JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. 1. The instant petition has been filed for the grant of following substantial reliefs: (i) “That a writ in the nature of Certiorari may very kindly be issued for quashing the order (AnnexureP-1) terminating the services of the petitioner from ITBP Force, and also Annexure P-5 whereby the petitioner has been denied the invalid pension, CCS (Extraordinary Disability Pension). (ii) That a writ in the nature of Mandamus may be issued directing the respondents to grant full invalid pension as provided under Rule 38 of CCS Pension Rules, 1972 and CCS (Extraordinary Disability Pension) and may be further directed to grant due and admissible benefits under the Pension Schemes with all consequential benefits. (iii) That the respondents may be further directed to pay the arrear along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum.” 2. The undisputed facts are that the petitioner was appointed as a Constable (GD) in Band Platoon against the strength of 1st Bn. ITB Police and joined on 15.12.1995 at BTC Bhanu (Haryana). It appears that thereafter a complaint had been received against the petitioner on the basis of which screening test was conducted by Medical Board at BTC, ITBP, Bhanu (Haryana) during the month of March, 1996 and the petitioner was found to be a case of Pulmonary T.B. and was required to be produced before the Medical Board. The petitioner appeared before S.M.B. on 23.8.1996 and after examination, the following opinion was given by the Sector Medical Board: (i) No. 950010702 CT/GD (RECT) Gopal Chand is a case of pulmonary Koch’s, incidentally detected during his recruitment training. (ii) Since he cannot be able to take strenuous duties at any place and cannot play on blowing, musical instruments, cannot work at HAA in hilly area cannot work in cook house. (iii) Therefore he is being placed in Cat “EEE” (Unfit for further service in ITBPF).” 3. Ultimately, the petitioner was invalidated out from service from 25.1.1997 constraining him to file the instant petition. 4. (iii) Therefore he is being placed in Cat “EEE” (Unfit for further service in ITBPF).” 3. Ultimately, the petitioner was invalidated out from service from 25.1.1997 constraining him to file the instant petition. 4. The respondents, in their reply, have not disputed the factual matrix and have sought to justify their action on the ground that the petitioner on account of his ailment whereby he has been diagnosed with disease Pulmonary T.B. cannot be retained in service and was rightly invalidated out by the Medical Board in exercise of powers conferred under rule 17 (v) read with Rule 26 of ITBPF Rules, 1994. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the material placed on record. 6. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was hale and hearty at the time of his enrolment with the respondents, therefore, in absence of disability or disease noted at the time of entry in service/Armed Forces, there would be a presumption of sound physical and mental condition at the time of entry in service and any disability, disease suffered by the petitioner later on would be deemed to be attributable or aggravated by the service. 7. Similar issue came up before the learned Division Bench of this Court in Union of India through Secretary (Home) vs Bali Ram, LPA No.25/2009 decided on 23.12.2014 and it was held as under: “7. It is not disputed that the writ petitioner was hale and hearty at the time of his enrollment with the writ respondents and, therefore, in absence of disability or disease noted or recorded at the time of entry into service/Armed Forces, there would be a presumption of sound physical and mental condition at the time of said entry in service and any disability, disease suffered by the writ petitioner later on would be deemed to be attributable or aggravated by the service. 9. In taking this view, we are fortified by the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dharamvir Singh versus Union of India and others (2013) 7 SCC 316 wherein after discussing relevant law on the subject, the Hon’ble Supreme Court culled out the following principles:- “29. A conjoint reading of various provisions, reproduced above, makes it clear that: 29.1. 9. In taking this view, we are fortified by the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dharamvir Singh versus Union of India and others (2013) 7 SCC 316 wherein after discussing relevant law on the subject, the Hon’ble Supreme Court culled out the following principles:- “29. A conjoint reading of various provisions, reproduced above, makes it clear that: 29.1. Disability pension to be granted to an individual who is invalidated from service on account of a disability which is attributable to or aggravated by military service in non-battle casualty and is assessed at 20% or over. The question whether a disability is attributable or aggravated by military service to be determined under the Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982 of Appendix II (Regulation 173). 29.2. A member is to be presumed in sound physical and mental condition upon entering service if there is no note or record at the time of entrance. In the event of his subsequently being discharged from service on medical grounds any deterioration in his health is to be presumed due to service. [Rule 5 read with Rule 14(b)]. 29.3. The onus of proof is not on the claimant (employee), the corollary is that onus of proof that the condition for non-entitlement is with the employer. A claimant has a right to derive benefit of any reasonable doubt and is entitled for pensionary benefit more liberally. (Rule 9). 29.4. If a disease is accepted to have been as having arisen in service, it must also be established that the conditions of military service determined or contributed to the onset of the disease and that the conditions were due to the circumstances of duty in military service. [Rule 14(c)]. 29.5. If no note of any disability or disease was made at the time of individual's acceptance for military service, a disease which has led to an individual's discharge or death will be deemed to have arisen in service. [14(b)]. 29.6. If medical opinion holds that the disease could not have been detected on medical examination prior to the acceptance for service and that disease will not be deemed to have arisen during service, the Medical Board is required to state the reasons. [14(b)]; and 29.7. [14(b)]. 29.6. If medical opinion holds that the disease could not have been detected on medical examination prior to the acceptance for service and that disease will not be deemed to have arisen during service, the Medical Board is required to state the reasons. [14(b)]; and 29.7. It is mandatory for the Medical Board to follow the guidelines laid down in Chapter-II of the Guide to Medical Officers (Military Pensions), 2002- "Entitlement: General Principles", including Paras 7, 8 and 9 as referred to above (para 27).” 