JUDGMENT : K. SURENDRA MOHAN, J. 1. The petitioners are eight students whose admissions to the MBBS Degree Course have been found to be improper by the Admission Supervisory Committee for Professional Colleges in Kerala, the third respondent herein. Consequently, grant of approval to their admissions has been rejected by Ext.P30 order. Though the students had sought for a review of the order, as per Ext. P45, the third respondent has found that there were no grounds to review the earlier decision. It is challenging the said orders that this writ petition is filed. They also challenge the proviso to Section 15 of the Kerala Medical Education (Regulation and Control of Admission to Private Medical Educational Institutions) Act, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act 15 of 2017' for short). The contentions of the petitioners is that, the admissions given to them are proper and in accordance with the law. 2. The short facts that are necessary to be taken note of for an adjudication of the issues involved in this case are the following: The Admission Supervisory Committee is constituted for regulating admissions to professional courses, including MBBS, BDS and Engineering Courses in the State of Kerala. The responsibility of the Committee is to ensure that all admissions are fair, merit based and transparent, free of vitiating elements like demanding and collecting of capitation fee. The Admission Supervisory Committee was constituted under the provisions of the Kerala Professional Colleges or Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee, Regulation of Admission, Fixation of Non-Exploitative Fee and Other Measures to Ensure Equity and Excellence in Professional Education) Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act 19 of 2006). 3. Admissions to Medical Colleges for the year 2016-2017 were to be made on the basis of the NEET. In order to ensure that admissions to all Self Financing Medical Colleges were done in a fair, transparent and merit based manner, the third respondent had issued elaborate directions on 4.8.2016 stipulating inter alia that admissions shall be only on the basis of online applications. While so, the Government of Kerala issued two Government Orders, viz. G.O.(Rt) No. 2314/2016/H&FWD dated 20.8.2016 and G.O. (Rt) No. 2336/2016/H&FWD dated 23.8.2016. As per the Government order, the counselling of students who were to be admitted was to be conducted only by the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations. While so, the Government of Kerala issued two Government Orders, viz. G.O.(Rt) No. 2314/2016/H&FWD dated 20.8.2016 and G.O. (Rt) No. 2336/2016/H&FWD dated 23.8.2016. As per the Government order, the counselling of students who were to be admitted was to be conducted only by the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations. The said Government Orders were challenged before this Court by the Self Financing Medical Colleges in a number of writ petitions. After hearing the respective counsel, this Court granted an interim order on 26.8.2016 (to which one of us, K. Surendra Mohan, J, was a party) staying the Government Orders subject to specific conditions stipulated in the order. The said order is evidenced herein by Ext.P1. The relevant portion of the order reads as follows: “(i) admissions to the MBBS/BDS Courses shall be only on the basis of the ranking of candidates in the rank list of NEET, 2016, on the basis of the inter-se merit among the candidates, who have applied to the respective colleges. (ii) All the colleges agree that, the applications for admission are received only through on-line and that the said process provides transparency with regard to the merit as well as the identities of the applicants. Such applications shall therefore be uploaded for the scrutiny of the Admission Supervisory Committee also immediately on the expiry of the last date for submission of applications.” The first respondent College was not a party to the writ petitions in which Ext.P1 order was passed. Therefore, they filed a separate writ petition, W.P.(C) No. 28856 of 2016 and obtained Ext.P2 interim order wherein this Court has directed that Ext.P1 interim order would enure to the benefit of the first respondent also. Ext.P1 order was challenged by the Union of India before the Apex Court. As per Ext.P9 order in Civil Appeal No. 9862 of 2016, the Apex Court interfered with Ext.P1 order and set aside that part of the order which permitted the respective colleges to conduct counselling and confirmed the order with respect to all other matters. Thus, the conditions stipulated by Ext.P1, except to the extent it permitted counselling by the respective Colleges, was confirmed by the Apex Court. 4. While so, as per an order dated 2.9.2016, the third respondent approved the Prospectus of the first respondent College. The total intake of the first respondent College for the year 2016-2017 was 150 students. Thus, the conditions stipulated by Ext.P1, except to the extent it permitted counselling by the respective Colleges, was confirmed by the Apex Court. 4. While so, as per an order dated 2.9.2016, the third respondent approved the Prospectus of the first respondent College. The total intake of the first respondent College for the year 2016-2017 was 150 students. By Ext.P5, the third respondent revised the admission schedule fixing the last date for admission of students as 30.9.2016. In the above circumstances, on 3.9.2016 the College entered into an agreement with the Government with respect to sharing of seats. As per the agreement, 50% of the available seats were to be filled up by the Government on the basis of the ranking in the Common Entrance Test. The remaining 50% seats were to be filled up by the Management, also on the basis of the ranking in the Common Entrance Test. It was in the above background that admissions to the first respondent College were effected. 