Bavchandbhai Ranchhodbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat
2018-10-01
RAJESH H.SHUKLA
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Rajesh H. Shukla, J. 1. The present petition is filed by the petitioners under Arts. 14, 19, 226 and 300A of the Constitution of India as well as under the provision of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code, 1879 and the Rules framed there under for the prayers as prayed for inter alia that appropriate writ, order or direction may be issued quashing and setting aside the order passed by the respondent No. 2-Collector, Surat dated 7-1-2011 and also the order passed by the respondent No. 1-Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department, State of Gujarat at Annexure-B dated 28-3-2016 on the grounds stated in the memo of petition. 2. The facts of the case briefly summarized are as follows:- 2.1. One Chhaganbhai Chhaniyabhai Halpati holding an agricultural land bearing Block Nos. 351 and 409 in the sim of Village : Tarbhon, Taluka : Bardoli, District : Surat, executed a registered Will on 29-12-2003 bequeathing land bearing Block No. 351 in favour of the petitioner No. 1 and land bearing Block No. 409 in favour of the petitioner No. 2. 2.2. The said Chhaganbhai Chhaniyabhai Halpati expired on 18-5-2004, which led to mutation of entry in favour of the petitioners dated 1-6-2004. However, the proceedings were initiated under Sec. 73AA of the Land Revenue Code that such a transfer of land is in breach of the provision of Sec. 73AA of the Land Revenue Code and the Mamlatdar rejected the entry, which led to filing of Appeal Nos. 29 and 30 of 2005 before the Deputy Collector, Vyara, who passed an order at Annexure-D granting mutation of entry in favour of the petitioners. However, it led to further transaction, for which, entries have been made as stated in detail in the memo of petition. 2.3. The respondent No. 2 in exercise of suo motu powers started proceeding to cancel the said Entry No. 2155 vide Notice dated 6-10-2010. 2.4. Therefore, the petitioners preferred Revision and impugned order came to be passed, which has been challenged in the present petition. 3. Heard learned Advocate, Shri B.S. Patel appearing with learned Advocate, Shri Chirag Patel for the petitioners and learned A.G.P. Shri Manan Mehta for the respondents. 4. Learned Advocate, Shri Patel referred to the papers and background of the facts and submitted that land originally belonged to one Chhaganbhai Chhaniyalal Halpati, who by Will bequeathed the land to the petitioner Nos.
Heard learned Advocate, Shri B.S. Patel appearing with learned Advocate, Shri Chirag Patel for the petitioners and learned A.G.P. Shri Manan Mehta for the respondents. 4. Learned Advocate, Shri Patel referred to the papers and background of the facts and submitted that land originally belonged to one Chhaganbhai Chhaniyalal Halpati, who by Will bequeathed the land to the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2. Thereafter, the entry was sought to be made, which was rejected by the Mamlatdar on the ground of breach of provision of Sec. 73AA of the Land Revenue Code. However, the petitioner approached the Deputy Collector, who allowed Appeal and allowed the entry to be made. Therefore, the Collector in exercise of suo motu powers set aside the order passed by the Deputy Collector by an order at Annexure-A, which led to filing of Revision before the Secretary (Appeals), which came to be rejected by impugned order. 5. Learned Advocate, Shri Patel referred to the provision of Sec. 73AA of the Land Revenue Code and emphasized the word "shall not be transferred to any person". He, therefore, submitted that the devolution of the land by Will would not amount to transfer. Learned Advocate, Shri Patel has emphasized with reference to the provision of Sec. 73A of the Land Revenue Code and submitted that sub-sec. (7) of Sec. 73AA refers to the penalty suggesting that it could be regularized. Therefore, learned Advocate, Shri Patel submitted that at the most, the transaction could be voidable and not void. Learned Advocate, Shri Patel has referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Mahadeo (dead through legal representatives) v. Shakuntalabai, reported in 2017 (13) SCC 756 and submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court has made the observations referring to Sec. 57 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 that the transfer by devolution by Will would not amount to transfer of property. He pointedly referred to the observation made in Paragraph Nos. 5 and 6 of the said judgment. Paragraph No. 5 reads as under: "5...................There is no prohibition insofar as the transfer of land by way of an Will is concerned. In fact, in view of the decision of this Court in State of W.B. v. Kailash Chandra Kapur, 1997 (2) SCC 387 devolution of property by way of a Will does not amount to a transfer of the property.
