JUDGMENT J.B. Pardiwala, J. This Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'the C.P.C.') is at the instance of the original defendants and is directed against the judgment and order dated 30th June 2018 passed by the 9th Additional District Judge, Surat in Regular Civil Appeal N0.67 of 2015 arising from the judgment and decree passed by the 3rd Additional Senior Civil Judge, dated 2nd July 2015 in the Special Civil Suit No.62 of 2012 filed by the respondents herein original plaintiffs for partition, declaration and injunction with regard to the suit properties. 2. For the sake of convenience, the appellants herein shall be referred to as the 'original defendants' and the respondents herein shall be referred to as the 'original plaintiffs'. 3. The plaintiffs instituted the Special Civil Suit No.62 of 2012 in the Court of the 3rd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Surat for partition, declaration and permanent injunction.. The plaintiffs are the sisters of the defendants and the defendants are the brothers of the plaintiffs. It is the case of the plaintiffs that their father namely Balubhai Bhanabhai was the owner of in all seven immovable properties described in para 3 of the plaint. Balubhai Bhanabhai passed away intestate on 23rd January 1985. His wife namely Paniben passed away intestate on 25th November 1985. The suit properties had been purchased by late Balubhai Bhanabhai from his own funds, and in such circumstances, after the demise of Balubhai and his wife, the plaintiffs by way of succession, have the right, title and interest in the suit properties. According to the plaintiffs, they have 1/8th share in the properties in question. 4. The defendants appeared before the Trial Court and contested the suit by filing their written statements vide Exhibits : 21 and 24 respectively. According to the defendants, the plaintiffs, being the daughters of late Balubhai Bhanabhai, cannot claim any share in the suit properties. It is also the case of the defendants that the suit filed by the plaintiffs is barred by limitation. It is their case that married sisters cannot claim any right, title and interest over the properties in question. In such circumstances, the defendants prayed before the Trial Court to dismiss the suit. 5. It is also the case of the defendants that the suit filed by the plaintiffs is barred by limitation. It is their case that married sisters cannot claim any right, title and interest over the properties in question. In such circumstances, the defendants prayed before the Trial Court to dismiss the suit. 5. The Trial Court having regard to the pleadings of the parties framed the following issues vide Exhibit : 37: "(1) Whether the plaintiffs prove that the plaintiffs and defendants are lineal descendants of late Balubhai Bhanabhai Patel as averred in para (2) of the plaint? (2) Whether the plaintiffs prove that properties described under para (3) of the plaint are self acquired properties of deceased Balubhai Bhanabhai Patel? (3) Whether plaintiffs prove that properties described under para (3) of the plaint were exclusively owned and possessed by deceased Balubhai Bhanabhai Patel? (4) Whether defendants prove that as a lineal descendants plaintiffs have undivided share in the properties of deceased Balubhai Bhanabhai Patel? (5) Whether plaintiffs prove that deceased Balubhai Bhanabhai Patel was having four sons and four daughters and they have undivided 1/8th share? (6) Whether plaintiffs prove that the defendants have legal right and share in the lands of Vesu? (7) Whether plaintiffs prove that the defendants had sold the old S. No.69/1, new S.No.4/1 admeasuring 3-02-00 H-Are-sq.mtrs. of mouje : Rundh without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs? (8) Whether defendants prove that indirectly plaintiffs and their ancestor had accepted that they do not have right, title and interest in the suit property? (9) Whether defendants prove that, they are cultivating the suit land and maintenance of their family solely depending upon the same? (10) Whether defendants prove that suit of the plaintiffs is barred by estoppel? (11) Whether plaintiffs prove that defendants have denied at the time of demanding their undivided shares? (12) Whether suit of the plaintiffs is barred by jurisdiction? (13) Whether suit of the plaintiffs barred by limitation? (14) Whether plaintiffs are entitled to decree as prayed for? (15) What order and decree?" 6. The issues framed by the Trial Court referred to above came to be answered as under: "(1) In the affirmative. (2) In the affirmative. (3) In the affirmative. (4) In the affirmative. (5) In the affirmative. (6) In the affirmative. (7) In the negative. (8) In the negative. (9) In the partly affirmative. (15) What order and decree?" 6. The issues framed by the Trial Court referred to above came to be answered as under: "(1) In the affirmative. (2) In the affirmative. (3) In the affirmative. (4) In the affirmative. (5) In the affirmative. (6) In the affirmative. (7) In the negative. (8) In the negative. (9) In the partly affirmative. (10) In the negative. (11) In the affirmative. (12) In the negative. (13) In the negative. (14) In the affirmative. (15) As per final order." 7. The plaintiff No.1 entered the box and led oral evidence vide Exhibit : 38 and the husband of the plaintiff No.2 also entered the box and led oral evidence vide Exhibit : 99. On the other hand, the defendant No.1 entered the box and led his oral evidence vide Exhibit : 130 and the defendant No.14 also entered the box and led his oral evidence vide Exhibit : 139. 