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2018 DIGILAW 108 (TRI)

Dulal Debnath S/o Sri Narayan Debnath v. State of Tripura

2018-04-18

S.TALAPATRA

body2018
JUDGMENT & ORDER : Heard Mr. S Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as Mr. A Roy Barman, learned Addl. PP appearing for the State. 2. This is an appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC from the judgment and order dated 18.06.2016 delivered in Criminal Appeal No. 53(4) of 2013 by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Court No.3, West Tripura, Agartala. 3. The appellant was tried under Section 468/471 of the IPC by the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Court No.5, Agartala, West Tripura. By the judgment and order dated 31.01.2013 delivered in GR 1269 of 2007 the petitioner was acquitted from the charge on benefit of doubt on observing that PW5 could not give any reason as to why the School Authority stopped to maintain such counter-file register on 27.01.1998 while issuing the Transfer Certificate, and as such, it cannot be held that such certificate dated 27.06.1998 (Exbt.-2) was issued in favour of the petitioner. Since that had created a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, the appellant was acquitted from the charge as framed under Section 468/471 of the IPC. 4. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order dated 31.01.2013 the State filed an appeal under Section 378(1) of the CrPC in the Court of the Sessions Judge, who in turn had transferred the said appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 53(4) of 2013 to the Court of the Addl. Sessions Judge, Court No.3, West Tripura, Agartala. The Addl. Sessions Judge by the impugned judgment dated 18.06.2016 reversed the finding of the trial court and convicted the appellant under Section 468/471 of the IPC. The appellant has been sentenced to suffer 3 years rigorous imprisonment for committing offence punishable under Section 468 of the IPC along with fine of Rs.2,000/-. Further, the appellant was sentenced to pay a sum of Rs.3,000/- for committing offence punishable under Section 471 of the IPC, in default of payment of fine, he shall suffer simple imprisonment for a period of one month. The period of detention already undergone during trial or investigation has been directed to be set off from the period of imprisonment. Being aggrieved, the appellant has filed the present appeal. 5. The period of detention already undergone during trial or investigation has been directed to be set off from the period of imprisonment. Being aggrieved, the appellant has filed the present appeal. 5. Before we record and appreciate the submission of the learned counsel for the parties, a brief resume of the facts relating to the said conviction may be recorded at the outset. 6. A Deputy Commandant of 2nd Bn. TSR, RK Nagar, Tripura West filed a complaint with the Officer-in-Charge of Bodhjungnagar P.S., West Tripura, revealing that to secure entry into the government service as the Rifleman in TSR, the petitioner had produced a forged Transfer Certificate and managed to get appointment as Rifleman in TSR. On the basis of the said written ejahar dated 22.12.2007, Bodhjungnagar P.S. Case No. 37 of 2007 under Section 468/471 IPC was registered and taken up for investigation. After investigation, the final police report chargesheeting the appellant was filed and on taking cognizance the charge was framed as stated under Section 468/471 of the IPC. The appellant herein denied the charge and pleaded innocence. 7. In order to substantiate the charge, as many as five witnesses were examined by the prosecution and a good number of documentary evidence (Exbt.-1 to Exbt.-11) were admitted in the trial. After the prosecution evidence was recorded, the petitioner was examined under Section 313 of the CrPC to have his response or reaction to the incriminating evidence that surfaced during investigation. The appellant repeated his claim of innocence and submitted that he has been entangled in the case with a malicious purpose. 8. Having appreciated the evidence on record, the trial court had acquitted the appellant, as stated. Against the said judgment and order of acquittal, the State preferred an appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 53(4) of 2013. The judgment dated 18.06.2016 delivered in the aforesaid criminal appeal is challenged in the present appeal filed by the convict, hereinafter referred to as the appellant. 9. Mr. S Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the trial court has correctly observed that there is enough and grave space to doubt the process by which the Transfer Certificate (Exbt.-2) has been created. The said certificate was ascertained through PW5, Smt. Sukla Das, the incumbent Headmistress of Sekerkote H.S. School. From that school, the said certificate (Exbt.-2) had been purportedly issued. The said certificate was ascertained through PW5, Smt. Sukla Das, the incumbent Headmistress of Sekerkote H.S. School. From that school, the said certificate (Exbt.-2) had been purportedly issued. But later on, on scrutiny, it surfaced that the authority of the said school did not issue the said certificate. Even it had come to surface that the person, namely, Binoy Bhushan Dhar who issued the said certificate under the designation of Headmaster was never the Headmaster of the said school. 10. PW5, Smt. Sukla Das has testified in the trial by stating that on verification she submitted the report to the Investigating Officer of the case, namely, Ashesh Debbarma on 07.01.2008. She identified the report and admitted the same in evidence as Exbt.-9. She submitted another report to the Commandant, 2nd Bn. TSR on 12.10.2007 to the effect that there was no teacher in the name of Binoy Bhushan Dhar in the said school or as Headmaster or as per relevant papers and documents of the school. In the said report, she has claimed to have mentioned that one Binoy Bhushan Dhar was performing duties as Assistant of the said school and he was transferred to Bidrohi Kabi Nazrul Vidya Bhavan School, Jogendranagar, Agartala on 02.01.1996, meaning much before the issuance of the said certificate. In cross-examination, she has denied the suggestion that the appellant was ever a student of the said school, which has been reflected in the questioned document. 