8. It is vehemently argued by Mr. Shashi Sirshoo, learned Central Government Counsel for the respondents that the petitioner cannot be held entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the Persons With Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, as otherwise claimed by him, because the applicability thereof has specifically been excluded to the Armed Forces, including the petitioner. 9. Even this issue was considered in detail in Bali Ram’s case (supra) and like the present petitioner where the petitioner was invalided from service on 25.1.1997. In Bali Ram’s case, he was invalided out of service on 11.3.1998 whereby the Act had already come into force with effect from 7.2.1996 and it was only on 28.3.2002 that the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment issued notification exempting the Armed Forces from the provisions of section 47. 10. It shall be apposite to refer to the relevant observations made in Bali Ram’s case, which read thus: 13. It would be seen that the Act of 1995 came into force with effect from 7th February, 1996, while the writ petitioner was found unfit for driving and combatant duty by the Departmental Rehabilitation Board in its meeting held on 17.01.1997. Therefore, on the date on which the writ petitioner’s medical condition had been adjudged, undisputedly, the provisions of Act of 1995 had already come into force. It was only on 28.03.2002 that the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment issued notification whereby in its exercise of powers conferred under Section 47 of the Act, the Central Government having regard to the type of work carried out, exempted all the categories of posts of the combatant of the Armed Forces from the provisions of Section 47. Undisputedly, the notification was only prospective in nature. Undisputedly, the notification was only prospective in nature. Thus, it can safely be concluded that the Act of 1995 was applicable to the CRPF at the time when the decision was taken by the writ respondents to invalidate the writ petitioner with effect from 11.03.1998.” 11. Now, the question arises as to what relief can be granted to the petitioner. 12. It is vehemently contended by the learned Central Government Counsel that the petitioner had been invalided out of service on 25.1.1997, whereas the instant petition has been filed after a period of 16 years i.e. on 18.3.2013 and, therefore, ought to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches alone. 13. However, I am unable to appreciate this contention as this issue is no longer res integra in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 wherein while dealing with the similar case wherein the High Court had not only entertained but had directed the payment of arrears for a period of 16 years in case of belated service matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: 4. The principles underlying continuing wrongs and recurring/ successive wrongs have been applied to service law disputes. A `continuing wrong’ refers to a single wrongful act which causes a continuing injury. `Recurring/successive wrongs' are those which occur periodically, each wrong giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of action. This Court in Balakrishna S.P. Waghmare vs. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan - [ AIR 1959 SC 798 ], explained the concept of continuing wrong (in the context of section 23 of Limitation Act, 1908 corresponding to section 22 of Limitation Act, 1963) : "It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury." 5. In M.R. Gupta vs. Union of India [ 1995 (5) SCC 628 ], the appellant approached the High Court in 1989 with a grievance in regard to his initial pay fixation with effect from 1.8.1978. The claim was rejected as it was raised after 11 years. This Court applied the principles of continuing wrong and recurring wrongs and reversed the decision. This Court held: "The appellant's grievance that his pay fixation was not in accordance with the rules, was the assertion of a continuing wrong against him which gave rise to a recurring cause of action each time he was paid a salary which was not computed in accordance with the rules. So long as the appellant is in service, a fresh cause of action arises every month when he is paid his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong computation made contrary to rules. It is no doubt true that if the appellant's claim is found correct on merits, he would be entitled to be paid according to the properly fixed pay scale in the future and the question of limitation would arise for recovery of the arrears for the past period. In other words, the appellant's claim, if any, for recovery of arrears calculated on the basis of difference in the pay which has become time barred would not be recoverable, but he would be entitled to proper fixation of his pay in accordance with rules and to cessation of a continuing wrong if on merits his claim is justified. Similarly, any other consequential relief claimed by him, such as, promotion etc., would also be subject to the defence of laches etc. to disentitle him to those reliefs. The pay fixation can be made only on the basis of the situation existing on 1.8.1978 without taking into account any other consequential relief which may be barred by his laches and the bar of limitation. to disentitle him to those reliefs. The pay fixation can be made only on the basis of the situation existing on 1.8.1978 without taking into account any other consequential relief which may be barred by his laches and the bar of limitation. It is to this limited extent of proper pay fixation, the application cannot be treated as time barred........." 6. In Shiv Dass vs. Union of India - 2007 (9) SCC 274 , this Court held: "The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition.......... If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years." 14. In view of aforesaid exposition of law, obviously the petitioner cannot be held entitled to the arrears of 16 years and the arrears only for three years before the date of writ petition can atleast be allowed in his favour. 15. In view of aforesaid discussion, I find merit in this petition and the same is accordingly allowed. The order terminating the services of the petitioner vide Annexure P-1 dated 25.1.1997 is quashed and consequently order rejecting his claim for grant of pension vide Annexure P-5 dated 21.5.2012 is also quashed. Resultantly, the respondents are directed to grant invalid pension to the petitioner from the date of his invalidation from service. However, this pension shall only be payable with effect from 17.3.2010, i.e. three years before the date of institution of this writ petition. 16. Resultantly, the respondents are directed to grant invalid pension to the petitioner from the date of his invalidation from service. However, this pension shall only be payable with effect from 17.3.2010, i.e. three years before the date of institution of this writ petition. 16. Since the petitioner himself has been guilty of delay and laches in filing the instant petition, therefore, he is not entitled to any interest on the arrears, as claimed by him. 17. The petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.