JUDGMENT : Anil Kumar Upadhyay, J. This application has been filed on 06.03.2012 for quashing of the order taking cognizance dated 27.09.2011, passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Patna in Complaint Case No. 3352 (C) of 2010. 2. This application was heard on different dates by different Co-ordinate Benches of this Court. After recusal by some of the Benches, the matter was listed before Hon'ble Justice Anjana Prakash, as Her lordship then was. 3. Although the offence under Section 498(A) of the Indian Penal Code is not compoundable, but having regard to the recent trend, particularly, the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh vs State of Punjab & Anr., (2012) 10 SCC 303 , the Court granted indulgence to the parties to settle their dispute in furtherance of family peace. Different orders passed by the different Benches in the instant case would indicate that the Court was made to understand by the parties that they are ready to settle the dispute by entering into compromise. Finally, the Court has held out that there is no chance of compromise between the parties, even after the intervention of the learned senior counsels. In the aforesaid circumstance, the Court disposed of the application with liberty to the petitioners to raise all the points at the appropriate stage vide judgment dated 16.02.2015. 4. Against the aforesaid decision, the petitioners approached the Apex Court in Special Leave Petition (CRL) No. 5194 of 2015. The Apex Court allowed the application vide order dated 08.05.2017. The order of the Apex Court is as follows: 1. Leave granted. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 3. Perused the impugned order which indicates that the High Court has not applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. Various questions which have been raised in the petition by the petitioner has not been dealt with. Thus, we are of the opinion that the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 4. Without commenting on the merits of the case, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is, accordingly, allowed. 5. We request the High Court to hear the parties afresh and decide the matter by a reasoned order." 5. Thus, we are of the opinion that the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 4. Without commenting on the merits of the case, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is, accordingly, allowed. 5. We request the High Court to hear the parties afresh and decide the matter by a reasoned order." 5. After the order of the Apex Court dated 08.05.2017, the case was listed on 26.07.2017, thereafter Hon'ble Justice Ashwani Kumar Singh has refused to hear the matter and thereafter this matter was assigned to this Court. 6. From 23.08.2017 onwards, the case was adjourned at the instance of the parties and finally when the Court declined to grant further adjournment, the case was heard on 20.07.2018 and 23.07.2018. 7. Mr. Kanhaiya Prasad Singh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that the order taking cognizance dated 27.09.2011 is an abuse of the process of law and further submits that the order taking cognizance is unsustainable on facts as well as on law and as such the Court should exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Mr. Singh with reference to Annexure-2 (Fardbeyan) submitted that on 04.12.2010 the complainant of this case has lodged fardbeyan before the Station House Officer, Mufassil P.S., Katihar at the very first opportunity after the suicide of the husband of the complainant, but in her statement in the Fardbeyan nowhere any ill-treatment, misbehaviour or any act or omission constituting offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code against these petitioners were made. 8. With reference to Annexure-5, Mr. Singh submitted that in the instant case when the Predecessor Magistrate on 23.05.2011 passed order for production of Post-mortem report, inquest report of the deceased, injury report and bed head ticket of the complainant and the Fardbeyan of the complainant and result of U.D. case then without production of those documents the successor Magistrate wrongly took cognizance and as such the order taking cognizance is bad. 9. Mr. Singh with reference to order taking cognizance including Annexure-3 and Annexure-6 submitted that at the instance of the complainant enquiry was made and the enquiry report (Annexure-6) demonstrate that on enquiry the police has found the allegation to be false. Referring to Annexure7 onwards, he submits that the materials would indicate that the husband of the complainant has committed suicide on account of conduct of the complainant. Referring to Annexure7 onwards, he submits that the materials would indicate that the husband of the complainant has committed suicide on account of conduct of the complainant. He also referred to Annexure-8 Series to contend that the allegation of demand of dowry is palpably false, as the document would indicate that payment was made from the account of the petitioners in favour of the complainant and also that Rs. 3,50,000/- was paid in connection with fee of the complainant at Katihar Medical College which falsify the allegation of demand of dowry and cruelty by the petitioners for non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. 