ORDER : 1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the letter as contained in Memo No. 735 dated 27.04.2016 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition) issued by the respondent No. 4 whereby the petitioner has been informed that his application for renewal of mining lease in respect of stone chips pertaining to Mouza-Nawadih, Thana-Barhi, Khata No. 1, Plot No. 832(Part), District-Hazaribagh, having an area of 2.10 acres has been rejected by the respondent No. 2 on the ground that the area in question for which renewal of lease was sought by the petitioner, falls within the protected forest vide Notification No. C/PF-10160/52-21R dated 02.01.1953. Further prayer has been made for quashing the order dated 25.04.2016 passed by the respondent No. 2 whereby the petitioner’s application for grant of renewal of his mining lease situated over the land in question has been rejected without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The petitioner has also prayed for issuance of direction upon the respondents to process his application dated 04.03.2014 for renewal of mining lease in respect of Village-Nawadih for a further period of 10 years in terms with Rule 23 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules 2004’) and consequently to grant renewal of mining lease to the petitioner over the said area. 2. The factual background of the case, as stated in the writ petition, is that the land appertaining to Khata No. 1. Plot Nos. 815, 824, 832 & 833, having total area of 6.81 acres (hereinafter referred to as ‘the said land’) was settled in favour of the petitioner’s father through Hukumnama granted by the Raja of Ramgarh on 12.11.1930 and after vesting of Zamindari, the rent receipt was issued in his favour by the State of Bihar. On the petitioner’s application, he was permitted to carry on mining activities over the said land vide Allotment Letter No. 1437 dated 18.06.2004. The said allotment was made for the period of 10 years, subject to renewal of the same. Pursuant to the said allotment, a lease deed was executed between the petitioner and the respondents vide registered lease deed dated 11.07.2004 which was valid from 11.07.2004 to 10.07.2014. Before expiry of the said lease deed, the petitioner made an application for renewal of the same in terms with Rule 23 of the Rules, 2004. Pursuant to the said allotment, a lease deed was executed between the petitioner and the respondents vide registered lease deed dated 11.07.2004 which was valid from 11.07.2004 to 10.07.2014. Before expiry of the said lease deed, the petitioner made an application for renewal of the same in terms with Rule 23 of the Rules, 2004. When the petitioner’s application was not processed, he preferred revision application before the Commissioner, Department of Mines and Geology, Ranchi vide Revision Case No. 97 of 2014 for extension of time which was granted twice with a direction to the respondent No. 2 to dispose of the petitioner’s application for renewal of the mining lease. However, the respondent No. 4 vide order contained in Memo No. 735 dated 27.04.2016, informed the petitioner that the respondent No. 2 has rejected his application for renewal of the mining lease over the area in question on the ground that the land over which renewal of mining lease was sought, is a protected forest area vide Notification No. C/PF-10160/52-21-R dated 02.01.1953. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the impugned letter dated 27.04.2016, the reference has been made to the letter dated 25.04.2016 issued by the respondent No. 2 whereby the petitioner’s application for renewal of lease has been said to be rejected, however, the said letter was not served to him. On bare perusal of the notification dated 02.01.1953, it would be evident that the same was issued in purported exercise of Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act 1927’), however, the nature and extent of the right of the Government or private persons in or over the said forest land has not been inquired in terms with Section 29(3) of the Act, 1927 and thus the said land cannot be treated to be a protected forest land. In the year 1960-61, a dispute as to whether the said land falls within the protected forest area arose and an order was passed by the Court of the Forest Settlement Officer, Hazaribagh in Case No. 1 of 60-61 whereby it was held that the said land is to be excluded from the forest boundary. In Title Suit No. 89 of 1998 filed by the petitioner’s father, the respondent No. 2 had filed a sketch map wherein the said land was not shown within the demarcation of the forest area. In Title Suit No. 89 of 1998 filed by the petitioner’s father, the respondent No. 2 had filed a sketch map wherein the said land was not shown within the demarcation of the forest area. Even if the mining lease area of the petitioner falls within the purview of the notification dated 02.01.1953, as on today, the said land cannot be treated as the protected forest in view of Section 30 of the Act, 1927 which gives power to the State Government to issue notification for declaring the protected forest for a period not exceeding 30 years. The notification dated 02.01.1953 has not been revalidated by the State Government. 4. Per-contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner has misconstrued the provisions provided under Section 29 of the Act, 1927 wherein it has nowhere mentioned that the notification issued under this Section will expire after 30 years. The land in question not only falls within the notified forest area, rather the same also comes under the definition of the ‘Forest’ and thus even for renewal of mining lease, the petitioner was required to take forest clearance under Forest Conservation Act, 1980. Although the land in question is outside the demarcated forest land, yet the same comes under the un-demarcated protected forest. