JUDGMENT A J Shastri, J. Rule. Mr.Utkarsh Sharma, learned AGP, waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of respondent No.1 and Mr.Dipen Desai, learned advocate, waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of respondent No.2. 2. The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed by the petitioners for seeking following reliefs : "A This Hon'ble Court be pleased to admit and allow the present petition. B. This Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue writ of or in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment and order dated 7.4.2018 passed by the Designated Authority, the Gujarat Provision for Disqualification of Members of Local Authorities for Defection Act,1987 in Application No.1-A/2017. C. That pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to stay execution, operation and implementation of the impugned judgment and order dated 7.4.2018 passed by the Designated Authority, the Gujarat Provision for Disqualification of Members of Local Authorities for Defection Act,1987 in Application No.1-A/2017. D. That ex-parte ad interim relief in terms of the above prayer clause be granted. E. That any other relief deemed fit and expedient be granted in the interest of justice." 3. The background on which the present petition is brought before the Court is that petitioners are the members of Mendarda Taluka Panchayat, elected on a symbol of 'Indian National Congress Party', whose election took place in the month of December, 2015. This Mendarda Taluka Panchayat is consisting of 16 representatives in which 9 members of Taluka Panchayat were elected on the symbol of 'Indian National Congress Party', whereas 7 members were elected on the symbol of 'Bhartiya Janta Party'. It is further the case of the petitioners that meeting of these members of Taluka Panchayat was scheduled on 19.5.2017 at about 12.00 p.m. for the purpose of electing the President of Taluka Panchayat. The Indian National Congress Party had nominated one Smt.Bhavnaben Rajeshbhai Kachhadiya for the post of President of Taluka Panchayat. It is further the case of the petitioners that meeting of these members of Taluka Panchayat was scheduled on 19.5.2017 at about 12.00 p.m. for the purpose of electing the President of Taluka Panchayat. The Indian National Congress Party had nominated one Smt.Bhavnaben Rajeshbhai Kachhadiya for the post of President of Taluka Panchayat. In the process, two members elected on the symbol of 'Indian National Congress Party' named as Labhuben Chavda and Shantilal Rakhodiya had defected themselves and acted contrary to the whip issued by the Indian National Congress Party, resultantly, incurred a disqualification under Section 3 of the Gujarat Provision for Disqualification of Members of Local Authorities for Defection Act, 1986 (for short ' the Act'). 3.1 It is further asserted by the petitioners that one of the defected members being Labhuben Chavda had contested the election of President of Taluka Panchayat supported by the candidate of Bhartiya Janta Party. Since two members had defected and acted contrary to the whip issued by the Indian National Congress Party, the remaining members of Taluka Panchayat had elected on the symbol of Indian National Congress Party came down to minority and the President of Taluka Panchayat was likely to be elected from and with the support of Bhartiya Janta Party. The Indian National Congress Party was though having majority in Taluka Panchayat, its candidate for the post of President was likely to lose the election on account of two defection of members of Indian National Congress Party. It is further the case of the petitioners that election of President was reduced to mere formality and, therefore, all the remaining left out 7 members of Indian National Congress Party walked out of the meeting to subserve the directions issued by the Indian National Congress Party. The petitioners were elected as members of Mendarda Taluka Panchayat had not acted contrary to the whip and directions issued by their party i.e. Indian National Congress Party but, acted in a manner to subserve the interest of the party by walking out. The petitioners were elected as members of Mendarda Taluka Panchayat had not acted contrary to the whip and directions issued by their party i.e. Indian National Congress Party but, acted in a manner to subserve the interest of the party by walking out. 3.2 It is further the case of the petitioners that on account of such situation, the Indian National Congress Party had issued a show cause notice on 20.5.2017 and sought an explanation from all the members of Mendarda Taluka Panchayat including the petitioners, to which a detailed reply was already submitted and vide order dated 1.6.2017, the Indian National Congress Party has pardoned the act of the petitioners and assured that no proceedings for disqualification will be initiated against them. 3.3 In the background of aforesaid facts, the petitioners have further asserted that respondent No.2, who is one of the members of the Mendarda Taluka Panchayat, who came to be elected on the symbol of Bhartiya Janta Party, had initiated the proceedings for disqualification of present petitioners by submitting an application before the designated authority under the Act which application was registered as Application No.1-A of 2017. Along with that application, only two documents along with list of documents came to be attached being the result of election dated 7.12.2015 and the proceedings of meeting dated 19.5.2017. The petitioners then appeared before the designated authority, submitted their detailed reply, interalia, mainly contending that application itself is not maintainable as respondent No.2 is not having any locus standi at whose instance the application itself is not tenable. It has further been contended that application is not submitted well within the time limit prescribed by the Act and the Rules and further, no procedural aspects have been taken care of which are required for the purpose of submitting an application and thereby, by raising contentions, application was contested. It is the case of the petitioners that respondent No.1 - designated authority granted an opportunity of hearing and vide order dated 7.4.2018, an order was passed by the designated authority disqualifying the petitioners as members of Mendarda Taluka Panchayat under the provisions of the Act. 4. The petitioners feeling aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said decision taken by the designated authority, have invoked extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by raising some of the contentions. 