JUDGMENT : SREENIVAS HARISH KUMAR, J. 1. The Principal Sessions Judge, Chikmagalur, by his judgment dated 16.8.2013 in S.C. 137/2010 convicted the appellant for the offences punishable under sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs. 50,000/- and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for two years in relation to offence under section 376 IPC and also sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and pay fine of Rs. 10,000/- with a default clause of simple imprisonment for six months in relation to offence under Section 506 IPC. The Sessions Court also ordered for payment of Rs. 50,000/- as compensation to the victim girl from out of the fine amount by exercising its power under section 357 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short Cr.P.C.). Aggrieved by this judgment, the accused has preferred this appeal. 2. The prosecution case is as follows:- On 29.7.2010 the victim girl made a report to the police stating that on 25.7.2010 at about 9.00 pm she went to a bakery situated near Syndicate Bank on IG road, Chikmagalur, for buying some eatables. When she was returning to her house, at about 9.15 pm, the accused forcibly took her to a nearby dilapidated house and tried to outrage her modesty. As she screamed, he left that place by putting a threat to her that if she would disclose that incident to anybody, he would kill her. She returned to the house but did not disclose the same to anybody in her house. On 29.7.2010 at 5.00 pm she disclosed about the incident dated 25.7.2010 to her father. Thereafter, the father brought her to the police station where she gave a report to the police which came to be registered in Cr. No. 160/2010 for the offences punishable under sections 354 and 506 IPC. 3. On 30.7.2010 the victim girl was taken to hospital by a women constable for medical examination. The doctor who conducted medical examination gave a report that he noticed the evidence of recent sexual intercourse. Therefore, the charge sheet was filed for the offences under Section 376 and Section 506 IPC. 4. After charging the accused, the Sessions Court conducted trial. The prosecution examined 12 witnesses - PWs. 1 to 12 and got marked 10 documents as per Exs.P1 to P10. Therefore, the charge sheet was filed for the offences under Section 376 and Section 506 IPC. 4. After charging the accused, the Sessions Court conducted trial. The prosecution examined 12 witnesses - PWs. 1 to 12 and got marked 10 documents as per Exs.P1 to P10. The appellant was examined under section 313 Cr.P.C. After appreciating the evidence, the trial court came to conclusion that the prosecution was able to prove its case and therefore convicted and sentenced the accused as aforesaid. The trial court has given the following findings to hold the accused guilty of the offence:- 4.1. The evidence given by PW-1 the victim girl is believable. There is nothing on record showing that PW-1 is an unworthy witness. The evidence of PWs. 3 and 4 further testifies the evidence given by PW-1. These two witnesses have not been discredited in the cross-examination. It is for the accused to have explained as to what made him to be present along with PW-1. The entire testimony of PW-1 stands corroborated by the medical evidence given by PW-9. 4.2. With regard to delay, the trial court has held that whenever an incident of this nature takes place, it is usual that the victim does not reveal the incident immediately. Therefore, delay does not come in the way of believing the case of the prosecution. 5. Impugning the findings of the Sessions Court, the counsel for the appellant firstly argues that the charge framed against the accused is defective. In the charge it is stated that the age of the girl was 15 years on the date of the incident. But, Ex.P3, the document produced by the prosecution to prove the age of the girl shows her date of birth as 16.1.1994. Therefore, her age on the date of alleged incident was 16 years 6 months. If the correct age had been mentioned in the charge, it would have given the accused an opportunity to take a line of defence that it was not an incident of rape, rather a consensual intercourse. Since the charge is defective, the accused was denied of taking defence in this manner and therefore his interest is prejudiced. For this reason, the case requires to be remanded to the trial court for correcting the charge and holding denovo trial: 5.1. Secondly, he argues that in Ex.P1-the first information, the offences mentioned are 354 and 506 IPC. Since the charge is defective, the accused was denied of taking defence in this manner and therefore his interest is prejudiced. For this reason, the case requires to be remanded to the trial court for correcting the charge and holding denovo trial: 5.1. Secondly, he argues that in Ex.P1-the first information, the offences mentioned are 354 and 506 IPC. Even if Ex.P7 is read, it only gives an impression that some attempt might have been made to outrage the modesty of the girl. The victim girl was studying in I year PUC. If really an incident of rape had taken place, she could have revealed the same in Ex.P1. It is in her handwriting. He further refers to Ex.P8-the medical certificate and argues that the doctor noticed only two external injuries, namely, an abrasion over the right knee and an abrasion over the left thigh. These injuries show that the girl was not subjected to rape. Indirectly, the medical certificate supports the defence version that there was consent on the part of the girl. If it was a case of rape, the doctor would have noticed some other injuries near the genital organ of the girl or some other resistance marks. If Ex.P8 does not disclose injuries of this