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2018 DIGILAW 1079 (GUJ)

Ravikumar A. Verma v. Bank of Baroda

2018-09-11

A.J.SHASTRI

body2018
JUDGMENT : A.J. SHASTRI, J. 1. Mr. Pawan Barot, learned Advocate, waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of respondent No. 1. Mr. Darshan M. Parikh, learned Advocate, waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of respondent No. 2. 1. The present petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is filed for the purpose of seeking following reliefs: (A) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit this Special Civil Application; (B) Your Lordships may be pleased to allow this petition by issuing appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondents to the effect that the petitioner be paid revised pension and communication as per 9th B.P.S. dated 27-4-2010 forthwith, in the interest of justice; (C) Your Lordships may be pleased to allow this petition by issuing appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondents to the effect that the petitioner may be paid consequential benefits of retirement dues after considering the Clauses of 9th B.P.S. dated 27-4-2010 and also be pleased to direct the respondent-Bank to issue certificate of discharge from Bank duties and no due certificate showing that there is no outstanding in any loan account of the Bank and the respondent-Bank to pay reasonable rate of interest for deliberately not paying the pensionary benefits to the present petition, in the interest of justice; (D) Your Lordships may be pleased to pass other and further order as the nature and circumstances of the case may be required. 2. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner had joined the respondent-Bank on 26th December, 1978 and was discharging sincere and honest duty throughout the career. It is submitted by the petitioner that on 7-3-2007, the petitioner made an application requesting for sabbatical leave for a period of three years for joining spouse and children, who are residing abroad. The competent authority has considered the said leave for a period of three years and by way of communication dated 29th March, 2007, the respondent-Bank sanctioned the said leave on the terms and conditions which are stipulated in this communication. 2.1. The competent authority has considered the said leave for a period of three years and by way of communication dated 29th March, 2007, the respondent-Bank sanctioned the said leave on the terms and conditions which are stipulated in this communication. 2.1. It is further the case of the petitioner that this sabbatical leave has been sanctioned in view of the terms of the scheme that thereafter, the petitioner being not in a position to resume the duty had applied for voluntary retirement from the Bank services under the Regulation and said application was given on 15-4-2010. The said request for V.R.S. was accepted by the competent authority on 9-9-2010. 2.2. It is further the case of the petitioner that the petitioner had already opted for pension under the provisions of Bank of Baroda (Employees) Pension Regulation. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner had been permitted to voluntarily retire on 9-9-2010. However, before that, the memorandum of settlement dated 27th April, 2010 arrived at between the management of 46 Banks represented by Indian Bank Association and their workmen. As a result of this settlement, the case of the petitioner is that the petitioner is entitled to receive revised pension with effect from 1-11-2007. The petitioner has stated that despite repeated representations, the Bank has not considered the request which has compelled the petitioner to move this Court by way of present petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for seeking aforementioned reliefs which are prayed for. 2.3. The Court on the basis of this stand taken by the petitioner has issued notice on 18-10-2013 made it returnable, and subsequently, during the course of adjudication of present petition the orders indicate that on 10-1-2010, the Court has directed the petitioner to clarify whether he had actually joined the service immediately after completion of sabbatical leave or not. It appears that thereafter, the pleadings have been completed and the matter had come up for consideration before this Court in which, extensive hearing has taken place and both the learned Advocates requested the Court to deal with and decide the matter finally since the pleadings are completed. Hence, the hearing at length has taken place. 3. The learned Advocate Mr. Hence, the hearing at length has taken place. 