5. 4. The petitioners feeling aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said decision taken by the designated authority, have invoked extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by raising some of the contentions. 5. This petition was entertained by way issuing notice on 18.4.2018 and thereafter, learned advocates have been heard and the matter was put up for orders. But by that time the roster has changed and later on, by virtue of an order dated 25.6.2018, a request was made on administrative side and thereafter, it has come up for consideration before this Court for its decision. Learned advocates appearing for the respective parties have submitted that the hearing had already taken place which had been taken note of and, therefore, nothing more to be added, as requested. Mr.Ashish H. Shah, learned advocate, has represented the petitioners, whereas Mr.Utkarsh Sharma, learned AGP, has appeared for the State authority i.e. designated authority and Mr.Dipen Desai, learned advocate, has represented respondent No.2. 6. Mr.Ashish H. Shah, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners, has vehemently contended that a bare perusal of the impugned order would make it clear that there is a complete non-application of mind on the part of the designated authority in passing an order. Some of the relevant provisions which are mandatory in nature have not been appreciated and considered and by giving lame reasons, an order came to be passed declaring the petitioners as disqualified under the Act. Mr.Shah, learned advocate, has contended that the application itself is not maintainable as it has not satisfied the ingredients of provisions of the statute. Further, the Indian National Congress Party has not taken any step and rather has condoned the act of the petitioners which has been alleged and, therefore, when the main political party to which the petitioners are attached, has not initiated any step, it is hardly open for respondent No.2 to generate the proceedings by resorting to the provisions of the Act. Mr.Shah, learned advocate, has further contended that respondent No.2 is affiliated and attached to the Bhartiya Janta Party and at his instance, the initiation of proceedings is not permissible. Mr.Shah, learned advocate, has further contended that respondent No.2 is affiliated and attached to the Bhartiya Janta Party and at his instance, the initiation of proceedings is not permissible. In fact, respondent No.2 is not having any locus to initiate the proceedings against the petitioners under the provisions of the Act and, therefore also, main proceedings are not maintainable at all, the designated authority was under an obligation to examine this issue and having not done so, there appears to be a complete non-application of mind to the core issue involved in the proceedings. 6.1 Mr. Shah, learned advocate, has further contended that this being a special legislation having an object of maintaining political discipline amongst the parties, these provisions must be strictly adhere to and, therefore, since the application is not in consonance with the statutory requirement, the application would not have been entertained. Apart from this, these are the election statutes, must be dealt with strictly and, therefore, when initiation itself is not permissible, there is hardly any reason of sustaining the consequential order which has been passed and, therefore also, the petition deserves to be accepted. Mr.Shah, learned advocate, has further contended that there is a specific plea taken by respondent No.2 about all these issues but, a bare reading of the order would clearly indicate that no attention is paid to and in a generalized form, the disqualification has been declared. Mr.Shah, learned advocate, has further contended that respondent No.2 is neither an aggrieved party nor a party competent to the proceedings as the issue is essentially between the Indian National Congress Party and the petitioners and the main political party has not initiated any step, this aspect ought not to have been ignored or evaded from being considered by the designated authority. It has further been contended that it is never the case of the respondents that alleged condonation by the Indian National Congress Party was fabricated. On the contrary, there is a specific decision taken in a meeting held on 19.5.2017 accepting the explanation of the petitioners by the Indian National Congress Party and has condoned the alleged Act and, therefore, when such is the scenario, there is hardly any reason justifiable enough remained with the authority to disqualify the petitioners. On the contrary, there is a specific decision taken in a meeting held on 19.5.2017 accepting the explanation of the petitioners by the Indian National Congress Party and has condoned the alleged Act and, therefore, when such is the scenario, there is hardly any reason justifiable enough remained with the authority to disqualify