JUDGMENT P.K. Lohra, J. Accused-appellants have filed this appeal under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C., 1973 to challenge impugned judgment dated 29th of October, 2015, passed by Addl. Sessions Judge (Women Atrocities Cases), Udaipur (for short, 'learned trial Court'), whereby accused-appellants Mohd. Bilal, Faiyaz alias Bhondu, Shabbir Khan and Sarafat alias Kalu have been convicted for offences under Sections 147, 148, 452, 323/149, 307/149 IPC and accused appellants Aslam Khan and Akram Khan for offences under Sections 147, 148, 452, 323/149, 307/149 IPC and Section 4/25 of the Arms Act, while acquitting all of them for offence under Section 326/149 IPC. Accordingly, the accused-appellants have been sentenced for offences under aforesaid Sections with fine of different denominations and have also been sentenced in case of default of payment of fine with the direction to run all the sentences concurrently. The learned trial Court has further directed each of them to pay Rs. 10,000/- as compensation under Section 357 Cr.P.C., 1973 to the injured, Abdul Mannan, who suffered serious injury dangerous to life in his abdomen. 2. The details of the sentences handed down by learned trial Court to the accused-appellants for the offences under different sections with fine amount and sentences in default of payment are as under : Accused-appellants Mohd. Bilal, Faiyaz @ Bhondu, Shabbir Khan, and Sarafat @ Kalu Section Sentence awarded 147 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for one year with fine Rs. 500/-, in default of payment to undergo one month's simple imprisonment 148 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for two years with fine Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment to undergo two months' simple imprisonment 452 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for five years with fine Rs. 2,000/-, in default of payment to undergo three months' simple imprisonment 323/149 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for six months with fine Rs. 500/-, in default of payment to undergo one month's simple imprisonment 307/149 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for seven years with fine Rs. 3,000/-, in default of payment to undergo six months' simple imprisonment Accused-appellants Aslam Khan & Akram Khan : Section Sentence awarded 147 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for one year with fine Rs. 500/-, in default of payment to undergo one month's simple imprisonment 148 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for two years with fine Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment to undergo two months' simple imprisonment 452 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for five years with fine Rs. 500/-, in default of payment to undergo one month's simple imprisonment 148 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for two years with fine Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment to undergo two months' simple imprisonment 452 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for five years with fine Rs. 2,000/-, in default of payment to undergo three months' simple imprisonment 323/149 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for six months with fine Rs. 500/-, in default of payment to undergo one month's simple imprisonment 307/149 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for seven years with fine Rs. 3,000/-, in default of payment to undergo six months' simple imprisonment 4/25 Arms Act Rigorous imprisonment for two years with fine Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment to undergo 15 days' simple imprisonment 3. Succinctly stated, the facts of the case are that FIR No. 272/10 was registered at Police Station Amba Mata on 19.06.2010, pursuant to written report submitted by complainant Abdul Sakoor, stating inter-alia therein that at about 4 O'Clock when Abdul Mannan, Kurban Bhai, Mohd. Shakeel alias Bhayyu, Arif and Munni - mother of Saheed, were doing enamel work (Meenakari) at home and he was walking outside, he suddenly heard shouts and, as such, rushed inside the house, where he found that Akram, Aslam, Bhondu, Sabbu, Bilal, Kalu and three others, nine in all, had entered the house and were beating his son Mannan by Lath, swords and Gupti. Akram forcibly pushed Gupti in the abdomen of his son, while Kurban @ Mubarik Hussain was given a sword blow on his head, Bhayyu was also given a Lath blow and Arif a stick blow. After investigation, police filed charge-sheet against accused Faiyaz alias Bhondu, Shabbir Khan, Sarafat alias Kalu and Mohd. Bilal for offence under Sections 147, 148, 452, 323, 307, 149 IPC and against accused Akram Khan and Aslam Khan, for offence under Sections 147, 148, 452, 323, 326, 307, 149 IPC and Section 4/25 of the Arms Act, in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, No. 2, Udaipur on 04.08.2010. The concerned Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions from where it was ultimately transferred to the learned trial Court. 