3. The learned Advocate Mr. Nirav Sanghavi appearing for the petitioner has vehemently contended that the petitioner has been permitted to go on leave for a period of three years as a sabbatical leave. The said leave has been sanctioned for a period of three years by way of communication dated 29th March, 2007, and thereafter, the petitioner has been permitted to retire voluntarily on 9-9-2010, and thereafter, the benefit which has accrued before the date of retirement are liable to be paid as has been paid to others. It has further been contended that bi-partite settlement has taken place on 27th April, 2010 prior to the voluntary retirement on 9-9-2010, and thereafter, the benefit which was extended by virtue of said settlement was with effect from 1-11-2007, and thereafter, the petitioner is not only entitled to seek benefit of revised pension, but also entitled to all other consequential benefits on the revised rate, and thereafter, the petitioner is legitimately entitled to pray for these benefits for which, the petition is brought before the Court. 3.1. Mr. Nirav Sanghavi, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner has further contended that condition No. 5 which is tried to be pressed into service for denial of the due benefit, the said condition runs counter to the regulations and bi-partite settlement. Such condition cannot be allowed to be pressed into service since the pension is held to be property, and thereafter, cannot be denied illegitimately and arbitrarily. Mr. Nirav Sanghavi, learned Advocate for the petitioner has further contended that pensionary benefits are flowing from benevolent object and for unilateral social security, and thereafter, instead of taking hyper-technical stand, Bank ought to have allowed the request made by the petitioner. Non-consideration of request, therefore, amounts to arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of jurisdiction, therefore, the relief as prayed for may be granted in the interest of justice. It has further been contended that the denial of benefit is based upon the misconstruction of clauses contained in the 9th bi-partite Settlement and Regulations of 1995 and against the basic scheme of sabbatical leave, and thereafter, the action on the part of the respondent authority is not only unjust and arbitrary, but based upon whims and such denial therefore, deserves to be corrected by granting relief as prayed for. 3.2. 3.2. To strengthen the submissions, the learned Advocate for the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to some of the correspondences which have taken place between the petitioner and the respondent-authority, and thereby, has contended that action on the part of the respondent-authority is completely illogical and not in consonance with the very object for which the settlement took place. Therefore, action is hit by Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 3.3. Mr. Nirav Sanghavi, learned Advocate for the-petitioner in support of his submissions has relied upon few decisions delivered by the various Courts and has denied the stand of the Bank by contending that there is no res-judicata to be applied to the writ proceedings. Such decisions are reproduced hereinafter: (i) Decision dated 4th December, 2015 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench in case of Deepak S/o. Yadavrao Gotefode v. Dy. Director & Member Secretary, Scheduled Tribe Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee. (ii) Decision dated 27th April, 2007, passed by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 2205 of 2007, in case of Arunima Baruah v. Union of India (reported in 2007 (6) SCC 120 ) (iii) Decision dated 12th May, 2006 passed by Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 1389 of 2006, in case of U.P. Raghavendra Acharya v. State of Karnataka (reported in 2006 (9) SCC 630 ) (iv) Decision dated 25th July, 1968 delivered by Rajasthan High Court in case of Ramsingh v. State of Rajasthan. 3.4. By referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned Advocate for the petitioner has requested the Court to grant relief as prayed for in the petition. No other submissions have been made by the learned Advocate for the petitioner. 4. To meet with the stand taken by the learned Advocate for the petitioner, Mr. Darshan Parikh, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent-Bank has vehemently opposed the petition and has requested the Court to dismiss the petition on the premise on which it has been presented. Mr. Parikh, learned Advocate has contended that present petition is clearly barred by the principle of res-judicata as well as similar provision contained in Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the petition also suffers from the vice of delay and laches. Mr. Parikh, learned Advocate has contended that present petition is clearly barred by the principle of res-judicata as well as similar provision contained in Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the petition also suffers from the vice of delay and laches. It has further been contended that the petition deserves to be dismissed only on the ground of suppression of material fact and non-disclosure of earlier round of litigation. It has been vehemently contended that for the purpose of seeking pensionary benefit in its correct term this very petitioner had approached this Court by way of petition being numbered as Special Civil Application 10730 of 2013 and the same was unconditionally withdrawn on 2nd September, 2013. On the contrary, after verifying since the grievance was ventilated and the petition was no longer survived, specifically the said petition was withdrawn which is reflecting on page 79 of the petition compilation. Therefore, there is a clear nondisclosure of material fact from the Court which disentitled the petitioner from equitable extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. 