In fact, in view of the decision of this Court in State of W.B. v. Kailash Chandra Kapur, 1997 (2) SCC 387 devolution of property by way of a Will does not amount to a transfer of the property. This is clear from Para 12 of the aforesaid decision wherein it has been observed that transfer connotes, normally, between two living person during life. However, a Will takes effect after demise of the testator and transfer in that perspective becomes incongruous." 6. Similarly, learned Advocate, Shri Patel referred to the judgment of the High Court in case of Pravinbhai Bhailalbhai Gor v. Rajivkumar Gupta, Collector, Vadodara, reported in 1991 (1) GLR 440. He emphasized the observations made in Paragraph No. 5 to support his contention. He also emphasized the provision of Sees. 63 and 63AA of the Land Revenue Code and submitted that the transaction in question is not sale, gift, exchange, lease, and therefore, would not be covered under Sec. 63 of the Land Revenue Code. He pointedly referred to the observations made in the aforesaid judgment: "The Will is not a document of transfer by way of sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease or assignment. It is instrument changing the course of devolution of interest by way of inheritance which even otherwise would have taken where the holder had died without a Will, by way of intestate succession. The inheritance in the case of intestate succession would have been as declared in the Act. Neither Sec. 43 nor Sec. 63 envisage prior permission of any authority for executing a Will that would take effect after the death of a person which he has right to vary, cancel or modify anytime before his death, as many times as the testator desires. Thus, the very premise on the basis of which the learned Collector, Vadodara, had issued Notice dated 29-11-1997 is on the face of it contrary to law and cannot be sustained. No other ground for initiating proceedings has been shown in the notice to show cause or urged." 7. Learned Advocate, Shri Patel also referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court in case of State of Gujarat v. Pravinbhai Bhailalbhai Gor, reported in 2000 (3) GLR 2168 . 8.
No other ground for initiating proceedings has been shown in the notice to show cause or urged." 7. Learned Advocate, Shri Patel also referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court in case of State of Gujarat v. Pravinbhai Bhailalbhai Gor, reported in 2000 (3) GLR 2168 . 8. Learned Advocate, Shri Patel also referred to Sec. 63AA of the Land Revenue Code and submitted that such power could be exercised within a reasonable time and could not have been exercised beyond a period of three years. He submitted that therefore also, the order is bad. He submitted that the Deputy Collector has allowed the appeal referring to the judgment of the High Court in case of Pravinbhai Bhailalbhai Gor (supra). He, therefore, submitted that as the land in question has been conveyed by devolution by 'Will', the provision of Tenancy Act or the Land Revenue Code would not be attracted and the present petition may be allowed. 9. Learned A.G.P. Shri Manan Mehta referred to the background of the facts and submitted that first aspect about the delay is required to be considered. He submitted that it cannot be said to be delay or beyond reasonable period as observed in the judgment and the pronouncement of the High Court and the Hon'ble Apex Court. He submitted that as provided in Sec. 63AA of the Land Revenue Code, it refers to "Restriction on transfer of occupancies of tribals to tribals or non-tribals". Learned A.G.P. Shri Mehta submitted that these restrictions have been imposed to protect the land of the tribal by putting such restrictions on transfer of land of tribal to non-tribal and others, who are not agriculturist. He referred to Sec. 73AA(4) of the Land Revenue Code and submitted that it has been observed: "Collector shall notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time-being in force, either suo-motu at any time, or on an application made by the tribal transferor or his successor in interest at any time within three years from the said date or the date of such transfer, whichever is later, after issuing a notice to the transferee or his successor-in-interest as the case may be, to show cause why the transfer should not be declared void....................." 10.
