has observed that the word 'person' defined in sub-section (11) of Section 2 of the Act cannot be allowed an expansive interpretation so as to include a legal person in the context of the provisions of Section 63 of the Act. Thus, the word 'person' was interpreted and construed in the context of Section 63 of the Act. 16. The definition of 'person' is inclusive definition and therefore, its meaning could be enlarged in the context in which it is used. As held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramanlal Bhailal Patel, ordinary and popular meaning of the word 'person' is specific individual human being, but in law, it has slightly different meaning and unless otherwise intended, it not only refers to natural person but also legal person, i.e. the entity capable of having rights and duties and as further held, the inclusive definition of 'person' given in General Clauses Act applies to all Gujarat Acts as per which the definition of 'person' includes the natural human being and the legal entity capable of possessing rights and duties, including the companies and association of persons. 17. 17. It appears that the legislature in its wisdom has given inclusive definition of 'person' in the Act, as the word 'person' is used in different provisions in the Act in the context of such provisions and it is thus left to be understood in the context in which it is used in different provisions of the Act. 18. In Section 63 of the Act, the word 'person' is qualified by further words 'who is not an agriculturist'. By use of such phrase, the legislature appears to have conveyed that for the purpose of section 63 of the Act, the meaning of 'person' is to be derived from the meaning of the word 'agriculturist' given in its definition, which would not include the company or any legal entity and even the individual who does not cultivate land personally. It was thus in the scheme of section 63 of the Act, the word 'person' was construed in Prathmesh Farma Pvt. Ltd. not to include the Company. 19. The word 'person' is used at two places in the first part of subsection (1) of Section 63AB of the Act. The word 'person' used in the first part of sub-section (1) of Section 63AB is also qualified and followed by similar phrase 'who is not an agriculturist' but such word precedes the sentence/words "where the Mamlatdar suo moto or on the application of any person interested in the land, has reason to believe that, in the breach of the provisions of clause (a), (b) or (c) or sub-section (1) of section 63, transfer of the land had taken place in favour of a". The Company or any legal/juristic person which is not the agriculturist for the purpose of the Act or the individual human being who is not the agriculturist, since not personally cultivating the land, any transfer of the land in favour of the Company or the individual human being not personally cultivating the land is in breach of clause (a), (b), (c) of section 63 of the Act. Therefore, for the purpose of section 63AB, the phrase 'who is not agriculturist' includes the juristic person like Company etc. and the individual, who is not personally cultivating the land, which will resultantly convey the meaning to the word 'person' used in first part of section 63AB of the Act to include juristic person. Therefore, for the purpose of section 63AB, the phrase 'who is not agriculturist' includes the juristic person like Company etc. and the individual, who is not personally cultivating the land, which will resultantly convey the meaning to the word 'person' used in first part of section 63AB of the Act to include juristic person. The legislature appears to have intended that after invalid transaction in favour of the person who is not an agriculturist, certain transaction or transactions have taken place and the person in whose favour the last transaction was made on or before the 30th June, 2015, is an agriculturist, such last transaction could be held valid on Mamlatdar satisfying himself that the last transaction was in favour of a person who is the agriculturist. 20. The context is what precedes and follows a word or passage as throwing light on its meaning. Therefore, in what context the word 'person' is used in any provision of any Act, if to be understood, it cannot be read in isolation, when the definition of word 'person' is inclusive. It appears that the word 'person' appears in first part and in second part of sub-section (1) of Section 63AB is used in different context. The sentence/words and the phrase appearing preceding to and following the word 'person' in first part of sub-section (1) of Section 63AB are to give effect to the intention of the legislature and therefore in that context the word 'person' is to be construed and understood . 21. The statement of objects and reasons for inserting section 63AB in the Act reads thus: "It is also necessary to insert a provision to protect the interests of an agriculturist who is at present as such despite the fact that earlier transaction or transactions in respect of the concerned land was or were invalid." The legislature appears to have intended to validate the last transaction made on or before 30.6.2015, if in favour of the agriculturist, for the land in respect of which the earlier transaction was in breach of clause (a), (b), (c) of Section 63 of the Act and such intention could well be gathered from the word 'person' used in second part of sub-section (1) of Section 63AB with the phrase 'is an agriculturist'. Through the statement of objects and reasons, the legislature has made it clear that it intended to protect the interest of the agriculturist despite the fact that earlier