the petitioners. Further, it is settled position of law that when substantial justice is pitted against the technical consideration, substantial justice must be given a predominance and here is a case in which the petitioners' alleged act has been specifically condoned by the Indian National Congress Party and when such condonation has taken place, there is hardly any reason or technicality in the way of the petitioners and, therefore, conclusion which has been arrived at is erroneous, perverse and suffers from the vice of non-application of mind. Resultantly, the impugned order requires to be quashed and set aside. Mr.Shah, learned advocate, has further contended that there is no concept of automatic disqualification and here is a case in which specifically the petitioners' act has been condoned and, therefore, relying upon the following decisions, learned advocate has requested the Court to grant the relief as prayed for in the petition. (1) Katara Bhaveshbhai Babubhai v. Designated Authority under the Gujarat Provision for Disqualification, 2012 (O) GLHEL-HC-226744. (2) Shobhaben Shantilal Kalal v. M.V.Joshi, the Designated Officer, reported in 2011 (O) GLH-ELHC-227866 (3) Raviyashwant Bhor v. District Collector, Raigad and Others., (2012) 4 SCC 407 (4) A decision dated 24.11.2016 rendered in SCA No.16135 of 2016. 6.2 By referring to aforesaid decisions, an ultimate contention is raised to grant the relief as prayed for in the petition, as strong case is made out by the petitioners. 7. To meet with the stand taken by learned advocate for the petitioners, Mr.Utkarsh Sharma, learned AGP appearing for the respondent No.1 - State, has vehemently contended that the petition is meritless petition. On the contrary, act of the petitioners which has been alleged is examined by the designated authority and having found specifically that petitioners have incurred disqualification, an order of disqualification came to be passed by assigning valid reasons. On the contrary, act of the petitioners which has been alleged is examined by the designated authority and having found specifically that petitioners have incurred disqualification, an order of disqualification came to be passed by assigning valid reasons. It has been contended that this is a special statute aimed at maintaining political discipline amongst the party members and with that object in mind, the special legislation has been enacted by the Parliament and, therefore, the conduct of the petitioners if allowed to be ignored, the very purpose and object of the Act would be defeated and, therefore, the designated authority has passed a correct order without being influenced by any other extraneous factor. In fact, learned AGP has submitted that this being an election statute must be strictly dealt with and each provision contained therein must be given a full effect and this be considered, it has clearly appeared that there is a specific time schedule prescribed under the provisions to condone the act of the petitioners and that undisputedly has not been maintained and, therefore, the order passed by the authority cannot be said to be erroneous in any manner. In fact, according to the learned AGP, specific dates have been examined and it has been found that there is no proper explanation assigned by the petitioners in any form. On the contrary, the documents related to their defence have also not been produced in a proper form and, therefore, analyzing the provisions and the relevant Rules in this context, it has been specifically found that petitioners have incurred specific disqualification which would visit the consequence under the Act and that has rightly been held, according to learned AGP. It has further been contended that the order in question is a well reasoned order and cannot be said to be laconic in any nature and this is more so in view of the fact that only specific contingencies are to be analyzed and, therefore, when such analysis has yielded, that a specific condonation has not been taken place within a stipulated time and the act of the petitioners is very much established and have defied the whip issued by their political party, the ingredients of Section 3 are clearly established on record and that too, from the record which has been produced by the petitioners and, therefore, the order cannot be said to be perverse in any form. On the contrary, there is a strong application of mind well supported by cogent reasons and the conclusion is based upon complete analysis of record of the case and, therefore, in no case, the designated authority has committed any error. 7.1 Mr.Utkarsh Sharma, learned AGP, has further contended that this petition is basically a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and even from another angle if it is to be treated as under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as well, still, however, the conclusion which is supported by well assigned reasons is not possible to be considered as perverse. Resultantly, this extraordinary jurisdiction is normally not to be exercised in view of settled position of law. It has been contended that in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction, the views are not possible to be substituted unless and until the view taken by the authority is patently erroneous and perverse. Having not visible all these situations, the petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India may not be entertained, there to at the behest of the petitioners, who are in fact wrong doers. It has further been contended that question of locus standi is insignificant in view of the fact that mandate of the party has been clearly disobeyed and defied by the petitioners and, therefore, when the entire substratum of the conduct is clearly attracting the disqualification provisions, there is hardly any reason as to who is the person who initiated the process. The hyper-technicality in such kind of strict statute may not be allowed to be marched over a specific conduct of the petitioners. As a result of this, the overall consideration of the material would clearly indicate that the petitioners have incurred disqualification and they are bound to face the consequences which have been spelt out in the statute. 