4. The learned trial Court heard on charge and framed charge against accused-appellants Faiyaz alias Bhondu, Shabbir Khan, Sarafat alias Kalu and Mohd. The concerned Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions from where it was ultimately transferred to the learned trial Court. 4. The learned trial Court heard on charge and framed charge against accused-appellants Faiyaz alias Bhondu, Shabbir Khan, Sarafat alias Kalu and Mohd. Bilal for offences under Sections 147, 148, 452, 323/149, 326/149, 307/149 IPC and against Akram Khan and Aslam Khan under Sections 147, 148, 452, 323/149, 326/149, 307/149 IPC & Section 4/25 Arms Act. During trial, in order to prove charge against accused persons, prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses and exhibited 18 documents under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. After conclusion of prosecution evidence, statements of accused were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., 1973 who in their defence examined 3 witnesses and exhibited 4 documents. Thereafter, final arguments were heard by the learned trial Court. 5. The learned trial Court, after appreciation of evidence and material available on record, found the offences fully established against accused-appellants and considering their culpability held them guilty and sentenced as aforesaid. 6. Mr. Pradeep Shah and Mr. Rakesh Arora, learned counsel for the appellants, contend that although as per prosecution case injured Mannan has suffered grievious abdominal injury, allegedly caused by appellant Akram Khan with sharp-edged weapon, but the surrounding circumstances and evidence available on record lack requisite sting to make out a case of intent oriented murderous assault. Learned counsel would contend that if the evidence of injured PW1 Abdul Mannan is examined in that background, then it would ipso facto reveal that as per his version he was stabbed in abdomen by appellant Akram by using Gupti. Pointing out discrepancy in his statements, it is further argued by learned counsel that in fact during investigation weapon of offence, allegedly recovered upon disclosure of accused under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, is knife. While referring to the statements of recovery witnesses PW4 Ahmed Hussain and PW8 Mohd. Sharif, learned counsel submit that alleged recovery of knife is per se doubtful and cannot satisfy the test of requirements envisaged under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants have strenuously urged that medical evidence to prove injury grievous in nature and dangerous to life is not of sterling worth. Learned counsel contend that PW6 Dr. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants have strenuously urged that medical evidence to prove injury grievous in nature and dangerous to life is not of sterling worth. Learned counsel contend that PW6 Dr. Anis Ahmed, author of injury report Ex.P/6 had proved the injury report but his opinion about nature of injury Ex.P/9 is based on original operational notes of the surgeon, Dr. Meenaxi Sharma, who did not appear in the witness box. Mr. Shah has also urged that Ex.P/9, opinion of Dr. Anis Ahmed, cannot be relied upon in isolation to the original operational notes of surgeon, which are not exhibited. Learned counsel, therefore, submit that in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the case, learned trial Court has seriously erred in indicting appellant Akram Khan for offence under Section 307 IPC and the offence cannot travel beyond Section 326 IPC. Learned counsel would urge that in absence of repeated blow of knife by appellant Akram to injured Abdul Mannan, it is per se improbable to draw an inference that he intended to cause death of the victim. Alternatively, learned counsel would urge that out of maximum sentence of 7 years' imprisonment, appellant Akram Khan has already undergone sentence for almost 4 years and 8 months, and therefore, it would be appropriate to reduce his sentence to the extent he has already undergone, to meet the ends of justice. 