ORDER : Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. Appellant-State is aggrieved by part of the impugned judgment dated 27th September. 2016 passed in W.P. (S) No. 1545/2012 whereunder a direction has also been issued for payment of equal pay for equal work to the writ petitioner/respondent herein on the premise that he had worked on daily wages under the respondents since long. Apart from the above learned Single Judge had also directed the respondent No.2-Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Jharkhand Ranchi to consider the application of the writ petitioner for regularization of his service under the new regularization rules framed by the State Government vide notification No. 1348 dated 13th February, 2015. 3. Petitioner had approached the Writ Court with a prayer to regularize his service and also for making payment of salary on the basis of the principle of "equal pay to equal work". 4. Facts as are not in dispute and culled out from paragraph-5 of the counter-affidavit of the respondent-State/appellant herein were recorded in the impugned order and are usefully reproduced hereunder as well :- "(a) Four persons namely Sri Mantu Gopal Mohanty, Sri Chandrashekhar Prasad, Sri Bhagwati Lal Srivastava and Sri Krishanballabh Kumar were appointed in the Forest department in Palamu District. (b) On these appointments, a writ was filed in Hon'ble High Court, Patna (CWJC No. 861/1989(R)). In this, judgment was passed by the Hon'ble High Court, Patna which nullified the appointments. In the judgment it was also directed to make appointment after due advertisement. (c) On the basis of the order, an advertisement No. 5-7/91 was issued in March, 1991 for appointment to the posts of Range Clerks. (d) A selection committee was constituted for selection of the candidates for appointment. (e) Tests were conducted and 44 persons were selected. (f) Appointment letters were issued to all of them in which Sri Sachidanand Pandey (petitioner) was also included. Appointment letter was issued by the Conservator of Forest, State Trading Palamau Circle-2, Daltonganj vide office Order No. 39, dated 30.11.1991]. He was later on posted in Daltonganj South State Trading Division, Daltonganj and further he was deputed to Regional Chief Conservator of Forest, Palamau Office. (g) The Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Bihar vide letter No. 57 dated 10.1.1992 cancelled all the appointments. He was later on posted in Daltonganj South State Trading Division, Daltonganj and further he was deputed to Regional Chief Conservator of Forest, Palamau Office. (g) The Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Bihar vide letter No. 57 dated 10.1.1992 cancelled all the appointments. (h) An interim order was passed by the Hon'ble High Court, Ranchi Bench on 24.2.1992 in case No. CWJC 484/1992(R) in which it was directed not to take any coercive measure against the petitioner. On the basis of the above interim order, the establishment committee of Palamau Region, on 28.2.1992 stayed the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Bihar Order No. 57 dated 10.1.1992. (i) Later on, the Hon'ble High Court, Ranchi Bench on 11.3.1992 in Case No. CWJC 484(R)/1992 quashed the order of the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Bihar letter No. 57 dated 10.1.1992. (j) The Forest and Environment Department, Government of Bihar vide letter No. 6129 dated 28.11.1992 cancelled all the appointments in Palamau. (k) Several writs CWJC No. 12595/93, 986/93, 977/93 and 1262/93 were filed in the Hon'ble High Court, Patna. (l) All writs were tagged and after hearing both parties order was passed on 05.04.1994 and quashed the order of Forest & Environment Department, Government of Bihar letter No. 6129 dated 28.11.1992. (m) In the said order it was also noted that 6 outside candidates had secured more points than the six petitioners appointed in the General Category at Sl. No. 10 to 15. It was further held that the outside candidates must be offered appointments and in case all six outside candidates responds to the offer of appointment. The petitioners appointed in the General category from Sl. No. 10 to 15 must go out to make room for those outside candidates. Sri Pandey was also one of the candidates who was placed between SL. No. 10 to 15 and had secured lower marks than the outside candidates. However, one silver lining was added to the judgment to the effect that in case the petitioners are removed to make room for the outside candidates they were at liberty to make representation before the concerned authority for appointment against any existing vacancies. In terms of the aforesaid order dated 5.5.1994 representations were submitted by 9 persons including the concerned workman which was considered and since there was very little job requirement in State Trading Circle Daltonganj the representation was rejected vide order dated 18.9.1999. In terms of the aforesaid order dated 5.5.1994 representations were submitted by 9 persons including the concerned workman which was considered and since there was very little job requirement in State Trading Circle Daltonganj the representation was rejected vide order dated 18.9.1999. (n) Pursuant to the order passed by the Hon'ble High Court and its observation to give appointment to the outside candidates in place of candidates selected and who has secured