Learned A.G.P. Shri Mehta, therefore, submitted that it provides that on an application by transferor within three years, it could be examined, whereas the Collector can in exercise of suo motu at any time examine and scrutinize such an entry. He submitted, that therefore, there is no specific time-limit and exercise of power by the authority like the respondent No. 2 in the present case cannot be said to be beyond a reasonable period. Again for that purpose, he referred to the facts and background and submitted that in such cases, when the notice has been issued, and thereafter, it has been verified, it cannot be said to be unreasonable. Learned A.G.P. Shri Mehta submitted that the Mamlatdar had not certified entry, and therefore, the Appeal was preferred before the Deputy Collector, who allowed such entry, and thereafter, the proceedings have been initiated. 11. Learned A.G.P. Shri Mehta submitted that another contention about the transfer of land by Will is not a transfer and it is a devolution, is misconceived. For that purpose, learned A.G.P. Shri Mehta referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court (Coram : S.J. Mukhopadhaya, C.J. and K.M. Thaker, J.) in case of Shamjibhai Keshavjibhai Kansagra (Patel) v. Principal Secretary, Revenue Dept. (Appeals), reported in AIR 2011 Guj. 55. He submitted that in Paragraph No. 22 of the said judgment, same issue has been considered, which is quoted as under: "22. The question arises as to whether any living person can execute a document in contravention of any law. The answer is always in negative. If law do not permit and there is a prohibition to do certain thing, or there is a prohibition to do certain act except in certain manner, any document or agreement or anything in contravention to such provision of law, is illegal and invalid. During the life-time of a living person, if the person is under restriction to execute certain document, and thereby, has no right to transfer his occupancy or no right to transfer his interest under one or other Act, he cannot execute any document, including a Will showing his wish and intention in regard to such property in contravention of such law.
Therefore, a tribal even cannot wish nor can show his intention to transfer his right of occupancy to a tribal or non-tribal, there being restriction under Sec. 73AA of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. Similarly, a tenant-owner of agricultural land cannot wish nor can show his intention to transfer his right on agricultural land to a non-agriculturist by executing a Will in contravention of Sec. 63 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, except in the manner prescribed there under. Any such wish and intention shown by testator during his lifetime, being in contravention of law, as noticed above, is invalid and can be ignored." 12. Similarly, learned A.G.P. Shri Merita emphasized the observations made in Paragraph Nos. 23 and 24. Learned A.G.P. Shri Mehta emphasized that word "assignment" in Sec. 63 of the Land Revenue Code has to be considered broadly. He emphasized the observations made in Paragraph No. 23 quoting the judgment of this High Court in case of Rajenbhai Baldevbhai Shah v. Baijiben Kabhaibhai Patanvadia, reported in 2009 (2) GLR 1784 : "We wonder when testator statutorily debarred from transferring the agricultural lands to a non-agriculturist during his life-time, then how he can be permitted to make a declaration of his intention to transfer agricultural land to a non-agriculturist to be operative after his death. Such attempt of testator, in our view, is clearly against the public policy and would defeat the object and purpose of the Tenancy Act. Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, acknowledges testamentary succession as a mode of succession, but not, by defeating the purpose and object of any legislation, like Tenancy Law. The legislative intent that an agricultural land shall not go into the hands of a non-agriculturist is manifest in Sec.63 of the Bombay Tenancy Act. In a country like ours where agriculture is the main source of livelihood, the restriction imposed in Sec. 63, cannot be given a go-bye, by a device. Obvious purpose of Sec. 63, is to prevent indiscriminate conversion of agricultural lands for non agricultural purpose and that provision strengthens the presumption that agricultural land is not to be used as per the holder's caprice or sweet-will." 13. Further, he emphasized the observations made in Paragraph No. 24: "24.