8. The hyper-technicality in such kind of strict statute may not be allowed to be marched over a specific conduct of the petitioners. As a result of this, the overall consideration of the material would clearly indicate that the petitioners have incurred disqualification and they are bound to face the consequences which have been spelt out in the statute. 8. To oppose the stand taken by learned advocate for the petitioners and to support the stand of the learned AGP, Mr.Dipen Desai, learned advocate, has clearly asserted that the conduct of the petitioners is sufficient enough to attract the provisions contained in Section 3 of the Act and it has rightly been held that the petitioners have incurred disqualification and there is no error committed by the designated authority in any manner and, therefore also, looking to the scope of writ jurisdiction, the conclusion which is just, proper and in consonance with the object of the Act and the provisions, may not be allowed to be substituted, that too at the behest of present petitioners, who are undisputedly violates. Mr.Desai, learned advocate, has further contended that there is a condonation which has been tried to be given a support to the petitioners, has hardly any legs to stand. This is more so in view of the fact that condonation has to take place within a specified period and there is no sufficient material available on record to justify such, as has been rightly held by the designated authority. In fact, in the defence which has been taken, there is no proper material produced before the authority and no clarification is made. On the contrary, it has appeared that the condonation letter is bearing no date nor in the form which is required nor within the stipulated period and, therefore, this is nothing but an attempt of concoction on the part of petitioners to improve the case and that has rightly been discarded by the designated authority and the order in question is not suffering from any infirmity. To substantiate this, Mr.Desai, learned advocate, has relied upon two decisions; (1) Lalsingh G. Rathva and Others. v. Competent Authority - Sports Youth and Cultural Activities and Others., (2010) 1 GLH 401 (2) A decision dated 27.4.2011 rendered in SCA No.2272 of 2011. To substantiate this, Mr.Desai, learned advocate, has relied upon two decisions; (1) Lalsingh G. Rathva and Others. v. Competent Authority - Sports Youth and Cultural Activities and Others., (2010) 1 GLH 401 (2) A decision dated 27.4.2011 rendered in SCA No.2272 of 2011. 8.1 Considering this proposition laid down, Mr.Desai, learned advocate, has ultimately opposed the stand taken by the petitioners and there is no error whatsoever committed by the designated authority in this regard. Considering the overall situation, Mr.Desai, learned advocate, has pointed out that no case is made out by the petitioners which calls for any interference. Resultantly, a request is made to dismiss the petition with costs. 9. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record and considering the decisions, few aspects centering around the controversy and the provisions of the Act and the Rules are not possible to be unnoticed by the Court : (1) From the record, it is emerging that detailed contentions have been raised and specifically contended that respondent No.2 has no locus to bring the application. It further appears that during the course of proceedings, several issues have been raised with regard to the non-compliance of specific Rules and the procedure. Even a point of bringing an application at a belated stage has also been taken specifically. Additionally, the condonation which has been tried to be relied upon is also not within the time schedule as contended and, therefore, the issues which have been raised which are appearing from the pleadings and documents attached to the petition compilation, it appears to this Court that the reasons which are assigned are not completely dealing with such specific contentions. Though it was found that appeal/application has been brought on 26.9.2017 but then, the reason which has been assigned appears to be not so cogent. On the contrary, a strict procedure which is required to be observed ought not to have been ignored by the authority. Further, it appears that there is a specific stand taken that Indian National Congress Party has condoned the act of the petitioners vide order dated 1.6.2017 and the authority, instead of examining, has indicated that there is no date available on such. Further, it appears that there is a specific stand taken that Indian National Congress Party has condoned the act of the petitioners vide order dated 1.6.2017 and the authority, instead of examining, has indicated that there is no date available on such. Be that as it may, even the authorities which have been relied and pressed into service appear to have not been dealt with specifically and the entire application came to be summed up without assigning any cogent reasons and close scrutiny. (2) In the context of the aforesaid scenario which is reflecting on record, if the relevant Rules to be considered, it prima facie suggest that the issue with respect to the locus standi, issue with respect to the limitation as well as issue with regard to the decision on pardon ought to have been dealt with in the meticulous manner. The meeting in question was undisputedly