5. While the admissions were so progressing, the third respondent received a number of complaints alleging that 355 applications had been rejected by the College stating reasons varying from, the print out not received, latest conduct certificate not produced, physical fitness certificate not produced, signature not seen on the print out form, sufficient number of photographs not produced, so on and so forth. The complainants alleged that they were not given an opportunity to cure the defects. The third respondent considered the complaints and directed as per Ext.P7 order that the Medical College should give an opportunity to all the rejected candidates to rectify the defects, for which time was granted upto 26.9.2016. On 26.9.2016 itself, the list of eligible applicants was directed to be published and to be forwarded to the third respondent. The candidates were to remit their fees and the admissions were to be completed on or before 28.9.2016 as per Ext.P7. It has also been directed that, the first respondent shall adhere to the directives issued by the third respondent, particularly the directives dated 19.9.2016. Accordingly, the admissions were completed and submitted for approval of the third respondent by the College. The admissions were scrutinized by the third respondent and Ext.P28 order was issued on 6.3.2017 approving the admissions of 60 candidates and withholding the admissions of 15 candidates. Thereupon, the first respondent submitted their explanation as per Ext.P29. Accordingly, the admissions were completed and submitted for approval of the third respondent by the College. The admissions were scrutinized by the third respondent and Ext.P28 order was issued on 6.3.2017 approving the admissions of 60 candidates and withholding the admissions of 15 candidates. Thereupon, the first respondent submitted their explanation as per Ext.P29. The explanation was considered on the basis of the additional documents produced and the admission of all except the petitioners herein were approved. The petitioners are aggrieved by the action of the third respondent in not granting approval to their admissions. 6. According to the third respondent, the second and eighth petitioners have been granted admission in the NRI quota, while the other petitioners have been admitted under the Management quota. It has been found in Ext.P30 that, they are students who had not submitted online applications to the first respondent College. Nor have they been subjected to counselling by the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations as stipulated by the Apex Court in Ext.P9 order confirming the conditions in Ext.P1 and modifying condition No.1 therein. 7. The explanation of the first respondent College is that, they had issued an advertisement in the newspapers, evidenced herein by Ext.P8 inviting applications for spot admissions. The petitioners herein had submitted their applications in response to the said advertisement and the College had granted them admission in the absence of any other candidates, though it is true that they had not submitted online applications to the college initially. The students were so admitted on 28.9.2016. They have been pursuing their studies, ever since. 8. According to Adv. Santhosh Mathew who appears for the petitioners, all of them are eligible for admission to the MBBS Course, being NEET qualified. They are persons who had submitted online applications to various other Colleges, as evident from Exts. P16 to P23 They had come across Ext.P8 newspaper advertisement inviting applications for spot admission issued by the first respondent. Pursuant thereto, they had submitted Exts.P10 to P15(B) applications. On the basis of the said applications, counselling was conducted by the College and they were granted admission. It is contended that, there is absolutely no irregularity in the said procedure or in the admissions granted to the petitioners. The third respondent has issued Ext.P30 order without considering any of the above aspects. On the basis of the said applications, counselling was conducted by the College and they were granted admission. It is contended that, there is absolutely no irregularity in the said procedure or in the admissions granted to the petitioners. The third respondent has issued Ext.P30 order without considering any of the above aspects. It is further contended that, the petitioners were granted admission on 28.9.2016, the list of students was submitted to the third respondent on 29.9.2016. However, Ext.P30 order was passed only on 2.6.2017 after considerable delay. According to the learned counsel, the directions issued by this Court on many occasions are to the effect that, orders are necessary to be passed in such matters expeditiously, considering the fact that the future of the students are involved. In the present case, the delay has vitiated the impugned order, it is contended. 9. Apart from the above, Ext.P30 order was passed on 2.6.2017. On the said date, the third respondent had no power to cancel the admissions of the petitioners. It only had a power to recommend to the Government to issue orders cancelling the admissions. This is for the reason that, the State Government had promulgated an Ordinance, the Kerala Medical Education (Regulation and Control of Admission to Private Medical Educational Institutions) Ordinance, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as 'Ordinance No. 6 of 2017' for short) on 10.4.2017. A copy of the said Ordinance is produced as Ext.P32. As per Ext.P32, a different Committee called the Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee has been constituted, on which the power to fix the fees to be charged by Medical Colleges as well as the power to enquire into the admissions made by the said Colleges was conferred. As per Section 15 thereof, the Ordinance has been given overriding effect. 10. Later, a second ordinance, Ordinance No. 7 of 2017 was promulgated on 1.6.2017 containing similar provisions. A copy of the said Ordinance is produced as Ext.P33. Reliance is placed on Section 15 thereof to contend that, the said Ordinance was also given overriding effect. A third ordinance, Ordinance No. 14 of 2017 was promulgated on 10.7.2017 replacing Ext.P33, which is Ext.P34. Ext.P34 has also been given overriding effect. However, a proviso was incorporated saving all actions taken or deemed to have been taken under the earlier Act, prior to the commencement of the Ordinance. A third ordinance, Ordinance No. 14 of 2017 was promulgated on 10.7.2017 replacing Ext.P33, which is Ext.P34. Ext.P34 has also been given overriding effect. However, a proviso was incorporated saving all actions taken or deemed to have been taken under the earlier Act, prior to the commencement of the Ordinance. Ext.P34 was later on replaced by Act 15 of 2017, which is produced as Ext.P35. As per Section 1(3) of the Act, the provisions thereof are deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of June, 2017. Taking into account all the above developments, according to the counsel for the petitioners, it can be seen that, as on 2.6.2017, on which date the third respondent passed Ext.P30, it had no power to do so. Therefore, it is contended that, the impugned order is liable to be set aside for the said reason alone. 