lower marks in termination order was issued. Sri Pandey continued and still continues to work in the Regional Chief Conservator of Forest, Palamau Office, albeit on daily wages. (o) The Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Jharkhand, Ranchi vide letter No. 2944 dated 16.8.2008 has dismissed the representation to Sri Pandey for regularization and payment of arrears. (p) Pursuant thereof an advise was sought by the Forest and Environment Department. Government of Jharkhand from the Law Department, Government of Jharkhand regarding the case of Sri Sachidanand Pandey. The Law Department has given advise and it has been treated that Sri Pandey is entitled to get wages for working as daily wage. The Forest and Environment Department vide letter No. 3839 dated 15.10.2011 communicated the advise to the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Jharkhand regarding the matter. (q) The petitioners and others had filed a writ No. CWJC No. 6578/ 1995 in which they pleaded for regularisation of their services but no relief was granted in this case later on they filed an LPA No. 714/1996. in which no relief was also granted." 5. Apparently from the narrative of facts noted above it appears that by an order dated 5th April. 1994 rendered by the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. Nos. 12595/1993, 986/1993. 977/1993 and 1262/1993 it was held that the petitioners therein including the present writ petitioner who were appointed in the General category at serial Nos. 10 to 15 had to make room for those outside candidates who had scored more points. Learned Court however also observed that in case the petitioners are removed to make room for the outside candidates they are at liberty to make representation before the concerned authority for appointment against any existing vacancies. Representations made by the petitioners including the present one were however rejected. Apparently 6 outside candidates got into service but this petitioner was allowed to continue on daily wages. 6. Representations made by the petitioners including the present one were however rejected. Apparently 6 outside candidates got into service but this petitioner was allowed to continue on daily wages. 6. In these factual light learned senior counsel for the appellants-State has made the following submissions :- (i) The status of the applicant was of a daily wager employee who had continued even after the judgment of the learned Patna High Court perhaps on sympathetic considerations. (ii) The writ petitioner's prayer for regularization thereafter however was also negated vide judgment passed in C.W.J.C. No. 6578/1995 and L.P.A. No. 714/1996. No relief was granted to the writ petitioner on the plea of regularization in service. (iii) The issue relating to minimum scale of pay to the temporary employees of the corresponding cadre of regular employees has been considered by the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab and others v. Jagjit Singh and others reported in (2017) 1 SCC 148 . The principle of law has been categorically laid down in paragraph-42 of the judgment, which is relied upon. (iv) Learned senior counsel has by reference to paragraph-42.6 of the judgment in the case of Jagjit Singh (supra) submitted that for placement in a regular pay scale, the claimant has to be a regular appointee. The claimant should have been selected on the basis of a regular process of recruitment. (v) The writ petitioner in the undisputed state of facts cannot be said to be a regular appointee. The posts in question were advertised and filled-up in regular manner and the writ petitioner had to go out in view of the judgments of the Patna High Court dated 5th April, 1994. (vi) Continuance of the writ petitioner as a daily wager thereafter on sympathetic consideration would not clothe him with the legal rights to seek minimum scale of pay on the corresponding cadre of regular employees as directed by the learned Single Judge. 7. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner /respondent herein has defended the impugned directions. Learned counsel submits that the narration of facts recorded by the learned Single Judge would show that the writ petitioner was appointed through a regular process of recruitment. Despite the orders passed by the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No.12595/1993 and other cases, petitioner has not been ousted from service, rather has been continued on daily wages. Learned counsel submits that the narration of facts recorded by the learned Single Judge would show that the writ petitioner was appointed through a regular process of recruitment. Despite the orders passed by the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No.12595/1993 and other cases, petitioner has not been ousted from service, rather has been continued on daily wages. In such circumstances the writ petitioner has continued in service and has been performing similar nature of duties and responsibilities under the appointment in the Department of Forest and Environment. In such circumstances, the impugned directions do not deserve to be interfered with. The writ petitioner has been performing the work which is of a perennial nature without any break since 1989. 8. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the relevant materials on record as also the impugned judgment and the judgment of the Apex Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. 