ORDER : Achintya Malla Bujor Barua, J. 1. Heard Mr. D. Saikia, learned Senior Additional Advocate General Assam for the applicant. Also heard Mr. M. Sarania, learned counsel for the respondents. This is an interlocutory application for condoning the delay of 297 days in preferring the accompanying writ appeal. 2. The respondents herein had preferred a writ petition being WP(C) No. 5324/2012, inter alia, praying for setting aside the order dated 31.03.2011 of the Principal Secretary to the Govt. of Assam, in the Revenue and Disaster Management Department, wherein a decision was taken that in respect of such families affected in the ethnic violence of 1993, 1996 and 1998 and who had returned back to their respective homes after normalcy had prevailed are entitled to a compensation of Rs. 10,000/- per family and their claims for enhancement of the relief grant from Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 50,000/- per family were rejected. Further relief for a direction to the respondent authorities to enhance the rehabilitation grant to Rs. 40,000/- per family was also made. 3. The State Government authorities in the response thereof took the stand that a categorization was made between the families, who were required to continue to live in the relief camps organized for the purpose, as they could not return back to their homes and such other families, who upon returning of normalcy had returned back to their respective homes. In respect of the first category of families who could not return to their homes, an amount of Rs. 50,000/- was paid as full and final relief grant, whereas the families who could return back to their homes upon returning of normalcy were paid an amount of Rs. 10,000/-. Accordingly, it was the contention of the State authorities that the families who were represented by the respondent society belongs to the category of families who could return back to their respective homes, and, therefore, the relevant grant to them was Rs. 10,000/- per family. 4. The learned Single Judge by the Judgment and Order dated 16.07.2015 arrived at a conclusion that the officials of the Forest and Revenue Department had made an assessment that the members of the respondent society had suffered damages which were quantified at a rate above Rs. 10,000/- per family. 4. The learned Single Judge by the Judgment and Order dated 16.07.2015 arrived at a conclusion that the officials of the Forest and Revenue Department had made an assessment that the members of the respondent society had suffered damages which were quantified at a rate above Rs. 50,000/- per family and secondly, the provision for compensation for the loss that may be suffered on account of destruction of property due to man made causes, having been provided under the Disaster Management Act of 2005, the order dated 31.03.2011 of the Department of Revenue and Disaster Management was not sustainable and that the members of the respondent society are entitled to a compensation up to a maximum of Rs. 50,000/- per family after adjusting the amounts already paid. 5. The State Government authorities in the Revenue and Disaster Management Department being aggrieved by the said Judgment and Order dated 16.07.2015 has preferred the accompanying writ appeal. But in preferring the writ appeal, there is a delay of 397 days for which the instant interlocutory application for condoning the delay has been preferred. 6. In the interlocutory application, an order dated 09.05.2018 was passed requiring the State Government authorities to file an additional affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay, stating in detail as to how the authorities had processed the matter leading to the filing of the writ appeal. Consequent thereof, an additional affidavit dated 02.06.2018 was filed. In the additional affidavit at paragraph 13, it is stated that the Revenue and Disaster Management Department had received the copy of the Judgment and Order dated 16.07.2015 on 12.08.2015. Immediately upon receipt of the Judgment and Order, the officials of the Department conferred with some of the officials, who were handling the matters of providing relief and rehabilitation to the affected families of the years, 1996 and 1998 and had retired in the meantime. Such consultation, according to the Department was required as all such cases for grant of rehabilitation were earlier finally settled by providing Rs. 10,000/- per family. Upon conferring with the retired officials, the Department with the approval of the concerned Minister wrote a letter dated 1.10.2015 to the Senior Government Advocate, Assam requesting him to file an appeal against the Judgment and Order dated 16.7.2015. 10,000/- per family. Upon conferring with the retired officials, the Department with the approval of the concerned Minister wrote a letter dated 1.10.2015 to the Senior Government Advocate, Assam requesting him to file an appeal against the Judgment and Order dated 16.7.2015. In the said letter of 1.10.2015, the Departmental Authorities had also indicated the purported grounds on which the appeal may be filed, which are as follows: "1. The State Government in Revenue & DM (Relief & Rehabilitation Branch) Department does not provide any relief measures to the victims of ethnic violence as per the provisions of the Disaster Management Act, 2005. 2. The quantum of relief and rehabilitation is determined as per policy of the State Government and it is only a partial compensation for the loss caused. It cannot be equivalent or proportionate to the damages caused as the resources available with the State Government will have to be taken into account. 3. It may not be feasible to the Government to provide rehabilitation grant as per actual assessment of damage. The intension behind the rehabilitation grant is to enable the affected families to have a house of bare minimum standard, where they can have accommodation. 