JUDGMENT : P.S.Dinesh Kumar, J. - Insurer has presented this appeal challenging Order and Award dated 19.6.2012 passed by the Labour Officer and Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation(hereinafter referred to as 'W.C.Commissioner'), Davanagere District, Davanagere in Proceedings No.WC-DVGWCA 76/2010. 2. For the sake of convenience, parties shall be referred to as per their status before the W.C.Commissioner. 3. Heard Shri R.Rajagopalan, learned Advocate for Insurer and Shri A.Hanumanthappa, learned Advocate for the claimants. 4. Respondents No.1 and 2 filed an application under Section 22 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, contending inter alia that first respondent's deceased husband T.T.Mukunda was driving an autorickshaw bearing registration No.KA-17-A-6365 belonging to third respondent; and that Mukunda suffered an heart-attack on 7.4.2010 and died on 8.4.2010 whilst he was discharging his duty. 5. The owner of autorickshaw has remained ex-parte and insurer contested the claim. 6. Based on the pleadings, the W.C.Commissioner framed following four issues for his consideration: 7. On behalf of the claimants, second respondent, mother of deceased was examined as P.W.1 and 9 exhibits marked. On behalf of the respondents, the Administrative Officer of the Insurance Company was examined and insurance policy was marked. 8. The W.C.Commissioner has awarded a compensation of Rs.4,15,960/- by holding that the death has occurred due to the stress and strain suffered by the driver during the course of duty. Hence, this appeal by the insurer. 9. Shri Rajagopalan, learned advocate for the Insurer vehemently contended that, admittedly, the medical records disclose that the husband of first claimant died due to heart-attack. There is no material on record attributable to any nexus between the occupation of the deceased and his death. He further argued that death of Mukunda is surrounded by doubtful circumstances, because, as per the post mortem report, the cause of death could not be ascertained as body was in advanced decomposed stage. 10. Shri Rajagopal, in support of his contentions, placed reliance on Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti Vs. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali and Another reported in, (2007) ACJ 1967 = (2007)11 SCC 668 . 11. Learned Advocate for the claimants argued in support of the award passed by the W.C.Commissioner. 12. I have carefully considered submissions of learned advocates for the parties and perused the records. 13. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali and Another reported in, (2007) ACJ 1967 = (2007)11 SCC 668 . 11. Learned Advocate for the claimants argued in support of the award passed by the W.C.Commissioner. 12. I have carefully considered submissions of learned advocates for the parties and perused the records. 13. In the conspectus of above facts, the following substantial question of law arises for consideration: Whether in the absence of clear and demonstrable evidence, the W.C.Commissioner committed a jurisdictional error in coming to the conclusion that the cause of death was attributable to the occupation of the deceased workman and awarding compensation? 14. The principal contention urged on behalf of the insurer in this appeal is that, death of autorickshaw driver has no nexus with his occupation. 15. Second claimant in her deposition has stated that while discharging his duty, her son developed chest pain at about 7.30 P.M. on 07.04.2010 due to stress and fell unconscious. He was taken to hospital for treatment and he died at about 2.50 A.M. on 08.04.2010. Mukunda was aged about 30 years and he was earning Rs.4,000/- per month and in addition, getting an allowance of Rs.50/- per day. 16. Exhibit A1 is the FIR, exhibits A2 and A3 are the panchanamas, exhibit A4 is statement of first claimant, exhibit A5 is post mortem report, exhibit A6 is Voter's I.D. Card of deceased, exhibit A7 is Voter's I.D. card of second claimant, exhibit A8 is the charge sheet and exhibit A9 is the FSL report. 17. The W.C.Commissioner has recorded that the documentary evidence corroborates claimants' plea that driver died due to driving stress while he was on duty. 18. On behalf of the claimants, second claimant has been examined. She has deposed in her examination in chief that some 'passers by' had called for an ambulance in which her son was taken to the hospital. In the cross-examination she has admitted that she learnt about the incident only after death of her son. Thus the evidence in totality, it leads to an inference that she was not present when her son allegedly suffered heart-attack. It is recorded in the post mortem report by the senior surgeon of the District Hospital, Davanagere, that the cause of death could not be opined as the body was in the process of decomposition. 19. Thus the evidence in totality, it leads to an inference that she was not present when her son allegedly suffered heart-attack. It is recorded in the post mortem report by the senior surgeon of the District Hospital, Davanagere, that the cause of death could not be opined as the body was in the process of decomposition. 