JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri A.K. Gaur, learned counsel for petitioners and Sri Anand Kumar, Advocate for respondents. 2. Writ petition is directed against judgment and order dated 15.11.2014 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as “Tribunal”) in Original Application No. 781 of 2011 directing petitioner to consider applicants-respondents in the light of judgment passed by Tribunal in Original Application (hereinafter referred to as “O.A.”) No. 63 of 1996 (Ashwini Kumar Gupta and others v. Union of India and others) and O.A. No. 1398 of 2001 (Chhote Lal Giri and others v. Union of India and others). 3. Facts of the case are that applicants-respondents claimed to have been engaged as Casual Labour for some time in North Eastern Railway, Varanasi Division on 23.11.1980, 1.1.1980 and 16.11.1976 respectively. They had worked for 120 days and were given temporary status. A Notification was issued on 9.2.1988 by Divisional Railway Manager, North Eastern Railway, Varanasi inviting applications for Ex-casual labourers who were appointed prior to 1.1.1980 and are within the age limit of 28 years for considering them for regularization against regular vacancies of Group D. List of Ex-Casual Labourers was also published vide letter dated 21.4.1989 for holding screening after verification of working periods. In the said list, applicants-respondents were at Serial No. 32, 103 and 175 respectively. Some other persons junior to applicants, namely, Sri Ashwini Kumar Gupta, Chhote Lal Giri, Hans Nath, Harendra Yadav and Rajendra figured at Serial No. 33, 167, 191, 200 and 307, respectively. After verification of list it is said that a list of 174 persons was prepared and forwarded to Divisional Manager on 9.2.1988 but no approval was granted by him hence no appointment could be made from said list. Subsequently, another panel was made and therefrom some persons were appointed. 4. Challenging non-selection and appointment on regular basis, Ashwini Kumar Gupta and others filed O.A. No. 63 of 1996 claiming regularization on the basis of verified list dated 21.4.1989. vide judgment dated 4.6.2001 aforesaid O.A. was allowed and petitioners-Railway Authorities were directed to consider those applicants, Ashwini Kumar Gupta and others for regularization as per list dated 21.4.1989. 5. 4. Challenging non-selection and appointment on regular basis, Ashwini Kumar Gupta and others filed O.A. No. 63 of 1996 claiming regularization on the basis of verified list dated 21.4.1989. vide judgment dated 4.6.2001 aforesaid O.A. was allowed and petitioners-Railway Authorities were directed to consider those applicants, Ashwini Kumar Gupta and others for regularization as per list dated 21.4.1989. 5. Claiming similar benefit, some other persons, namely, Chhote Lal and nine others filed O.A. No. 1398 of 2001 seeking following relief: “(a) to issue a direction to the respondents to consider the application for appointment to the regular post considering the seniority of the applicants. (b) to implement the panel list prepared pursuant to the notification dated 9.2.1988 and 28.11.1995 by appointing the applicants to the regular post. (c) to issue any other order or direction as this Hon’ble Tribunal may deed fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case.” 6. This O.A. was allowed partly by Tribunal vide judgment dated 26.5.2004 giving following directions: “9. In view of the above, the contention of the limitation is rejected and this O.A. is partly allowed by giving direction to the respondents to reconsider the case of those applicants herein also whose particulars about working period have been found to be correct on verification in the list dated 21.4.89 for regularisation in accordance with the instructions available at the relevant time and subject to availability of vacancies. Respondents are further direction to take care that no fresh face or juniors to the applicants is given preference over applicants for regularisation.” 7. Objection of Railways with regard to limitation in aforesaid O.A. was negated by Tribunal on the ground that against judgment dated 4.6.2001 in O.A. No. 63 of 1996 a review application was filed, i.e., Review Application No. 25 of 2002 wherein judgment was modified on 1.3.2004 and that being so it cannot be said that O.A. filed in 2001 was barred by limitation. 8. Applicants-respondents in the present case approached Tribunal in 2011 seeking following reliefs: “(i) The Hon’ble Tribunal may graciously be pleased to direct the respondents to extend the similar benefits of regularization of applicants as given to their junior persons of the screening list dated 21.4.1989 viz. S/Shri Ashwami Kumar Gupta, Chhote Lal Giri, Ramanand, Harendra, Ram Pal Prasad etc. 8. Applicants-respondents in the present case approached Tribunal in 2011 seeking following reliefs: “(i) The Hon’ble Tribunal may graciously be pleased to direct the respondents to extend the similar benefits of regularization of applicants as given to their junior persons of the screening list dated 21.4.1989 viz. S/Shri Ashwami Kumar Gupta, Chhote Lal Giri, Ramanand, Harendra, Ram Pal Prasad etc. in group ‘D’ categories as per order of this Hon’ble Tribunal dated in M.A. for Execution No. 8/2008 in RA No. 25/2002 in O.A. No. 63/1996 i.e. from the date above named junior persons to the applicants and fresh faces were engaged and regularized in group ‘D’ categories as per scheme for screening of ex casual labours issued in terms of Notification dated 9.2.1988 which result of is screening was declared vide Notification dated 18.5.2009 (Annexure A-1) and appointment letters were issued vide letters dated 31.12.2010 & 17.1.2011 by the respondents (Annexure A-10). (ii) The Hon’ble Tribunal may further be pleased to direct the respondents to give all consequential benefits of service, seniority etc. in respect of their junior persons already regularized ignoring the preferential claim of the applicants. (iii) Any other order or direction which the Hon’ble Tribunal deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case may also kindly be issued in the interest of justice. (iv) Cost of the application may also be awarded.” 