Obvious purpose of Sec. 63, is to prevent indiscriminate conversion of agricultural lands for non agricultural purpose and that provision strengthens the presumption that agricultural land is not to be used as per the holder's caprice or sweet-will." 13. Further, he emphasized the observations made in Paragraph No. 24: "24. Therefore, even if it is accepted that the transfer under the Transfer of Property Act is a conveyance of an existing property by one living person to another, and Will does not involve any transfer, but if a Will is executed in contravention of law, it is always open to the authority to ignore such Will and may refuse to mutate the name on the basis of such Will." 14. Learned A.G.P. Shri Mehta also referred to the observations made in a judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this High Court (Coram : K.S. Radhakrishnan, C.J. and Akil Kureshi, J.) in case of Rajenbhai Baldevbhai Shah v. Baijiben Kabhaibhai Patanvadia, reported in 2009 (2) GLR 1784 and submitted that as observed, word "transfer" has been discussed with reference to the interpretation by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment in case of State of Punjab v. Amar Singh, reported in AIR 1974 SC 994 . 15. In rejoinder, learned Advocate, Shri Patel again referred to the provision of Sec. 73AA of the Land Revenue Code. He also referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench reported in case of Shamjibhai Keshavjibhai Kansagra AIR 2011 Guj. 55. Learned Advocate, Shri Patel referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court (Coram : R. Subhash Reddy, C.J. and Vipul M. Pancholi, J.) in case of Somabhai Sharubhai Gamit v. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 2018 Guj. 5 and emphasized the observations made in Paragraph No. 12. He emphasized the observations that the Collector can take action within a period of three years from the date of transfer. Learned Advocate, Shri Patel also referred to the judgment of this High Court in case of Ahmedbhai Abdulgani Memon v. State of Gujarat, reported in 1972 GLR 354 . 16. In view of the rival submissions, it is required to be considered whether the present petition deserves consideration. 17.
Learned Advocate, Shri Patel also referred to the judgment of this High Court in case of Ahmedbhai Abdulgani Memon v. State of Gujarat, reported in 1972 GLR 354 . 16. In view of the rival submissions, it is required to be considered whether the present petition deserves consideration. 17. First aspect which has been emphasized with reference to Will that it is not a transfer of land but devolution of property by way of Will, and therefore, it would not amount to transfer of property, is required to be considered. However, before this aspect could be examined, it is necessary to address the history and underlying purpose and object of such restrictions imposed by the Legislature by provision of the Tenancy Act and also Land Revenue Code. The objects and reasons of the Tenancy Act and also Land Revenue Code could be a guidance for considering such issues while interpreting the specific words when it has been emphasized that the Legislature has not provided for such transfer by devolution as it has not been mentioned specifically. The Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court in a judgment in case of Ahmedbhai Abdulgani Memon, [ 1972 GLR 354 ], while considering the aspect of constitutional validity and challenge to such provision like Sees. 70, 73, 73A and 79A of the Land Revenue Code had occasion to examine with reference to Art. 14 and the charges of arbitrariness, it has been observed: "The object behind the provision was to protect the members of the Scheduled Tribes against exploitation. They are persons primarily attached to land. They are wholly dependent upon the land. If they are made to part with the land they would suffer immense hardship and possibly they would be rendered destitute. In order to extend the protection to such class in respect of land held by them, even the Constitution makes a special provision that the Governor may restrict transfer of land in scheduled areas. Section 73A and especially the notification issued there under, seeks to effectuate the very purpose underlying Para 5 of the Fifth Schedule read with Art. 244 of the Constitution. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the scheme of Sees. 70, 73, 73A and 79A fixes norms and provides guidance for the exercise of power.