4.1. It has further been contended that the petitioner has not come with clean hands and has made a deliberate attempt to mislead the Court firstly, on the count of non-disclosure of material fact regarding earlier petition and additionally, has also not produced the entire scheme of sabbatical leave and has chosen to merely produce the circular without producing the entire scheme/policy for sabbatical leave, and thereafter, this attempt deserves to be discouraged by dismissing the petition with exemplary cost. 4.2. Learned Advocate for the respondent-Bank has further contended that a very surprising chronology is reflecting that on 2nd September, 2013, the petition came to be unconditionally withdrawn, and thereafter, has initiated a speculative litigation by way of present petition immediately on 16-9-2013 and that to without disclosing any material with regard to aforesaid petition. Therefore, considering this attempt which has been made sitting abroad and bringing the petition without any disclosure amounts to abuse the process of law, and thereafter, on this count alone, the petition deserves to be dismissed. Therefore, considering this attempt which has been made sitting abroad and bringing the petition without any disclosure amounts to abuse the process of law, and thereafter, on this count alone, the petition deserves to be dismissed. Learned Advocate for the respondent-Bank has further contended specifically that undisputedly, the petitioner has availed a sabbatical leave on specific terms and conditions engrafted in the scheme and even sanction has also been accorded based upon specific terms which the petitioner was aware about right from the beginning by inviting some of the terms contained in approval letter dated 29th March, 2007, received by the petitioner. Learned Advocate for the respondent-Bank has stated that there being no case, the petitioner is not entitled to seek any relief from this Court. 4.3. Learned Advocate for the respondent-Bank has specifically drawn the attention of this Court to Condition Nos. 3 and 5 in precise contained in approval letter dated 29th March, 2007, which clearly indicates that the petitioner is not entitled to seek benefit and additionally, by further drawing the attention of this Court to the Circular and the Scheme attached thereto has indicated that there being no case, the petitioner is not entitled to seek this benefit. Learned Advocate for the respondent-Bank has further contended that though the petitioner was aware about the fact that he is not entitled to have any benefit by virtue of approval letter dated 29th March, 2007, still however, present petition has been brought approximately after a period of about 5 to 6 years and no explanation whatsoever for such delay is reflecting from the petition, and thereafter, the petition deserves to be dismissed on account of well recognized principle of delay and laches. It has further been contended that on the contrary, by unconditionally withdrawing the earlier petition, the petitioner has acquiesced his right of claiming benefit. Of course, even on merit also, the petitioner is not entitled. Mr. Parikh, learned Advocate for the respondent-Bank thereby has vehemently opposed to grant any relief in favour of the petitioner. 4.4. Learned Advocate for the respondent-Bank has further drawn attention of this Court to the pleadings which are contained in the affidavit-in-reply and rejoinder whereby clearly objected to grant of any relief. Mr. Parikh, learned Advocate for the respondent-Bank thereby has vehemently opposed to grant any relief in favour of the petitioner. 4.4. Learned Advocate for the respondent-Bank has further drawn attention of this Court to the pleadings which are contained in the affidavit-in-reply and rejoinder whereby clearly objected to grant of any relief. To strengthen his submissions, the learned Advocate for the respondent-Bank has relied upon few following decisions: (i) A decision of the Apex Court in case of State Bank of India v. Gracure Pharmaceuticals Ltd., reported in 2013 (3) GLH 626 (SC). (ii) Decision delivered by the Apex Court in case of S. Kesari Hanuman Goud v. Anjum Jehan, reported in AIR 2013 SC (Supp) 265. (iii) Decision delivered by the Apex Court in case of Vijay Seal v. State of Punjab, reported in 2003 (2) GLH 786 (SC) (iv) Decision delivered by this Court in case of Larsen & Toubro Ltd. E.C.C. Division v. Inspector of Motor Vehicles, reported in 2006 (3) GLH 457 . (v) Decision dated 3rd November, 1998 passed by the Apex Court in case of Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board Peermade, reported in 1999 (5) SCC 590 . 