9. The applicability of the principle of equal pay for equal work was specifically under consideration by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagjit Singh (supra) in a batch of cases arising out of the judgments rendered by the Punjab High Court. The Civil Appeal was decided on a bunch of cases comprising of challenge to the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of the High Court in the State of Punjab v. Rajinder Singh reported in 2009 SCC Online P&H 125; to the judgment in the case of State of Punjab v. Rajinder Kumar reported in 2010 SCC Online P&H 13009 and also to the judgment rendered by the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab reported in 2011 SCC Online P&H 15326. The issue which arose for consideration was whether temporarily engaged employees (daily-wage employees, ad hoc appointees, employees appointed on casual basis. contractual employees and the like), are entitled to minimum of the regular pay scale, along with dearness allowance (as revised from time to time) on account of their performing the same duties which are discharged by those engaged on regular basis, against sanctioned posts? 10. The Apex Court dealt with the issue after taking note of the precedents on the point pertaining to employees engaged on regular basis who were claiming higher wages under the principle of "equal pay for equal work". 10. The Apex Court dealt with the issue after taking note of the precedents on the point pertaining to employees engaged on regular basis who were claiming higher wages under the principle of "equal pay for equal work". The claim raised by such employees were premised on the ground that the duties and responsibilities rendered by them were against the same post for which a higher pay scale was being allowed in other Government departments or alternatively, their duties and responsibilities were the same as of other posts with different designations, but they were placed in a lower scale. The Apex Court having considered the parameters laid down by it through the precedence rendered earlier where the principle of "equal pay for equal work" was invoked felt just and appropriate to delineate the parameters laid down by the Court at paragraph-42 of the report. Paragraph-42 of the report being quoted hereunder : "42. All the judgments noticed in paras 7 to 24 hereinabove pertain to employees engaged on regular basis, who were claiming higher wages, under the principle of "equal pay for equal work". The claim raised by such employees was premised on the ground, that the duties and responsibilities rendered by them were against the same post for which a higher pay scale was being allowed in other Government departments. Or alternatively, their duties and responsibilities were the same as of other posts with different designations, but they were placed in a lower scale. Having been painstakingly taken through the parameters laid down by this Court, wherein the principle of "equal pay for equal work" was invoked and considered, it would be just and appropriate to delineate the parameters laid down by this Court. In recording the said parameters, we have also adverted to some other judgments pertaining to temporary employees (also dealt with. in the instant judgment), wherein also, this Court had the occasion to express the legal position with reference to the principle of "equal pay for equal work". Our consideration. has led us to the following deductions : 42.1. The "onus of proof' of parity in the duties and responsibilities of the subject post with the reference post under the principle of "equal pay for equal work" lies on the person who claims it. Our consideration. has led us to the following deductions : 42.1. The "onus of proof' of parity in the duties and responsibilities of the subject post with the reference post under the principle of "equal pay for equal work" lies on the person who claims it. He who approaches the Court has to establish that the subject post occupied by him requires him to discharge equal work of equal value, as the reference post (see Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology case. UT Chandigarh, Admn. v. Manju Mathur, SAIL case and National Aluminium Co. Ltd. case) : 42.2. The mere fact that the subject post occupied by the claimant is in a "different department" vis-a-vis the reference post does not have any bearing on the determination of a claim under the principle of "equal pay for equal work". Persons discharging identical duties cannot be treated differently in the matter of their pay, merely because they belong to different departments of the Government (see Randhir Singh case and D.S. Nakara case). 42.3. The principle of "equal pay for equal work", applies to cases of unequal scales of pay, based on no classification or irrational classification (see Randhir Singh case). For equal pay, the employees concerned with whom equation is sought, should be performing work, which besides being functionally equal, should be of the same quality and sensitivity (see Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers case. Mewa Ram Kanojia case, Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union case and S.C. Chandra case). 