11. The petitioners also challenge the proviso to Section 15 of Act 15 of 2017 contending that, the same is invalid. According to the learned counsel, Section 8 limits the powers of the third respondent. However, the effect of the limitations placed on the powers of the Admission Supervisory Committee has been set at naught by the proviso. In other words, though the powers of the third respondent have been scaled down by making the same only recommendatory, the proviso, by saving every action of the Committee initiated under the provisions of the earlier Act has taken away the effect of the enactment itself. The above, according to the learned counsel, is invalid. The counsel places reliance on a Division Bench decision of the High Court of Madras in M. Vetri Selvan v. High Court of Judicature at Madras (2015-1-L.W.208) and the decision of the Apex Court in Sundaram Pillai v. Pattabiraman ( (1985) 1 SCC 591 ) in support of his contentions. Reliance is also placed on the decision in Ali M.K. v. State of Kerala ((2003) 11 SCC 632), particularly paragraphs 9 to 12. 12. The Senior Counsel Shri. Kurian George Kannanthanam who appears for the first respondent contends that, the College was faced with a situation where even after the final round of allotment, there were vacant seats that required to be filled up. There was no prohibition against filling up of such vacant seats by the College. 12. The Senior Counsel Shri. Kurian George Kannanthanam who appears for the first respondent contends that, the College was faced with a situation where even after the final round of allotment, there were vacant seats that required to be filled up. There was no prohibition against filling up of such vacant seats by the College. It was for the said reason that, the College had issued an advertisement on 25.9.2016 as evidenced by Ext.P8. According to the learned Senior Counsel, on the basis of the advertisement, the petitioners were granted admission on 28.9.2016. On the next day itself, the list of students was sent to the third respondent. It is contended that, Ext.P7 order issued by the third respondent permitted the College to fill up the seats remaining vacant, as done by them. Though the list of students had been forwarded to the third respondent on 29.9.2016, the impugned order Ext.P30 was passed only on 2.6.2017. It is further pointed out that, as per Ext.P47 order, the third respondent has permitted students in similar circumstances to continue their studies for the BDS Course. Therefore, there is no reason why the petitioner College also should not be extended the said benefit. The petitioners are all NEET qualified persons and eligible to be admitted to the MBBS Degree Course. They had been admitted for the reason that there were no other students available at the time of the spot admission. The learned Senior Counsel also contends that, since no person has complained against the admissions granted to the petitioners so far, it is to be presumed that no claim of a person with superior merit has been overlooked while granting admissions to the petitioners. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel, also contends that Ext.P30 is unsustainable and liable to be set aside. 13. Adv. Mary Benjamin who appears for the third respondent Committee places reliance on Ext.P1 interim order passed by this Court to contend that, it was agreed by all the petitioners therein that admissions shall be only on the basis of online applications. The first respondent, who was not a party to the said order, had thereafter filed a writ petition and had obtained Ext.P2 order from this Court by which, Ext.P1 order has been made applicable to the said College also. Therefore, it was incumbent on the first respondent to have admitted students only on the basis of online applications. The first respondent, who was not a party to the said order, had thereafter filed a writ petition and had obtained Ext.P2 order from this Court by which, Ext.P1 order has been made applicable to the said College also. Therefore, it was incumbent on the first respondent to have admitted students only on the basis of online applications. The learned counsel refers to the directives issued by the third respondent as early as on 4.8.2016 stipulating the procedure to be followed for grant of admissions for the year 2016-2017. According to the learned counsel, in the said proceedings, it was specifically stipulated that, applications for admission shall be submitted only through the online process. The petitioners herein are persons who were fully aware of the said mandatory stipulation that was insisted upon to ensure transparency and fairness in the admission process. This is evident from the fact that the petitioners had also submitted online applications, copies of which are produced as Ext.P16 to Ext.P23. However, they had not submitted applications to the first respondent College. Ext.P1 interim order is relied upon to point out that, it contains a specific stipulation that, admission shall be only on the basis of an approved Prospectus. The Prospectus of the first respondent was granted approval as per Ext.P4 on 2.9.2016. As per Clause 10 of Ext.P9, it has been stipulated that, the application for admission shall only be online, as per the directives of the Committee on 4.8.2016. As per Ext.P5, a schedule was provided for the admission process. As per the schedule, the last date for submission of online applications was 9.9.2016. Therefore, Exts. P10 to P15(B) applications of 28.9.2016 are violative of the stipulation in Ext.P5. The last date for forwarding the list of candidates to the third