8. The Trial Court, on appreciation of the oral as well as the documentary evidence on record, allowed the suit filed by the plaintiffs and passed the following order: "ORDER The suit of the plaintiff is allowed. It is hereby ordered that 1/8 share of the plaintiff no. 1, 1/8 share of the plaintiff no.2, jointly 1/8 share of the plaintiff nos. 3 to 5, and undivided jointly 1/8 share of the plaintiff nos. 6 to 8 in the agriculture land mentioned in para-3 of the Schedule 'A' of the suit application is to be continued. The stay order regarding the properties mentioned in para no. 19(1) of the application of interim stay vide exhibit-5 against the opponents which was partly granted by my predecessor Judge on 17-07- 2012 is confirmed till partition is made. Parties shall bear the cost of suit." 9. The defendants, being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, preferred the Regular Civil Appeal No.67 of 2015 in the District Court at Surat. The lower Appellate Court, upon reappreciation of the oral as well as the documentary evidence on record, dismissed the appeal filed by the defendants and thereby affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. 10. Being dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the lower Appellate Court, the defendants are here before this Court with this Second Appeal under Section 100 of the C.P.C. 11. 10. Being dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the lower Appellate Court, the defendants are here before this Court with this Second Appeal under Section 100 of the C.P.C. 11. This Second Appeal has been admitted after hearing the parties on the following substantial questions of law: "(A) Whether heirs and LRs. of the deceased daughters can seek share in their grandfather's property and further pray for partition irrespective of the fact that, the father and daughter both have expired prior to the Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005? (B) Whether living married daughters can seek decree for partition and claim their equal shares in the suit properties left by their deceased father, who died prior to the date of Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005, in the other words can living married daughters become coparceners by virtue of Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005, whose father died prior to the year 2005? (C) Whether the impugned judgment and decree of partition passed by the Ld. Trial Court has resulted into giving retrospective effect of the Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005 and the same is in consonance with the ratio of laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the matter of reported in Prakash vs. Phulavati, (2015) AIRSCW 6160? (D) Whether married daughters and their heirs can pray for partition in view of the repeal of Sec. 23 by Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005? (E) Whether the Ld. Trial Court has erred in passing final decree of partition instead of passing preliminary decree of partition as provided under OR. XX Rule 18(2) r/w. Sec. 54 of C.P.C.? (F) Whether suit of the respondents plaintiff is barred by limitation under Article 110 of Limitation Act, 1963? (G) Whether the suit of the resp. - plaintiffs was instituted on proper court fees as defined under sub-section 13 r/w. 15 r/w. 12 of Sec. 6 of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004? (H) Whether the Ld. Trial Court has erred in passing decree of partition by awarding 1/8th share each in favour of all the four daughters and/or their branches though out of four daughters only two daughters were alive on the date of filing the suit, moreover, one daughter namely, Naniben, wife of Dahyabhai Narsinhbhai Patel died on 29.9.1997? (i) Whether the points for determination framed by the Ld. (i) Whether the points for determination framed by the Ld. First Appellate Court for deciding the Appeal are in consonance with the provisions of OR. XLI Rule 31 of CPC r/w and law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the matter of reported in H. Sinddiqui (dead) by LRS. vs. A. Ramalingam, (2011) 1 GLH 586, Hemlataben Mangalsinh vs. Shantaben Chandulal Narshidas, whereby it was held that, the first Appellate Court is required to decide First Appeal as provided under Order XLI Rule-31 of the CPC r/w provisions of Bombay Civil Manual, by framing suitable points in appeal applying same principles on which issues were framed by the Trial Court? SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS/DEFENDANTS: 12. Mr. Gandhi, the learned counsel appearing for the defendants vehemently submitted that the plaintiffs are the daughters of late Balubhai. They got married years back. It is submitted that on the marriage of a female, she ceases to be a member of her father's H.U.F. and becomes a member in her husband H.U.F. In such circumstances, according to Mr. Gandhi, the plaintiffs had no interest or share in the properties in her father's H.U.F. on the date of the suit. Mr. Gandhi would submit that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the benefit of the amendment in Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, as the father had passed away way back in the year 1985. On demise of the father in the year 1985, the succession opened and there was a notional partition. According to Mr. Gandhi, to seek the benefit of the 2005 amendment in Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, the father should be alive on the date of the amendment. 13. Mr. Gandhi further submitted that even otherwise, the suit is time barred. According to Mr. Gandhi, the suit is governed by the period of limitation, as prescribed under Article 110 of the Limitation Act. He would submit that the suit should have been filed within twelve years when the exclusion became known to the plaintiffs. 14. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Gandhi prays that there being merit in this Second Appeal, the same be allowed and the suit of the plaintiffs be dismissed. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS HEREIN PLAINTIFFS: 15. Mr. 14. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Gandhi prays that there being merit in this Second Appeal, the same be allowed and the suit of the plaintiffs be dismissed. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS HEREIN PLAINTIFFS: 15. Mr. Viral Shah, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs vehemently submitted that the submissions canvassed on behalf of the defendants are thoroughly misconceived because they proceed on the footing as if the suit properties are ancestral properties and Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act is applicable. Mr. Shah would submit that indisputably, the suit properties are self acquired properties of late Balubhai, and therefore, in such circumstances, the succession would be governed in accordance with Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act and not Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. Having regard to Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, the plaintiffs being the daughters of late Balubhai and Balubhai having died intestate have a share in all his properties. 16. Mr. Shah submits that one of the properties situated at village : Rundh came to be transferred by the defendants in the year 2003 and even at that point of time, the defendants had not declined to give the share to their sisters. In the year 2004, the plaintiffs asked for their share in the properties for the first time and as the defendants did not respond to the same, the plaintiffs had to issue public notice in the year 2004 and also initiate the legal proceedings for the purpose of getting their name mutated in the revenue record of rights. According to Mr. Shah, the suit filed by the plaintiffs is well within the period period of twelve years, as provided under Article 110 of the Limitation Act. 17. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Shah submitted that there being no merit in this Second Appeal, the same be dismissed. 18. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the Courts below committed any error in passing the impugned judgment and order. 19. Shah submitted that there being no merit in this Second Appeal, the same be dismissed. 18. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the Courts below committed any error in passing the impugned judgment and order. 19. Let me give a fair idea about the family pedigree: PEDIGREE Balubhai Bhanabhai (Date of Death 23.01.1985) Paniben Balubhai (Date of Death 25.11.1985) (son) Maganbhai Balubhai Age 79 (son) Ramanbhai Balubhai Age 77 (daughter) Jamnaben w/o Balubhai Bhikhabhai (DD 28-8-11) (son) Dayabhai Balubhai (DD 25-1-92) (son) Ratilal Balubhai Age:67 (daughter) Lilavatiben w/o Naginbhai Age 66 (daughter) Padmaben w/o Shantilal Age 65 (daughter) Naniben w/o Dayabhai (DD 29-9-97) ↓ ↓ Lilaben Bhiikhabhai (son) Age 55 Kishorbhai Bhiikhabhai (son) Age 48 Vinubhai Bhiikhabhai (son) Age 50 Shilaben Dayabhai (daughter) Age 38 Liluben Dayabhai (daughter) Age 36 Jayeshbhai Dayabhai (son) DD 28/2/04 Kishor Dayabhai (son) DD 27/10/02 ↓ Jyotiben (wife) (DD 29/8/09) Henali (daughter) Age 10 Monilkumar (DD 25/2/10) Mankorben (wife) Age 69 Ranjitbhai (son) Age 45 Manjuben w/o Kishorbhai (daughter) (DD 02/10/2001 ) Taraben (daughter) Age 50 Chanchalben (daughter) Age 48 Jasuben (daughter) Age 46 Shardaben (daughter) Age 44 Rekhaben (daughter) Age 42 ↓ Dimpalben Kishorbhai (daughter) Age 30 Hemaben Kihorbhai (wife) Age 25 Jatinbhai Kishorbhai (daughter) Age 20 20. The Trial Court framed as many as fifteen issues. The first three issues are important. I may, at the cost of repetition, reproduce the three issues as under: "(1) Whether the plaintiffs prove that the plaintiffs and defendants are lineal descendants of late Balubhai Bhanabhai Patel as averred in para (2) of the plaint? (2) Whether the plaintiffs prove that properties described under para (3) of the plaint are self acquired properties of deceased Balubhai Bhanabhai Patel? (3) Whether plaintiffs prove that properties described under para (3) of the plaint were exclusively owned and possessed by deceased Balubhai Bhanabhai Patel?" 21. The Courts below have recorded a concurrent finding of fact that the suit properties are self acquired properties of late Balubhai Bhanabhai Patel. The defendants have also not disputed this fact. In such circumstances, all the three issues referred to above came to be answered in the affirmative. 22. The Courts below have recorded a concurrent finding of fact that the suit properties are self acquired properties of late Balubhai Bhanabhai Patel. The defendants have also not disputed this fact. In such circumstances, all the three issues referred to above came to be answered in the affirmative. 22. Thus, I need to decide this Second Appeal, more particularly, the rights of the parties keeping in mind that the suit properties are self acquired properties of late Balubhai Bhanabhai Patel. Once there is no dispute as regards the fact that the suit properties are self acquired properties of late Balubhai Bhanabhai, the issue as regards the benefit of 2015 amendment in Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act pales into significance. The rights of the parties would be governed by Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The plaintiffs and the defendants are the children of late Balubhai. The plaintiffs are the sisters of the defendants. As per Section 8 of the Act, 1956, the plaintiffs and the defendants are Class I legal heirs of their father and if there father died intestate, they would get equal share in the suit properties. 