ORDER : The Management of the Petitioner-Industry has knocked at the doors of this Court assailing the Government Order dated 26.12.2016 at Annexure – E, made under the provisions of Section 10 (1) (c) & (d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 whereby, the subject Industrial Dispute has been referred to the Addl. Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore, for adjudication. 2. The terms of reference stipulated in the above Government Order read as under: 3. After service of notice, the 1st Respondent-Government has entered appearance through the learned Addl. Government Advocate Sri. Laxminarayana and the 2nd Respondent-Trade Union has entered appearance through its learned counsel Sri. T.S. Anantharam. 4. The learned Senior Advocate Sri. S.N. Murthy appearing for the learned Advocate for the petitioner on record submits that the impugned Government Order of Reference contains the assumptive findings, prejudicial to the interest of the petitioner in as much as the Referee Tribunal would not be able to re-open the same for consideration afresh and thus, the defence otherwise available to the petitioner stands foreclosed. 5. The learned Senior Advocate Sri.S.N. Murthy in support of his submission, banks upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd Vs. Workmen and Others (1967) SCC Online Page 1 : AIR 1967 SC 469 . The relevant paragraphs 29, 30 and 31 that are pressed into service read as under: “29. On behalf of the respondents, Mr. Chari put before us four propositions which according to him the Tribunal had to consider before coming to a decision on these two issues. They were:(i)The fact that there was a recital of dispute in the order of reference did not show that the Government had come to a decision on the dispute; (ii) The order of reference only limited the Tribunal's jurisdiction in that it was not competent to go beyond the heads or points of dispute; (iii) Not every recital of fact mentioned in the order of Government was irrebuttable; and (iv) In order to fix the ambit of the dispute it was necessary to refer to the pleadings of the parties. No exception can be taken to the first two points. The correctness of the third proposition would depend on the language of the recital. 30. So far as the fourth proposition is concerned, Mr. No exception can be taken to the first two points. The correctness of the third proposition would depend on the language of the recital. 30. So far as the fourth proposition is concerned, Mr. Chari argued that the Tribunal had to examine the pleadings of the parties to see whether there was a strike at all. In our opinion, the Tribunal must, in any event, look to the pleadings of the parties to find out the exact nature of the dispute, because in most cases the order of reference is so cryptic that it is impossible to cull out there from the various points about which the parties were at variance leading to the trouble. In this case, the order of reference was based on the report of the Conciliation Officer and it was certainly open to the Management to show that the dispute which had been referred was not an industrial dispute at all so as to attract jurisdiction under the Industrial Disputes Act. But the parties cannot be allowed to go a stage further and contend that the foundation of the dispute mentioned in the order of reference was non-existent and that the true dispute was something else. Under s. 10(4) of the Act it is not competent to the Tribunal to entertain such a question. 31. In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal had to examine issues 3 and 4 on the basis that there was a strike at the D.C.M. unit and a sit-down strike at Swatantra Bharat Mills and that there was a lockout declared with regard to the former as stated in the third term of reference. It was for the Tribunal to examine the evidence only on the question as to whether the strikes were justified and legal. It then had to come to its decision as to whether the workmen were entitled to the wages for the period of the lock-out in the Delhi Cloth Mills and for the period of the sit-down strike at the Swatantra Bharat Mills”. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the 2nd Respondent-Trade Union, fairly submits that let it be kept open to the petitioner-management to take up all contentions by way of defence before the Referee Tribunal which shall adjudicate all aspects of the dispute in question, the assumptive findings in the impugned order notwithstanding. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the 2nd Respondent-Trade Union, fairly submits that let it be kept open to the petitioner-management to take up all contentions by way of defence before the Referee Tribunal which shall adjudicate all aspects of the dispute in question, the assumptive findings in the impugned order notwithstanding. He further submits that by this liberal stand of the Trade Union, whatever grievance the petitioner management has, as to the alleged restrictive scope of its defence owing to the said assumptive findings would wither away in thin air. This apart, he has also filed a handwritten memo, which is not that expressively worded. Anyway, he has made the intent clear by his submissions. There is no objection by the respondent-Government to the stand of these workmen expressed through their Trade Union. 7. In the decision of the Apex Court cited by the petitioner’s side above, the concession now shown by the workmen through their Trade Union is obviously absent. The said concession which figures as a material factor in the adjudication of this writ petition makes all the difference to the case. Therefore, the ratio in the said decision is an uninvokable under the special fact matrix of this case. 8. In view of the above, the grievance of the petitioner does not survive for consideration; it is made clear that it is open to the petitioner to plead and prove all the contentions by way of defence and that the Referee Tribunal shall consider the same on merits regardless of the assumptive findings and the factual premises on which the impugned order of reference is founded and that the respondent-Trade Union or its Members shall not contend to the contrary. 9. The Referee Industrial Tribunal keeping the above observations in mind, shall hear and dispose of the reference in question within an outer limit of one year, after affording a reasonable opportunity to the litigating parties. Costs made easy.