19. A combined reading of both oral and documentary evidence on record, does not conclusively establish that the driver of the autorickshaw suffered a heart-attack and the same is attributable to his occupation. 20. In Shakunthala supra, the deceased therein was working as a cleaner in the vehicle. The W.C.Commissioner awarded compensation. On appeal, High Court opined that the findings of W.C.Commissioner were inconsistent with the material on record. Claimant challenged the judgment of the High Court before the Supreme Court of India, wherein it is held as follows: "38. Unless evidence is brought on record to elaborate that the death by way of cardiac arrest has occurred because of stress or strain, the Commissioner would not have jurisdiction to grant damages. In other words, the claimant was bound to prove jurisdictional fact before the Commissioner. Unless such jurisdictional facts are found, the Commissioner will have no jurisdiction to pass an order. It is now well settled that for arriving at a finding of a jurisdictional fact, reference to any precedent would not be helpful as a little deviation from the facts of a decided case or an additional fact may make a lot of difference by arriving at a correct conclusion. For the said purpose, the statutory authority is required to pose unto himself the right question. 39. Section 30 of the said Act postulates an appeal directly to the High Court if a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. 40. A jurisdictional question will involve a substantial question of law. A finding of fact arrived at without there being any evidence would also give rise to a substantial question of law. From the order passed by the Commissioner, it appears, he has not arrived at a finding that the job involved any stress or strain. It was merely stated that he was working as a khalasi in a truck which was going to Tavarewadi Village from Kolhapur to get the milk. The autopsy was conducted at Chandgad District Hospital. The driver Parasharam Chandrakant Shreshti admittedly brought him to hospital. It was merely stated that he was working as a khalasi in a truck which was going to Tavarewadi Village from Kolhapur to get the milk. The autopsy was conducted at Chandgad District Hospital. The driver Parasharam Chandrakant Shreshti admittedly brought him to hospital. He was his brother. The post-mortem examination commenced from 6.30 a.m. on 28-9-2002 and ended at 7.30 a.m. on the same day. From the postmortem report, it appears that in the accompanying report, it is stated that the death was due to sudden heart attack. When exactly the death took place is not known. It will bear repetition to state that under what circumstances the death took place is also not known. There was also no pleading in this behalf. The Commissioner came to the conclusion that the death took place during the course of the employment but then no evidence has been brought on record to show that it had a causal connection between accident and serious injury so as to fulfil the requirements of the terms "out of employment". Indisputably, there has to be a proximate nexus between cause of death and employment. A stray statement made by the appellant that the deceased had died while working in the vehicle and stress or strain of the work did not appear to have any foundation. Admittedly, she was not present at the spot. She had also no personal knowledge. All these facts she had admitted in the cross-examination. 41. This vital aspect of the matter was required to be considered by the High Court so as to arrive at a finding as to how the said accident has arise or not. 42. A question of law would arise when the same is not dependent upon examination of evidence, which may not require any fresh investigation of fact. A question of law would, however, arise when the finding is perverse in the sense that no legal evidence was brought on record or jurisdictional facts were not brought on record." 21. As noticed hereinabove, there is no oral evidence with regard to admission of the workman into the hospital. Further, the cause of death is not forthcoming in the records. As noticed hereinabove, there is no oral evidence with regard to admission of the workman into the hospital. Further, the cause of death is not forthcoming in the records. Therefore, in my considered view, the conclusion arrived at by the W.C.Commissioner that there exists a nexus between the cause of death and the occupation of workman is not supported by any evidence and therefore, the W.C. Commissioner does not get jurisdiction to award compensation. 22. Resultantly, this appeal merits consideration and accordingly; i) the appeal is allowed; ii) the order and award dated 19.6.2012 passed by the Labour Officer and Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Davanagere District, Davanagere in Proceedings No.WC-DVGWCA 76/2010 is set aside; iii) Claim petition filed by the claimantsrespondents No.1 and 2 is dismissed. iv) The compensation amount deposited before this Court or the W.C.Commissioner shall be refunded to the Insurer. No costs.