10. Referring to Complaint petition he submits that the complainant has also included her husband, who died on 04.12.2010, as accused no.5. He submits that in the present case without application of mind, the Magistrate has taken cognizance. He also contended that from perusal of the complaint petition, it would be evident that the allegations are leveled against the husband and not against these petitioners. He submits that reading in between the line of the complaint petition, it would be evident that the complaint was the device as a defence for the U.D. case registered at the instance of petitioner no.1 on 04.12.2010/08.12.2010. 11. Per contra, Mr. Rajendra Prasad Singh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant submits that the scope of interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is very limited. He submits that in the matter of order taking cognizance in complaint, the Court is only required to enquire whether prima facie case is made out or not. The High Court while exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not required to examine the merit of the case and in any manner not expected to examine the veracity or truthfulness of the allegation. He further submits that in the instant case, the Magistrate has passed the order on 23.05.2011 at the instance of opposite parties, who have no locus before commencement of trial. He supported the order taking cognizance saying that there is no infirmity in the order taking cognizance and from the contents of the complaint petition as well as statement of the complainant on Solemn Affirmation (SA) as well as deposition of different witnesses of the complainant, the case against these petitioners for the offence under Section 498A is well founded. 12. 12. On behalf of the complainant, reliance has been placed on different judgments of the Apex Court as well as this Court. Mr. Singh has placed reliance of the judgment in the case of Chanddhawan Vs. Jawaharlal, (1992) BBCJ(SC) 172 para 4 to 9 to contend that truthfulness is not scope of enquiry under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. He has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Das Vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr., (2011) 4 PLJR 216 (SC) to contend that reliability and the genuineness of the allegation is not open to scrutiny under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. He also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Premnarayan Mishra & Ors. Vs. The State of Bihar & Anr., (2017) 1 PCCR 478 to contend that the scope of enquiry under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is not open to examine the veracity of the allegation and the defence of the parties. Lastly, he also placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Upendra Rai Vs. The State of Bihar & Anr., (2017) 1 BBCJ 223 (para 4 to 6) and submitted that the Court has to see whether prima facie case is made out or not. 13. On behalf of the petitioner reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, (1992) AIR SC 604 (para 108) where the Apex Court has formulated the circumstance where the Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing of the criminal proceeding. Mr. Sanjay Kumar Verma, learned counsel for the petitioners, who assisted senior counsel Mr. Kanhaiya Prasad Singh has referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the Case of Neelu Chopra and Another Vs. Bharti, 2010 AllCriR 22 to contend that in the matter where the allegations are vague and not specific, who has committed the offence, what is the specific role committed by the accused persons, the order taking cognizance is fit to be quashed in exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 14. Adverting to the peculiar facts of this case, it is seen that the instant complaint was filed on 13.12.2010. Adverting to the peculiar facts of this case, it is seen that the instant complaint was filed on 13.12.2010. In the complaint petition there is not only reference of events and conduct of the petitioners as to post death of the husband of the complainant, but certain instance and conducts prior to death, even before the solemnization of marriage to make out prima facie case of cruelty for dowry to attract Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The complainant has impleaded her late husband Shashi Shekhar in the complaint petition as one of the accused. The complainant in her complaint petition as well as in her statement on S.A. has mentioned the detailed fact as to torture on account of non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. The complainant has impleaded her late husband Shashi Shekhar in the complaint petition as one of the accused. The complainant in her complaint petition as well as in her statement on S.A. has mentioned the detailed fact as to torture on account of non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. The relevant part of the complaint petition as well as statement on S.A. of the complainant reads as follows: ^^¼4½ ;g fd vfHk;qDrksa }kjk 'kknh ds dqN fnu igys ls gh ifjokfnuh ds firk ls ngst ds :i esa iUnzg yk[k :i;k ,oa ,d ek:fr ,l-,Dl-4 xkM+h dh ekax djus yxsA ysfdu ifjokfnuh ds firk us bl ekax dks iwjk djus esa viuh vleFkZrk trkbZA ¼5½ ;g fd ifjokfnuh dks llqjky esa vfHk;qDrx.k nks fnu rd Bhd ls j[ks mlds ckn mlds ifr] lkl] llqj] nsoj ,oa uUn ,oa vU; yksx ,d lkFk feydj nqO;Zogkj djuk 'kq: dj fn;k rFkk mls fofHkUu rjg ls izrkfM+r djus yxsA ges'kk ekjihV ,oa xkyh&xykSp djus yxsA tc Hkh og Qksu ls vius ekrk&firk ls ckr djuk pkgrh Fkh rks mls vfHk;qDrx.k ckr ugh djus nsrs Fks vkSj dgrs Fks fd firk ls :i;k ,oa xkM+h ekax dj ykvksA ¼22½ ;g fd fnukad 9 fnLkEcj] 2010 dks Jkn ,oa gou ds ckn 'kke esa lHkh vfHk;qDrx.k dkQh mxz gks x;s vkSj mls xkyh&xykSt nsus yxs rFkk lkl ,oa uUn us ekjihV fd;k rFkk mlds xksn ls mlds cPps dks fNu fy;k rFkk esjk xyk nckdj gR;k djus dk iz;kl fd;kA ¼23½ ;g fd mlds ckn lHkh vfHk;qDr feydj mldks ?kj ls tcjnLrh fudky fn;k rFkk esjh lkl ,oa llqj us lc xguk ,oa lkeku fNu fy;k vkSj j[k fy;Ka ¼24½ ;g fd fnukad 10 fnlEcj] 2010 dks fnu esa ifjokfnuh iqu% vius firk HkkbZ ,oa vU; xokgu ds lkFk vius xksy?kj fLFkr llqjky xbZ ysfdu iqu% vfHk;qDrksa us feydj mls ogka ls Hkxk fn;kA lkFk gh /kedh fn;k fd rqedks rFkk cPps ,oa cke&HkkbZ dks tku ls ejok nsaxsa vkSj yk'k dk irk Hkh ugh pysxkA Statement of Complainant on Solemn Affirmation 'kknh ds ckn fnukad 21-02-2009 dks fonk gksdj llqjky xksy?kj xbZA 'kknh esa firkth nkuLo:i nl yk[k :i;k ikap yk[k dk tsoj ,oa vU; ?kjsyw lkeku fn;sA llqjky esa eS ifr ds lkFk iRuh ds :i esa jgus yxhA 'kknh ds r; gksus ds i'pkr 'kknh ds iwoZ clUr flag ,oa lqtkrk flag esjs firk ls 15 yk[k :i;k rFkk ek:fr ,l ,Dl&4 dkj dh ekax ngst ds :i esa djus yxsA firkth nsus esa viuh vleFkZrk crk;s FksA llqjky esa eq>s nks fnu rd vPNk ls j[ks] mlds ckn llqj clUr flag] lkl lqtkrk flag] ifr 'k'kh 'ks[kj] uUn dfork vkuUn] nsoj pUnz 'ks[kj mQZ eksuw feydj esjs lkFk nqoZ;Ogkj pkyw dj fn;s rFkk eq>s fofHkUu rjg ls izrkfM+r djus yxsA lHkh dgus yxs fd 15 yk[k :i;k rFkk ,l ,Dl&4 vius firk ls ekax dj nksA ugh dgus ij lHkh eq>s ekj&ihV fd;k djrs Fks] ekrk&firk ls Qksu ij ckr djus ugh nsrs FksA esjh lkl lqtkrk flag ,oa uUn dfork vkUun us esjh xksn esa ls esjs cPpk dks Nhu fy;kA lkl lqtkrk flag us xyk nckdj esjh gR;k djus dk iz;kLk fd;kA mlds ckn lHkh feydj eq>s tcjnLrh ?kj ls fudky fn;kA firk HkkbZ LkHkh dks Hkxk fn;sA esjs llqj clUr flag o lkl lqtkrk flag esjk lkjk tsoj o lkeku Hkh Nhu fy;kA^^ 15. Learned Court below on the basis of the statement of the complainant on S.A. and on examination of the witnesses of the complainant while taking cognizance in the instant case has held out that no case is made out against accused nos. 3 to 9 and as such declined to issue process against opposite party nos. 3 to 9. From the discussion of the court below, it is manifest that the court below has applied its judicial mind while taking cognizance and issued process under Section 204 of the Cr.P.C. against these petitioners. 16. So far as contention of Mr. Rajendra Prasad Singh that opposite party has no locus standi before commencement of trial is well founded. From the entire ordersheet of the complaint case produced by the parties. From the order dated 20.07.2018, it is apparent that before taking cognizance in the instant case, the Judicial Magistrate has entertained the application filed on behalf of opposite party. The order dated 06.05.2011 is worth quoting: "6.5.11 Attendance filed on behalf of complainant. Petition along with some document and fresh power is filed on behalf of accused no.2 proposed in complaint petition namely Dr. Basant Singh. Copy of which is given to the complainant with filed copy of documents. Today case is fixed for order but prior to passing any order, hearing of complainant on the filed petition is essential. Learned counsel for complainant submits to file rejoinder to the petition filed by the proposed accused no.2 Dr. Basant Singh. Complainant is directed to file reply of the petition on the fixed date. Put up on 11.5.11 for filing rejoinder and hearing of complainant." 17. Thus, the order dated 06.05.2011 is clinching on the point that the predecessor Magistrate has entertained the application filed on behalf of opposite party at the stage before order taking cognizance. Law in this regard is well settled. The Apex Court has occasion to consider this issue in the case of Chandra Deo Singh Vs. Prokash Chandra Bose @ Chabi Bose and another, (1963) AIR SC 1430. The Apex Court has considered this issue in para 7 of the judgment, which is quoted below for ready reference: "(7) Taking the first ground, it seems to us clear from the entire scheme of Ch. XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure that an accused person does not come into the picture at all till process is issued. The Apex Court has considered this issue in para 7 of the judgment, which is quoted below for ready reference: "(7) Taking the first ground, it seems to us clear from the entire scheme of Ch. XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure that an accused person does not come into the picture at all till process is issued. This does not mean that he is precluded from being present when an enquiry is held by a Magistrate. He may remain present either in person or through a counsel or agent with a view to be informed of what is going on But since the very question for consideration being whether he should be called upon to face an accusation, he has no right to take part in the proceedings nor has the Magistrate any jurisdiction to permit him to do so. It would follow from this, therefore, that it would not be open to the Magistrate to put any question to