JUDGMENT : Ujjal Bhuyan, J. 1. Heard Mr. OP Bhati, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S Saikia, learned Standing Counsel, Assam State Agriculture Marketing Board (Marketing Board). By filing this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner seeks a direction to the respondents not to levy cess on mustard oil imported from outside the State of Assam and further seeks a direction to the respondents for refund of an amount of Rs. 4,22,022.00 charged and collected by the respondents as cess on mustard oil on the petitioner for the period from 04.07.2014 to 10.03.2015. 2. Case of the petitioner is that it is a private limited company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, having registered office at Fancy Bazar, Guwahati. It is engaged in the business of dealing in general merchants and commission agent. 3. In the course of its business, petitioner imports various commodities from outside the State of Assam, including mustard oil for sale within the State of Assam as well as outside the State of Assam. Since inception, respondents have been levying cess on the imported mustard oil under the Assam Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1972 (Act). Petitioner's objection that mustard oil is not an agricultural produce as specified in the Schedule appended to the Act was not considered and instead, cess was levied on the imported mustard oil while entering into the designated market under the Act. According to the petitioner, such levy of cess on mustard oil is illegal as mustard oil is not an agricultural produce as per Clause-IV of the Schedule to the Act. Notwithstanding the same, cess was levied on the mustard oil imported by the petitioner from outside the State which has been assessed at Rs. 4,22,022.00 for the period from 04.07.2014 to 10.03.2015. 4. It is in the above backdrop that the present writ petition has been filed. 5. This Court by order dated 02.12.2015 had issued notice and passed an interim order to the effect that the cess collected from the petitioner on account of mustard oil should be carefully accounted for by the Marketing Board and in the event the verdict of the Court goes in favour of the petitioner, the Marketing Board should be in a position to refund the collected cess to the petitioner. 6. 6. Marketing Board i.e., respondent No. 2 has filed an affidavit-in-opposition through Sri Pronab Baruah, Chief Executive Officer of the Marketing Board. Stand taken in the affidavit is that mustard oil which is dealt with by the petitioner is the processed form of mustard seeds and, therefore, would be leviable to cess under Section 21 of the Act read with Clause-IV to the Schedule. It is contended that going by the definition of specified agricultural produce and processing under the Act, mustard oil is a processed form of mustard seeds. Thus, mustard oil is specified agricultural produce which is a processed form of mustard seeds. It is, therefore, contended that levy of cess on imported mustard oil is justified. Reference has been made to a decision of this Court dated 12.09.2008, passed in 2008(4) GLT 366: WP(C) No. 5491/2001 (Assam Roller Flour Mills Association v. State of Assam) and the related contempt case; as per which the Marketing Board was restrained from levying cess. However, it is stated that in the Special Leave Petition filed by the Marketing Board before the Supreme Court, permission has been granted to the Marketing Board by the Supreme Court to levy and collect cess. Therefore, levy of cess on mustard oil imported by the petitioner has been justified. 7. Detailed submissions have been made by learned counsel for the parties, which have been considered. Also perused the materials on record. A number of decisions have been cited at the Bar which have been considered and would be referred to in the subsequent stage of the judgment. 8. The Act has been enacted to provide for better regulation of buying and selling of agricultural produce and the establishment of market for agricultural produce in the State of Assam and for matters connected therewith. Preamble to the Act says that the objective behind the enactment of the Act is to provide for better regulation of buying and selling of agricultural produce in the State of Assam and establishment of regulated markets for agricultural produce. As per Section 2 (1) (i) of the Act, "Agricultural Produce" has been defined to mean and include any produce whether processed or non-processed of Agriculture, Horticulture, Animal Husbandry, Pisciculture, Sericulture and Forest as specified under Schedule. Specified agricultural produce has been defined under Section 2 (xxiv) to mean any or all the items included in the Schedule to the Act. Specified agricultural produce has been defined under Section 2 (xxiv) to mean any or all the items included in the Schedule to the Act. As per Section 2(1) (xxxiii), a Schedule has been defined to mean a Schedule to the Act. Under Section 2(1) (XLV), processing has been defined to mean anyone or more of a series of treatment relating to powdering, crushing, decorticating, dehusking, parboiling, polishing, ginning, pressing, curing or any other manual, mechanical, chemical or physical treatment to which raw agricultural produce or its product is subjected to. 9. Power to levy cess is traceable under Section 21 of the Act. As per Section 21(1) of the Act, every Market Committee shall levy and collect a cess on the agricultural produce brought or sold in the market area at a rate not exceeding two rupees for every one hundred rupees of the aggregate amount for which a specified agricultural produce is bought or sold whether for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable considerations. 10. In terms of Section 2 (1) (xxxiii), a Schedule is appended to the Act containing the list of specified agricultural produce. 11. Clause-IV of the Schedule lists the specified agricultural produce under the heading "Oil seed". At Sl. No. 2 of oil seed is mentioned "mustard". In other words, mustard oil seed is a specified agricultural produce on which cess may be levied under Section 21 (1) of the Act. 12. It is the contention of the petitioner that mustard oil is not a specified agricultural produce included in the Schedule; the specified agricultural produce is mustard oil seed. Cess can be levied under the Act on mustard oil seed and not on mustard oil. 13. Per contra, stand of the respondents is that by way of processing as defined under Section 2(1) (XLV) of the Act, mustard oil seed is converted to mustard oil. Therefore, mustard oil seed will also include mustard oil for which the Marketing Board is entitled to levy cess on the imported mustard oil. 14. The Schedule to the Act is a self-contained list of specified agricultural produce on which cess can be levied. The Legislature has specifically mentioned the specified agricultural produce in the Schedule on which cess is leviable under the Act by the Marketing Board. 