8. Espousing cause for the other appellants, learned counsel submit that appellant Aslam Khan is assigned the role of giving blow of sword on the head of other injured Kurban but neither injured Kurban has appeared in the witness box nor his injury report is proved during trial, therefore, his conviction for offence under Section 323/149 IPC is not sustainable. Learned counsel have further urged that conviction of all the appellants for offence under Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC is not at all tenable, inasmuch as, there is no evidence to prove common objects of all the accused-appellants. Mr. Shah has argued that in order to attract Section 149 IPC, prosecution must show that incriminating act was done to accomplish common object of unlawful assembly. Mr. Shah has argued that in order to attract Section 149 IPC, prosecution must show that incriminating act was done to accomplish common object of unlawful assembly. Impeaching the findings of the learned trial Court for indicting all the appellants for offence under Section 149 IPC, learned counsel have urged that star witness of prosecution injured PW1 Abdul Mannan, during his cross-examination, has admitted that there was no previous enmity between him and appellant Akram. 9. Elaborating his submission in this behalf, learned counsel have further argued that as per version of the witness, cause of scuffle was alleged abduction of Akabar Khan's daughter by Saheed and occurrence of incident when appellants were making inquiry to trace out her is yet another significant circumstance to dispel common object of the appellants. Learned counsel, therefore, urged that in fact in the spur of moment hot altercations took place between complainant party and the accused persons and that led to sudden fight which by no means a concrete/substantial proof of common object of all the appellants. Learned counsel have contended that in order to indict accused persons for offence under Section 149 IPC, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that object should be common to the persons who compose the assembly, i.e., they should all be aware of it and concur in it. 10. Learned counsel have further argued that against the accused-appellants offence under Section 452 IPC is not made out. It is submitted by learned counsel that PW1 Abdul Mannan has though deposed during his cross-examination that appellant Akram and Aslam were armed with Gupti and sword but pleaded ignorance about other appellants as to what weapons they were carrying at the time of scuffle. Learned counsel have also argued that the witness has not castigated appellant Aslam for causing any injury to him and the alleged injury caused by Aslam to Kurban has not been proved, as such, barring appellant Akram, against other accused appellants, their dominant intention of causing hurt to the victims, while committing house trespass, assault or wrongful restraint, is per se not discernible from the prosecution evidence, and therefore, their offence cannot travel beyond Section 451 IPC. Lastly, learned counsel submit that in the backdrop of peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, sentences handed down to them are liable to be reduced to the extent already undergone by them inasmuch as all of them remained in custody for more than a year. 11. E. Converso, learned Public Prosecutor, Mr. Rajesh Bhati submits that the learned trial Court, upon appreciation of evidence, has rightly convicted appellants for the charged offences, and therefore, no interference with finding of guilt and the quantum of sentence handed down to them is warranted. Mr. Bhati would contend that, in the instant case, besides grievous injury inflicted on the victim by a sharp-edged weapon, intention of the assailant is also clear, inasmuch as, injury was on vital part, and therefore, offence under Section 307 IPC is clearly made out. Learned Public Prosecutor submits that appellants were well armed and two appellants; viz., Akram and Aslam, have caused injury to the victims by using sharp-edged weapons, therefore, common object of all the accused persons is clearly discernible and as such learned trial Court has rightly convicted all the accused persons for offence under Section 307/149 IPC. 12. Mr. Bhati, learned Public Prosecutor, would urge that learned trial Court, upon a close scrutiny of evidence, has recorded a definite finding about common object of all the accused/appellants, and therefore being members of unlawful assembly, has rightly made them vicariously liable for the offence of attempt to murder. While refuting the argument of learned counsel for the appellants, learned Public Prosecutor submits that house-trespass by all the appellants after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint is proved by cogent prosecution evidence, and therefore, no interference with the finding of the learned trial Court in this regard is warranted. Lastly, learned Public Prosecutor contends that in the backdrop of proven criminal delinquency of all the appellants, alternative argument of the learned counsel for the appellants to reduce the sentence, as already undergone by them, is not sustainable. 