on 19.5.2017, whereas the date of application which is reflecting on page-32 appears to be of 9.8.2017. However, the actual presentation of it must have been gone into. Apart from this, the proceedings which have been brought to the notice with regard to the meeting have also not been discussed and dealt with and, therefore, the conclusion arrived at is not possible to be digested. Additionally, the effect and construction of Rule 6 of the Rules in the context of specific provision under Section 3 of the Act must have been kept in mind. Simply because the condonation has taken place not within the specified time but, then tenability of proceedings also must not have been ignored. No doubt, the Act has got its own specific object to be achieved, meaning thereby to maintain the political discipline amongst the political parties. However, this being a special statute must have been strictly construed by the authority. If Section 3 of the Act which deals with Chapter of Disqualification on the ground of defection to be read closely, Section 3(1) (d) must have been dealt with appropriately and ought to have been analyzed read with Rules. A bare reading of the conclusion is indicating that no such exercise is undertaken and that has vitiated the decision-making process by the authority. If the Rules governing the procedure to be perused, a specific mode is prescribed in the manner in which it has to be presented. A bare reading of the conclusion is indicating that no such exercise is undertaken and that has vitiated the decision-making process by the authority. If the Rules governing the procedure to be perused, a specific mode is prescribed in the manner in which it has to be presented. (3) The requirement of the Rules must have been adhered to by the respondent No.2 even if having locus, if any. As a result of this, it appears to this Court that while taking the decision, the designated authority has not properly dealt with the issue and has not assigned cogent reasons. All these issues having not gone into properly, this Court is of the considered opinion that a fresh look deserves to be given by the designated authority, who is invested with the powers under the special statute. This is more so in view of the fact that statutory authorities are under an obligation to examine the issue meticulously and also deal with the contentions which are raised by the respective sides. From the bare reading, as said earlier, it appears that the effect of Section 3 in the context of Rule 6 appears to have not been examined properly by the authority below. Additionally, Section 6 is silent on the issue as to who shall referred this act of disqualification, particularly when the locus standi issue is raised by the petitioners, the authority ought to have examined. Further, a set procedure is prescribed under the Rules having statutory effect and Rule 6 sub-Rule (3) requires first the satisfaction about reasonable belief by the person, who is bringing the petition. Secondly, sub-Rule (4) of Rule 6 postulates certain material facts to be stated in the application and other sub-Rules are prescribing as to in what manner the application is to be presented. Now, these issues ought to have been examined in the context of disqualification which has been allegedly incurred by the petitioners. The time schedule also, as said earlier, appears to have not been considered and just on the basis of inference, without examining much in detail or calling for the particulars, straightway, an order of disqualification is passed which, per-se, not supported by cogent conclusion and, therefore, appears that the decision-making is ill-founded which requires this Court to direct the authority to apply its mind and deal with the issues which have been raised in the proceedings. 10. 10. In a situation like this, the Court deems it proper to remand the matter for fresh consideration, particularly when the discretion which has been assigned to a statutory authority, it must be allowed to do so and the Court cannot usurp or take over the discretion available to a statutory authority and render a decision and, therefore, these issues are required to be dealt with by the statutory authority, who has been invested with the powers. Therefore, the Court deems it proper to remand the proceedings. The Court has an advantage of proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in case of D. N. Jivraj v. Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka, (2016) 2 SCC 653 . Relevant observations contained therein are reproduced hereinafter : "41. This Court has repeatedly held that where discretion is required to be exercised by a statutory authority, it must be permitted to do so. It is not for the courts to take over the discretion available to a statutory authority and render a decision. In the present case, the High Court has virtually taken over the function of BDA by requiring it to take action against Sadananda Gowda and Jeevaraj. Clause 10 of the lease-cum-sale agreement gives discretion to BDA to take action against the lessee in the event of a default in payment of rent or committing breach of the conditions of the lease-cum-sale agreement or the provisions of law. This will, of course, require a notice being given to the alleged defaulter followed by a hearing and then a decision in the matter. By taking over the functions of BDA in this regard, the High Court has given a complete goby to the procedural requirements and has mandated a particular course of action to be taken by BDA. It is quite possible that if BDA is allowed to exercise its discretion it may not necessarily direct forfeiture of the lease but that was sought to be pre-empted by the direction given by the High Court which, in our opinion, acted beyond its jurisdiction in this regard. 