nature, the inference that can be drawn is that it was a case of consent only. In this regard he further argues that the alleged date of incident is 25.7.2010, i.e. before amendment was brought to section 375 of IPC in the year 2013. Before amendment, a consensual act of intercourse with a female up to the age of 16 years was not an offence and for this reason the entire case of the prosecution could be brought within the purview of sixthly of section 375. He garnered support for his argument from Ex.P3 in which the date of birth of the girl is shown as 16.1.1994. His another point of argument is that nothing prevented the victim’s father examined as PW-2 from disclosing the incident before the police to see that a complaint under section 376 was registered. Therefore, PW-2 also becomes untrusty witness. He argues that PWs. 3 and 4 are the chance witnesses. Even if the evidence of these two witnesses is believable, it is possible to say that their evidence also shows consent on the part of the girl. Therefore, PW-2 also becomes untrusty witness. He argues that PWs. 3 and 4 are the chance witnesses. Even if the evidence of these two witnesses is believable, it is possible to say that their evidence also shows consent on the part of the girl. Therefore, it is his argument that if all these aspects are taken into consideration, though a specific defence of consent was not introduced during cross-examination, it is possible to draw inferences in this manner. The trial court has failed to appreciate the evidence in proper perspective and thus the judgment of the trial court is erroneous. 6. Countering the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, Sri Vijayakumar Majage, Additional SPP argues that any defect in charge is not a matter to be considered seriously unless the accused is able to demonstrate as to how his interest is prejudiced. Moreover there is evidence of doctor PW-8 that the age of the girl was 13 to 14 years. The theory of consent is not available as PW-1 was not cross-examined in that angle. The cross-examination of PW-1 shows that she has not been discredited. The evidence of the doctor PW-9 who examined the girl has not been discredited. In fact, two external injuries noticed by the doctor shows that the girl was forcibly dragged to a dilapidated house where the offence was committed. There are no infirmities in the findings given by the trial court and therefore the judgment of the trial court should not be interfered with. 7. We have considered the points of arguments and perused the evidence, both oral and documentary. It is true that when the first information was given to the police as per Ex.P1 on 29.7.2010, the victim girl just stated that she was sought to be outraged by a boy who met her while she was returning from a bakery at about 9.15 pm. The actual incident as disclosed in Ex.P1 is said to have taken place on 25.7.2010. There is a delay of 4 days in reporting to the police. In regard to delay, we too are of the opinion that no girl dares to reveal the incident soon after the incident and therefore delay cannot be seriously considered. 8. The actual incident as disclosed in Ex.P1 is said to have taken place on 25.7.2010. There is a delay of 4 days in reporting to the police. In regard to delay, we too are of the opinion that no girl dares to reveal the incident soon after the incident and therefore delay cannot be seriously considered. 8. With regard to one line of argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant regarding defect in charge, we have to state that though the age is mentioned as 15 years in the charge, Ex.P3, the age proof produced by the prosecution shows that date of birth of the girl is 16.1.1994. The prosecution cannot go back upon this document. Therefore, on the date of the alleged incident, the age of the girl appears to be 16 years 6 months. But, the argument of the learned counsel that on account of defect in charge, he was deprived of the defence cannot be accepted. Defect in charge is not a matter that can be taken note of unless that defect seriously prejudices the interest of the accused. Having noticed the correct date of birth, nothing prevented the accused from making an application before the trial court to correctly mention the age of the girl in the charge or taking up a defence with regard to consent while cross-examining the material witnesses. Neither the victim girl nor the investigation officer has been questioned. Therefore, this argument is not acceptable. However, on perusing the evidence of the other material witnesses-PWs. 1 and 2 and also the doctor-PW-9, we have to arrive at a conclusion different from the findings given by the trial court for the following reasons:- 8.1. PW-1, the prosecutrix, has stated that on 25.7.2010 at about 9.00 pm she went to a bakery. While she was returning to her house, the accused closed her mouth and forcibly took her to a dilapidated house near Seethamma Mysore Krishnappa Municipal Hospital and there he removed her clothes and he also removed his clothes. She has clearly stated that he spread her veil on the ground and thereafter sexually assaulted on her forcibly without her consent. She screamed at that time. She has stated that he put a threat to her that he would kill her in case she would disclose this incident to anybody. According to her, when she was wearing the clothes, PWs. She screamed at that time. She has stated that he put a threat to her that he would kill her in case she would disclose this incident to anybody. According to her, when she was wearing the clothes, PWs. 3, 4 and CW6 came to that place as they heard a screaming voice. She narrated the entire incident to them. The accused ran away seeing