transaction or the transactions in respect of the concerned land was or were invalid. There is no qualification provided in the statement of objects and reasons that only those invalid transactions for the lands which were in favour of natural persons shall be validated, if the last transactions before 30.06.2015 are in favour of the agriculturists. Therefore invalid transaction or the transactions referred in statement of objects and reasons would include the transaction or the transactions in favour of juristic person. The impugned instructions have attempted to supplement the statement of objects and reasons and thereby have defied the legislative intention behind framing section 63AB of the Act. Therefore, the court is of the view that the word 'person' used in first part of Section 63AB of the Act includes juristic person like Company etc. and the restricted meaning sought to be given to word 'person' by impugned instructions is contrary to the intention of the legislature behind enacting Section 63AB of the Act. 22. The above view gets fortified by the provisions of Section 63AD of the Act, which provides for penalty to transferee for transfer of the land in breach of sub-section (1) of Section 63 of the Act. Section 63AD reads as under:- 63AD. Penalty to transferee for transfer of land in breach of provisions of sub-section (1) of section 63.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 84C, where the Mamlatdar suo moto or on the application of any person, has reason to believe that, in the breach of the provisions of clause (a),(b) or (c) of sub-section (1) of section 63, transfer of the land has taken place in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist or in favour of any institution, the Mamlatdar shall issue a notice to such person or institution and, after affording an opportunity of being heard, decide whether the transfer of the land is valid or not. (2) If the Mamlatdar comes to a decision that the transfer of such land is not valid then he shall pass an order thereby,- (i) imposing the penalty of three times the amount of the prevailing Jantri of such land on such person or institution in whose favour such land is not validly transferred; and (ii) directing the person or institution in whose favour such land is not validly transferred to restore the land along with the rights and interest therein to the position in which it was immediately before such transfer within a period of one month of such order. 23. The very invalid transaction in breach of clause (a), (b) or (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 63 is intended to be dealt with by imposing penalty three times the amount of the prevailing Jantri value of the land and directing the person or institution in whose favour such land is not validly transferred to restore the land along with rights and interest therein to the position in which it was immediately before the invalid transfer took place. If the word 'person' is read or construed so as to include only natural person/ individual human being, it may be difficult for the concerned authority to act against the company or the legal entity in whose favour the transfer in breach of clause (a), (b) or (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 63 has taken place. 24. In the case of Oswal Fats and Oils Limited Vs. Additional Commissioner (Administration), Bareilly Division, Bareilly and Others, (2010) 4 SCC 728, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para -30 to 39 as under:- 30. We shall now consider whether the restriction contained in Section 154(1) is not attracted in a case involving transfer of land by Bhumidhar in favour of a company. In this context, it is important to bear in mind that the Act was enacted by the State Legislature to achieve the goal of social and economic justice enshrined in the preamble of the Constitution. It provides for abolition of zamindari system, which involves intermediaries between tiller of the soil and the State and for acquisition of their rights, title and interest and to reform the law relating to land tenure. 31. It provides for abolition of zamindari system, which involves intermediaries between tiller of the soil and the State and for acquisition of their rights, title and interest and to reform the law relating to land tenure. 31. Section 154, 166 and 167 of the Act, which contain restriction on transfer of land by Bhumidhar 22 and also specify the consequences of transfer made in violation of that restriction, read as under:- "154. Restriction on transfer by a bhumidhar.- (1) Save as provided in sub-section (2), no bhumidhar shall have the right to transfer by sale or gift, any land other than tea gardens to any person where the transferee shall, as a result of such sale or gift, become entitled to land which together with land if any, held by his family will, in the aggregate, exceed 5.0586 hectares (12.50 acres) in Uttar Pradesh. Explanation.