Section 73A and especially the notification issued there under, seeks to effectuate the very purpose underlying Para 5 of the Fifth Schedule read with Art. 244 of the Constitution. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the scheme of Sees. 70, 73, 73A and 79A fixes norms and provides guidance for the exercise of power. Therefore, these Sections and especially Sec. 73A fix the norms and provide guidance and the power thereby conferred cannot be said to be uncontrolled, unbriddled or arbitrary and cannot be challenged under Art. 14 of the Constitution." 18. In the aforesaid judgment, it has also been observed that such restrictions are protecting the interest of Scheduled Tribe. 19. A useful reference can be made to another judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court in case of Rajenbhai Baldevbhai Shah, 2009 (2) GLR 1784 . The Hon'ble Division Bench while referring to same issue of restriction on transfer of land under Sec. 43 of the Tenancy Act, had considered the same issue as to whether the expression assignment would include such devolution. It has been observed in the said judgment referring to word "assignment" while considering Karnataka Land Reforms Act by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment in case of Sangappa Kalyanappa Bangi (dead) through L.Rs., reported in AIR 1998 SC 3229 : ".............. The question arose whether the expression 'assignment' would take in a Will. The Court held that on a fair construction of Sec. 61, a transfer of agricultural land with occupancy right is permissible only in favour of one of the heirs, who would be entitled to claim partition of land, and not others, having regard to the definition of 'family' as contained in Sec. 2(12) and 'joint family' as contained in Sec. 2(17) of the said Act." 20. Further, in the said judgment, the Hon'ble Division Bench having considered with reference to Sec. 43 of the Tenancy Act has observed: "Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy Act uses same expression 'assignment', and in our view, the same meaning attributed by the Apex Court to the word 'assignment' be attributed to Sec. 43 as well. We find no reason to ascribe a different meaning to that word in the context of Bombay Tenancy Act.
We find no reason to ascribe a different meaning to that word in the context of Bombay Tenancy Act. We also hold that when there is a disposition of rights under a Will, though operates posthumously, is nevertheless a recognition of the right of the legatee there under as to his rights of the tenanted land. If Sec. 43 of the Bombay Tenancy Act does not apply in such a situation then the tenant could assign his interest to strangers, which will completely negatives the object and purpose of Sec. 43 and defeat the intents of the Legislature. We, therefore, hold that the word 'assignment' in Sec. 43 would take in a 'Will' also and is governed by the statutory provisions and the same shall be parted, only with the previous sanction of the Collector. Statutory tenancies, therefore, cannot be devised by 'Will', nor do they become subject to the rules of intestacy." 21. Again discussion has been made with reference to Will and provision of Sec. 63 of the Land Revenue Code and Sec. 43 of the Tenancy Act and it has been observed: "..................Where the Legislature deem it expedient to fetter the privilege of free alienation, the prohibition founded upon conditions of public interest, must be treated as obsolete. General rule is that property of any kind may be transferred by way of gift or Will, sale, etc. unless non-transferability is barred due to existence of any law. Willian's Law relating to Will, Sixth Edition, Volume I, page 60 states that the power of disposition by Will is not at the testator's caprice, but extends only to the creation of those interests, which are recognized by law. Theobold on Wills, Fourth Edition, Page 629, says that a condition which is illegal or contrary to the policy of the law is void." 22. Therefore, as the Tenancy Act or the Land Revenue Code does not authorize such transfer of land in favour of non-agriculturist without permission, same are considered as void and impermissible. Therefore, if such agricultural land which a person during his life-time could not transfer to a non-agriculturist, is allowed to be conveyed in this fashion by Will would defeat the very soul of the legislation and would frustrate the very purpose of such Legislature like Tenancy Act, which has been made to protect the interest of the weaker section and agriculturist from any exploitation.
