JUDGMENT : ALOK ARADHE, J. Smt. H.R. Renuka, learned counsel for the appellant. Sri. John D’Souza appearing party-in-person. In this intra court appeal, the appellant has assailed the validity of the order dated 20.09.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge, by which the writ petition preferred by the appellant has been dismissed and the order passed by the Labour Court dated 28.10.2016 rejecting the application preferred by the appellant under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short) has been upheld. The issues, which arise for consideration in this appeal are: (i) whether in passing the order dated 28.10.2016, the Labour Court has traveled beyond the scope of order of remand dated 14.07.2016 passed in Writ Appeal No.30/2015 (Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation vs. John D’souza)? (ii) whether while passing the impugned order, the Labour Court has acted like an Appellate Authority? (iii) whether the findings recorded by the Labour Court that the findings recorded against the respondent in the departmental enquiry are perverse and he has been subjected to victimization can be sustained in the eye of law? (iv) whether the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the aforesaid aspects of the matter while passing the impugned order? In order to appreciate the appellants challenge to the impugned order, few facts need mention, which are stated infra: 2. The facts, which are discernable from the memo of appeal as well as the order passed by the learned Single Judge are that the respondent at the relevant time was posted as a conductor in the establishment of the appellant. The respondent remained unauthorizedly absent from his duties with effect from 18.08.2005. Thereupon a report dated 25.08.2005 was submitted by the Depot Manager, Kanakapura Depot reporting about the unauthorized absence of the appellant. By a communication dated 05.09.2005, the respondent was called upon to report for duty. However, despite receipt of the aforesaid communication, the respondent did not join the duty. Thereafter, Article of Charges was issued to the respondent, to which he did not respond. Thereafter, the respondent was subjected to the disciplinary enquiry in respect of unauthorized absence for a period from 18.08.2005 to 29.10.2005. The Enquiry Officer held a detailed enquiry. The respondent only cross-examined the witnesses produced by the appellant but did not adduce any evidence in his defence in the enquiry. Thereafter, the respondent was subjected to the disciplinary enquiry in respect of unauthorized absence for a period from 18.08.2005 to 29.10.2005. The Enquiry Officer held a detailed enquiry. The respondent only cross-examined the witnesses produced by the appellant but did not adduce any evidence in his defence in the enquiry. The respondent was issued a show cause notice dated 31.08.2010, to which he submitted a reply. The Disciplinary Authority, after considering the reply submitted by the respondent, accepted the findings of the Enquiry Officer and passed an order of dismissal of services of respondent dated 11.10.2010. 3. A dispute was already pending against the respondent before the Labour Court viz., Reference No.243/2006, in which the appellant filed an application seeking approval of the order of dismissal passed by the appellant in terms of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. The respondent was issued a cheque for a sum of Rs.13,497/- dated 11.10.2010 towards one month’s wages. The Labour Court issued the notice to respondent, pursuant to which he filed objections before the Labour Court. The appellant examined two witnesses in support of its case and produced documents, which were marked as Exs.A1 to A34. The respondent examined himself and produced documents, which were marked as Exs.R1 to R104. The Labour Court, by an order dated 16.03.2012, held that the domestic enquiry has been conducted against the respondent in a fair and proper manner. 4. The respondent challenged the aforesaid finding by approaching this court by way of W.P.NOs.11236- 237/2012. The learned Single Judge vide order dated 30.07.2012 dismissed the writ petition. The order passed by the learned Single Judge was subject matter of challenge in W.A.Nos.537-538/2013. The Division Bench affirmed the order passed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 09.07.2013. The respondent preferred Special Leave Petition against order passed by the Division Bench. However, during the pendency of the Special Leave Petition before the Division Bench, an order was passed in favour of the respondent and the order of dismissal of the respondent was set aside. Therefore, the Special Leave Petition preferred by the respondent was disposed of. 5. The respondent preferred Special Leave Petition against order passed by the Division Bench. However, during the pendency of the Special Leave Petition before the Division Bench, an order was passed in favour of the respondent and the order of dismissal of the respondent was set aside. Therefore, the Special Leave Petition preferred by the respondent was disposed of. 5. The respondent thereafter, led evidence before the Labour Court on the question of victimization as well as on the merits of the case and by an order dated 06.11.2013, the Labour Court held that the order of dismissal of services of the respondent is not justified and dismissed the application preferred by