42.4. Persons holding the same rank/designation (in different departments). but having dissimilar powers, duties and responsibilities, can be placed in different scales of pay and cannot claim the benefit of the principle of "equal pay for equal work" (see Randhir Singh case. State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Assn., and Hukum Chand Gupta case). Therefore the principle would not be automatically invoked merely because the subject and reference posts have the same nomenclature. 42.5. State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Assn., and Hukum Chand Gupta case). Therefore the principle would not be automatically invoked merely because the subject and reference posts have the same nomenclature. 42.5. In determining equality of functions and responsibilities under the principle of "equal pay for equal work", it is necessary to keep in mind that the duties of the two posts should be of equal sensitivity, and also, qualitatively similar, Differentiation of pay scales for posts with difference in degree of responsibility, reliability and confidentiality, would fall within the realm of valid classification, and therefore, pay differentiation would be legitimate and permissible (see Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers case and SBI case). The nature of work of the subject post should be the same and not less onerous than the reference post. Even the volume of work should be the same. And so also, the level of responsibility. If these parameters are not met, parity cannot be claimed under the principle of "equal pay for equal work" (see State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia and Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union case). 42.6. For placement in a regular pay scale, the claimant has to be a regular appointee. The claimant should have been selected on the basis of a regular process of recruitment. An employee appointed on a temporary basis cannot claim to be placed in the regular pay scale (see Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology case). 42.7. Persons performing the same or similar functions, duties and responsibilities, can also be placed in different pay scales. Such as - "selection grade", in the same post. But this difference must emerge out of a legitimate foundation, such as merit, or seniority, or some other relevant criteria (see State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia). 42.8. If the qualifications for recruitment to the subject post vis-a-vis the reference post are different, it may be difficult to conclude that the duties and responsibilities of the posts are qualitatively similar or comparable (see Mewa Ram Kanojia case and State of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy). In such a case the principle of "equal pay for equal work" cannot be invoked. 42.9. In such a case the principle of "equal pay for equal work" cannot be invoked. 42.9. The reference post with which parity is claimed under the principle of "equal pay for equal work" has to be alt the same hierarchy in the service as the subject, post, Pay scales of posts may be different, if the hierarchy of the posts in question, and their channels of promotion, are different. Even If the duties and responsibilities are same. Parity would not be permissible, as against a superior post, such as a promotional post (see Union of India v. Pradip Kumar Dey and Hukum Chand Gupta case). 42.10. A comparison between the subject post and the reference post under the principle of "equal pay for equal work" cannot be made where the subject post and the reference post are in different establishments, having a different management. Or even, where the establishments are in different geographical locations, though owned by the same master (see Harbans Lal case). Persons engaged differently, and being paid out of different funds, would not be entitled to pay parity (see Official Liquidator v. Dayanand). 42.11. Different pay scales, in certain eventualities, would be permissible even for posts clubbed together at the same hierarchy in the cadre. As for instance, if the duties and responsibilities of one of the posts are more onerous, or are exposed to higher nature of operational work/risk, the principle of "equal pay for equal work" would not be applicable. And also when the reference post includes the responsibility to take crucial decisions, and that is not so for the subject post (see SBI case). 42.12. The priority given to different types of posts under the prevailing policies of the Government can also be a relevant factor for placing different posts under different pay scales. Herein also, the principle of "equal pay for equal work” would not be applicable (see State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Assn.). 42.13. The parity in pay, under the principle of "equal pay for equal work", cannot be claimed merely on the ground that at an earlier point of time the subject post and the reference post, were placed in the same pay scale. 42.13. The parity in pay, under the principle of "equal pay for equal work", cannot be claimed merely on the ground that at an earlier point of time the subject post and the reference post, were placed in the same pay scale. The principle of "equal pay for equal work" is applicable only when it is shown, that the incumbents of the subject post and the reference post, discharge similar duties and responsibilities (see State of W.B. v. Minimum Wages Inspectors Assn.). 