respondent was 13.9.2016 as per Ext.P5. However, the said deadline was also violated for the reason that, admittedly the College had forwarded the list of candidates to third respondent only on 29.9.2016. Thereafter, the third respondent had passed Ext.P7 order on 22.9.2016, that related to the complaint received alleging rejection of applications of 355 persons. The third respondent scrutinized the admissions of the first respondent thereafter and issued Ext.P28 order on 6.3.2017 summoning the parties to appear before it on 21.3.2017. Ext.P29 letter of the College is dated 24.5.2017. It was thereafter on 2.6.2017 that Ext.P30 order was passed. The third respondent scrutinized the admissions of the first respondent thereafter and issued Ext.P28 order on 6.3.2017 summoning the parties to appear before it on 21.3.2017. Ext.P29 letter of the College is dated 24.5.2017. It was thereafter on 2.6.2017 that Ext.P30 order was passed. According to the learned counsel, 2.6.2017 is the date on which the proceedings that were initiated on 4.8.2016 by issuing necessary directives for admission for the year 2016-2017 had culminated. Since the proceedings had been initiated and were pending, they were saved by the proviso to Section 15 of Act 15 of 2017. It is therefore contended that, the third respondent did not lack power to issue the impugned order. 14. According to the learned counsel, it was not open to the students to question the powers of the third respondent. This is for the reason that, they themselves had approached the third respondent seeking a review of Ext.P30 and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the said authority. The said review petition has been disposed of by Ext.P45 order. Though as per Ext.P5, the list of candidates who have submitted online applications was to be furnished to the third respondent on 13.9.2016, the same was admittedly submitted only on 29.9.2016. Since the list was not supported by sufficient documents evidencing the eligibility of many of the students, further clarifications required to be obtained. Such clarifications were sought for only for the purpose of ensuring that no prejudice was caused to an eligible student. Consequently, though the admissions of 15 students were initially withheld as per Ext.P28 order dated 6.3.2017, as per Ext.P30 only the petitioners herein have been found to be ineligible. It is pointed out by the learned counsel that, the College has not challenged the impugned order, till date. It is only the students who have filed this writ petition that too only on 4.10.2017, after a considerable lapse of time. 15. The learned counsel further points out that, though the students are stated to have been pursuing their studies all along, they are not persons who deserve any sympathy from this Court. They were well aware of the fact that applications for admission had to be submitted online. They had accordingly submitted online applications to various other Colleges as evidenced by Exts. P16 to Ext.P23 documents. However, they had not submitted applications to the first respondent College. They were well aware of the fact that applications for admission had to be submitted online. They had accordingly submitted online applications to various other Colleges as evidenced by Exts. P16 to Ext.P23 documents. However, they had not submitted applications to the first respondent College. They have claimed that they had submitted their applications pursuant to Ext.P8 advertisement, the same was issued long after the cut off date. The said advertisement does not show the date on which the spot admission was scheduled. Therefore, the advertisement apart from being unauthorised, was also misleading. The counsel also draws our attention to the fact that, the first respondent College had rejected as many as 355 applications on flimsy or insignificant reasons. Only 60 of the said candidates had complained to the third respondent. The fact that such a large number of candidates had been disqualified by the College is indicative of their devious intentions. They have resorted to a nontransparent, and unfair method to grant admissions to the eight petitioners herein, violating the directions of this Court as well as that of the third respondent with impunity. They have not moved even their little finger to challenge Ext.P30. They have instigated the petitioners to do so, obviously banking upon this Court to show sympathy to the students and to sustain their admissions condoning the illegal acts of the College. It is contended that, such devious methods ought not to be permitted to fructify. Therefore, the counsel seeks dismissal of the writ petition. 16. According to the learned counsel, this is a case in which the petitioners, who were applicants to other Medical Colleges of their choice, had on realizing that their chances of getting an admission was non-existent, had struck a deal with the first respondent on the basis of which they have been granted admission under the guise of making spot admissions. The first respondent had no power to make such spot admission. The candidates have submitted their applications only on 28.9.2016, long after the last date for submission of such applications had expired. They had not undergone the counselling. Both the petitioners as well as the first respondent were well aware of the fact that they were violating the directions of the third respondent as well as this Court. Therefore, they are not entitled to claim any reliefs on the ground of equity from this Court. 17. They had not undergone the counselling. Both the petitioners as well as the first respondent were well aware of the fact that they were violating the directions of the third respondent as well as this Court. Therefore, they are not entitled to claim any reliefs on the ground of equity from this Court. 