23. In this regard, Section 6 and Section 8 of the Act are necessary to be considered in the facts and circumstances of this case. The same reads thus: "6. Devolution of interest of coparcenary property. When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act: Provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class who claims through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship. Explanation I: For the purposes of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. Explanation I: For the purposes of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. Explanation 2: Nothing contained in the proviso to this section shall be construed as enabling a person who has separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein. 8. General rules of succession in the case of males The property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of this Chapter (a) firstly upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class I of the Schedule; (b) secondly, if there is no heir of class I, then upon he heris, being the relatives specified in class II of the Schedule; (c) thirdly, if there is no heir of any of the two classes, then upon the agnates of the deceased; and (d) lastly, if there is no agnate, then upon the cognate of the deceased." 24. According to the provisions of the Act the old order of inheritance by survivorship had been changed to the new order of inheritance by succession according to which if a male Hindu dies intestate after the commencement of the Act his property shall devolve firstly upon his heirs specified in Class I of the Schedule and if there is no Class I heir, then upon the relatives specified in Class II of the Schedule and if there is no heir of even Class II, then upon the agnates and if the agnates are also not available then upon the cognates, as has been provided in Section 8 of the Act. But Section 8 read with its proviso is an exception to the aforesaid scheme which lays down that if a male Hindu dies intestate after the commencement of the Act without leaving a female heir of Class I then the property left by him shall devolve upon other coparceners according to the rules of survivorship and not by the rules of succession under Section 8 of the Act. 25. 25. In the instant case, indisputably, Balubhai was the exclusive owner of the suit properties and died in the year 1985 leaving behind among other heirs, a widow namely Puniben who also passed away six months thereafter. In the circumstances, Section 8 of the Act, 1956 would squarely cover the facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly, when neither there is any coparcenary interest involved in the suit property, nor any such interest has been mentioned in the said section of the Act. 26. Balubhai died after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, came into force and under Section 8 of the said Act, on a male Hindu dying intestate, his properties shall devolve firstly on the heirs specified in, Class I of the Schedule. It may be stated that I am concerned with the other class of heirs. In schedule of Section 8, Class I heirs have been specified as under: Son; daughter; widow; mother; son of a pre- deceased son; daughter of a pre-deceased son; son of a pre-deceased daughter; daughter of a predeceased daughter; widow of a pre- deceased son; son of a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased son; daughter of a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased son; widow of a pre- deceased son of a pre-deceased son; son of a predeceased daughter of a pre-deceased daughter; daughter of a pre-deceased daughter of a pre-deceased daughter; daughter of a pre- deceased son of a pre-deceased daughter; daughter of a pre-deceased daughter of a predeceased son." 27. All the heirs mentioned in the said class inherit simultaneously, that, is to say, in equal share. 28. In the aforesaid context, I may refer to and rely upon a decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Srimati Tapeshwari Devi and Others vs. State of Bihar and Others, (1994) AIR Patna 3. Justice S.B. Sinha (as His Lordship then was), speaking for the Bench, has observed as under: "7. The learned standing counsel submitted that the married daughters being not members of the family of their father, they are not entitled to allotment of separate unit. 8. By reason of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the daughters of a person dying intestate also inherit along with their brothers in equal shares. The learned standing counsel submitted that the married daughters being not members of the family of their father, they are not entitled to allotment of separate unit. 8. By reason of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the daughters of a person dying intestate also inherit along with their brothers in equal shares. Such inheritance of the property is by reason of operation of statute, in terms whereof a valid right, title and interest is created in the properties of the land-holder. 9. In order to lay a claim with regard to their shares the petitioners were also not obliged to show that they were in actual physical possession of the properties in question upon getting the same demarcated as per their share. A co-sharer can claim exclusive title to the property not only by merely remaining in possession thereof for a period of 12 years but, in order to acquire indefeasible title in relation thereto, ouster of the other co-sharers has to be pleaded and proved." 29. I may refer to and rely upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bay Berry Apartments (P) Ltd vs. Shobha and Others, (2006) 13 SCC 737, wherein, in para 32, the following has been observed: "Plaintiffs who are the daughters of the original defendant No. 1, in law was not entitled to inherit their father's share in the properties but for the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, which brought statutory change. Admittedly, by reason of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, they became heirs of their father in terms whereof the sister's share is equal to that of the brothers. If they were to be excluded, it would have been said so in the Will." 30. Thus, in my view, both the Courts below have rightly held that the suit properties being the self acquired properties of late Balubhai Bhanabhai having died intestate his children would be governed by Section 8 of the Act, 1956 so far as share in the suit properties is concerned. 