- For the removal of doubt it is hereby declared that in this sub-section the expression 'person' shall include and be deemed to have included on June 15, 1976 a 'Cooperative Society': Provided that where the transferee is a co-operative society, the land held by it having been pooled by its members under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 77 of the Uttar Pradesh Co- operative Societies Act, 1965 shall not be taken into account in computing the 5.0586 hectares (12.50 acres) land held by it. (2) Subject to the provisions of any other law relating to the land tenures for the time being in force, the State Government may, by general or special order, authorise transfer in excess of the limit prescribed in sub-section (1) if it is of the opinion that such transfer is in favour of a registered cooperative society or an institution established for a charitable purpose, which does not have land sufficient for its need or that the transfer is in the interest of general public. (3) For every transfer of land in excess of the limit prescribed under sub-section (1) prior approval of the State Government shall be necessary: Provided that where the prior approval of the State Government is not obtained under this sub-section, the State Government may on an application give its approval afterward in such manner and on payment in such manner of an amount, as fine, equal to twenty-five per cent of the cost of the land as may be prescribed. The cost of the land shall be such as determined by the Collector for stamp duty. Provided further that where the State Government is satisfied that any transfer has been made in public interest, it may exempt any such transferee from the payment of fine under this sub-section. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, the expression 'family' shall mean the transferee, his or her wife or husband (as the case may be) and minor children, and whee the transferee is a minor also his or her parents. 166. Transfer made in contravention of the Act to be void.- Every transfer made in contravention of the provisions of this Act shall be void. 167. Consequences of void transfers.- (1) The following consequences shall ensue in respect of every transfer which is void by virtue of Section 166, namely- (a) the subject-matter of transfer shall with effect from the date of transfer, be deemed to have vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances; (b) the trees, crops and wells existing on the land on the date of transfer shall, with effect from the said date, be deemed to have vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances; (c) the transferee may remove other movable property or the materials of any immovable property existing on such land on the date of transfer within such time as may be prescribed. (2) Where any land or other property has vested in the State Government under sub-section (1), it shall be lawful for the Collector to take over possession over such land or other property and to direct that any person occupying such land or property be evicted therefrom. For the purposes of taking over such possession or evicting such unauthorised occupants, the Collector may use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary." 32. While enacting law for abolition of zamindari system, the legislature was aware of the ground reality that despite the welfare measures which may be taken by the State to protect the interest of poor farmers, economically affluent class of people may persuade or pressurize them to part with their sole source of sustenance i.e., the land. This is the reason why a ceiling has been imposed on transfer of land by Bhumidhar. This is the reason why a ceiling has been imposed on transfer of land by Bhumidhar. Section 154(1), in no uncertain terms, declares that no Bhumidhar shall be entitled to transfer any land other than tea gardens by sale or gift to any person if holding of the transferee would exceed 12.50 acres (Earlier the prescribed limit was 30 acres but by an amendment it was reduced to 12.50 acres). An explanation was subsequently added to clarify that the word 'person' shall include and be deemed to have included a cooperative society on June 15, 1976. Proviso to Section 154(1) lays down that where the transferee is a cooperative society, the land held by it having been pooled by its members under Section 77(1)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 shall not be taken into account for the purpose of computing 12.50 acres. 33. Under sub-section (2) to Section 154, the State Government is empowered to authorize transfer of land in excess of the limit prescribed in sub-section (1) if it is of the opinion that such transfer is in favour of a registered cooperative society or an institution established for a charitable purpose, which does not have sufficient land for its need or the transfer is in the interest of general public. The substantive part of subsection (3), which was added by an amendment made in 2005, lays down that every transfer of land in excess of the limit prescribed under sub-section (1) shall require prior approval of the State Government. By virtue of proviso to this sub-section, the State Government has been clothed with power to give post facto approval on payment of the specified amount as fine. 34. Section 166 declares that every transfer made in contravention of the provision of the Act shall be void. This obviously includes Section 154(1). Section 167 enumerates the consequences of void transfers. Clause (a) of Section 167(1) lays down that a transfer which is void by virtue of Section 166, the subject matter of transfer shall be deemed to have vested in the State Government from the date of transfer. In terms of Section 167(2), the Collector is entitled to take over possession of any land or other property which has vested in the State Government under sub-section (1) and also direct eviction of any person occupying such land or property. 35. In terms of Section 167(2), the Collector is entitled to take over possession of any land or other property which has vested in the State Government under sub-section (1) and also direct eviction of any person occupying such land or property. 