17. In reply to the contention that the third respondent was denuded of its powers by the Ordinances promulgated by the State as well as the subsequent enactment, Act 15 of 2017, the learned counsel draws our attention to Ordinance No. 6 of 2017 to point out that though the same was promulgated on 10.4.2017, Section 1(3) provides that it shall come into force on such date, the Government may by notification in the Gazette appoint. No such notification was issued and no Committee was also constituted under the provisions thereof. With respect to Ext.P33, Ordinance No. 7 of 2017 which was issued on 1.6.2017, Section 3 provided that the Government shall by notification in the Gazette constitute a Committee to be called the Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee. However, no such Committee was constituted and no notification was issued, as contemplated. Therefore, as on the date of Ext.P30, 2.6.2017, the Committee was clothed with ample powers to issue the order. Ordinance No. 14 of 2017 (Ext.P34) was promulgated on 10.7.2017. It was only as per Section 15 of the said Ordinance that the provisions thereof were given overriding effect over Act 19 of 2006. In the previous ordinances, the analogues provision did not refer to Act 19 of 2006. In Ext.P34, the proviso saves all action taken under Act 19 of 2006. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the contention that the provisions of the Ordinances divested the third respondent of all powers under Section 15 is without any basis. Act 15 of 2017 has been given effect from 1.6.2017. The proviso to Section 15 of the said enactment saves all actions initiated under Act 19 of 2006. 18. With respect to the spot admission conducted by the first respondent, it is contended that, such spot admission could have been made only by the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations. The first respondent had therefore acted without any authority in granting admission to the petitioners. The learned counsel therefore prays for dismissal of the writ petition. 18. With respect to the spot admission conducted by the first respondent, it is contended that, such spot admission could have been made only by the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations. The first respondent had therefore acted without any authority in granting admission to the petitioners. The learned counsel therefore prays for dismissal of the writ petition. We have heard the learned Special Government Pleader Shri. M.A. Asif as well as Adv. P. Sreekumar who appears for the fourth respondent. They have also put forward similar contentions as the counsel for the third respondent. 19. Heard. We have considered the contentions advanced before us by the respective counsel carefully and anxiously. It is not in dispute that, the petitioners are persons who had not submitted online applications for admission to the first respondent College at any time. It is not in dispute that, well before the process of admission for the year 2016-2017 had commenced, the third respondent had issued elaborate directives as per its communication dated 4.8.2016 setting out the conditions that were to be adhered to while proceeding with the process of admissions for that year. NEET was made applicable to the admissions for the year 2016-2017. It was at the above juncture that the State issued two Government Orders mandating that the counselling in respect of all seats shall be conducted only by the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations. Various Self Financing Medical Colleges challenged the said orders before this Court. In the said writ petitions, Ext.P1 interim order was passed granting a stay of the Government Orders, subject to specific conditions set out in the said order. Since the third respondent was not a party to Ext.P1 order, they approached this Court for the benefit of the said order by filing a separate writ petition. As per Ext.P2, they were also extended the benefits of Ext.P1 order. Though Ext.P1 was the subject matter of an appeal before the Apex Court at the instance of the Union of India, the Apex Court as per Ext.P9 confirmed the said order, subject to the modification that no counselling shall be conducted by the respective colleges. Thus, the conditions in Ext.P1 interim order stood confirmed. Though Ext.P1 was the subject matter of an appeal before the Apex Court at the instance of the Union of India, the Apex Court as per Ext.P9 confirmed the said order, subject to the modification that no counselling shall be conducted by the respective colleges. Thus, the conditions in Ext.P1 interim order stood confirmed. Consequently, it was incumbent on all colleges to have admitted students only on the basis of online applications received, on the basis of a prospectus approved by the third respondent Committee and on the basis of a counselling conducted by the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations. The petitioners are persons who have been granted admission by the first respondent College in gross violation of all the three conditions referred to above. 20. The petitioners are persons who had not applied to the first respondent College through the process of submitting online applications. According to them, they came across Ext.P8 advertisement in the Malayala Manorama newspaper dated 25.9.2016. Thereafter, they submitted Exts. P10 to P15(B) applications on 28.9.2016 and the first respondent granted them admissions on the very same day. A close reading of Ext.P8 advertisement shows that it merely announces a spot admission at the first respondent College for MBBS/BDS. It provides three contact numbers and states that hostel facility is available in the campus. A date for spot admission is conspicuously absent. Therefore, one fails to understand on which date the spot admission was scheduled or on which date a candidate interested in seeking spot admission was expected to appear at the college. No details regarding how and in what manner the spot admission was conducted is also forthcoming. According to the college, the petitioners herein were the only persons available. We are not told whether the spot admission was conducted at the college. The advertisement Ext.P8 itself is vague, apart from being unauthorized. The college had no business to issue such an advertisement, without authority. To be capable of any reliance, the advertisement ought to have contained necessary details that could enable a prospective candidate to appear for the spot admission. The defective manner in which such an elusive advertisement was planted in the newspaper only adds force to the contention of the learned counsel for the third respondent that the same was intended only as part of the devious methods of the College to lend some semblance of legitimacy to their illegal acts. The defective manner in which such an elusive advertisement was planted in the newspaper only adds force to the contention of the learned counsel for the third respondent that the same was intended only as part of the devious methods of the College to lend some semblance of legitimacy to their illegal acts. According to the counsel for the third respondent, the College authorities had zeroed in on the petitioners for the purpose of granting admission, after invalidating the applications of as many as 355 eligible candidates. The advertisement was only a camouflage. Since the College had no authority to issue such an advertisement or to make such spot admission, we are not satisfied that the same can advance the case of the petitioners in any manner. 