these three people coming there. All the three escorted her till her house. After returning to the house she did not disclose the same to her father and other members of the family. She took bath and washed her clothes. She has stated that she did not inform about the incident to anybody fearing injury to her reputation. In the cross-examination she has been questioned as to why she did not disclose to her parents at least. She has answered that she could not disclose the same as it was not a matter to be disclosed. She has denied the suggestion that at the time of incident her age was more than 18 years. The other portion of the cross-examination need not be mentioned here as nothing worth is elicited from her. 8.2. PW-2 is the father of the victim girl. He has only spoken that on 29.7.2010 at about 5.30 pm his daughter told him that while she was returning from bakery, the accused closed her mouth, took her to a dilapidated house and thereafter committed rape on her and also put life threat to her if she disclosed the incident to anybody. Except giving suggestions to this witness, nothing worth has been elicited from him in the cross-examination. 8.3. PWs. 3 and 4 have given evidence that on 25.7.2010 at about 9.20 pm when they were going near Srinagar Circle near Seethamma Krishnappa Mysuru Hospital, they heard a screaming voice. Immediately, they went to that place and saw PW-1 and the accused. They have stated that the accused ran away from that place seeing them. When they asked PW-1 as to what happened, she told that the accused closed her mouth and brought to that place, removed the clothes and raped her. Their evidence in examination-in-chief shows that she told them that the accused spread her veil on the ground before having intercourse with her. They have denied the suggestions given to them in the cross-examination. 8.4. Their evidence in examination-in-chief shows that she told them that the accused spread her veil on the ground before having intercourse with her. They have denied the suggestions given to them in the cross-examination. 8.4. PW-5 is the Principal of the college where PW-1 was studying. She speaks about Ex.P3, a certificate, stating that the date of birth of PW-1 was 16.1.1994. Very strangely a suggestion is given to PW-5 that the date of birth 16.1.1994 was not the correct date of birth. She has denied that suggestion. 8.5. The other two important witnesses whose evidence needs consideration are PWs. 8 and 9. PW-8 has given evidence that on 30.7.2010 he examined PW-1 and then sent her to a dentist. As per the certificate given by the dentist, he mentioned the age of PW-1 as 13 to 14 years. Ex.P6 is the said certificate. PW-9 is the doctor who examined the victim girl. He found her hymen ruptured. There was no be bleeding, but there was tenderness. From the clinical examination he arrived at a conclusion that there were signs of recent intercourse and he issued the certificate as per Ex.P8. 8.6. PW-10 is the investigation officer, he has given an account of investigation conducted by him. 9. On re-appreciation of evidence of these witnesses, it is possible to say that the age of the girl on the date of incident was not 15 years. Though a suggestion has been given to PW-5 that the date mentioned in Ex.P3 is not correct, it cannot be given much importance because it is just a suggestion. The prosecution cannot make use of this suggestion to hold that the age of the girl on the date of incident was 15 years. Ex.P3 is produced by the prosecution and it binds the prosecution. Therefore, the age of the girl on the date of incident was not 15 years, her correct age was 16 years 6 months. What we need to examine here is whether consent on the part of the girl can be inferred although such a defence has not been put forward in the cross-examination? In our opinion such inferences can certainly be drawn from the evidence in examination-in-chief itself if inklings to that effect are available, though sometimes specific defence is not introduced in cross- examination or defence evidence not lead. In our opinion such inferences can certainly be drawn from the evidence in examination-in-chief itself if inklings to that effect are available, though sometimes specific defence is not introduced in cross- examination or defence evidence not lead. If this benefit is available to the accused, that has to be given notwithstanding such a defence being not taken. As has been referred to above, PW-1 has clearly stated the way in which she was taken to a dilapidated place and subjected to intercourse. The same thing is revealed by her before PWs. 3 and 4 also. If evidence of PWs. 1, 3 and 4 is scrutinized, it can be very much said that she knew the accused even before the incident took place as he happened to be her neighbour. In addition to evidence of PW-1 about removal of clothes and spreading a piece of cloth on the floor, what can be made out from medical certificate Ex.P8 is also important. Only two injuries were noticed by the doctor. He has mentioned the same in Ex.P8. They are abrasions on the right knee and left thigh. The State Public Prosecutor has argued that these injuries in fact show that she was forcibly taken to a dilapidated house or otherwise such injuries would not have occurred. Of course this argument is plausible. It is also true that the evidence of PW-9 shows that he noticed signs of recent intercourse when he examined the girl. But these injuries and evidence of PW-9 by themselves will not lead to conclusion being drawn about rape. There are other circumstances also. In an incident relating to rape, the evidence of prosecutrix must be trustworthy, only then her sole testimony can be relied upon. The