4.5. By referring and relying upon these decisions, the learned Advocate for the respondent-Bank has requested the Court not to grant any relief in favour of the petitioner. 5. Having heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record, before dealing with the submissions on merit, it appears that few circumstances in the background on which the present petition is brought, deserve to be dealt with. (i) The petitioner had asked for sabbatical leave in the year 2007, which was approved by the Bank with specific stipulations. Some of the relevant terms and conditions while approving are quoted hereinafter: "3. You will not be eligible for pay, salary, allowances and any consequential benefits, monetary or otherwise during the sabbatical leave period including perquisites and reimbursements. No increment will be earned during the sabbatical leave period and you will rejoin at the same stage of pay as existing at time of your availing sabbatical leave. 5. The sabbatical leave period will not be considered as active service for any purpose, including for seniority, consequential benefit arising out of seniority, eligibility for promotions, for availing loans/benefits, etc. No increment will be earned during the sabbatical leave period and you will rejoin at the same stage of pay as existing at time of your availing sabbatical leave. 5. The sabbatical leave period will not be considered as active service for any purpose, including for seniority, consequential benefit arising out of seniority, eligibility for promotions, for availing loans/benefits, etc. and shall also not be counted as service for the purpose of calculation of terminal benefits, viz. Gratuity/P.F./Pension, etc. Effect of wage/salary revision, if any during the period of sabbatical leave will be given only from the date of rejoining service on the expiry of the sabbatical leave." (ii) These terms have been specifically accepted by the petitioner without any demur and has proceeded to enjoy this leave and stationed himself at abroad keeping eye over the development which is to take place during the pendency, the petitioner was specifically aware about the bi-partite settlement which took place on 27th April, 2010 with respect to revised pension. As a result of this, it appears that for the purpose of claiming such benefit by executing Power of Attorney on 7th August, 2012 from Ontario appeals to have initiated process for claiming and in furtherance of that, the first attempt which has been made is to bring the petition in the month of June, 2018 essentially for claiming basic relief contained in Paragraph No. 14-B of that petition: "(B) Your Lordships may be pleased to allow this petition by issuing appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondents to the effect that the petitioner be paid correct amount of pension per month as well as difference of actual due amount of pension and paid pension forthwith, in the interest of justice;" (iii) After hearing learned Advocates for the respective parties, the said petition was disposed of as not pressed by the petitioner on 2nd September, 2013. The relevant order contained at page 79 of the petition compilation reads as under: "Heard Mr. Pawan Barot learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Darshan Parikh, learned Counsel for the respondents. In view of the fact that the grievance ventilated in this petition does not survive, hence, learned Counsel for the petitioner does not press this petition. Permission, as prayed for, is granted. Accordingly, the petition stands disposed of as not pressed. Pawan Barot learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Darshan Parikh, learned Counsel for the respondents. In view of the fact that the grievance ventilated in this petition does not survive, hence, learned Counsel for the petitioner does not press this petition. Permission, as prayed for, is granted. Accordingly, the petition stands disposed of as not pressed. Notice is discharged." (iv) It appears that immediately thereafter, within couple of days, the petitioner has brought this petition affirmed on 16-9-2013 for claiming revised pension and commutation on the basis of bi-partite settlement which was very much contained in settlement which took place on 27th April, 2010 well within the knowledge of the petitioner since prior to the petition even earlier one, the petitioner did make an attempt to approach the Bank. Therefore, the terms of 9th bi-partite settlement dated 22nd April, 2011, though available and well within the knowledge, appears to have been agitated in earlier petition as well and if not that has not claimed and unconditionally