31. The above takes me to consider the issue with regard to limitation. Both the Courts below have taken the view that the suit filed by the plaintiffs is within the period of limitation. However, according to the defendants, the suit is time barred and should have been dismissed on the ground of limitation. 32. 31. The above takes me to consider the issue with regard to limitation. Both the Courts below have taken the view that the suit filed by the plaintiffs is within the period of limitation. However, according to the defendants, the suit is time barred and should have been dismissed on the ground of limitation. 32. Under Article 110 of the Limitation Act, the period prescribed to enforce a right in the share of the joint family property by way of partition is prescribed twelve years. The limitation starts to run from the date of the denial of a share in the property. According to the plaintiffs, the share was demanded in the year 2004, more particularly, when they came to learn about the disposal of the suit properties situated at village : Rundh. The suit ultimately came to be filed in the year 2012. 33. It is settled law that the plea of limitation cannot be decided as an abstract principle divorced from facts, as in every case, the starting point of limitation has to be ascertained, which is, entirely a question of fact. A plea of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. (Ramesh B. Desai Vs. Bipin Vadilal Mehta, (2006) 5 SCC 638 ). 34. Therefore, what would be the period of limitation in a suit will depend on the cause of action and nature of the relief sought in the suit. 35. The Apex Court in Nav Rattanmal vs. State of Rajasthan, (1961) AIR SC 1704 observed that the theory underlying the statutes of limitation was designed to effectuate a beneficent public purpose, viz., to prevent the taking away from one what he has for long been permitted to consider his own and on the faith of which he plans his life, habits and expenses. The Apex Court in paragraph 10 of the said judgment observed: "First and foremost there is this feature that the Limitation Act, though a statute of repose and intended for quieting titles, and in that sense looks at the problem from the point of view of the defendant with a view to provide for him a security against stale claims, also addresses at the same time to the position of the plaintiff. Thus, for instance, where the plaintiff is under a legal disability to institute a suit by reason of his being a minor or being insane or an idiot, it makes provisions for the extension of the period taking into account that disability." 36. In Rajendar Singh vs. Santa Singh, (1973) 2 SCC 705 , the Apex Court elucidated that the object of the law of limitation is to prevent disturbance or depreviation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence, or laches. The Apex Court further held that it is the duty of the Court to apply the bar of limitation, where, on patent facts, it is applicable even though not specifically pleaded. 37. In Tara Nath Chakraverty Vs. Iswar Chandra Das Sarkar, 1911 16 CWN 398, the Calcutta High Court held that "all statutes of limitation have for their object the prevention of the rearing up of claims at great distances of time when evidences are lost, and in all well regulated countries, the quieting of possession is held an important point of policy. The Calcutta High Court followed the principle explained by Sir Thomas Plumer M. R. in Cholmondeley vs. Clinton, 1820 (2) Jac&W 140 that : "the public have a great interest in having a known limit fixed by law to litigation for the quiet of the community, and that there may be a certain fixed period, after which the possessor may know that his title and right cannot be called in question". 38. An administration suit is essentially one where reliefs claimed relate to seeking administration of the estate of a deceased under orders of the court. The classic aspect which qualifies any suit for being called an administrative suit is that the reliefs claimed involve the administration of the estate of the deceased. Such reliefs may be sought by the heirs of the deceased or the beneficiaries or even an absolute third party, such as a creditor. 39. It has been always understood that the Limitation Act does not explicitly provide for a period of limitation for an administration suit [See Nandlal Chunilal Vs. Gopilal Manilal, (1907) 9 BLR 316]. Such reliefs may be sought by the heirs of the deceased or the beneficiaries or even an absolute third party, such as a creditor. 39. It has been always understood that the Limitation Act does not explicitly provide for a period of limitation for an administration suit [See Nandlal Chunilal Vs. Gopilal Manilal, (1907) 9 BLR 316]. It has been held in that decision that in England the principle is that "actions for the administration of the estates of deceased persons can only be instituted by persons whose claims to recover are not barred by any statute of limitation". The Division Bench held that the same principle should be made applicable in India (See page 319). 40. At this point, it will be useful to reproduce Articles 106, 110 and 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which read as under: Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 106. For a legacy or for a share of a residue bequeathed by a testator or for a distributive share of the property of an intestate against an executor or an administrator or some other person legally charged with the duty of distributing the estate. Twelve year When the legacy or share becomes payable or deliverable. 