42.14. For parity in pay scales under the principle of "equal pay for equal work", equation in the nature of duties is of paramount importance. If the principal nature of duties of one post is teaching, whereas that of the other is non-teaching, the principle would not be applicable. If the dominant nature of duties of one post is of control and management, whereas the subject post has no such duties, the principle would not be applicable. Likewise, if the central nature of duties of one post is of quality control, whereas the subject post has minimal duties of quality control, the principle would not be applicable (see U.T. Chandigarh, Admn. v. Manju Mathur). 42.15. There can be a valid classification in the matter of pay scales between employees even holding posts with the same nomenclature, i.e. between those discharging duties at the headquarters, and others working at the institutional/sub-office level (see Hukum Chand Gupta case), when the duties are qualitatively dissimilar. 42.16. The principle of "equal pay for equal work" would not be applicable, where a differential higher pay scale is extended to persons discharging the same duties and holding the same designation, with the objective of ameliorating stagnation, or on account of lack of promotional avenues (see Hukum Chand Gupta case). 42.17. Where there is no comparison between one set of employees of one organization, and another set of employees of a different organization, there can be no question of equation of pay scales under the principle of "equal pay for equal work", even if two organisations have a common employer. Likewise, if the management and control of two organisations is with different entities which are independent of one another, the principle of "equal pay for equal work" would not apply (see S.C. Chandra case and National Aluminium Co. Ltd. case)." 11. Likewise, if the management and control of two organisations is with different entities which are independent of one another, the principle of "equal pay for equal work" would not apply (see S.C. Chandra case and National Aluminium Co. Ltd. case)." 11. The Apex Court thereafter ventured to summarise the conclusions recorded by it with reference to the claim of pay parity raised by temporary employees (differently designated as work-charge, daily-wage, casual, ad hoc, contractual, and the like) in the following two paragraphs. 12. Having analysed the issue at great length, it finally dealt with claim of the temporary employees who were there before the Court at paragraphs 56 to 62. The opinion of the Apex Court at paras 57, 58, 59 and 60 are quoted hereunder: "57. There is no room for any doubt that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" has emerged from an interpretation of different provisions of the Constitution. The principle has been expounded through a large number of judgments rendered by this Court, and constitutes law declared by this Court. The same is binding on all the Courts in India under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The parameters of the principle have been summarised by us in para 42 hereinabove. The principle of "equal pay for equal work" has also been extended to temporary employees (differently described as work-charge, daily wage, casual, ad hoc, contractual, and the like). The legal position, relating to temporary employees has been summarised by us, in para 44 hereinabove. The above legal position which has been repeatedly declared, is being reiterated by us yet again. 58. In our considered view, it is fallacious to determine artificial parameters to deny fruits of labour, An employee engaged for the same work cannot be paid less than another who performs the same duties and responsibilities, Certainly not, in a welfare State. Such an action besides being demeaning, strikes at the very foundation of human dignity. Anyone, who is compelled to work at a lesser wage does not do so voluntarily. He does so to provide food and shelter to his family, at the cost of his self-respect and dignity, at the cost of his self-worth, and at the cost of his integrity. For he knows that his dependants would suffer immensely, if he does not accept the lesser wage. He does so to provide food and shelter to his family, at the cost of his self-respect and dignity, at the cost of his self-worth, and at the cost of his integrity. For he knows that his dependants would suffer immensely, if he does not accept the lesser wage. Any act of paying less wages as compared to others similarly situate constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a domineering position. Undoubtedly, the action is oppressive, suppressive and coercive, as it compels involuntary subjugation. 59. We would also like to extract herein Article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. The same is reproduced below: "7. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular : (a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum with : (i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work; (ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the provisions of the present Covenant; (b) Safe and healthy working conditions; (c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence; (d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays." (Emphasis supplied) India is a signatory to the above Covenant having ratified the same on 10.4.1979. There is no escape from the above obligation in view of different provisions of the Constitution referred to above, and in view of the law declared by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the principle of "equal pay for equal work" constitutes a clear and unambiguous right and is vested in every employee-whether engaged on regular or temporary basis. 