21. The admissions of the Self Financing Medical Colleges in the State were conducted during the year 2016-2017 in accordance with the directives issued by the third respondent initially on 4.8.2016 and in accordance with the stipulations contained in Ext.P1 interim order of this Court as confirmed by the Apex Court in Ext.P9. The first respondent has granted admission to the petitioners in total violation of the stipulations contained in the said orders. Therefore, we hold that the admissions granted to the petitioners are unsustainable. It is the contention of the counsel for the first respondent that, under similar circumstances admissions to the BDS course of the very same year 2016-2017 made by the College on the basis of spot admission has been approved by the third respondent. However, it is clear from a perusal of Ext.P7 order that in the said instance a spot admission had been scheduled by the College on 27.9.2016, facilitating all interested candidates to appear on the said date. In stark contrast, as already noticed above, the advertisement in the present case, does not carry a date for spot admission. In the absence of a notified date for spot admission, no purpose is served by the advertisement Ext.P8. In view of the above, the counsel for the third respondent is fully justified in characterizing the advertisement as an invitation to interested persons to approach the College for striking a deal with respect to the seats remaining vacant. In the absence of a notified date for spot admission, no purpose is served by the advertisement Ext.P8. In view of the above, the counsel for the third respondent is fully justified in characterizing the advertisement as an invitation to interested persons to approach the College for striking a deal with respect to the seats remaining vacant. For the above reasons, we find no substance in the contention of the first respondent that, the concession extended by the third respondent as per Ext.P7 order should be made available to the petitioners herein also. 22. Another contention put forward is that, since the students have been pursuing their courses and studying from September, 2016 onwards, they should be permitted to continue and complete their studies. As we have already noted, there is a lot more than what meets the eye in the whole episode. When the procedure adopted by the first respondent College is examined, the petitioners, who were not applicants to the first respondent College, had surfaced from nowhere, allegedly responding to the vague newspaper advertisement, Ext.P8. Despite being persons who had submitted online applications to other Medical Colleges, they are stated to have applied to the first respondent College and granted admission on the very same day, 28.9.2016. It is also stated that there were no other candidates available. The petitioners cannot therefore be considered to be persons who have unwittingly fallen prey to a fraud played on them They are also persons who are equally culpable of the illegality perpetuated. 23. The contention strenuously put forward by the counsel for the petitioners is that, as on 2.6.2017 the third respondent lacked the power to issue Ext.P30. As already noticed above, he has elaborately drawn our attention to the dates of the successive ordinances promulgated by the Government to support his contention that the third respondent had been denuded of all powers of an affirmative action of cancelling admissions. In the above context, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of the Ordinances in a little detail. Ext.P32 is a copy of Ordinance No. 6 of 2017. In the above context, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of the Ordinances in a little detail. Ext.P32 is a copy of Ordinance No. 6 of 2017. Section 1 (3) of the Ordinance reads as under: “(3) It shall come into force on such date as the Government may by notification in the Gazette appoint.” The said ordinance was intended to provide for the regulation of admission and fixation of fee in Private Medical Educational Institutions in the State of Kerala. Therefore, the Ordinance purported to regulate only medical admissions. Section 3 provided for the constitution of an Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee. The said provision is to the effect that the State shall, by notification in the Gazette, constitute a Committee. According to the counsel for the third respondent, no notification as stipulated by Section 1(3) or the notification under Section 3 of the Ordinance was issued by the Government. Therefore, though the Ordinance was promulgated on 10.4.2017, it did not affect the functioning of the third respondent in any manner. 24. Ext.P33, Ordinance No. 7 of 2017 came on 1.6.2017. Section 1(3) of the said Ordinance also is worded on similar terms as in Ext.P32 extracted above. Section 3 conferred power on the Government to constitute a Committee called the Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee 'by notification in the Gazette.' Since no such notification was issued, the said Ordinance also had no effect on the powers of the third respondent. It was in the above circumstances that the impugned order Ext.P30 was passed on 2.6.2017. We further take note of the fact that, Section 15 in Ext.P32 as well as Ext.P33 Ordinances only provided that the provisions thereof would have effect 'notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Ordinance.' 