35. The argument of Shri Manoj Swarup that a company is not a 'person' within the meaning of Section 154(1) of the Act and, therefore, the restriction contained therein is not applicable to transfer of land in favour of a company sans merit. Since, the word 'person' has not been defined in the Act, reference can usefully be made to the definition of that word in the Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1904. Sections 3 and 4(33) of that Act read as under: "3. Application of the Act to other enactments. - (1) The provisions of this Act shall apply to this Act and to all Uttar Pradesh Acts, whether made before or after the commencement of this Act. (2) The provisions of this Act in their application to any enactment or statutory instrument shall be subject to any contrary requirements of the context of the enactment or instrument that is to be interpreted. 4. Definitions. - In all Uttar Pradesh Acts, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, - xxxx xxxx xxxx (33) "Person" shall include any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not; 36. A reading of Section 3(1) reproduced above makes it clear that the provisions contained in the U.P. General Clauses Act are applicable to all Uttar Pradesh Acts including the Act with which we are concerned. To put it differently, by virtue of Section 3(1) of the General Clauses Act, the definition of the word 'person' contained in Section 4(33) will be deemed to have been engrafted in the Act and the same cannot be given a restricted meaning as suggested by the learned counsel. Rather, in view of the definition contained in Section 4(33) of the U.P. General Clauses Act, the word 'person' appearing in Section 154(1) would include any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. This view of ours is strengthened by the language of explanation added to Section 154(1) whereby it was declared that the expression 'person' shall include a cooperative society. This view of ours is strengthened by the language of explanation added to Section 154(1) whereby it was declared that the expression 'person' shall include a cooperative society. The word 'include' is generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statue and when it is so used those words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things, as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. The word 'include' is susceptible of another construction, which may become imperative, if the context of the Act is sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for the purpose of adding to the natural significance of the words or expressions used. It may be equivalent to 'mean and include' and in that case it may afford an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which for the purposes of the Act must invariably be attached to those words or expressions. - Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps. 37. In State of Bombay and Others v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and Others, (1960) AIR SC 610, Gajendragadkar, J., observed: "It is obvious that the words used in an inclusive definition denote extension and cannot be treated as restricted in any sense. Where we are dealing with an inclusive definition, it would be inappropriate to put a restrictive interpretation upon terms of wider denotation. 38. In CIT, A.P. v. Taj Mahal Hotel, Secunderabad, (1971) 3 SCC 550 , this Court interpreted the word 'plant' used in Section 10(2)(vi-b) of the Income Tax Act, 1922. Speaking for the Court, Grover, J., observed: "The very fact that even books have been included shows that the meaning intended to be given to 'plant' is wide. The word 'includes' is often used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute. When it is so used these words and phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their nature and import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include." 39. When it is so used these words and phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their nature and import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include." 39. Moreover, if the word 'person' used in Section 154(1) is interpreted keeping in view the object of legislation and by applying the rule of contextual interpretation, the applicability of which has been recognised in Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras (AIR para 7), S.K. Gupta v. K.P. Jain (SCC para 25), RBI v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. (SCC para 33) and Central Bank of Iondia v. State of Kerala (SCC para 98), it becomes clear that the same would include human being and a body of individuals which may have juridical or non juridical status. 25. In light of above and for reasons stated above, the Court finds that the impugned instructions have impinged upon the statutory provisions of Section 63AB of the Act and are thus ultra vires and are therefore required to be quashed. They are accordingly quashed. The Collector shall now decide the applications of the petitioners for N A permissions ignoring the impugned instructions. However, quashing of the impugned instructions shall not make the petitioners automatically entitled to grant of the NA permission. It is left open to the collector or the concerned authority to consider while deciding the applications for NA permissions the impact of the order for validation of the sale transactions under section 63AB of the Act in the context of the purpose mentioned therein. In the case of the petitioners of first five petitions, since the Mamlatdar is yet to take decision, the Mamlatdar may proceed to take decision in accordance with the provisions of section 63AB of the Act and it will be thereafter for the Collector to decide on the applications of the petitioners of first five petitions for N.A. permission. The petitions are thus finally disposed of.