4. The damages relate to the period 1992-1996 and, therefore, it is not feasible to assess the damage after lapse of such long period. Further these cases for compensation were settled by payment of compensation of Rs. 10,000/- as per the rate prevalent then. It is not desirable to reopen the cases based on the demands in view of the revision of rates of compensation in a later period. The rates of compensation are revised from time to time based on price rise/inflation etc., and policy of the Government. 5. If the petitioners are paid as per the order of the Hon'ble High Court, then this Department will be flooded with many more such claims, which will be an unbearable burden for the State. 6. Any other relevant points may be taken into consideration." 7. Thereupon, the Junior Government Advocate Assam by letter dated 02.11.2015 informed that certain PIL's relating to the ethnic violence which had already been disposed of by the Division Bench would also be relevant and accordingly required the Department to depute an Officer, who was acquainted with the matter. 6. Any other relevant points may be taken into consideration." 7. Thereupon, the Junior Government Advocate Assam by letter dated 02.11.2015 informed that certain PIL's relating to the ethnic violence which had already been disposed of by the Division Bench would also be relevant and accordingly required the Department to depute an Officer, who was acquainted with the matter. But though the officials visited the office of the Junior Government Advocate on several occasions, but due to her busy schedule, the officials were provided any time for discussion. Ultimately, the Deputy Secretary of the Department could meet the Junior Government Advocate on 19.02.2016 and explained that the PIL referred by her related to ethnic violence in the BTAD areas in the year 2012 and as such have no relevance for deciding payment of rehabilitation grant to the families affected with ethnic violence during the years 1996-1998. 8. As the appeal was not filed, the Departmental Authorities made another communication dated 26.02.2016 to the Senior Government Advocate, Assam requesting that the appeal be filed. As nothing materialized, a further communication dated 16.03.2016 was made to the learned Advocate General Assam requesting that the appeal be filed and in the said communication the possible grounds for the appeal were reiterated. As nothing further happened inspite of such requests being made, another communication dated 18.04.2016 was made by the Joint Secretary of the Department to the learned Advocate General Assam with a further request to file an appeal wherein the entire background of the matter as well as the possible grounds to be taken were stated. Thereupon, the learned Advocate General, Assam had asked the Departmental officials to approach the Additional Advocate General, Assam for filing the appeal and accordingly, the Departmental officials by the communication dated 12.05.2016 had so requested the learned Additional Advocate General, Assam. On 26.05.2016, the draft memorandum of appeal along with the related interlocutory application were sent to the Department for its vetting, which was returned back to the learned Additional Advocate General Assam on 01.06.2016. In the process, there was a delay of 297 days in filing the appeal. 9. On 26.05.2016, the draft memorandum of appeal along with the related interlocutory application were sent to the Department for its vetting, which was returned back to the learned Additional Advocate General Assam on 01.06.2016. In the process, there was a delay of 297 days in filing the appeal. 9. According to the learned Senior Additional Advocate General, Assam, the Departmental officials upon receiving the copy of the Judgment and Order dated 16.07.2015 on 12.08.2015 had taken its decision to file the appeal on or before 01.10.2015 itself, and, accordingly had communicated with the Senior Government Advocate by their communication dated 01.10.2015, wherein the grounds of appeal were also indicated. According to the learned Senior Additional Advocate General, Assam there was no deliberate delay and laches on the part of the Departmental Officials in arriving at its decision to file the appeal and also preparing on its own the likely grounds to be taken. The said period between 12.08.2015 and 01.10.2015 was required as the Departmental officials had to confer with the retired officials who were handling the rehabilitation of the affected families in the year 1996 and 1998. 10. According to the learned Senior Additional Advocate General, Assam the delay subsequent thereof up to the filing of the appeal was not because of any laches or omission on the part of the Departmental Officials, but was due to the lackadaisical attitude on the part of the Government Advocates dealing with the matter. 11. In the aforesaid circumstances, Mr. D Saikia, learned Senior Additional Advocate General, Assam by relying upon the views expressed by the Supreme Court in paragraph 3 of Rafiq & Anr. v. Munshilal & Anr. reported in (1981) 2 SCC 788 , wherein the adverse conduct of an advocate vis-a-vis, the litigant was examined, submits that there being no laches or omission on the part of the Departmental Officials, who, in fact, are the litigants in the present case, the omission on the part of the Government Advocate should not be made a reason for not condoning the delay in preferring the writ appeal. 