13. Heard Mr. Pradeep Shah and Mr. Rakesh Arora, learned counsel for the appellants at length as well as learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Rajesh Bhati. With the assistance of learned counsel for the rival parties, I have also made endeavour to examine impugned judgment and looked in every nook and cranny of the record. 14. 13. Heard Mr. Pradeep Shah and Mr. Rakesh Arora, learned counsel for the appellants at length as well as learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Rajesh Bhati. With the assistance of learned counsel for the rival parties, I have also made endeavour to examine impugned judgment and looked in every nook and cranny of the record. 14. Giving allegedly a serious blow to victim Abdul Mannan by sixth appellant, Akram Khan, with a sharp-edged weapon in his abdomen, has eventually led to prosecution of all the accused/appellants for offence under Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC being members of the unlawful assembly, besides other offences. Therefore, it would be appropriate to examine, at the threshold, the nature of offence, as to whether it constitutes offence of attempt to murder or any other lesser offence, including offence under Section 326 IPC, as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants. 15. Undeniably, stab injury in the abdomen of the victim is a grievous hurt within the four corners of Section 320 IPC and same is also fortified by Ex.P-6, injury report of Abdul Mannan, however, the question remains that whether the said injury can be construed as dangerous to life, is precisely founded on report Ex.P-9 of the medical jurist. Report Ex.P-9 is though authored by PW6 Dr. Anis Ahmed, but the opinion expressed therein is based on original operational notes of Surgeon, Dr. Meenaxi Sharma, who performed operation of victim and surprisingly the operational notes prepared by Surgeon have not been exhibited. Moreover, Dr. Meenaxi Sharma is also not examined as one of the prosecution witnesses. The injury report (Ex.P-6) indicates stab would of 1.5 x 0.5 cm and Ex.P-9, wherein opinion of the Jurist, based on original operational notes, has reported the same dangerous to life. In common parlance, punctured wounds are dangerous and may cause death immediately from shock or internal haemorrhage or subsequently from septic peritonitis. After undergoing surgery, victim has survived and what would have been the complications of this stab injury, had he not been treated in time, is not ascertainable from the evidence available on record, inasmuch as, Surgeon Dr. Meenaxi Sharma has not deposed during trial and operation of the victim too was performed after six days from the date of incident. 16. At this juncture, evidence of victim Abdul Mannan (PW1) also requires consideration. Meenaxi Sharma has not deposed during trial and operation of the victim too was performed after six days from the date of incident. 16. At this juncture, evidence of victim Abdul Mannan (PW1) also requires consideration. PW1 Abdul Mannan has though attributed stab injury to sixth appellant Akram Khan but he is quite skeptical about the weapon used in stabbing him. Although according to the witness he was stabbed by sixth appellant in his abdomen by Gupti but during investigation police has recovered knife from the sixth appellant. During cross-examination, the witness has very candidly admitted that there was no previous enmity between him and sixth appellant Akram and the cause of so called acrimony was alleged kidnapping of Akabar's daughter by Saheed. Witness Abdul Mannan, in his testimony, has attributed only one abdominal injury to sixth appellant Akram Khan while specifically denying repeated blow of knife by him. After over-powering the victim with a stab injury in his stomach, sixth appellant could have given repeated blows had he intended to cause death of the victim. In order to bring the offence home against accused, the prosecution must establish that his intention was one of the three kinds mentioned in Section 300 IPC. For deducing state of mind of the accused, surrounding circumstances and motive would also be a relevant circumstance. A very significant fact that other injured Kurban, who allegedly suffered injury on his head, has not appeared in the witness box to corroborate the version of PW1 Abdul Mannan also cannot lose sight of the Court. 