witnesses at the instance of the person named as accused but against whom process has not been issued; nor can he examine any witnesses at the instance of such a person. Of course, the Magistrate himself is free to put such questions to the witnesses produced before him by the complainant as he may think proper in the interests of justice. But beyond that, he cannot go. It was, however, contended by Mr. Sethi for respondent No. 1 that the very object of the provisions of Ch. XVI of the' Code of Criminal Procedure is to prevent an accused person from being harassed by a frivolous complaint and, therefore, power is given to a Magistrate before whom complaint is made to postpone the issue of summons to the accused person pending the result of an enquiry made either by himself or by a Magistrate subordinate to him. A privilege conferred by these provisions can, according to Mr. Sethi, be waived by the accused person and he can take part in the proceedings. No doubt, one of the objects, behind the provisions of S. 202, Cr.P.C. is to enable the Magistrate to scrutinise carefully the allegations made in the complaint with a view to prevent a person named therein as accused from being called upon to face an obviously frivolous complaint. No doubt, one of the objects, behind the provisions of S. 202, Cr.P.C. is to enable the Magistrate to scrutinise carefully the allegations made in the complaint with a view to prevent a person named therein as accused from being called upon to face an obviously frivolous complaint. But there is also another object behind this provision and it is to find out what material there is to support the allegations made in the complaint. It is the bounden duty of the Magistrate while making an enquiry to elicit all facts not merely with a view to protect the interests of an absent accused person, but also with a view to bring to book a person or persons against whom grave allegations are made. Whether the complaint is frivolous or not has, at that stage, necessarily to be determined on the basis of the material placed before him by the complainant. Whatever defence the accused may have can only be enquired into at the trial. An enquiry under S. 202 can in no sense be characterised as a trial for the simple reason that in law there can be but one trial for an offence. Permitting an accused person to intervene during the enquiry would frustrate its very object and that is why the legislature has made no specific provision permitting an accused person to take part in an enquiry. It is true that there is no direct evidence in the case before us that the two persons who were examined as court witnesses were so examined at the instance of respondent No. 1 but from the fact that they were persons who were alleged to have been the -associates of respondent No. 1 in the first information report lodged by Panchanan Roy and who were alleged to have been arrested on the spot by some of the local people, they would not have been summoned by the Magistrate unless suggestion to that effect had been made by counsel appearing for respondent No. 1. This inference is irresistible and we hold that on this ground, the enquiry made by the enquiring Magistrate is vitiated. This inference is irresistible and we hold that on this ground, the enquiry made by the enquiring Magistrate is vitiated. In this connection; the' observations of this court in Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigsonkar, (1961) 1 SCR 1, may usefully be quoted: "The enquiry is for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint that is, for ascertaining whether there is evidence in support of the complaint so as to justify the issue of process and commencement of proceedings against the person concerned. The section does not say that a regular trial for adjudging the guilt or otherwise of the person complained against should take place at that stage for the person complained against can be legally called upon to answer the 'accusation made against him only when a process has issued and he is put on trial." 18. In view of the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Chandra Deo Singh, the opposite party has no locus standi before order taking cognizance. The view expressed by the Apex Court still hold the field, yet the predecessor Magistrate has entertained the application and that is the reason order dated 23.05.2011 was passed for production of certain documents, which were uncalled for and without jurisdiction. 19. Under the aforesaid circumstance, the Court does not find any substance in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that the order taking cognizance is bad for non-consideration of documents referred to in the order dated 23.05.2011. 