110. By a person excluded from a joint family property to enforce aright to share therein. Twelve years. When the exclusion becomes known to the plaintiffs. 113. Any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule. Three years When the right to sue accrue. 41. It should also be noted that it is well settled principle of the Law of Limitation that where two articles of such law may be wide enough to cover a given right of suit and it can be postulated of neither of them that the one applies more specifically than the other, then the Court should lean in favour of the application of the provision which would keep the right of suit alive in preference to that which would destroy it (Nathulal Vs. Sualal, (1962) AIR Raj. 83). 42. It is also well settled rule of construction of the Limitation Act that when there is a specific article dealing with a specific subject, then that article is applicable in preference to a general and residuary article (Shri Mahadeoji Idol vs. Desai, (1964) AIR M.P. 207). 43. Sualal, (1962) AIR Raj. 83). 42. It is also well settled rule of construction of the Limitation Act that when there is a specific article dealing with a specific subject, then that article is applicable in preference to a general and residuary article (Shri Mahadeoji Idol vs. Desai, (1964) AIR M.P. 207). 43. I may also refer to and rely upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Parmeshwari Devi Ruia vs. Krishnakumar Nathmal Murarka and Others, (2007) 6 BomCR 180 . Khanwilkar A.M., J., (as His Lordship then was) has observed in para 53 as under: "On the above findings, it necessarily follows that the suit property in which Jankibai had 1/3 share, after her demise, devolved upon Nathmal. The property was inherited by Nathmal as his separate property. (See The Vijaya College Trust V/s. Kumta Co-operative Arecanut Sales Society Ltd., (1995) AIR Karnataka 35 -para-8; Madanlal Phulchand Jain V/s. State of Maharashtra, (1992) AIR SC 1254 -para-2; and M. Shanmugha Udayar V/s. Sivanandam and Others., (1994) AIR Madras 123 -para-15). It is nobody's case, nor the plea of Defendant No.1 that the suit property was acquired by Jankibai as member of a joint family with the aid of ancestral property. Thus understood, after the demise of Jankibai who died intestate, her only heir Nathmal inherited the property as his separate property. The fact that Nathmal died intestate is not in dispute at all. After his demise, naturally the rights possessed and owned by Nathmal in the suit property devolved upon his son and seven married daughters equally. The Plaintiff and Defendant No.21 are two such daughters. The defendant No.1 being the son of Nathmal, though in possession of the suit property, did not have right to transfer or sell the entire 1/3rd share in the suit property. At best he could have committed himself only to the extent of his share in the suit property and not on behalf of other co-heirs of the Nathmal. The Plaintiff has rightly pressed into service exposition of the Apex Court in the case of Shanmughasundaram and Others. V/s. Diravia Nadar (Dead) by Lrs. & Another., (2005) 10 SCC 728 , in particular paragraph 28 and 30 thereof. The Plaintiff has rightly pressed into service exposition of the Apex Court in the case of Shanmughasundaram and Others. V/s. Diravia Nadar (Dead) by Lrs. & Another., (2005) 10 SCC 728 , in particular paragraph 28 and 30 thereof. The Apex Court has observed that absence of partition between co-heirs, the two brothers together had undivided share in the property and they could not have agreed for the sale of the entire property. They were competent to execute agreement to the extent only to their undivided property. It is further observed that in the event of sale of such undivided share, the vendee would be required to file a suit for partition to work out his right in the property. In paragraph 30, while considering the purport of section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, the Apex Court observed that in the absence of sisters being parties to the agreement, the vendee can at best obtain undivided interest of two brothers in the property. It is further observed that Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act cannot be invoked by the vendee to obtain sale of undivided share of the two brothers with right to force partition on the sisters who were not parties to the agreement of sale..." 44. I may refer to a Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Sajanbir Singh Anand and Others vs. Raminder Kaur Anand and Others, (2018) 3 MhLJ 892, wherein one of the questions of law referred to the Full Bench was as regards the period of limitation for deciding a suit for administration and partition of the property and whether Article 110 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has any application to a suit for administration of the estate of a deceased person. I may quote the relevant observations: "28 An administration suit, as noted earlier, is essentially one where reliefs claimed relate to seeking administration of the estate of a deceased under orders of the court. The quintessential aspect which qualifies any suit for being called an administrative suit is that the reliefs claimed involve the administration of the estate of the deceased. A suit for a legacy or for a share of a residue bequeathed by a testator or for a distributive share of the property of an intestate can only be by a legal heir. In such a suit, Article 106 will be applicable. A suit for a legacy or for a share of a residue bequeathed by a testator or for a distributive share of the property of an intestate can only be by a legal heir. In such a suit, Article 106 will be applicable. But while an administration suit by a creditor for recovery of his debt, there is no specific period provided and therefore, the residuary Article 113 will be applicable. 