17. The opinion-evidence of doctor to determine offence of attempt to commit murder is though eligible to some weight and value yet for adjudging criminality of the offender, Court cannot shirk from its responsibility to apply tests, which are innate in the ingredients of Section 307 IPC. As observed supra, even the doctor's evidence is also based on original operational notes of the Surgeon who performed surgery on the victim. The opinion of PW6 Dr. Anis Ahmed, therefore, cannot be given undue credence in isolation to other surrounding circumstances. For judging murderous assault from the act of the accused, a Court is required to see the manner in which it was executed, the surrounding circumstances as also the result achieved together with intention of the accused. The law enjoins on the Court a duty to examine such a case intent oriented. For judging murderous assault from the act of the accused, a Court is required to see the manner in which it was executed, the surrounding circumstances as also the result achieved together with intention of the accused. The law enjoins on the Court a duty to examine such a case intent oriented. At times, any injury, caused with the help of sharp-edged weapons on vital parts of the body, by itself, in absence of sufficient material and medical evidence cannot be declared as dangerous to life in want of sufficient evidence to establish with certainty intention and knowledge of accused. I am afraid, the evidence and materials available on record are not satisfying the tests which are innate in the ingredients of Section 307 IPC. There is no dichotomy in the factual backdrop of the case that injury to victim Abdul Mannan was caused by sixth appellant Akram Khan by using sharp-edged weapon, and therefore, sixth appellant cannot escape his conviction under Section 326 IPC, i.e., offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapon. 18. Now, the moot question which requires consideration is culpability of substantive offence committed by sixth appellant Akram Khan as member of the unlawful assembly. As per prosecution case, all the appellants were well-armed when they entered into the house of complainant and being members of unlawful assembly all of them are guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object. The concept of joint liability is founded on common object. Sections 34 & 149 IPC deal with liability for constructive criminality for an offence not committed by the person charged. Thus, Section 149 creates a constructive or vicarious liability on the members of unlawful assembly for the unlawful acts committed pursuant to common object by any other member of that assembly. 19. In order to examine 'common object', it would be just and appropriate to critically analyze evidence of star prosecution witness PW1 Abdul Mannan. The witness in his testimony has although shown all the appellants well-armed but conspicuously silent about any aggression much less an overt-act by other appellants. The other injured Kurban, who was allegedly given blow of sword on his head by appellant Aslam, has not appeared in the witness box, nor his injury reports are exhibited, and therefore, taking note of this fact, the learned trial Court has completely discarded the prosecution case to that extent. The other injured Kurban, who was allegedly given blow of sword on his head by appellant Aslam, has not appeared in the witness box, nor his injury reports are exhibited, and therefore, taking note of this fact, the learned trial Court has completely discarded the prosecution case to that extent. A very significant fact that during scuffle only one incumbent PW1 Abdul Mannan has suffered injury and no other incumbent has received any visible injury also deserves due credence for unearthing common object. The recovery witness PW13 Mohd. Rafiq, in his statements, has clearly asserted that police has not recovered weapon from any of the appellants in his presence. Truly speaking, testimony of PW13 amounts to retracting from his police statements, but then, at the behest of prosecution, no endeavour was made to declare him hostile, and therefore, his testimony favouring cause of the appellants cannot be discarded. 20. At this stage, testimony of PW4 Ahmed Hussain too cannot be ignored wherein he has admitted that memo of recovery of knife (Ex.P-4) was prepared at police station as the same was lying at police station. This witness was also not declared hostile, therefore, his testimony also deserves due credence. Likewise, PW5 Mohd. Shakeel has also not supported prosecution case by turning hostile and so also PW7 Mohd. Ismail. A cumulative reading of statements of PW9 Ms. Munni Bai makes it abundantly clear that prosecution has made an attempt to project her a pseudo ocular witness. If the court statements of PW9 are examined on the touchstone of her police statements Ex.D-2, then it would ipso facto reveal that in her deposition she has projected an embellished version while partly admitting the cause of the quarrel. Admission of Ms. Munni Bai (PW9) that Abdul Sakoor (PW2) disclosed names of all the appellants to her with a somer sault in second breath of allegedly knowing personally all the appellants during cross examination, has also rendered her testimony vulnerable. 