JUDGMENT : This appeal is filed by the plaintiff in O.S.No.25857/2017. He has challenged the order dated 14.11.2017 passed on I.A.Nos.1, 2 and 3. 2. I.A.No.1 was filed by the plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC, seeking an order of injunction restraining the defendant Nos.2 to 6 from changing the nature of the suit schedule property; I.A.No.2 was also filed by the plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC seeking an order of injunction restraining the defendants from alienating the suit schedule property. Initially, the trial Court granted an order of status quo on both I.A.Nos.1 and 2 and seeking to vacate this order, defendant Nos.2 to 6 have filed I.A.No.3 under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of CPC. 3. It is the case of the plaintiff that, his grandfather B.N. Krishna Singh bequeathed the suit schedule property to him when he was minor and appointed his mother i.e., the first defendant as his guardian, with a condition that the first defendant should not alienate the property till the plaintiff would attain majority. The plaintiff alleged that, before he attained the majority, his father and mother sold the suit schedule property in favour of second defendant by forging his signature on the sale deed. Thereafter, there took a partition among defendant Nos.2 to 6 and in this partition, suit property was allotted to the fourth defendant. The plaintiff came to know about the sale only when the third defendant and his children came near the suit schedule property for demolishing the old house that was there. Therefore, he filed a suit for partition and in the said suit, he filed applications for temporary injunction. 4. The defendant Nos. 2 to 6 filed written statement contending that the plaintiff was neither the owner nor in possession of the suit schedule property. The suit property belonged to B.N. Krishna Singh, who is the grandfather of the plaintiff. The suit schedule property was sold to second defendant by the plaintiff himself, after he attained the majority, as he needed money for repaying the debts incurred for his sister’s marriage. The second defendant purchased the property through a registered sale deed on 25.05.1996. The plaintiff’s date of birth is 05.10.1977. On the date of sale, he was major. The suit schedule property was sold to second defendant by the plaintiff himself, after he attained the majority, as he needed money for repaying the debts incurred for his sister’s marriage. The second defendant purchased the property through a registered sale deed on 25.05.1996. The plaintiff’s date of birth is 05.10.1977. On the date of sale, he was major. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot claim to be the owner of the suit schedule property and he has no right to seek partition also. 5. The trial Court which had granted an order of status-quo at the initial stage, came to the conclusion that the said order needed to be vacated. The plaintiff appears to have produced a document said to have been issued by the St. Martha’s Hospital, Bengaluru regarding date of birth of the plaintiff to be 05.10.1978. On the other hand, the defendants rely upon a birth certificate of the plaintiff showing the date of birth as 05.10.1977. 6. The trial Court has observed that the validity of the documents cannot be decided at the stage of deciding the interlocutory application for temporary injunction. However, the trial Court also observed another very important factor that the plaintiff approached the Court 21 years after the execution of the sale deed. Therefore, the plaintiff has to prove his case by producing cogent evidence. The trial Court also observed that it appears that the plaintiff was major as on 25.09.1996, when the sale deed came to be executed. Having come to the conclusion that no prima-facie case was made out, the trial Court vacated the order of status-quo. 7. Having perused the impugned order and heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/plaintiff and respondents/defendants, I do not think that there is any infirmity in the impugned order. The plaintiff has to prove his correct date of birth. His allegation that, his signature was forged on the sale deed is also a matter to be decided after recording of evidence. It is not a matter to be decided at the time of granting injunction. The trial Court came to the correct conclusion that there was no prima-facie case, which does not require any interference by this Court. 8. Since this is a suit for partition, if the suit is decreed, the appellant/plaintiff will be entitled to a share. Therefore, the impugned order does not affect the appellant’s interest. The trial Court came to the correct conclusion that there was no prima-facie case, which does not require any interference by this Court. 8. Since this is a suit for partition, if the suit is decreed, the appellant/plaintiff will be entitled to a share. Therefore, the impugned order does not affect the appellant’s interest. In my view, no good reason is there to interfere with the order of the trial Court. Therefore, appeal is dismissed. IA No.1/2017 does not survive for consideration, in view of dismissal of the appeal.