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant materials available on record. The learned counsel for the petitioner has primarily raised the grievance against the violation of the principles of natural justice, as no opportunity of hearing was given to him before passing the impugned order dated 27.04.2016. The respondents have failed to controvert the said averment raised by the petitioner in the writ petition by bringing on record any cogent material. 6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment rendered in the case of Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. & Another Vs. Masood Ahmed Khan & Others, (2010) 9 SCC 496 while considering the requirement of observance of the principles of natural justice as well as to record reasons in the decision making process, has held as under: “47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants’ faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. A pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. Ruiz Torija v. Spain and Anya v. University of Oxford, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions. (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of due process.” 7. In another judgment rendered in the case of Dharampal Satyapal Limited Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati & Others, (2015) 8 SCC 519 , the Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with the historical development of the principles of natural justice has held as under: “35. From the aforesaid discussion, it becomes clear that the opportunity to provide hearing before making any decision was considered to be a basic requirement in the court proceeding. Later on, this principle was applied to other quasi-judicial authorities and other tribunals and ultimately it is now clearly laid down that even in the administrative actions, where the decision of the authority may result in civil consequences, a hearing before taking a decision is necessary. It was, thus, observed in A.K. Kraipak case that if the purpose of rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, one fails to see how these rules should not be made available to administrative inquiries. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India also the application of principle of natural justice was extended to the administrative action of the State and its authorities. It is, thus, clear that before taking an action, service of notice and giving of hearing to the noticee is required. In Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Suvarna Board Mills, this aspect was explained in the following manner: “3. It is, thus, clear that before taking an action, service of notice and giving of hearing to the noticee is required. In Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Suvarna Board Mills, this aspect was explained in the following manner: “3. It has been contended before us by the learned counsel for the appellant that principles of natural justice were satisfied before taking action under Section 29, assuming that it was necessary to do so. Let it be seen whether it was so. It is well settled that natural justice cannot be placed in a straitjacket; its rules are not embodied and they do vary from case to case and from one fact-situation to another. All that has to be seen is that no adverse civil consequences are allowed to ensue before one is put on notice that the consequence would follow if he would not take care of the lapse, because of which the action as made known is contemplated. No particular form of notice is the demand of law. All will depend on facts and circumstances of the case.” 36. In East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, this Court held that whether the statute provides for notice or not, it is incumbent upon the quasi-judicial authority to issue a notice to the persons concerned disclosing the circumstances under which proceedings are sought to be initiated against them, failing which the conclusion would be that principles of natural justice are violated. To the same effect are the following judgments: (a) Union of India v. Madhumilan Syntex (P) Ltd. (b) Morarji Goculdas B & W Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (c) Metal Forgings v. Union of India (d) Union of India v. Tata Yodogawa Ltd.” 8. Admittedly, the petitioner was having the mining lease duly granted by the respondent authorities, however, renewal of the mining lease has been refused on the ground that the said land situates within the protected forest area wherein no mining activities could be allowed that too without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It is settled principle of law that if any decision is taken by any administrative/quasi-judicial authority against a person adversely affecting his/her rights, observance of the principles of natural justice is not a mere formality. 9. It is settled principle of law that if any decision is taken by any administrative/quasi-judicial authority against a person adversely affecting his/her rights, observance of the principles of natural justice is not a mere formality. 9. In view of the discussions made hereinabove and the judicial pronouncements, the impugned letter as contained in Memo No. 735 dated 27.04.2016 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition) issued by the respondent No. 4 cannot be sustained in law and the same is, hereby, quashed and set aside. The respondent No. 2 is directed to pass a fresh order on the petitioner’s application for renewal of the said mining lease within a period of 12 (twelve) weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order after providing due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 10. The impugned order dated 25.04.2016 passed by the respondent No. 2, as referred in the letter contained in Memo No. 735 dated 27.04.2016, shall also be kept in abeyance till the said order is passed in the matter by the respondent No. 2 and the status quo as exists today with regard to the leasehold area in question, shall be maintained by the parties. 11. The present writ petition is accordingly disposed of with the aforesaid observation and direction. 12. Consequently, I.A. No. 3830/2017 also stands disposed of. Petition disposed of.