Further, if any attempt to transfer of agricultural land in favour of non-agriculturist, which is not permissible during his life-time, is allowed by such device as observed, then it would be contrary to the public policy or rather could be considered as a device to frustrate the underlying object of Legislature like Tenancy Act. Therefore, as observed, the Hindu Succession Act, acknowledges testamentary succession as a mode of succession, but not, by defeating the purpose and object of any legislation, like Tenancy Law. Therefore, as rightly emphasized with the observations by learned A.G.P., Shri Mehta, which is required to be considered. It has been observed: "The legislative intent that an agricultural land shall not go into the hands of a non-agriculturist is manifest in Sec. 63 of the Bombay Tenancy Act. In a country like ours, where agriculture is the main source of livelihood, the restriction imposed in Sec. 63, cannot be given a go-bye, by a device. Obvious purpose of Sec. 63, is to prevent indiscriminate conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purpose and that provision strengthens the presumption that agricultural land is not to be used as per the holder's caprice or sweet-will." 23. The Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment State of Punjab v. Amur Singh, AIR 1974 SC 994 , which has been referred to by the Hon'ble Division Bench, has considered and interpreted a word "transfer". The Hon'ble Division Bench in a judgment in case of Rajenbhai Baldevbhai Shah, 2009 (2) GLR 1784 , has observed in Paragraph No. 11: "The expression 'transfer' was interpreted by the Apex Court in the context of Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953. Apex Court in State of Punjab (Now Haryana) v. Amar Singh, AIR 1974 SC 994 held the expression 'transfer' is wide enough to cover transfer by operation of law unless expressly excluded. Special exclusions to save transfer by way of inheritance and compulsory land acquisition by State have been made which would have been supererogatory had involuntary transfers automatically gone out of the pale of Sec. 10A(b). Apex Court held that the triple objects of the agrarian reform projected by the Act appear to be (a) to impart security to tenure, (b) to make the tiller the owner, and (c) to trim large land holdings, setting sober ceiling.
Apex Court held that the triple objects of the agrarian reform projected by the Act appear to be (a) to impart security to tenure, (b) to make the tiller the owner, and (c) to trim large land holdings, setting sober ceiling. The Apex Court held that basic judicial approach must be to discover this soul of the law and strive to harmonize the many limbs to subserve the pervasive spirit and advance the social project of the enactment. The Apex Court in Dayandeo Ganapat Jadhav v. Madhav Vitthal Bhaskar, 2005 (8) SCC 340 , while interpreting the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 held that the Act has been enacted with a view to protect the tenants and the provisions of the Act, therefore, must be construed in favour of a weaker class of society to ensure that the object underlying the Act is fulfilled. The Act has been described as a beneficial legislation to protect the tenants as well as the agriculturists and parties cannot be allowed to defeat the object and purpose of the Act by executing testamentary disposition." 24. Therefore, the provision of Sec. 73AA of the Land Revenue Code is required to be considered keeping in mind the aforesaid broad guidelines. Section 73A of the Land Revenue Code refers to the power to restrict the right of transfer. The provision of Sec. 73 has a reference to "Occupancy to be transferable and heritable". Similar provisions are to be found in the Tenancy Act imposing restrictions on a transfer by Will, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease or assignment. Therefore, as discussed above, word "assignment" has been considered by the Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court with detailed discussion on the aspect of such right of transfer or devolution by Will or device of a Will. It has been specifically observed that such device is not permissible when the Legislature imposes restriction on transfer. Thus it will be evident that there is a restriction on transfer of occupancy of land by tribal by any mode whether sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease or assignment and/or even under Will.
It has been specifically observed that such device is not permissible when the Legislature imposes restriction on transfer. Thus it will be evident that there is a restriction on transfer of occupancy of land by tribal by any mode whether sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease or assignment and/or even under Will. While considering the interpretation of word "assignment" with reference to Will, it has been considered by the Hon'ble Division Bench in a judgment in case of Rajenbhoi Baldevbhai Shah, 2009 (2) GLR 1784 , that it has to be given a wider meaning and interest would also include in such devise of Will, which is not permissible without prior sanction of the competent authority under the Act. Thus, while considering such an issue, one has to have regard to underlying purpose of the Act like Tenancy Act and Land Revenue Code and the approach must be to give meaning and interpretation, which fulfills the legislative intention. Therefore, as observed, the basic judicial approach must be to discover this soul of the law and strive to harmonize the many limbs to sub serve the pervasive spirit and advance the social object of the enactment. Therefore, such acts like Tenancy Act have been enacted as a beneficial legislation to protect the tenants as well as the agriculturists and parties cannot be allowed to defeat the object and purpose of the Act by executing testamentary disposition or device like Will. 25. Another facet of submissions, which have been made relying upon the judgment and observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Mahadeo (dead through legal representatives) v. Shakuntalabai, 2017 (13) SCC 756 , is required to be considered with binding precedent. There is no quarrel that such judgments and observations are binding. However, at the same time, the judgment has not considered earlier judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court as discussed above. Further, the observations, which have been made in this judgment relying upon the observations made in earlier judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of S. Rathinam alias Kuppamuthu v. L.S. Mariappan, reported in 2007 (6) SCC 724 , has to be considered in background of the facts and the context, in which, the observations have been made.