29. A suit may contain a bouquet of reliefs one of which would be a prayer for administration of a joint family property alongwith his share therein. The other relief could be to enforce a right to share in a joint family property alleging that he was excluded from the joint family property. In such a situation, Article 110 may become applicable depending on the cause of action and the reliefs sought. Merely because plaintiff has used the nomenclature "administration suit", the suit does not become one only for administration because other reliefs may also have been sought like to enforce a right to share in a joint family property. The reliefs claimed by plaintiff will have to be tested against the facts of each case and the aspect of limitation would have to be considered in the context of those facts. 30. The term administration suit connotes a relief rather than a cause of action. An administration suit is, in essence, one in which plaintiff seeks special relief, viz., the administration of the estate of a deceased person, be he a debtor, a testator or an intestate, by and under the direction of the Court for the better realisation of the specific claim regarding which plaintiff has a cause of action. Therefore, the period of limitation applicable to such a suit would depend on who the plaintiff is and what his specific cause of action is. It is for that reason that the Limitation Act has not explicitly provided a period of limitation for such a suit. If the suit is by a creditor, the cause of action is to recover the debt, the appropriate article applicable to a suit for debt would govern and the period of limitation would be three years. It is the real nature of the claim that counts and if the suit for legacy involves administration of the estate of the deceased, Article 106 will govern (Rajamannar and Anr. Vs. Venkatakrishnayya and Anr.). It is the real nature of the claim that counts and if the suit for legacy involves administration of the estate of the deceased, Article 106 will govern (Rajamannar and Anr. Vs. Venkatakrishnayya and Anr.). We also find support for this view from Parmeshwari Devi Ruia Vs. Krishnakumar Nathmal Murarka. If the suit is by a person entitled to a part of the interest of a coheir in the estate as against certain other heirs for administration, Article 106 would not apply as the suit would be one between coheirs.[(Mohomedally Tyebally and Ors. Vs. Safiabai and Ors.]. 31. Even the Madras High Court in the case of T.A. Meenakshi Sundarammal and Anr. Vs. K. Subramania Ayyar and Ors., (1955) AIR Madras 369 has considered the judgments passed hitherto by the Privy Council and confirmed that a suit filed as against an executor or administrator for a share in the legacy, the relevant article would be Article 123 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (corresponds to Article 106 of the Limitation Act, 1963). This proposition is also confirmed by a judgment of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of Mohinder Lal and Others. v. Tule Ram and Others. In the said judgment, the Court has held that a suit claiming title to the property of a deceased person or a portion of such property on the strength of a Will is in the nature of a suit for a legacy as against the executor and the period of limitation is 12 years under Article 106 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In Tara Nath Chakraverty the Court further held that : "if there is a conflict between two periods of limitation, one of which, the longer, is applicable to all circumstances, and the other, the shorter, to special circumstances only, the longer term given by the statute to bring the suit ought to be applied, unless there is clear proof of the special circumstances which would make the shorter term applicable and it is upon the party claiming the benefit of a shorter period of limitation to establish that the case fell within the special rule limiting the period of a shorter time". 32. In the circumstances, there cannot be a straitjacket formula to determine the period of limitation for filing an administration suit. 32. In the circumstances, there cannot be a straitjacket formula to determine the period of limitation for filing an administration suit. The pleadings and the prayers of a suit for administration would have to be analysed and thereafter, the relevant Article is to be made applicable. The onus will be on the party claiming benefit of shorter period of limitation to establish that the case fell within the special rule limiting the period of a shorter time. If in a situation two articles of the law may be wide enough to cover a given right of suit and the Court is unable to come to a conclusion that one applies more specifically than the other, then it should lean in favour of the application which would keep the right of suit alive in preference to that which would destroy it." 45. The Trial Court recorded the following findings with regard to limitation. I may quote as under: "11.3. In order to prove that the plaintiffs have instituted the present suit within time limit, they have submitted that they filed the R.T.S. appeal No. 101/04 before the Deputy Collector, Choryasi Prant in the year 2004. Thus, as the plaintiffs have demanded their right in the land situated at the village Vesu, since 2004 and thereafter, the present suit is instituted in the year 2012 and as there is a limitation of 12 years from the year in which it was denied to institute the suit for apportionment and time limit of 12 years is not completed for the present suit, this Court believes that the plaintiff's suit is instituted within time limit. Here, it is worthy to be noted that the defendants have got their names posted illegally in revenue record of the village Vesu vide entry No. 1262 and 1286 by keeping the plaintiffs in dark. Considering the same, the time limit for plaintiff's suit remains in force till the said entry doesn't get rejected by the competent Court. Hence, my reply to the Issue No. 13 is in negative." 