JUDGMENT : Hon'ble Harsh Kumar, J. The above two applications under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. seeking leave to file appeal have been moved by same applicant-appellant against same opposite party no.2 Shiv Kumar Sharma against the consolidated judgment and order dated 1.2.2018 passed by Presiding Officer of Additional Court, Court No.39, Civil Courts, Kanpur Nagar in two Complaint Cases No.14059 of 2006 & 14344 of 2006, acquitting the opposite party no.2 from the charges of offence under Section 138 N.I. Act. Since two complaints were filed by one and the same company "India Infoline Commodities Private Ltd." against same accused Shiv Kumar Sharma under Section 138 N.I. Act regarding the incident of dishonour of two cheques within 12 months, both the complaint cases were tried and heard together and were also disposed of by impugned consolidated judgment and order of acquittal. Feeling aggrieved by above consolidated judgment and order of acquittal in two complaint cases, two separate appeals have been filed by complainant with application for leave to file appeal and learned counsel for the applicant-appellant submitted that both appeals be connected and the application for leave to file appeal in both the cases may be heard and decided together by one and the same order. Heard Sri Piyush Tripathi and Satyendra Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the applicant-appellant, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record. Learned counsel for the applicant-appellant contends that learned Magistrate has acted wrongly and illegally in disbelieving the case of complainant and holding that the complainant failed to prove that the cheque in question was issued for discharge of any debt or other liability; that trial court has acted wrongly in holding that the complainant failed to prove the service of legal notice on the accused-respondent in absence of postal receipt regarding remittance of notice; that it was proved from the evidence on record that the notice was sent to accused from Head Office, Mumbai and so the postal receipt could not be filed; that learned trial court has acted wrongly in holding that R. Mohan was not duly authorized to serve notice and Dileep Bharati was not duly authorized to file complaint; that complaint cases are not required to be conducted by one and the same person, from beginning till end. The learned counsel for the applicant-appellant has also raised a totally new argument in appeal that since the head office of the complainant company, which carries the business of share trading, is at Mumbai so the complaint ought to have been transferred to Mumbai in view of the amended provisions of Section 142A of N.I. Act and the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the case. Learned A.G.A. supported the impugned order and contended that learned trial court has discussed and analyzed the evidence in detail and has found that the complainant has failed to prove its case. The perusal of record shows that notices under Section 138 N.I. Act Exhibits A-4 & A-5 are alleged to have been sent to accused-respondents through Sri R. Mohan on 5.10.2006 and 12.10.2006 while the authority letter authorizing him is alleged to have been issued subsequently in the meeting of Board of Directors dated 17.10.2006 which clearly shows that on the date of remittance of notices Sri R. Mohan was not duly authorized by the company to serve notices on accused-respondents. I do not find any illegality in the findings of trial court holding that legal notice has been sent by a person who was not duly authorized to send the notices under the provisions of Section 291 of Companies Act. The certified copies of Complaint Nos.14059 of 2006 and 14344 of 2006 at Annexure-1 on record of two appeals show that they were filed by the company through its authorized representative Sri Dileep Bharati on 23.11.2006 and 28.11.2006 respectively. However contrary to it, the evidence on record shows that vide authority letter dated 15.10.2007 issued in another meeting of Board of Directors of the company, Sri Mukesh Singh was authorized to give authority to prosecute to Sri Dileep Bharati but the above authority letter was not produced rather another authority letter dated 17.10.2007 was produced which shows that Sri Dileep Bharati was not duly authorized to file complaint. In any case above authority letter is alleged to have been issued subsequent to filing of complaints. Hence the learned trial court has rightly held that Sri Dileep Bharati was not duly authorized to file the two complaints. In any case above authority letter is alleged to have been issued subsequent to filing of complaints. Hence the learned trial court has rightly held that Sri Dileep Bharati was not duly authorized to file the two complaints. It is also pertinent to mention that the complainant-appellant deals in business as a share broker company and was maintaining a share trading commodity account of accused-respondent in its Kanpur Branch and according to the contract between the parties the accused-respondent had to deposit margin money in his account maintained by complainant-appellant. The appellant had to purchase commodities on the instructions of accused-respondent and make entry of profit or loss in his account upon sale of commodity on his instructions. It was also agreed between them that in case the amount deposited by accused-respondent falls short from margin money, his account will be seized and in case of profit, the complainant company will further purchase commodities as per instructions of the accused-respondent. The appellant has failed to assign any reason as to why the account of accused-respondent was not seized despite zero amount in his account and so also the learned trial court has disbelieved the complainant's case. Before dealing with the new point of argument raised in appeal it would be just and proper to reproduce the provisions of Sections 142 and 142A of N.I. Act as inserted and amended by Act 26 of 2015 w.e.f. 15.6.2015:- "[142. Cognizance of offences.