Further, the observations, which have been made in this judgment relying upon the observations made in earlier judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of S. Rathinam alias Kuppamuthu v. L.S. Mariappan, reported in 2007 (6) SCC 724 , has to be considered in background of the facts and the context, in which, the observations have been made. The facts in a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of S. Rathinam alias Kuppamuthu, 2007 (6) SCC 724 , were totally different with regard to the bequeathed shebaitship by Will. This is kind of issue regarding inheritability and religious endowment. It is in this context, the observations have been made that Will is not a transfer, but a mode of devolution. Thus, it is totally in a different context. Similarly, the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of State of W.B. v. Kailash Chandra Kapur, reported in 1997 (2) SCC 387 , which is also referred to, has a reference to grant of lease and the word "transfer" has been considered in the context of lease-deed as to whether such right could be assigned by way of transfer or assignment. In the facts of the case, the issue is with regard to the restriction or prohibition by legislative enactment made with specific social purpose and object sought to be achieved in the public interest to protect the agriculturist from being exploited. Therefore, the text of enactment has to be read in the context of the underlying purpose or the object and the material. The word like transfer defines in a different context in another statute may have to be considered in the context of the Act. 26. It is in this background, when the transfer of the agricultural land has been restricted, the words "assignment" or "transfer" have to be considered in broader sense, which has also been considered by the Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court in a judgment in case of Rajenbhai Baldevbhai Shah, [ 2009 (2) GLR 1784 ], addressing same issue with regard to the restriction on transfer of land and whether it could be by Will, which may amount to defeating very object and purpose of the Legislation. Therefore, the same issue with regard to same statutory provision and Will has been considered as discussed above.
Therefore, the same issue with regard to same statutory provision and Will has been considered as discussed above. Again it has been observed specifically that as a general rule, property may be transferred by way of gift or Will unless transferability are barred by any existence law. Reference is made to Theobold on Wills, Fourth Edition and Willian's Law relating to Will, Sixth Edition, providing that testator does not have any right for disposition of such a land by Will defeating the specific statutory provision. Same view has been reiterated in another judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court in case of Shamjibhai Keshavjibhai Kansagra, AIR 2011 Guj. 55, wherein it has been specifically observed: "Therefore, even if it is accepted that the transfer under the Transfer of Property Act, is a conveyance of an existing property by one living person to another, and Will does not involve any transfer, but if a Will is executed in contravention of law, it is always open to the authority to ignore such Will and may refuse to mutate the name on the basis of such Will." 27. Further, it has also to be considered that whether a person can be permitted to do indirectly what he cannot do directly during his life-time. In other words, whether a person can transfer the land, which is not permissible due to restriction by such device of a Will. The word "transfer" has a reference to conveyance between two living persons. The devolution by such device of Will would also amount to transfer of interest in the property like land by such device, which may take effect after the death. Therefore, it is a devolution and not transfer as sought to be canvassed. Further, what is not permitted during life-time as stated above, could not be made permissible by execution of some device like the documents of disposition or Will. Unless, the restriction qua land for such transfer would not go away, and therefore, it has been observed that the provision of the Act, which restricts any kind of transfer of land by whatever nomenclature like transfer, lease or assignment has to be interpreted broadly fulfilling the underlying object and purpose of the Act and not defeating such purpose of the Act. 28.
28. Therefore, in light of the discussion made here in above, the present petition cannot be entertained and deserves to be dismissed and accordingly stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief stands vacated. No order as to cost. FURTHER ORDER: After the judgment and order was pronounced, learned Advocate, Shri Chirag Patel has requested for stay of the operation of the order, which is declined.