21. Therefore, in substance, the basic ingredients; viz., commission of an offence by any member of an unlawful assembly, commission of such offence in prosecution of common object of the assembly, or knowledge of the members of the assembly that such offence is likely to be committed, are per se not discernible from the prosecution evidence. 21. Therefore, in substance, the basic ingredients; viz., commission of an offence by any member of an unlawful assembly, commission of such offence in prosecution of common object of the assembly, or knowledge of the members of the assembly that such offence is likely to be committed, are per se not discernible from the prosecution evidence. Mere presence of a person in any unlawful assembly cannot attract Sections 147, 148 & 149 IPC unless it is shown that he has actively participated by doing some overt-act with the necessary criminal intention, or shares the common object of the unlawful assembly. Supreme Court, in case of Waman and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra [ (2011) 7 SCC 295 ], while examining requisites of common object for convicting accused persons under Section 149 IPC, held: "The only thing is that whenever the court convicts any person or persons of any offence with the aid of Section 149, a clear finding regarding the common object of the assembly must be given and the evidence disclosed must show not only the nature of the common object but also that the object was unlawful. In order to attract Section 149 it must be shown that the incriminating act was done to accomplish the common object of unlawful assembly. It must be within the knowledge of the other members as one likely to be committed in prosecution of common object. If members of the assembly knew or were aware of the likelihood of a particular offence being committed in prosecution of a common object, they would be liable for the same under Section 149." On overall analysis of the entire evidence, in my view, learned trial Court has grossly erred in construing the evidence to record its affirmative finding that being members of the unlawful assembly all the appellants have acted in furtherance of common object to accomplish crime. Therefore, convicting all the appellants for the substantive offences with the aid of Section 149 IPC, is ex-facie infirm conclusion of the learned trial Court. Similarly, serious loopholes and pitfalls in the prosecution evidence to prove common object of all the appellants has per se vitiated finding of guilt against them for offences under Section 147 and 148 IPC. 22. Conviction of the appellants for offence under Section 452 IPC is also assailed with full gusto by learned counsel. Similarly, serious loopholes and pitfalls in the prosecution evidence to prove common object of all the appellants has per se vitiated finding of guilt against them for offences under Section 147 and 148 IPC. 22. Conviction of the appellants for offence under Section 452 IPC is also assailed with full gusto by learned counsel. In common parlance, relatively it is a graver offence under the caption 'criminal trespass'. Gravity of offence is, therefore, clearly spelt out from the eloquent phraseology employed in Section 452 IPC. As per legislative intent, proof insisted for bringing home guilt against an accused is his dominant intention to cause hurt or to assault or to wrongfully restrain any person. Therefore, prosecution in order to prove the charge must necessarily adduce clear evidence of preparation for causing hurt. Mere entry of an incumbent in another person's house and committing an assault does not necessarily pre-suppose such preparation. The overall fact scenario, which has come to the fore in the instant case, is that entry of appellants in the house of complainant was with specific purpose and not to avenge previous rivalry. Evidence on record clearly indicates that appellants entered into the house of complainant to ascertain whereabouts of one Saheed, who had allegedly kidnapped minor daughter of Akabar. 