11. PW5, Smt. Sukla Das was re-examined and in the re-examination she has categorically stated that she produced the Transfer Certificate Counter File Register in the Court for the year 1997-1998. In the year, 1997-1998 one Sadhan Chandra Chakraborty was the Headmaster of Sekerkote H.S. School. In cross-examination, PW5 has stated that for the period from 08.01.1997 to the period up to 27.01.1998, Transfer Certificates were issued as per the Transfer Certificate Counter File Register. Lastly on 27.01.1998, Transfer Certificate was issued. It implies that from that date no certificate was issued maintaining the Transfer Certificate Counter File Register. From a keen reading of the testimony of PW5, it would surface that no transfer certificate was issued after 27.01.1998 keeping its foil in the register file. 12. The other witnesses, namely, Sudarshan Chakraborty, PW1, is a Naik-Subedar-Clerk in the office of the TSR 2nd Battalion Headquarters. He had narrated how the written ejahar was lodged against the appellant. 13. From a keen reading of the testimony of PW5, it would surface that no transfer certificate was issued after 27.01.1998 keeping its foil in the register file. 12. The other witnesses, namely, Sudarshan Chakraborty, PW1, is a Naik-Subedar-Clerk in the office of the TSR 2nd Battalion Headquarters. He had narrated how the written ejahar was lodged against the appellant. 13. PW2, Apurba Das, Subedar (H/C) seized some reports of the appellants. He has not stated anything of material importance. 14. PW3, Nayan Das @ Narayan seized the attestation forms, the school certificate and the school verification certificate. 15. PW4, Suresh Kalai, the Deputy Commandant of TSR, 2nd Battalion has stated that in course of investigation, he seized some documents from the office by preparing seizure list on 31.12.2007. He was elaborately cross-examined to extract some statement contrary to the evidence he laid. PW4 has stated nothing more of relevance. 16. So far the testimony of PW5, Smt. Sukla Das is concerned, it has been already discussed. 17. In this perspective fact relating to the records of evidence, Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that there is no proof that the petitioner forged the certificate (Exbt.2) and as such his conviction under Section 468/471 of the IPC is untenable in law. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has submitted that there is no evidence to establish the forgery within the meaning of Section 463 and 464 of the IPC. 18. Forgery has been well defined in Section 463 of the IPC by providing that, whoever makes any false document or false electronic document or part of a document or electronic record, with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery. 19. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has submitted that that there is no proof, even no indication by any of the witnesses that anyone of them knew the handwriting of the appellant and the handwriting in the certificate is of the appellant, and as such, the prosecution has utterly failed to prove that the appellant is a person who can be said to have made the forged document within the definition of Section 464 of IPC. 20. 20. Further, Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove that the appellant had knowledge that the said document was forged, and as such, the conviction under Section 471 of the IPC is equally bad and warrants to be interfered with. 21. Mr. Bhattacharjee, in his last limb of submission has relied on a decision of this Court in Dulal Miah Vs. State of Tripura [judgment and order dated 13.08.2015 delivered in Criminal Revision Petition No. 62/2010]. In the said decision, this Court has held that unless “knowledge” or “reason to believe” is proved by the prosecution, no person can be convicted under Section 471 of the IPC. 22. To repel the submission made by Mr. Bhattcharjee, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. A Roy Barman, learned Addl. PP appearing for the State has submitted that the circumstances would prove that it is none but the appellant who has forged the document as the appellant, under Section 313 CrPC has nowhere stated that he procured that certificate. That apart, Mr. Roy Barman, learned Addl. PP has relied on the statements made by PW5 to contend that it has been squarely proved that the document as produced before the TSR authorities was a forged document within the meaning of Section 463 of the IPC. It has been manufactured definitely by the appellant and as such the appellate court by convicting the appellant under Section 468 of the IPC and for use of the said document under Section 471 of the IPC has done no wrong at all and this Court may not interfere with the judgment. 23. Having regard to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the view that the prosecution’s duty was to establish beyond any reasonable doubt that the document (Exbt.2) was forged by the appellant. Such proof does not depend on the reaction of the appellant while he was examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. Even if the document is forged and the prosecution cannot connect its manufacture to the appellant, he cannot be convicted under Section 468 of the IPC. 24. But this Court is unable to accept the submission of Mr. Bhattacharjee that the appellant had no knowledge or reason to believe that the document was forged when he used the said document to procure employment under the TSR. 24. But this Court is unable to accept the submission of Mr. Bhattacharjee that the appellant had no knowledge or reason to believe that the document was forged when he used the said document to procure employment under the TSR. It is the appellant and none but him who had the knowledge whether he had read in the Sekerkote H.S. School or not. If the prosecution had been successful in proving that the appellant did not read in the Sekerkote H.S. School, it was the onus of the appellant to prove that he read in that school. As part of the charge has been proved, this Court does not find any infirmity in the finding that the appellant has committed an offence punishable under Section 471 of the IPC. 25. In the result, the conviction of the appellant under Section 468 of the IPC is set aside and quashed and the appellant is discharged from the said charge under Section 468 of the IPC. 26. But this Court shall affirm the conviction under Section 471 of the IPC as passed by the appellate court by the impugned judgment. But the sentence was not legally given by the appellate Court inasmuch as the sentence for committing an offence under Section 471 of the IPC is similar to that of the offence punishable under Section 468 IPC. Section 468 IPC provides that a person who commits forgery intending to cause damage or for purpose of cheating shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. But the appellate court did not give any sentence of imprisonment. In view of that, the appellant is sentenced to suffer one year RI and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- i.d. to suffer 15 days SI. It is made clear that the period of detention or imprisonment that the appellant has already suffered shall be set off in terms of Section 428 of CrPC. 27. Having observed thus, this appeal stands partly allowed. Send down the LCRs forthwith.