-- [(1)] Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)-- (a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque; (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138: [Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period.] (c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under section 138.] [(2) The offence under section 138 shall be inquired into and tried only by a court within whose local jurisdiction,? (a) if the cheque is delivered for collection through an account, the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account, is situated; or (b) if the cheque is presented for payment by the payee or holder in due course, otherwise through an account, the branch of the drawee bank where the drawer maintains the account, is situated. [142A. Validation for transfer of pending cases.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any judgment, decree, order or direction of any court, all cases transferred to the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142, as amended by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (Ord. 6 of 2015), shall be deemed to have been transferred under this Act, as if that sub-section had been in force at all material times. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of section 142 or sub-section (1), where the payee or the holder in due course, as the case may be, has filed a complaint against the drawer of a cheque in the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142 or the case has been transferred to that court under sub-section (1) and such complaint is pending in that court, all subsequent complaints arising out of section 138 against the same drawer shall be filed before the same court irrespective of whether those cheques were delivered for collection or presented for payment within the territorial jurisdiction of that court. (3) If, on the date of the commencement of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015, more than one prosecution filed by the same payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, against the same drawer of cheques is pending before different courts, upon the said fact having been brought to the notice of the court, such court shall transfer the case to the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142, as amended by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (Ord. 6 of 2015), before which the first case was filed and is pending, as if that sub-section had been in force at all material times.]" Upon hearing learned counsel for the applicant-appellant and perusal of record, considering the new argument regarding transfer of case, I find that according to the allegations made in the complaint itself at Annexure-1, the complainant/applicant-appellant is a registered company having its branch at Kanpur and the share trading commodity account of accused-respondent was in Kanpur Branch of applicant company. There is no whisper in the entire complaint that the company has its head office at Mumbai. It is the specific case of complainant-appellant that a huge amount was due on the accused-respondent, in part payment of which he issued Cheque No.233799 on 13.9.2006 for Rs.20,000/- in Complaint Case No.14059 of 2006 and Cheque No.233800 dated 28.9.2006 for Rs.50,000/- in Complaint Case No.14344 of 2006 on Bhartiya State Bank, Industrial Estate, Kanpur which were tendered by the complainant to his banker H.D.F.C. in Naveen Market, Kanpur and since the two cheques were dishonoured vide bank memo dated 14.9.2006 in Complaint Case No.14059 of 2006 and dated 3.10.2006 in Complaint Case No.14344 of 2006, legal notices were sent to accused on 14.9.2006 & 12.10.2006 respectively and since the accused did not make payment, so the Complaint Case No.14059 of 2006 & 14344 of 2006 were filed on 23.11.2006 & 28.11.2006 respectively. No argument with regard to jurisdiction of court was ever advanced before trial court and no application for transfer of complaint cases from Kanpur to Mumbai is alleged to have been moved at any point of time during pendency of complaints. It is pertinent to mention that even in memo of appeal no such ground has been taken and ground no.5 of memo of appeal reads as under:- "Because the Court below had no jurisdiction to try the aforesaid case as amendment has been done under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which says that the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act shall be enquired into and tried only by Court within whose local jurisdiction, the branch of bank where the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account, is situated. Admittedly (i) the complainant-appellant company has a branch at Kanpur, (ii) cheques in question were issued at Kanpur, (iii) tendered for payment at Kanpur Bank Branch, (iv) were dishonoured at Kanpur, (v) the complaints were also filed in Kanpur Courts, and not even an application was ever moved by complainant/appellant in any of the complaint cases for transfer of case to Mumbai, so the new argument made by the applicant-appellant for the first time in this appeal that complaint case ought to have been transferred to Mumbai, has no force. In view of the material on record, I am of the considered view that the trial court of Magistrate at Kanpur was a court of competent jurisdiction under provisions of Section 142 of Negotiable Instrument Act and the complaint case was not required to be transferred to courts of Mumbai Metropolitan Magistrate. It is settled principle of law as held by Hon'ble the Supreme court in the case of K. Prakashan Vs. P.K. Surenderan, (2008) 1 SCC 258 "When two views are possible, appellate Court should not reverse the Judgment of acquittal merely because the other view was possible. When Judgment of trial Court was neither perverse, nor suffered from any legal infirmity or non consideration/misappropriation of evidence on record, reversal thereof by High Court was not justified". In view of discussions made above, I have come to the conclusion that the learned counsel for the applicant-appellant has failed to show any legal infirmity, incorrectness or perversity in the findings given in the impugned order of acquittal and there is no sufficient ground for interfering with or setting it aside the acquittal order and substituting it with conviction order. The application for leave to file appeal has no force and is liable to be dismissed. The application for leave to file appeal is dismissed accordingly and the appeal also stands dismissed. Lower court record be sent back to court concerned along with a copy of this order.