withdrawn the said petition. The said petition was withdrawn on 2nd September, 2013 whereas, though it was recent withdrawal the very petitioner has brought the petition without stating anything with regard to earlier litigation not a whisper, and thereafter, the fact which is emerging is that material particulars have not been brought to the Court in the present proceedings as well. (v) Apart from that, even on merit also, if the scheme of sabbatical leave is closely to be read, then the petitioner is not entitled to seek any benefit as the sabbatical leave was to be considered as such from the date of rejoining the service on expiry of sabbatical leave. Now here in this case, undisputedly, the petitioner has not rejoined the services which can be seen from the record. Not only that, even the petitioner has also specifically shown inability to resume the duty. The said communication dated 5-4-2010 is reflecting on page 102 of the petition compilation, and thereafter, the petitioner having not resumed the duty not rejoined has clearly violated the terms upon which his leave was approved, and thereby, the petitioner is not entitled to seek any benefit. Even apart from that, had it been joined the service then also the terms are very specific which can be seen from clauses contained in the approval letter dated 29th March, 2007. Even apart from that, had it been joined the service then also the terms are very specific which can be seen from clauses contained in the approval letter dated 29th March, 2007. The case of the petitioner therefore, not possible to be accepted. (vi) Additionally, even the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has categorically passed an order on 10th January, 2018 pointing out in clear terms as to whether the petitioner had actually joined the service immediately after completion of sabbatical leave or any time thereafter, and if so the date when he has actually rejoined the service. Now, in this context, it is undisputedly emerging that the petitioner has not joined the services and on the contrary, brought this petition through Power of Attorney-Mr. Namdev Gopaldas Masand. As such, what is emerging from the record is that the petitioner stood relieved from the date of acceptance of his V.R.S. i.e. 9-9-2010. (viii) Yet another circumstance which is not possible to be unnoticed by the Court is that the present petition is not for the relief of setting aside any terms of the sabbatical leave and no relief for that is existing. On the contrary, the Bank had informed the petitioner to resume the duty as the leave period was getting expired on 25th April, 2010 and as such, it is his own violation which has placed him in such situation where the petitioner is not entitled to seek any relief. Yet another circumstance which is to be dealt with is that the petitioner's sabbatical leave was over on 25-4-2010 and immediately thereafter, the petitioner has not rejoined the Bank services, and thereafter, his absence was informed to be treated as unauthorized absence. On the contrary, for getting himself relieved a communication is visible from the record dated 21st April, 2010 that his overdraft account may be debited for the amount equivalent to three months' pay as required for voluntarily retirement under the regulation in lieu of notice period, and thereafter, effectively the petitioner got himself relieved. Further from the record, it appears that the petitioner's dues have been settled long back i.e. in the year 2010. The petitioner has been paid the retiral benefits in the following form: “BASIC PENSION 11670.00 UPDATED BAS.50/45/40 0.00 QUALIFYING BASIC PENSION 11670.00 TOTAL 11670.00 1/3 PENSION FOR COM. 3890.00x 11.73X12 = 5.47.556.00 REDUCED PENSION 7780.00 (A) PENSION UPTO OCT. Further from the record, it appears that the petitioner's dues have been settled long back i.e. in the year 2010. The petitioner has been paid the retiral benefits in the following form: “BASIC PENSION 11670.00 UPDATED BAS.50/45/40 0.00 QUALIFYING BASIC PENSION 11670.00 TOTAL 11670.00 1/3 PENSION FOR COM. 3890.00x 11.73X12 = 5.47.556.00 REDUCED PENSION 7780.00 (A) PENSION UPTO OCT. 2010 CALCULATIN SHEET) 0.00 (B) COMMUTATIN 5.47.556.00 (C) BANK PF + INTEREST @ 6% PAYABLE BY YOU 0.00 (A+B+C) : AMOUNT PAYABLE TO YOU 5.47.556.00 CALCULATION SHEET MON YYYY PENSION BALB D. RELIEF TOTAL/MTH SEP 2010 5446.00 409 5012.00 10458.00 OCT 2010 7780.00 409 7160.00 14940.00 TOTAL 13226.00 12172.00 25398.00 D.A. RELIEF TO BE PAID AT ADMISSIBLE RATE ON QUALIFYING BASIC PENSIN ALONG WITH REDUCED PENSION EVERY MONTH.” D.A. RELIEF TO BE PAID AT ADMISSIBLE RATE ON QUALIFYING BASIC PENSIN ALONG WITH REDUCED PENSION EVERY MONTH.” 