60. 60. Having traversed the legal parameters with reference to the application of the principle of "equal pay for equal work", in relation to temporary employees (daily-wage employees, ad hoc appointees, employees appointed on basis, contractual employees and the like), the sole factor that requires our determination is, whether the employees concerned (before this Court), were rendering similar duties and responsibilities as were being discharged by regular employees holding the same/ corresponding posts. This exercise would require the application of the parameters of the principle of "equal pay for equal work" summarised by us in para 42 above. However, insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it is not difficult for us to record the factual position. We say so, because it was fairly acknowledged by the learned counsel representing the State of Punjab, that all the temporary employees in the present bunch of appeals were appointed against posts which were also available in the regular cadre/establishment. It was also accepted that during the course of their employment, the temporary employees concerned were being randomly deputed to discharge duties and responsibilities which at some point in time were assigned to regular employees. Likewise, regular employees holding substantive posts were also posted to discharge the same work which was assigned to temporary employees from time to time. There is, therefore, no room for any doubt, that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the temporary employees in the present set of appeals were the same as were being discharged by regular employees. It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of the State that any of the temporary employees would not be entitled to pay parity on any of the principles summarised by us in para 42 hereinabove. There can be no doubt, that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" would be applicable to all the temporary employees concerned, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages on a par with the minimum of the pay scale of regularly engaged Government employees holding the same post." 13. There can be no doubt, that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" would be applicable to all the temporary employees concerned, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages on a par with the minimum of the pay scale of regularly engaged Government employees holding the same post." 13. It is apparent from the passage quoted herein above that the Apex Court finally at paragraph-60 of the report proceeded to test whether the employees before the Court were rendering similar duties and responsibilities as were being discharged by the regular employees holding the same/corresponding post. It further observed that for this exercise it would require the application of the parameters of the principal of "equal pay for equal work" summarized by the Apex Court in para 42 above. Thereafter on the basis of the factual position available on record, the Apex Court proceeded to hold in the same paragraph that there could be no doubt that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" would be applicable to all the temporary employees concerned, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages on par with the minimum of the pay scale of regularly engaged Government employees holding the same post. 14. What follows from the pronouncement of the Apex Court on the subject and the passages quoted above that in order to come to a finding whether the temporary employee (daily-wage employees, ad hoc appointees, employees appointed on casual basis. contractual employees and the like) is entitled to claim wages at par with the minimum of pay scale of regularly engaged Government employees holding the same post on the principle of equal pay for equal work, an exercise would be required for application of the parameters of the principle of "equal pay for equal work" summarized at paragraph-42 of the report quoted above. This requires an inquiry on facts. 15. In the facts of the case which have been recorded by the learned Single Judge and quoted above, we are of the view that the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Jharkhand, Ranchi-respondent No.2 in the writ petition/appellant herein is required to undertake such an exercise as contemplated under the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Jagjit Singh (supra), the extract of which has also been quoted herein above as well, to come to an informed decision. Let such exercise be completed within a reasonable period of 16 weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. We, therefore, conclude that a direction to straightway grant the minimum of pay scale of the corresponding cadre of regular employees to the writ petitioner was not proper in the eyes of law and on facts. The impugned directions are, therefore, modified to the extent indicated herein above. The instant appeal stands disposed of in that light. Appeal disposed of