25. Ext.P34 is a copy of Ordinance No. 14 of 2017. The said Ordinance was Promulgated on 10.7.2017. Section 1(3) of the said Ordinance reads as under: “(3) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of June, 2017.” Section 3 of the said Ordinance empowered the Government 'by notification in the Gazette' to constitute a Committee to be called the Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee, in accordance with the provisions thereof. Section 1(3) of the said Ordinance reads as under: “(3) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of June, 2017.” Section 3 of the said Ordinance empowered the Government 'by notification in the Gazette' to constitute a Committee to be called the Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee, in accordance with the provisions thereof. Section 15 of Ext.P34 Ordinance for the first time provided that, the provisions thereof shall have effect over Act 19 of 2006. However, a proviso that saves all action taken under the provisions of the previous enactment has been incorporated. The said provision is extracted hereunder for convenience of reference: “15. Overriding effect of the Ordinance.-The provisions of this Ordinance and the rules made there under shall have effect over the provisions of the Kerala Professional Colleges or Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation fee, Regulation of Admission, Fixation of Non-Exploitation Fee and other Measures to ensure Equity and Excellence in Professional Education) Act, 2006 (19 of 2006) in so far as it is applicable to the private medical educational institutions in the State: Provided that anything done or deemed to have been done or any action taken or deemed to have been taken under the said Act prior to date of commencement of this Ordinance shall be continued and maintained under the provisions of that Act and any suit, prosecution or any other legal proceedings so taken under the said Act shall be continued, maintained or dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the said Act as if this Ordinance was not promulgated.” The said Ordinance has subsequently become Act 15 of 2017. The provisions of the Act have also been given effect from 1.6.2017. Section 15 has been retained in the Act in the same form in which it was available in Ordinance No. 14 of 2017 (Ext.P34). 26. A perusal of the above provisions leaves no doubt in our minds that the third respondent was clothed with sufficient powers to issue Ext.P30 as on 2.6.2017. Though Ordinance No. 6 of 2017 was issued on 10.4.2017, the provisions thereof did not take effect in the absence of any notification by the Government giving effect to them. 26. A perusal of the above provisions leaves no doubt in our minds that the third respondent was clothed with sufficient powers to issue Ext.P30 as on 2.6.2017. Though Ordinance No. 6 of 2017 was issued on 10.4.2017, the provisions thereof did not take effect in the absence of any notification by the Government giving effect to them. Ordinance No.7 of 2017 though promulgated on 1.6.2017, also did not affect the powers of the third respondent for the reason that, no notification as stipulated therein was issued by the Government and no Committee as envisaged therein was constituted. Therefore, as on 2.6.2017, there was no impediment in issuing Ext.P30, as sought to be made by the counsel for the petitioners. Ordinance No. 14 of 2017 was promulgated on 10.7.2017. It was in the said Ordinance that for the first time a provision giving overriding effect to the provisions thereof was included. While including the said provision, a proviso has also been put in place providing that any action taken under Act 19 of 2006 could be continued and completed. The said provision is also part of Act 15 of 2017. In view of the above, we hold that the third respondent had sufficient powers to issue Ext.P30 on 2.6.2017. 27. Another contention put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that, the proviso is invalid for the reason that it takes away the effect of the main provision, Section 15. Reliance is placed on the decision in Sundaram Pillai v. Pattabiraman (supra) to contend that the proviso is unsustainable and liable to be set aside. In the said decision the Apex Court has summed up the legal position with respect to provisos in paragraphs 43 and 44 thereof, which reads as under: “42. We need not multiply authorities after authorities on this point because the legal position seems to be clearly and manifestly well established. In the said decision the Apex Court has summed up the legal position with respect to provisos in paragraphs 43 and 44 thereof, which reads as under: “42. We need not multiply authorities after authorities on this point because the legal position seems to be clearly and manifestly well established. To sum up, a proviso may serve four different purposes: (1) qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment; (2) it may entirely change the very concept of the intendment of the enactment by insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable; (3) it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an integral part of the enactment and thus acquire the tenor and colour of the substantive enactment itself; and (4) it may be used merely to act as an optional addenda to the enactment with the sole object of explaining the real intendment of the statutory provision. 