12. Mr. Saikia also by relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani & Ors. 12. Mr. Saikia also by relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani & Ors. reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132 in paragraph 11 contends when the State is an applicant praying for condoning the delay, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible and the requirement of sufficient cause be considered with pragmatism in a justice oriented approach, rather than the technical requirement of explaining everyday's delay. 13. Further reliance has also been placed by Mr. Saikia upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Executive Officer, Antiyur Town Panchayat v. G. Arumugam (Dead) by Legal Representatives, reported in (2015) 3 SCC 569 , wherein in paragraph 4, it has been held that the Court must always take a justice oriented approach while considering the application for condoning the delay. By relying upon the said judgment of the Supreme Court, Mr. Saikia submits that in the instant case, a public interest is also involved as the Judgment and Order of the learned Single Judge is structurally incorrect to the extent that the provisions of the Disaster Management Act of 2005 had also been relied upon in a factual background where the relief claimed is related to ethnic violence that had taken place in the years 1996 and 1998. Furthermore, according to Mr. Saikia, the State is not required to pay the rehabilitation grant to the members of the respondent society at an enhanced rate. 14. Mr. M Sarania, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand, relies upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Post Master General & Ors. v. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr. reported in (2012) 3 SCC 569 wherein in paragraph 29, it has been held that even the Government bodies, unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and that there was bona fide effort on their part are not bestowed with any further entitlement that there exists the requirement to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending because of procedural red tape. 15. Mr. 15. Mr. Saikia, on the other hand, distinguishes the said Judgment of the Supreme Court in Post Master General (supra) by pointing out that the said view was taken in the particular facts of that case, where the Departmental Authorities had not taken any steps for filing of the appeal for several months and even after the process was initiated, it remained static in every subsequent table through which the file had to pass, whereas in the case at hand, the Departmental Authorities had taken all the steps including preparing possible ground of appeal, with promptitude, but the delay in filing had occurred mainly due to the lackadaisical attitude in the office of the Government Advocate. 16. Considered the rival submissions. From the sequence of events narrated in the additional affidavit filed by the Departmental Authorities, it is taken note of that while the copy of the Judgment and Order under appeal was made available before the Departmental Authorities on 12.08.2015, the authorities after conferring with the retired officials, who had dealt with the rehabilitation process in the years 1996 and 1998 had taken the initiative to file the appeal atleast by 1.10.2015. The period between 12.8.2015 to 1.10.2015 was also required by the Departmental Authorities to verify the entitlement of the members of the respondent society for an enhanced rehabilitation grant @Rs. 50,000/- per family. The claim for rehabilitation grant being related to a period which is almost 20 years back, it cannot be said that the time taken by the Departmental Authorities from 12.03.2015 to 01.10.2015 for arriving at the decision to file the appeal and to initiate the process thereof is an indication of any deliberate inaction or omission on their part in processing the appeal. As indicated in the additional affidavit the subsequent time taken by the appellant for filing the appeal which was ultimately filed on 08.06.2016 was not because of any delay on the part of the Departmental Authorities but because of the time taken in the office of the Government Advocate, Assam. 17. To that extent, the reliance placed by Mr. D. Saikia, learned Senior Additional Advocate General, Assam on the views expressed by the Supreme Court in Rafiq and Another (supra) would not be totally irrelevant. 17. To that extent, the reliance placed by Mr. D. Saikia, learned Senior Additional Advocate General, Assam on the views expressed by the Supreme Court in Rafiq and Another (supra) would not be totally irrelevant. Although the said Judgment by the Supreme Court was rendered in the context of a petition being dismissed for non-prosecution because of non-appearance of the concerned Advocate, but the reason behind such view taken is that the conduct of the Advocate would have to be separated from the conduct of the actual litigant in determining a matter where the litigant is adversely affected. The Supreme Court in paragraph 3 of Rafiq and Another (supra) has held as follows: "3. ......................What is the fault of the party who having done everything in his power and expected of him would suffer because of the default of his advocate. If we reject this appeal, as Mr. A.K. Sanghi invited us to do, the only one who would suffer would not be the lawyer who did not appear but the party whose interest he represented. The problem that agitates us is whether it is proper that the party should suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission, or misdemeanour of his agent. The answer obviously is in the negative. May be that the learned advocate absented himself deliberately or intentionally. We have no material for ascertaining that aspect of the matter. We say nothing more on that aspect of the matter. However, we cannot be a party to an innocent party suffering injustice merely because his chosen advocate defaulted." 