23. If the evidence of prosecution is examined threadbare in this regard, then there is a lot of confusion or commotion. At once, testimony of PW1 Abdul Mannan appears to be quite convincing, but, upon its meaningful construction, he too has not attributed any role to appellants No. 1 to 4 in the scuffle. Moreover, the witness has admitted that besides him and Kurban, appellants have not assaulted anyone. Therefore, absence of Kurban in the witness box has confined prosecution case on sole testimony of Abdul Mannan. The so-called eye witness PW5 Mohd. Shakeel has turned hostile and witness PW2 Abdul Sakoor sought to be projected as ocular witness has made an affirmative attempt to depict an embellished version from his police statements Ex.D-1. PW2 Abdul Sakoor has also admitted the cause of acrimony during his cross-examination. In his statements, witness without any demure admits abduction of Akabar's daughter by Saheed, a friend of his son. PW2 Abdul Sakoor has also admitted the cause of acrimony during his cross-examination. In his statements, witness without any demure admits abduction of Akabar's daughter by Saheed, a friend of his son. As observed supra, recovery of alleged weapon of offence from the appellants is in serious jeopardy, therefore, in my opinion, it would be unsafe to uphold conviction of the appellants for offence under Section 452 IPC. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, besides assailant - sixth appellant, others cannot be bailed out for the offence of house trespass in order to commit punishable offence. Thus, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, conviction of the appellants for offence under Section 452 IPC merit alteration to relatively lesser offence under Section 451 IPC. 24. Adverting to offence under Section 323 IPC, suffice it to observe that although serious injury caused to PW1 Abdul Mannan is attributed to sixth appellant but in overall scenario overt-act of other appellants is discernible. While it is true that in absence of evidence of Kurban, act of fifth appellant giving sword blow to him has eventually proved catastrophe so also sans authentication of injury report but then presence of all the appellants and showing some aggression during scuffle cannot absolve them from the offence under Section 323 IPC. The offence of voluntarily causing hurt is also inferable from the cause of acrimony between rival groups and happening of the scuffle at the spot, coupled with the act of appellants' tirade against Kurban by running after him. Consequently, conviction of all the appellants for offence under Section 323 IPC is not liable to be disturbed. 25. Finding of guilt of fifth and sixth appellant for offence under Section 4 read with section 25 of the Arms Act, recorded by learned trial Court, is based on alleged recovery of sword and knife respectively from them. In this regard, evidence establishing use of knife by sixth appellant in assaulting victim Abdul Mannan, duly supported by medical evidence, cannot be eschewed. Use of sword for causing injury to Kurban by fifth appellant Aslam Khan is not proved during trial due to nonappearance of Kurban in the witness box. Besides that, its recovery from him is seriously questionable as the recovery witnesses PW7 Mohd. Ismail and PW13 Mohd. Rafiq have turned hostile. Use of sword for causing injury to Kurban by fifth appellant Aslam Khan is not proved during trial due to nonappearance of Kurban in the witness box. Besides that, its recovery from him is seriously questionable as the recovery witnesses PW7 Mohd. Ismail and PW13 Mohd. Rafiq have turned hostile. That apart, the alleged recovery is also after more than a month from the date of incident. This sort of situation has per se rendered conviction of fifth appellant for offence under Section 4 read with section 25 of the Arms Act vulnerable. However, possession of arm-knife and its use by sixth appellant without any valid licence clearly tantamount to offence under Section 4 read with section 25 of the Arms Act and consequently his conviction by the learned trial Court merits no interference. Thus, in totality of the circumstances conviction of the fifth appellant for offence under Section 4 read with section 25 of the Arms Act is per se not tenable and is liable to be annulled but for affirmation of conviction for the aforesaid offence of sixth appellant. 26. The overall re-appraisal of prosecution evidence and critical analysis of other material has made it swiftly possible for the Court to cut to the chase. Therefore, in view of foregoing discussion, sans proof about commission of offence in prosecution of common object, conviction of all the appellants with the aid of Section 149 IPC as well as for offence under Section 147 and 148 IPC is set aside by giving them benefit of doubt. Extending benefit of doubt to appellant No. 5 also entails his acquittal for offence under Section 4 read with section 25 of the Arms Act. Likewise, their conviction under Section 452 IPC merit annulment and all the appellants are liable to be indicted for a lesser offence under Section 451 IPC. 27. As regards conviction of sixth appellant Akram for offence under Section 307 IPC being not found sustainable, the same is modified