20. The other documents placed on record by Mr. Singh for the purpose of submission that the materials would indicate that the petitioners are innocent and they have been falsely implicated in this case, the Court does not find any merit in the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners for the reason: (a) that in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., the court is supposed to exercise the power sparingly only in case to prevent the abuse of the process of law or for the ends of justice. (b) The scope of enquiry under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. as to the power exercised by the Magistrate in taking cognizance after enquiry under Section 202 is very limited. (b) The scope of enquiry under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. as to the power exercised by the Magistrate in taking cognizance after enquiry under Section 202 is very limited. The Court is only supposed to examine whether prima facie case is made out from the materials placed on record i.e. complaint petition and the evidence of complainant and the other witnesses of the complainant in the enquiry. The Apex Court has occasion to discuss in various cases the scope of enquiry at the stage of order taking cognizance. The Magistrate is not required to go into the merit of the case to ascertain whether the materials are sufficient to lead conviction or not. For the purpose of order taking cognizance, the Court is only required to see whether prima facie case is made out or not. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Thirukkural Perumal, (1995) 2 SCC 449 , the Apex Court has formulated the scope of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The relevant part of para 4 of the judgment is quoted herein below for ready reference: " The power of quashing a FIR and criminal proceedings should be exercised sparingly by the Courts. Indeed, the High Court has the extra-ordinary or inherent power to reach out injustice and quash the First Information Report and criminal proceedings, keeping in view the guidelines laid down by this Court in various judgments (reference in this connection may be made with advantage to State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., (1992) Supp1 SCC 335 but the same has to be done with circumspection. The normal process of the criminal trial cannot be cut short in a rather casual manner. The Court, is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of the allegations made in the FIR of the complaint on the basis of the evidence collected during investigation only while dealing with a petition under Section 432 Cr.P.C. seeking the quashing of the FIR and the criminal proceedings. The learned single Judge apparently fell into an error in evaluating the genuineness and, reliability of the allegations made in the FIR on the basis of the evidence collected during the investigation. The order of the learned single Judge cannot, therefore, be sustained. This appeal succeeds and is allowed. The learned single Judge apparently fell into an error in evaluating the genuineness and, reliability of the allegations made in the FIR on the basis of the evidence collected during the investigation. The order of the learned single Judge cannot, therefore, be sustained. This appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is hereby set aside." 21. The same view was reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Manik Taneja and another Vs. State of Karnataka and another, (2015) 7 SCC 423 wherein the Apex Court has reiterated the principle discussed in the principle formulated in the case of State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Thirukkural Perumal. The judgment relied upon by Mr. Rajendra Prasad Singh, learned senior counsel for complainant referred to herein above are more or less on the point that truthfulness are not matter of enquiry under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The genuineness, the veracity of the allegation or the defence cannot be looked into while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and under the aforesaid circumstance, the Court is of the view that in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court is not expected to enter into the veracity of the allegation, truthfulness of the allegation, adequacy or inadequacy of the materials available for taking cognizance or that the Court is required to see whether prima facie case is made out or not. 22. Adverting to the scope of interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing the criminal proceeding, as discussed above, the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, particularly, para 108 settler on the point, the Apex Court has formulated the scope of quashing of the criminal proceeding. From the materials available on record, the circumstance enumerated in Bhajan Lal case is not attracted in the instant case. The limited scope for discussion of this case is within the para-meter of exception 7, of para 108 of the judgment of State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others case is quoted herein below: "108. From the materials available on record, the circumstance enumerated in Bhajan Lal case is not attracted in the instant case. The limited scope for discussion of this case is within the para-meter of exception 7, of para 108 of the judgment of State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others case is quoted herein below: "108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases are given by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines orrigid formulae and to give and exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised: 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code; 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code; 5. 4. Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code; 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party; 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." Underline for Emphasis 23. The only area for scrutiny in this case is malafide of allegation, if the dominant purpose of the complaint is vexatious and malafide then the Court may interfere with the order, but such exercise of power is rarest of rare. Para 9 and 10 of the judgment in the case of Ganga Dhar Kalita Vs. State of Assam and Another, (2015) 9 SCC 647 is clinching on the point. Relevant part of the judgment aforesaid is quoted herein below for ready reference: "In Arun Bhandari v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2013) 2 SCC 801 , this Court has held that if the allegations in the First Information Report are not frivolous, mala fide or vexatious, it cannot be simply quashed for the reason that civil suit is also pending in the matter. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 33 of said case are reproduced below: - "2. The factual score as depicted is that the appellant is a non-resident Indian (NRI) living in Germany and while looking for a property in Greater Noida, he came in contact with Respondent 2 and her husband, Raghuvendra Singh, who claimed to be the owner of the property in question and offered to sell the same. The factual score as depicted is that the appellant is a non-resident Indian (NRI) living in Germany and while looking for a property in Greater Noida, he came in contact with Respondent 2 and her husband, Raghuvendra Singh, who claimed to be the owner of the property in question and offered to sell the same. On 24-3-2008, as alleged, both the husband and wife agreed to sell the residential plot bearing No. 131, Block Cassia Fistula Estate, Sector Chi-4, Greater Noida, U.P. for a consideration of Rs 2,43,97,880 and an agreement to that effect was executed by Respondent 3, both the husband and wife jointly received a sum of Rs 1,05,00,000 from the appellant towards part-payment of the sale consideration. It was further agreed that Respondents 2 and 3 would obtain permission from the Greater Noida Authority to transfer the property in his favour and execute the deed of transfer within 45 days from the grant of such permission. 3. As the factual antecedents would further reveal, the said agreement was executed on the basis of a registered agreement executed in favour of Respondent 3 by the original allottee, Smt Vandana Bhardwaj to sell the said plot. After expiry of a month or so, the appellant enquired from Respondent 3 about the progress of delivery of possession from the original allottee, but he [pic] received conflicting and contradictory replies which created doubt in his mind and impelled him to rush to Noida and find out the real facts from the Greater Noida Authority. On due enquiry, he came to know that there was a registered agreement in favour of the third respondent by Smt Vandana Bhardwaj; that a power of attorney had been executed by the original allottee in favour of Respondent 2, the wife of Respondent 3; that the original allottee, to avoid any kind of litigation, had also executed a will in favour of Respondent 3; and that Respondent 2 by virtue of the power of attorney, executed in her favour by the original allottee, had transferred the said property in favour of one Monika Goel who had got her name mutated in the record of the Greater Noida Authority. Coming to know about the aforesaid factual score, he demanded refund of the money from the respondents, but a total indifferent attitude was exhibited, which compelled him to lodge an FIR at Police Station Kasna, which gave rise to Criminal Case No. 563 of 2009. xxx xxx xxx 33. Applying the aforesaid parameters we have no hesitation in coming to hold that neither the FIR nor the protest petition was mala fide, frivolous or vexatious. It is also not a case where there is no substance in the complaint. The manner in which the investigation was conducted by the officer who eventually filed the final report and the transfer of the investigation earlier to another officer who had almost completed the investigation and the entire case diary which has been adverted to in detail in the protest petition prima facie makes out a case against the husband and the wife regarding collusion and the intention to cheat from the very beginning, inducing the appellant to hand over a huge sum of money to both of them. Their conduct of not stating so many aspects, namely, the power of attorney executed by the original owner, the will and also the sale effected by the wife in the name of Monika Singh on 28-7-2008 cannot be brushed aside at this stage." 10. No doubt, where the criminal complaints are filed in respect of property disputes of civil in nature only to harass the accused, and to pressurize him in the civil litigation pending, and there is prima facie abuse of process of law, it is well within the jurisdiction of the High Court to exercise its powers under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings. However, the powers under the section are required to be exercised sparingly. In Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of W.B. and others, (2002) 1 SCC 555 this Court has observed as under: - "This Court has consistently held that the revisional or inherent powers of quashing the proceedings at the initial stage should be exercised sparingly [pic] and only where the allegations made in the complaint or the FIR, even if taken at their face value and accepted in entirety, do not prima facie disclose the commission of an offence. Disputed and controversial facts cannot be made the basis for the exercise of the jurisdiction." 