18. As regards the approach to be taken while considering the delay in filing an appeal where the State is an appellant, the view of the Supreme Court is as follows: "11. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community...........Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process." 19. Further in Executive Officer (supra) in paragraph 4, it has been held as follows: "4. As held by this Court in State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, the Court must always take a justice-oriented approach while considering an application for condonation of delay. If the Court is convinced that there had been an attempt on the part of the government officials or public servants to defeat justice by causing delay, the Court, in view of the larger public interest, should take a lenient view in such situations, condone the delay, howsoever huge may be the delay, and have the matter decided on merits." 20. In view of the aforesaid propositions being laid down by the Supreme Court, it would be incumbent upon the Court, while examining the delay caused by the Government Authorities in filing an appeal, to take into consideration the circumstances under which the delay was caused and as to whether the file was kept pending and not attended for a long period of time without there being any apparent reason for it. 21. In the absence of such situation where there is no indication of the file being not attended to without any apparent reason, the delay in preferring the appeal would be justified to be condoned. 22. Further consideration would also have to be given on the subject matter of the appeal and if the consequence of the appeal not being admitted would have an adverse impact on the public interest, a condonation of delay in such circumstances would also be justified. Such approach would be in conformity with the concept of justice oriented approach as approved by the Supreme Court in Executive Officer (supra). Such approach would be in conformity with the concept of justice oriented approach as approved by the Supreme Court in Executive Officer (supra). Another factor to be taken into consideration would also be the attitude of the Government Officials who may have deliberately caused the delay in order to defeat justice and give an undue advantage to the adversarial litigants. 23. Considering the matter in its entirety, when the facts of the present case is looked into, and as has already been alluded hereinabove, the Departmental Authorities had taken its decision and initiated the process for filing the appeal by 01.10.2015 after receiving the copy of the Judgment and Order dated 16.07.2015 on 12.08.2015. But the actual delay in filing the appeal had occurred thereafter when the matter was not proceeded in the desired manner in the office of the Government Advocate. Hence from the point of view of the Departmental Authorities, who are the actual litigants in the appeal, no deliberate delay and laches can be found in their conduct. From such point of view and also taking into consideration the subject matter of the appeal, where a substantial amount would have to be paid by the Departmental Authorities, in a case where according to them, the members of the respondent society are not entitled, it would be in the interest of justice to condone the delay of 297 days in preferring the appeal. 24. The reliance of Mr. M Sarania on the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Post Master General (supra) would also have to be seen from the point of view in the context in which the said principle were stated. In paragraph 29 of Post Master General (supra) it has been held as follows: "29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process......Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few." 25. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few." 25. Although, in principle, no distinction is made between the Departmental Authorities and the other litigant, but again when the factual background under which the said principles were laid down is considered, it is noticed that in the case before the Supreme Court, the Departmental Authorities had deliberately sat over the matter and had not even initiated the process of examining the question as to whether the appeal is to be filed or not, atleast for a period of 4(four) months since the date of the Judgment. Although a copy of the Judgment was available with the Departmental Authorities, but still they had not further proceeded on a plea that the certified copy was not available. Thereafter also it is noticed that the authorities at various level had kept the file pending for a considerable period without any acceptable reason. But in the instant case, as already indicated above, the Departmental Authorities had acted with promptitude and had taken its decision to file the appeal and initiate the process thereof from their end by 01.10.2015 where the copy of the Judgment was received by them on 12.08.2015. Even in the matter before the Supreme Court, in paragraph 29, it has been provided that the delay should not be condoned unless the authorities have a reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and that there was a bona fide effort on their part. In the instant case, the conduct of the Departmental Authorities clearly indicates a bona fide effort on their part and also the explanation for the delay caused in the office of the Government Advocate appears to be reasonable and acceptable. 26. In such view of the matter, we are of the view that the delay of 397 days in preferring the appeal is required to be condoned in the interest of justice and, accordingly, the delay stands condoned. 27. Registry is directed to register the accompanying appeal and place it for consideration at an appropriate date to be fixed for the purpose. In terms of the above, this interlocutory application stands allowed.