43. These seem to be by and large the main purport and parameters of a proviso.” In the said case, the Apex Court was concerned with the validity of an Explanation that was inserted to a provision by a subsequent amendment. It was held that, an Explanation must necessarily explain the provision and not take away the effect of the main provision. It is worth noticing that, no such situation exists in the present case. As we have already noticed above, Act 15 of 2017 has only removed the regulation of admissions to medical colleges from the purview of Act 19 of 2006. Therefore, the provisions of Act 19 of 2006 continue to be in force in so far as admissions to all other courses are concerned. What Section 15 has done is only to give overriding effect to the provisions of Act 15 of 2017 over Act 19 of 2006 in so far as admissions to the Private Medical Educational Institutions are concerned. Since Act 19 of 2006 had been regulating such aspects until Act 15 of 2017 was enacted, it has been provided that any action taken, initiated or continued under the provisions of Act 19 of 2006 could be continued and completed under the provisions thereof. The proviso has therefore been enacted for the removal of difficulties. Since Act 19 of 2006 had been regulating such aspects until Act 15 of 2017 was enacted, it has been provided that any action taken, initiated or continued under the provisions of Act 19 of 2006 could be continued and completed under the provisions thereof. The proviso has therefore been enacted for the removal of difficulties. The same is only a transitional provision that does not denude the main part of Section 15 of its efficacy in any manner. Therefore, we are not satisfied that there is any justification for the contention of the counsel for the petitioners. According to him, inasmuch as the powers of the third respondent have been made recommendatory by the provisions of Act 15 of 2017, the said effect has been taken away by the proviso, since under Act 19 of 2006 the committee had the power to cancel admissions. The said contention cannot be accepted for the reason that, the Committee under Act 19 of 2006 is the Admission Supervisory Committee whereas the Committee contemplated by Act 15 of 2017 is the Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee. The constitution of the Committee contemplated by Act 15 of 2017 is totally different from that of the Committee envisaged by Act 19 of 2006. Therefore, both the Committees are different. The powers of the Admission Supervisory Committee have been taken away only in so far as it related to the scrutiny of admissions to self financing medical institutions. The Committee is in existence and functional in so far as admissions to other disciplines and courses are concerned. As per Act 15 of 2017 therefore, the Committee that has been constituted is a different entity. A perusal of Ext.P30 shows that, the said order has been passed by the Admission Supervisory Committee under the provisions of Act 19 of 2006. Therefore, the said contention of the petitioners is rejected. 28. Yet another contention put forward is that, though the list of candidates had been furnished to the third respondent by the College as early as on 29.9.2016, the impugned order was passed only on 2.6.2017. Therefore, there was unconscionable delay on the part of the third respondent Committee. Had the committee been vigilant in passing orders promptly and within a reasonable time, the petitioners would not have lost more than one year in the prime of their lives. Therefore, there was unconscionable delay on the part of the third respondent Committee. Had the committee been vigilant in passing orders promptly and within a reasonable time, the petitioners would not have lost more than one year in the prime of their lives. At this length of time, it is too harsh on the students to be told that they have no right to pursue their MBBS studies, it is contended. However, a perusal of the schedule, Ext.P5 issued by the third respondent required the first respondent College to furnish the list of eligible students whose online applications had been received, at least on 13.9.2016. The counselling and admissions of the candidates were to commence from 17.9.2016. The first respondent had not adhered to the said schedule. The list of students, evidenced herein by Ext.P24 was forwarded to the third respondent, admittedly only on 29.9.2016. As rightly contended by the counsel for the third respondent, the list was not accompanied by all the necessary details of the students. Therefore, further details had to be solicited and obtained, which took time. Finally, on 6.3.2017, the third respondent has passed Ext.P28 order withholding the admissions of 15 candidates and approving the admissions of all other candidates. Thereafter, the College authorities were heard and on the basis of the additional documents submitted by them, the admissions of all other candidates except the petitioners were approved. The third respondent being the Committee that is entrusted with the duty of scrutinizing the admissions of all the self financing Medical Colleges in the State, it is contended that the time that was taken to complete the proceedings cannot be said to be unreasonable. Though it is true that, the list of candidates had been furnished to the third respondent on 29.9.2016, the process of scrutinizing the admissions appear to have been continuing, as evident from Ext.P28. On 6.3.2017, the said order was issued withholding the admissions of 15 candidates. Thereafter, the impugned order Ext.P30 was passed on 2.6.2017, after giving sufficient opportunity to the College to explain and justify the legitimacy of the admissions granted by them. In view of the above, it cannot be said that there was any unreasonable delay in issuing Ext.P30 order as contended. 29. The counsel for the petitioners has also contended that, the petitioners were not heard before Ext.P30 was passed. In view of the above, it cannot be said that there was any unreasonable delay in issuing Ext.P30 order as contended. 29. The counsel for the petitioners has also contended that, the petitioners were not heard before Ext.P30 was passed. It is worth noticing from Ext.P28 order withholding the candidature of the petitioners that the third respondent had directed the first respondent College, as evident from paragraph 15, to communicate to the respective candidates their respective approved and withheld status. It was upto the first respondent College and the petitioners to have made use of the opportunity that was provided to them for establishing their claims before the third respondent. An opportunity for the said purpose is seen to have been granted by scheduling a hearing on 21.3.2017 at 2.30 p.m. in the Head Office of the third respondent. In view of the above, we do not find any merit in the contention that the petitioners were not heard. For the foregoing reasons, we find no grounds to interfere with the impugned orders Ext.P30 and Ext. P45. We also repel the challenge against the proviso to Section 15 of Act 15 of 2017. The writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.