medical evidence is only corroborative, nothing more. 10. There remains the evidence of PW-3 and PW-4 who have stated they heard the scream of PW-1 and went to the place of incident. But their evidence is difficult to be believed. If they accompanied PW-1 till her house, they did not inform the father of PW-2 about what they came to know from PW-1. If PW-2 was present in the house when PW-3 or PW-4 brought her, the former should have spoken in examination in chief that PW-3 or PW-4 brought his daughter to house on that night. If they accompanied PW-1 till her house, they did not inform the father of PW-2 about what they came to know from PW-1. If PW-2 was present in the house when PW-3 or PW-4 brought her, the former should have spoken in examination in chief that PW-3 or PW-4 brought his daughter to house on that night. Even if he was not present, he should have deposed so, because such a testimony of PW-2 would have corroborated the testimonies of PW-3 and PW-4. This is an important circumstance, which, if established, makes the testimony of PW-1 believable. The answer given by PW-4 in the cross-examination clearly shows that he and PW-3 met PW-2 on the date of incident, but they did not tell him anything. Added to this PW-4 has also stated that PW-3, CW4 and he had gone to that place and did not see accused running away from that place. This being the evidence of PW-4, it is not safe to place reliance on evidence of PW-3 and PW-4. The evidence of PW-2 is also difficult to be relied upon, for, he being the father of PW-1, could have, at the time of lodging FIR by PW-1, brought to the notice of police about actual incident of rape. 11. The age of the girl as per Ex.P3 appears to be 16 years 6 months. Evidence in examination-in-chief shows semblance of consent and her evidence lacks credit worthiness. Therefore we arrive at a conclusion that the reasons ascribed by the learned Sessions Judge for holding that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt cannot be accepted. The doubts that arise from the scrutiny of the evidence of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3 or PW-4 have remained answered. The findings given by the trial court cannot be accepted. Hence, we proceed to pass the following order:- (a) Appeal is allowed. (b) The judgment dated 16.8.2013 in S.C. No. 137/2010 passed by the Principal Sessions Judge, Chikmagalur, is set aside. (c) The accused is acquitted of the offence. He shall be let free from custody forthwith if his presence is not required in any other case. 12. Hence, we proceed to pass the following order:- (a) Appeal is allowed. (b) The judgment dated 16.8.2013 in S.C. No. 137/2010 passed by the Principal Sessions Judge, Chikmagalur, is set aside. (c) The accused is acquitted of the offence. He shall be let free from custody forthwith if his presence is not required in any other case. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant has filed application I.A. No. 1/2018 under section 8 read with section 12 (1)(G) of the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 seeking a direction to the State Legal Services Authority and High Court Legal Services Committee to ensure time bound compliance of directions given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Cri) No. 6740/2018 in the case of Imtiyaz Ramzan Khan vs. State of Maharashtra. The learned counsel submits that in cases where legal aid is given to accused, it is difficult for the advocates rendering legal aid to contact the accused who are languishing in jail and take suitable instructions. He also submits that the accused should also be aware that their case are posted before the court and they should be in a position to contact their lawyers. Therefore, suitable directions may be issued in accordance with the Supreme Court judgment. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant has produced a letter communicated to him by the High Court Legal Services Committee to the effect that there is already a video conferencing facility to enable the advocates to contact the accused undergoing sentence in the jail. If any counsel wants to obtain instructions from the accused who are in custody, they should approach the Committee for providing video conferencing facility. 14. From this letter it is clear that the Legal Services Authority has already taken steps to facilitate video conference to enable the advocates to contact the accused who are in custody. But, at the same time we have to state that the accused should also be aware about their cases being posted before the court. We do not find such a facility is made available to the accused in the jail. Therefore, Karnataka State Legal Services Authority and the High Court Legal Services Committee are hereby directed to instruct the Jail Superintendents that necessary arrangements be made to enable the accused to contact the advocates who have been engaged by Legal Aid Committee for rendering assistance to them. Therefore, Karnataka State Legal Services Authority and the High Court Legal Services Committee are hereby directed to instruct the Jail Superintendents that necessary arrangements be made to enable the accused to contact the advocates who have been engaged by Legal Aid Committee for rendering assistance to them. The Jail Superintendents should also bring to the notice of the accused that their cases are posted before the Court so that the accused can give suitable instructions to their advocates through video conference before their cases are argued. The Registry may take suitable steps for notifying the Jail Superintendents about listing of cases in which legal aid is given, for final hearing. With these observations, I.A. No. 1/2018 is disposed of.