43. To this we may add that if a court is of the opinion that a statutory authority cannot take an independent or impartial decision due to some external or internal pressure, it must give its reasons for coming to that conclusion. 43. To this we may add that if a court is of the opinion that a statutory authority cannot take an independent or impartial decision due to some external or internal pressure, it must give its reasons for coming to that conclusion. The reasons given by the court for disabling the statutory authority from taking a decision can always be tested and if the reasons are found to be inadequate, the decision of the court to by-pass the statutory authority can always be set aside. If the reasons are cogent, then in an exceptional case, the court may take a decision without leaving it to the statutory authority to do so. However, we must caution that if the court were to take over the decision taking power of the statutory authority it must only be in exceptional circumstances and not as a routine. Insofar as the present case is concerned, the High Court has not given any reason why it virtually took over the decision taking function of the authorities and for this reason alone the mandamus issued by the High Court deserves to be set aside, apart from the merits of the case which we have already adverted to." 11. This Court has yet another reason to remand the proceedings and allow the authority to examine the issue afresh as the Court is of the opinion that statutory authority herein is in a position to take an independent and impartial decision without being influenced by extraneous factor and, therefore also, it would be just and proper for the statutory authority to opine first and arrive at a conclusion. 12. Since the Court has considered the decision as a whole to be reconsidered and has thought it fit to remand the proceedings for fresh look, the Court has refrained from discussing the issues on merit at length and has also not opined anything leaving it open for the designated authority to deal with strictly in consonance with the effect of provisions of law and the procedure prescribed under the Rules. This is more so in view of the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in case of J. Balaji Singh v. Diwakar Cole and Others., (2017) 14 SCC 207 . Relevant observations contained in Para.16 are reproduced hereinafter "16. This is more so in view of the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in case of J. Balaji Singh v. Diwakar Cole and Others., (2017) 14 SCC 207 . Relevant observations contained in Para.16 are reproduced hereinafter "16. In our considered view, the only error which the first Appellate Court committed was that it went on to record the findings on merits. In our view, it was not necessary to do so while passing the order of remand. The reason is that once the first Appellate Court formed an opinion to remand the case, it was required to give reasons in support of the remand order as to why the remand is called for in the case. Indeed, the remand was made only to enable the Trial Court to decide the case on merits. Therefore, there was no need to discuss much less record findings on several issues on merits. It was totally uncalled for." 13. The issues which have been raised are of vital importance for the affairs of the Taluka Panchayat, the authority is under an obligation to deal with the same in the manner in which it is required to be dealt with. The authority, while giving a fresh look, is expected to deal with the decisions which have been referred to above by the respective parties and after discussing the same, appropriate and just decision may be taken so as to see that object of the Act and the Rules be preserved. Resultantly, the petition deserves to be partly allowed by issuing consequential directions : (1) The impugned order dated 7.4.2018 passed by the Designated Authority in Application No.1-A/2017 is quashed and set aside and consequently, the respondent No.1 - authority is directed to decide afresh the very same application presented by respondent No.2, after granting fresh opportunities to the respective parties and after dealing with each contention and authorities cited. (2) In view of the time gap which has lapsed, it is desirable and expected from respondent No.1 that such process for re-consideration be undertaken within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of the order, after complying the principles of natural justice but, not later than that. (2) In view of the time gap which has lapsed, it is desirable and expected from respondent No.1 that such process for re-consideration be undertaken within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of the order, after complying the principles of natural justice but, not later than that. (3) Since the present proceedings are remanded back to the authority concerned, the Court has not expressed any opinion on merits of the issues which have been raised and left it open for the respondent No.1 authority to take an independent decision on merits in accordance with law and shall pass a reasoned order. (4) It is clarified that this setting aside of the order would not in any way consider by the petitioners of restoring their membership of Taluka Panchayat till fresh decision and any act of petitioners if taken, would be strictly subject to the outcome of the decision to be taken by the respondent No.1 - authority. 14. With these observations and directions, the present petition stands partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. There shall be no order as to costs. CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1 of 2018 In view of the order passed in main Special Civil Application, the present civil application does not survive and stands disposed of accordingly.