46. At this stage, I must quote para 9 of the judgment of the lower Appellate Court wherein the lower Appellate Court has taken note of few factual aspects not in dispute. Hence, my reply to the Issue No. 13 is in negative." 46. At this stage, I must quote para 9 of the judgment of the lower Appellate Court wherein the lower Appellate Court has taken note of few factual aspects not in dispute. Para 9 reads as under: "(9) Considering the written submissions of the original respondent and the original plaintiffs vide Exhibits 43 and 44 respectively, the principles established in the judgment in support of their order were read and considering the order passed by the trial court and its findings, following facts on the records are undisputed. (1) The property mentioned in para - 3 of the suit was the land under the occupancy of Balubhai Bhanabhai as an independent owner. (2) Balubhai Bhanabhai died on 23/01/1985. (3) Balubhai Bhanabhai has died intestate. (4) Balubhai's wife Paniben has died intestate on 25/11/1985. Her name has been posted again in the revenue records on 01/05/1986. (5) The plaintiffs and the respondents are the successors of Balubhai Bhanabhai. (6) The names of the plaintiffs and the respondents have been posted in the revenue records of the property at moje Gaviyar. (7) RTS Appeal No-2004 had been instituted before the Dy. Collector, Choryashi Prant by the plaintiffs to post their names in the revenue records of the said property. As it was filed after the limitation period, it was rejected. The plaintiffs filed an appeal vide Revision No61/2008 before the Collector, Surat against the order of the RTS appeal. It was prayed to decide afresh. (8) For partially granted rightful share in RTS Remand Case No-151/2009 a relief is to be sought from the Civil Court. (9) The suit has been filed before the Civil Court on 27/01/2012. (10) There is no evidence showing that the plaintiffs have waived off their rightful share in the land in dispute. (11) Plaintiffs have demanded 1/8th share. (12) The plaintiffs and the respondents are Hindus. (13) An entry has been made in R. Survey No-428, New Survey No-1262 moje Vesu, Taluka-Surat on the basis of the statements of the parties. On this basis the names of (1) Paniben who is the widow of Balubhai Bhanabhai (2) Maganbhai Balubhai (3) Ramanbhai Balubhai (4) Dahyabhai Balubhai (5) Ratilal Balubhai are in record. (14) Name of Paniben has been recorded vide entry no-1286. On this basis the names of (1) Paniben who is the widow of Balubhai Bhanabhai (2) Maganbhai Balubhai (3) Ramanbhai Balubhai (4) Dahyabhai Balubhai (5) Ratilal Balubhai are in record. (14) Name of Paniben has been recorded vide entry no-1286. (15) As the original papers regarding the entry no-1262 were not available at village record, they have not been produced. (16) The evidence regarding voluntarily waiving off the share in the land at Vesu by the plaintiffs (sisters) is not produced." 47. Thereafter, the lower Appellate Court dealt with the issue of limitation as under: "(10) In connection with the dispute between the parties, first if we consider as to whether Plaintiff has filed the suit within Limitation period, Plaintiff has filed Special Civil Suit No. 62/2012 on 27-01-2012. Cause of action arose when order was passed in RTS Remand Case No. 151/2009 on 25-11-2011 and thereafter, the suit has been filed. As per the Article 110 of the Limitation Act, suit of partition should be filed within 12 years of such partition. Taking into consideration evidence produced before the Trial Court and facts of the case, as per Revenue Record No.1262 and 1286 and evidence produced by Plaintiff, defendants registered the disputed agricultural land property in their names without his knowledge and consent and the defendants partitioned the land without his knowledge. Plaintiff came to know about the partition of the land and published a public notice cautioning against entering into any transaction and plaintiffs filed RTS No. 101/2004 before Deputy Collector. Wherein defendants submitted objections falsely that they were not liable to get their entitled share. Thus, they were denied their share and present suit came to be filed in the Civil Court. As per the facts of Plaintiffs, they have relied upon documentary evidence produced in RTS No. 101/2004 and it appears from evidence of Plaintiffs that share of defendant has been d enied since then. Thus, considering the year from 2003 or 2004, Plaintiff should have filed the suit to obtain his share within 12 years since then as per the Limitation Act. He has filed the suit on 27-02-2012. Thus, it can be said to be within 12 years." 48. Thus, considering the year from 2003 or 2004, Plaintiff should have filed the suit to obtain his share within 12 years since then as per the Limitation Act. He has filed the suit on 27-02-2012. Thus, it can be said to be within 12 years." 48. In the overall view of the matter, I have reached to the conclusion that no error, not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the two Courts below in holding that the plaintiffs have a share in the suit property being the ancestral properties of their late father Balubhai. I see no good reason to disturb the concurrent findings recorded by the two Courts below in favour of the plaintiffs. 49. In the result, this Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. The relief granted on the civil application stands vacated forthwith.