and altered for offence under Section 326 IPC. The conclusion aforesaid has eventually led to conviction of all the appellants for various offences as follows : "Appellants No. 1 Mohd. Bilal, No. 2 Faiyaj @ Bhodu, No. 3. Shabbir Khan, No. 4. Sharafat @ Kalu, and No. 5. Aslam Khan are convicted for offence under Section 451 and 323 IPC. The conclusion aforesaid has eventually led to conviction of all the appellants for various offences as follows : "Appellants No. 1 Mohd. Bilal, No. 2 Faiyaj @ Bhodu, No. 3. Shabbir Khan, No. 4. Sharafat @ Kalu, and No. 5. Aslam Khan are convicted for offence under Section 451 and 323 IPC. "Appellants No. 6 Akram Khan is convicted for offence under Section 326, 323, 451 IPC and offence under Section 4 read with section 25 of the Arms Act. 28. In the backdrop of conviction of all the appellants for relatively less graver offences and acquittal vis-a-vis some other offences, it would be just and appropriate to consider quantum of sentence to be awarded to each appellant. At this stage, prayer of the appellants, for lesser sentences and reducing the same to the extent they have already undergone, requires objective consideration. In order to take a just decision on this issue, relevant factors are lapse of time from the date of incident; duration of incarceration period of individual appellant vis-a-vis his culpability; absence of previous enmity between rival parties and existence of any extenuating circumstances which can be said to mitigate the enormity of the crime. 29. That apart, at times, in a given case, Court may adopt the therapeutic approach rather than the punitive approach to farther the object of punishment in the scheme of modern social defence. Correction of the wrongdoer, and not wrecking gratuitous punitive vengeance on the criminal for his alleged criminal act, is the hallmark of Reformative Theory of Punishment. In umpteen number of cases criminal act of an individual is a mere manifestation of a deep-rooted social maladjustment for which society itself may be responsible in some way. 30. For paying heed to the prayer of the learned counsel for appellants, Court has made endeavour to solicit custody certificates of individual appellant with a view to record its satisfaction that custody period of each appellant is commensurating with his proven delinquencies. The learned Public Prosecutor, in all fairness, has furnished requisite certificates showing period of incarceration of individual appellant as under : S.No. Name of Appellant Custody Period 1. Mohd. Bilal S/o Akram Khan One year and one month 2. Faiyaj @ Bhodu S/o Chhotu Khan One year and one month 3. Shabbir Khan S/o Chhotu Khan One year and one month 4. Mohd. Bilal S/o Akram Khan One year and one month 2. Faiyaj @ Bhodu S/o Chhotu Khan One year and one month 3. Shabbir Khan S/o Chhotu Khan One year and one month 4. Sharafat @ Kalu S/o Akabar Khan One year and one month 5. Aslam Khan S/o Chhotu Khan One year, one month and fifteen days 6. Akram Khan S/o Chhote Khan Four years, seven months and seven days as on 17.04.2018. Thus, as on the day four years, seven months and twenty-two days. 31. Therefore, in the light of mitigating circumstances noticed hereinabove and taking into account proven criminal delinquencies of the appellants, their substantive sentences are reduced to the extent they have already undergone. However, appellants No. 1 to 5 shall pay fine of Rs. 2500/- and Rs. 500/- respectively for offence under Section 451 and 323 IPC and in default of payment of fine each one of them shall undergo sentence of one month's simple imprisonment. The appellant No. 6 shall pay fine of Rs. 15,000/- for offence under Section 326 IPC, Rs. 2500/- for offence under Section 451 IPC, Rs. 500/- for offence under Section 323 IPC and Rs. 1,000/- for offence under Section 4 read with section 25 of the Arms Act. In default of payment of aforesaid fine amounts, appellant No. 6 shall undergo sentence of three months' simple imprisonment. Upon deposition of the amount of fine by the appellants, the same shall be paid as compensation to victim Abdul Mannan under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C., 1973 Appellants No. 1 to 5 are on bail, therefore, they need not surrender and their bail bonds are cancelled. However, State shall be at liberty to take them into custody for serving sentence in default of payment of fine, if the requisite amount of fine is not deposited by them before the learned trial Court within one month from this verdict. The appellant No. 6, who is in custody, be released forthwith upon his depositing the requisite amount of fine, if not wanted in other case. 32. Upshot of above discussion is that the instant appeal is allowed in part as indicated supra.