14. The Schedule to the Act is a self-contained list of specified agricultural produce on which cess can be levied. The Legislature has specifically mentioned the specified agricultural produce in the Schedule on which cess is leviable under the Act by the Marketing Board. Of course, by way of processing which includes powdering, crushing, decorticating, dehusking, parboiling, polishing etc., a processed product can also be included in the said Schedule as specified agricultural produce for levy of cess. The objective is to adopt a pragmatic approach so that various seeds of specified agricultural produce included in the Schedule are brought within the ambit of the cess net. But the moot question is whether mustard oil can be construed to be a variant of mustard oil seed which is produced by undergoing processing of mustard oil seed. 15. Kishan lal v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1990 (Supp) SCC 743 is a case where validity of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Marketing Act, 1961 levying market fee on sale and purchase of agricultural produce in market yard or sub-market yard was challenged by the dealers on the ground of lack of legislative competence, violation of constitutional provisions, absence of any quid pro quo and services rendered etc. Therefore, the said decision would not of much relevance to the case in hand. 16. In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Shankar Industries, reported in 1993 Supp. (3) SCC 361, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether gur-lauta, raskat, rabgalawat and rab-salawat were liable to levy of market fee under the UP Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam of 1964. Adverting to the definition of agricultural produce in the UP Act which included admixture of two or more items and also included such item in processed form, such as, gur, rub, shakkar, khandsari and jiggery, Supreme Court held that gur lauta or raskat and rab-galawat and rab salawat fell within the definition of agricultural produce as per Section 2(a) of the UP Act and thus exigible to market fee. 17. In State of Rajasthan v. Rajasthan Agriculture Input Dealer's Association, reported in (1996) 5 SCC 479 , Supreme Court observed that foodgrains per se could be used as seeds for being sown and achieving germination, but in that form they retain the dual utility of being foodgrains as well as seeds. But by the process of coating and applying insecticides, other chemicals etc. But by the process of coating and applying insecticides, other chemicals etc. to the food grains meant to be utilized as seeds, one of its basic character i.e., consumption as food items by human beings or by animals or for extraction for the like purpose, gets irretrievably lost and such processed seeds become a commodity distinct from foodgrains as it is commonly understood. Referring to the Schedule appended to the Rajasthan Act, Supreme Court held that words relating to foodgrains cannot be said to automatically include seeds; the Schedule to the Act was not meant to be filled up by inferences. What was meant to contain there should be explicit and categoric. If the Government wanted to add suitable words to have that foodgrains, as processed for seeds, would also be agricultural produce, nobody can prevent the Government from doing so. Therefore, the State Government cannot be permitted to achieve indirectly which it could have achieved directly by being specific. 18. In Park Leather Industry (P) Ltd. v. State of UP, reported in (2001) 3 SCC 135 , Supreme Court referred to the definition of agricultural produce in Section 2(a) of the UP Act and held that an agricultural produce would be a product which is specified in the Schedule or one which is admixture of two or more items and would also include any such item in a processed form. 19. In Orient Paper & Industries Ltd. v. State of MP, reported in (2006) 12 SCC 468 , Supreme Court dilated on the distinction between manufacturing and processing. After referring to various dictionary meanings, it was held that by manufacturing something is produced and brought into existence which is different from that out of which it is made in the sense that the thing produced is by itself a commercial commodity capable of being sold or supplied. The material from which the thing or product is manufactured may necessarily lose its identity or may become transformed into the basic or essential properties. It is the cumulative effect of the various processes to which the raw material is subjected to that the manufactured product emerges. It was held that manufacture is a transformation of an article which is commercially different from the one which is converted. It is the cumulative effect of the various processes to which the raw material is subjected to that the manufactured product emerges. It was held that manufacture is a transformation of an article which is commercially different from the one which is converted. The essential point is that in manufacture something is brought into existence, which is different from that which originally existed whereas, in the case of processing, it is not necessary to produce a commercially different article. After saying so, Supreme Court formulated the test to determine whether a particular activity amounts to manufacture or not. The test is: do new and different goods emerge having distinctive name, use and character. 20. Applying the above test, it cannot be said that mustard oil is a processed form of mustard oil seed. To produce mustard oil, mustard oil seed has to undergo a manufacturing process because in the ultimate analysis mustard oil is a distinctively different commercial product vis-à-vis mustard oil seed. Looking once again into the Schedule, it is quite clear that what is leviable to cess is oil seeds, such as, mustard oil seeds, mustard oil per se is not a specified agricultural produce included in the Schedule. 21. In Orient Paper & Industries Ltd. (supra), Supreme Court held that when the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous i.e., they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. 22. Thus, sum total of the above discussion is that as per the Schedule to the Act, it is mustard oil seed on which cess is leviable and not mustard oil. Therefore, action of the respondents in levying cess on imported mustard oil under Section 21(1) of the Act read with Clause-IV (2) of the Schedule, cannot be sustained in law and is accordingly declared as such. 23. In view of above, respondents shall not levy cess on mustard oil imported by the petitioner from outside the State and the cess levied so far, shall be refunded back to the petitioner in terms of the interim order of this Court dated 02.12.2015 after due verification. Writ petition is accordingly allowed. No costs.