24. Disputed and controversial facts cannot be made the basis for the exercise of the jurisdiction." 24. Adverting to the judgment on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Sanjay Kumar Verma i.e. the case of Neelu Chopra and Another Vs. Bharti. Para 5 and 6 are relevant for discussion, which is quoted herein below for ready reference: "5. In order to lodge a proper compliant, mere mention of the sections and the language of those sections is not be all and end of the matter. What is required to be brought to the notice of the court is the particulars of the offence committed by each and every accused and the role played by each and every accused in committing of that offence. When we see the complaint, the complaint is sadly vague. It does not show as to which accused has committed what offence and what is the exact role played by these appellants in the commission of offence. There could be said something against Rajesh, as the allegations are made against him more precisely but he is no more and has already expired. Under such circumstances, it would be an abuse of process of law to allow the prosecution to continue against the aged parents of Rajesh, the present appellants herein on the basis of vague and general complaint which is silent about the precise acts of the appellants. 6. The High Court has merely mentioned that the allegation in the complaint are of retaining jewellery articles in possession of the husband and the petitioners. Now if the articles were in the possession of the husband, there is no question of the present appellants being in possession of the jewellery. This is apart from the fact that it has already been expressed by us that there is no mention of the date on which the said ornaments, if any, were entrusted to the appellants or even the date when they were demanded back and were refused to be given back by the appellants or any one of them. Insofar as the offence under Section 498A IPC is concerned, we do not find any material or allegation worth the name against the present appellants. All the allegations appear to be against the Rajesh." 25. Insofar as the offence under Section 498A IPC is concerned, we do not find any material or allegation worth the name against the present appellants. All the allegations appear to be against the Rajesh." 25. Applying the said principle, it is seen that the same is not attracted in this case as the learned Magistrate has meticulously discussed the material while taking cognizance and issued process against these petitioners and refused to issue process against accused nos. 3 to 9 of the complaint petition. 26. On consideration of materials available on record including the complaint petition, statement of the complainant on S.A., deposition of witnesses during enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. and the discussion made by the learned Magistrate while taking cognizance would indicate that the complainant has made out a prima facie case and the learned court below has not committed any illegality in taking cognizance. 27. So far as the malafide in filing present complaint is concerned, emphasis has been made on the background and to high light the events followed by suicide of the husband of the complainant is concerned, in view of the judgment of the Coordinate Bench where in similar circumstance, the Court held out that if the case is made out from the complaint, it cannot be disbelieved on the ground that earlier another case was filed by the accused. The facts situation of this case is similar and considering the totality of the facts situation, the Court is of the view that the when prima facie case is made out from the complaint and the complainant statement on S.A. and the deposition of the witnesses of the complainant during enquiry under Section 202 of Cr.P.C., the issue of malafide is not made out in the present case warranting interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 28. So far as impleadment of late husband in the complaint petition, Mr. Rajendra Prasad Singh with reference to statement of the complainant has explained that there was an error as the complainant has categorically mentioned that she has filed the complaint against the accused persons excluding the husband. The aforesaid error does not cut ice in the present case. 29. In view of the above, the Court does not find any merit in the present case. It is accordingly dismissed. 30. The aforesaid error does not cut ice in the present case. 29. In view of the above, the Court does not find any merit in the present case. It is accordingly dismissed. 30. However, before parting, the Court may deem it fit to observe that in order to restore the peace and better relationship in the family, if parties entered into compromise, then the court below will accept the compromise in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh and in the case of Jitendra Raghuvanshi and others Vs. Babita Raghuvanshi and another, (2013) 4 SCC 58 notwithstanding the fact that offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code is non-compoundable.