6. As per the calculation sheet and the documents which are part of the record from page 132 onwards, it appears that the payments, as per the Rules, have been made by the Bank and undisputedly, the petitioner has acknowledged the said payment, and as such, it appears that sitting at Canada this speculative litigation is generated by the petitioner to excavate an amount if by chance to be paid to him. Though, he was well aware about the fact of terms of approval of sabbatical leave, the conditions contained therein acceptance of V.R.S. and knowing fully well that he is not entitled to have that period benefit during which, he enjoyed the leave. On the contrary, it appears that the 9th bi-partite settlement took place on 27th April, 2010, whereas voluntary retirement was sought on 15th April, 2010 and the sabbatical leave period was already lapse prior to settlement i.e. on 25th April, 2010. So even under this set of the circumstance, when there is a clear breach undisputedly made by the petitioner which would disentitle the petitioner from the benefit of the period, there is hardly any case made out by the petitioner to seek the benefit as has been prayed for. 7. On the contrary, the petition is to be dismissed substantially on the ground of misdirecting the Hon'ble Court by not disclosing true particulars, the material facts, and has concealed few facts as narrated above. However, even on the ground of eligibility of benefits sought for, the case is highly questionable. 7. On the contrary, the petition is to be dismissed substantially on the ground of misdirecting the Hon'ble Court by not disclosing true particulars, the material facts, and has concealed few facts as narrated above. However, even on the ground of eligibility of benefits sought for, the case is highly questionable. Resultantly, in the background of this peculiarity of circumstance, in considered opinion of this Court, this is not a fit case in which extraordinary equitable jurisdiction can be exercised in favour of the petitioner. The case is made out by the respondent-Bank to deny the claim of the petitioner. As a result of this, it is not possible for this Court to accept the petition preferred by the petitioner. 8. The Court while coming to this conclusion and parting with the present order would like to emphasize upon few observations made by some of the decisions which are referred to by the respective parties. The first decision which has been brought by the petitioner is on the issue of res-judicata, but as stated earlier, the Court is not examining on the limited issue of res-judicata, and as such, the decision of Bombay High Court dated 4th September, 2015 in the background of different set of circumstance would not possible to be pressed into service by the petitioner. With respect to the case of Arunima Baruah v. Union of India, decided by the Apex Court on 27-4-2007 in Civil Appeal No. 2205 of 2007, (reported in 2007 (6) SCC 120 ) wherein, on the contrary, one of the Paragraphs wherein the Apex Court has made it clear that as to what should be treated as material fact suppression, the relevant observation contained therein read as under: "It is trite law that so as to enable the Court to refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression must be of material fact. What would be a material fact, suppression whereof would disentitle the appellant to obtain a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Material fact would mean material for the purpose of determination of the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether the same was material for grant or denial of the relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the Court may not refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. Material fact would mean material for the purpose of determination of the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether the same was material for grant or denial of the relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the Court may not refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. It is also trite that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the Court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is removed and the hands become clean, whether the relief would still be denied is the question." 9. Yet another decision which has been pressed into service is a decision delivered by Rajasthan High Court on 25th July, 1968, in case of Ramsingh v. State of Rajasthan, however, going through the said decision which is on the issue of applicability of Order 2, Rule 2 C.P.C. in which the Court held that second petition is not maintainable which is on the contrary lean in favour of the respondent-Bank. The relevant observations contained in the last Paragraph reads as under: "The result of acceptance of such a proposition would mean that even though, a writ application may have remained pending for a few years and then it has been dismissed in default or may have been disposed of for any other reason except on merits, the petitioner would have a right to move such an application on the same facts again and again till it is disposed of on merits. Looked at from another point of view, such a procedure would result in disregarding and circumventing the earlier orders of this Court. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the principle contained in Order 9, Rule 9, C.P.C. : can be suitably applied to writ proceedings. As has already been stated above, the earlier writ application in this case based on the same facts was dismissed in default in the presence of the opposite party and the application for its restoration was dismissed on merits. Thus, applying the principle contained in Order 9, Rule 9, C.P.C., the present writ application is not maintainable. Even otherwise we may state that, in the circumstances of the present case, we are not prepared to exercise our inherent and extra-ordinary jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner on this second writ application. Thus, applying the principle contained in Order 9, Rule 9, C.P.C., the present writ application is not maintainable. Even otherwise we may state that, in the circumstances of the present case, we are not prepared to exercise our inherent and extra-ordinary jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner on this second writ application. The preliminary objection raised by the learned Counsel for respondent No, 7 has, therefore, force and must prevail." 10. Yet another decision which has been relied upon is a decision delivered by the Apex Court on 12th May, 2006, but no much emphasis has been pressed into service by the learned Advocate for the petitioner, and thereafter, the Court has not examined his applicability in detail as not pressed. 11. In view of the aforesaid situation what has been relied upon by the respondent-Bank are the decisions having some relevance and can be taken note of and one of the decisions which has been delivered by the Apex Court reported in Gracure Pharmaceuticals Ltd. [2013 (3) GLH 626 (SC)]. While dealing with the provision contained under Order 2, Rule 2, the Apex Court has found that there is no fresh cause of action arise in which the first suit and the second suit, and thereby, applying the principle of Order 2, Rule 2, it has been held that the High Court committed an error in lieu of the observations contained in Paragraph 15. The relevant are quoted hereinafter: "When we go through the above-quoted Paragraph it is clear that the facts on the basis of which subsequent suit was filed existed on the date on which the earlier suit was filed. The earlier suit was filed on 15-3-2003 and subsequent suit was filed on 21-5-2003. No fresh cause of action arose in between the first suit and the second suit. The closure of account, as already indicated, was intimated on 20-3-2002 due to the alleged fault of the respondent in not regularizing their accounts i.e. after non-receipt of payment of L.C., the account became irregular. When the first suit for recovery of dues was filed i.e. on 15-3-2001 for alleged relief, damages sought for in the subsequent suit could have also been sought for. Order 2, Rule 2 provides that every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the same cause of action. When the first suit for recovery of dues was filed i.e. on 15-3-2001 for alleged relief, damages sought for in the subsequent suit could have also been sought for. Order 2, Rule 2 provides that every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the same cause of action. Respondent is not entitled to split the cause of action into parts by filing separate suits. We find as such, that respondent had omitted certain reliefs which were available to it at the time of filing of the first suit and after having relinquished the same, it cannot file a separate suit in view of the provisions of sub-rule (2) of Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C. The object of Order 2, Rule 2 is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and not to vex the parties over and again in a litigative process. The object enunciated in Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C. is laudable and it has a larger public purpose to achieve by not burdening the Court with repeated suits." 12. If these judgments to be perused in the context of present petition on hand at the time when first petition came to be filed there was a definite claim of the petitioner with regard to pension in the correct form. Further, there was definitely an existence of 9th bi-partite settlement which took place and the same was within the knowledge of the petitioner, and thereafter, in between the first petition and the present petition, there is no material change of any nature reflecting or projected by the petitioner. Therefore, applying the said principle enunciated by the Apex Court, the case appears to have been made out by the respondent-Bank. 13. Yet another decision which has been relied upon almost on same principles regarding full facts to be disclosed the case reported in Vijay Seal, [ 2003 (2) GLH 786 (SC)] has been delivered by the Apex Court and the relevant observations contained assume some relevance. Paragraph 24 being material one, the same is reproduced hereinafter: "24. 