9. With regard to limitation applicants-respondents in para 3 of O.A. disclosed that the same is within limitation and claimed that Tribunal, if finds delay, may condone the same. Para 3 of O.A. may be reproduced as under: “3. Limitation: The applicant further declares that the applicant is within the limitation period prescribed in Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 as the respondents have failed to give similar benefits in similarly situated case as per settled law position. Moreover, if the Hon’ble Tribunal considers any delay on the part of the applicants, it may kindly be condoned graciously for which applicants have filed Misc. Delay Condonation Application separately.” 10. In the judgment in question Tribunal has simply extended benefit of earlier judgments referring to Supreme Court’s decision in State of Karnataka and others v. C. Lalitha, 2006(2) SCC 747 , without considering the question of limitation and whether delay was explained satisfactorily justifying its condonation. 11. Delay Condonation Application separately.” 10. In the judgment in question Tribunal has simply extended benefit of earlier judgments referring to Supreme Court’s decision in State of Karnataka and others v. C. Lalitha, 2006(2) SCC 747 , without considering the question of limitation and whether delay was explained satisfactorily justifying its condonation. 11. Mere fact that some persons are similarly situated is not sufficient but if they are guilty of extraordinary delay and laches they are not entitled for the benefit of earlier judgment, if approached Court after a long delay since those who were vigilant and claim their rights within time cannot provide a justification to others who were sleeping for their rights. 12. In Rup Diamonds, M/s. v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 674 , Court considered a case where petitioner wanted to get relief on the basis of judgment of Supreme Court wherein a particular law had been declared ultra vires. Court rejected petition on the ground of delay and latches, observing as under: “There is one more ground which basically sets the present case apart. Petitioners are re-agitating claims which they had not pursued for several years. Petitioners were not vigilant but were content to be dormant and chose to sit on the fence till somebody else’s case came to be decided.” 13. In State of Karnataka and others v. S.M. Kotrayaya and others, 1996 (6) SCC 267 , Court rejected contention that a petition should be considered ignoring delay and laches on the ground that it has been filed just after coming to know about relief granted by Court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. Court observed that such a plea is wholly unjustified and cannot furnish any ground for ignoring delay and laches. 14. Same view has been reiterated in Jagdish Lal and others v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1997 SC 2366 , observing as under: “Suffice it to state that appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and elected to wake-up when they had impetus from Veer Pal Chauhan and Ajit Singh’s ratio... desperate attempts of the appellants to re-do the seniority, had by them in various cadre... are not amenable to the judicial review at this belated stage. The High Court, therefore, has rightly dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay as well.” 15. desperate attempts of the appellants to re-do the seniority, had by them in various cadre... are not amenable to the judicial review at this belated stage. The High Court, therefore, has rightly dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay as well.” 15. In State of U.P. and others v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and others, 2015(1) SCC 347 , Court in paras 22.1, 22.2 and 22.3 said as under: “22.1 The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 22.2 However, this principle is subject to well recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 22.3 However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma and others v. Union of India, 1997(6) SCC 721 ). With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma and others v. Union of India, 1997(6) SCC 721 ). On the other hand, if the judgment of the Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence. “ 16. Since in the present case these aspects have not been considered by Tribunal, in our view, judgment in question cannot be sustained. 17. In the result, writ petition is allowed. Impugned judgment dated 15.11.2014 passed in O.A. No. 781 of 2011 is hereby set aside. Tribunal is directed to treat aforesaid O.A. pending and thereafter first to consider question, whether O.A. is barred by limitation and if so, whether their exist circumstances to condone delay. If Tribunal finds reasons to condone delay, it may do so and thereafter shall proceed to consider matter on merit.