13. Yet another decision which has been relied upon almost on same principles regarding full facts to be disclosed the case reported in Vijay Seal, [ 2003 (2) GLH 786 (SC)] has been delivered by the Apex Court and the relevant observations contained assume some relevance. Paragraph 24 being material one, the same is reproduced hereinafter: "24. In order to sustain and maintain sanctity and solemnity of the proceedings in Law Courts, it is necessary that parties should not make false or knowingly, inaccurate statements or misrepresentation and/or should not conceal material facts with a design to gain some advantage or benefit at the hands of the Court, when a Court is considered as a place where truth and justice are solemn pursuits. If any party attempts to pollute such a place by adopting recourse to make misrepresentation and is concealing material facts, it does so at its risk and cost. Such part must be ready to take consequences that follow on account of its own making. At times, lenient or liberal or generous treatment by Courts in dealing with such matters are either mistaken or lightly taken instead of learning proper lesson. Hence, there is a compelling need to take serious view in such matters to ensure expected purity and grace in the administration of justice." 14. One of the relevant observation contained in yet another decision, delivered by the Apex Court on 3rd November, 1998 in case of Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board Peermade, 1999 (5) SCC 590 the doctrine of res-judicata is analyzed and by referring to some of the decisions, the said principle on issue of estoppel as well as doctrine of res-judicata dealt with and observed in following terms: "Law on res-judicata and estoppel is well understood in India and there are sample authoritative pronouncements by various Courts on these subjects. As noted above, the plea of res-judicata, though technical, is based on public policy in order to put an end to litigation. It is, however a different, if an issue which had been decided in earlier litigation again arises for determination between the same parties in a suit based on a fresh cause of action or where there is continuous cause of action. The parties then may not be bound by the determination made earlier if in the meanwhile law has changed or has been interpreted differently by higher forum. The parties then may not be bound by the determination made earlier if in the meanwhile law has changed or has been interpreted differently by higher forum. But that situation does not exist here. Principles of constructive res-judicata apply with full force. It is the subsequent stage of the same proceedings. If we refer to Order 47 of the Code (explanation to Rule 1) review is not permissible on the ground "that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment"." 15. Yet another decision delivered by this Court reported in Patel Kaushikbhai Bhogilal v. Zapli Khadni Dana Nakhvani Chaklani Parabadi Trust, Bavla, 1996 (1) GCD 369 . The Court has heavily come out with nondisclosure of material fact issue and has observed like this observation of the High Court based upon several decisions of the Apex Court. Hence, observations to be quoted hereinafter: "21. In the case of T. Subramani Chettiar v. District Supply Officer, reported in AIR 1995 Mad. 54 , the Court held: "Anyway, it is clear that the petitioners have suppressed in the supporting affidavit this particular fact, namely that the payment of renewal fee and the application for registration certificate were out of time. In all fairness, the petitioners in their supporting affidavit should have mention about this material fact, but deliberately have suppressed the above-said material fact on this ground also, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed." Again the Madras High Court in the case of Kamashi v. A. Radhakrishnan, reported in AIR 1995 Madras 60, observed as follows:- "When the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is invoked the person who does so must take the Court into confidence and place all the facts before it without any reservation. If the Court finds that the petitioner has not stated the full trust in the relevant matters, it shall refuse to exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioner"." 16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, and in view of the fact that the petitioner is otherwise not entitled to seek the benefit as claimed, this Court, in the aforesaid background is unable to accept the petition. In view of the aforesaid discussion, and in view of the fact that the petitioner is otherwise not entitled to seek the benefit as claimed, this Court, in the aforesaid background is unable to accept the petition. Accordingly, the same is dismissed with no order as to costs. Rule is discharged. Interim relief, if any, granted earlier stands vacated.