the appellant. The appellant challenged the aforesaid order in a Writ Petition viz., W.P.No.10271/2014, which was dismissed by learned Single Judge vide order dated 21.11.2014. The aforesaid order passed by the learned Single Judge was subject matter of Writ Appeal viz., W.A.No.30/2015, which was allowed by Division Bench of this Court by an order dated 14.07.2016 and the order passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the Labour Court was set aside and the matter was remitted to the Labour Court for consideration afresh in the light of observations made in the order by the Division Bench. The Labour Court, on remand, decided the matter afresh and by an order dated 28.10.2016, dismissed the application preferred by the appellant under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. The aforesaid order was upheld by the learned Single Judge vide order 20.09.2017. In the aforesaid factual background the appellant has filed this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant, at the outset, has submitted that 18 departmental enquiries were pending against the respondent and in a pending matter, an application was filed under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act after conducting the departmental enquiry against the respondent. It is submitted that in the departmental enquiry, the respondent did not adduce any evidence before the Enquiry Officer and produced the documents for the first time before the Labour Court, which have been taken into account by the Labour Court while passing the impugned order. It is submitted that in the departmental enquiry, the respondent did not adduce any evidence before the Enquiry Officer and produced the documents for the first time before the Labour Court, which have been taken into account by the Labour Court while passing the impugned order. Our attention has been invited to the order dated 14.07.2016 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.30/2015 and it has been submitted that the Labour Court while passing the impugned order has traveled beyond the order of remand passed by the Division Bench of this Court and has acted like an Appellate Court. It is urged that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer with regard to the victimization and perversity is based on documents, which were produced by the respondent before the Labour Court for the first time. It is argued that it was not open to the Labour Court to take into account the documents produced by the respondent before the Labour Court for the first time. It is contended that learned single Judge has traveled beyond the scope of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act while affirming the order of the Labour Court and the findings recorded by the Labour Court are erroneous. 7. On the other hand, the respondent who appeared in person submitted that the Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge has recorded a finding in favour of the respondent that he was subjected to victimization and the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are perverse. The respondent has invited our attention to judgment dated 22.06.2005 passed in W.A.No.2363/2005 as well as judgment dated 18.12.2009 passed in W.A.No.3766/2009 and has submitted that both the aforesaid appeals were disposed of with the direction to the appellant to conclude the enquiry in a time bound manner. However, instead of concluding the enquiries pending against the respondent, the impugned order of termination of services of the respondent was passed. It is also submitted that the order of termination has been passed in violation of Circular dated 03.08.2001. However, the fact that 18 departmental enquiries were pending against the respondent has not been disputed by him. It is submitted that the Labour Court while deciding an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act is required to decide the same in the light of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘LALLA RAM V. VS. However, the fact that 18 departmental enquiries were pending against the respondent has not been disputed by him. It is submitted that the Labour Court while deciding an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act is required to decide the same in the light of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘LALLA RAM V. VS. D.C.M. CHEMICAL WORKS’, 1978 SUPREME COURT CASES (L & S) 396 and the Labour Court is required to examine whether the domestic enquiry has been held in accordance with rule, whether prima facie dismissal based on legal evidence before the Labour court is made out and the dismissal did not amount to unfair labour practice and was not intended to victimize the employee. 8. We have considered the submissions made on both sides. At this stage, it is apposite to reproduce the relevant extract of Section 33(2) (b) of the Act: “33 (1) xxxxxxx (2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute or, where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman – (a) xxxxxxxx (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman: Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer.” 9. Before proceeding further, we may refer to the well settled legal principles with regard to the scope of Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘MARIN BURN LTD. v. R.N.BANERJEE’, AIR 1958 SC 79 , has taken note of previous decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of ‘ATHERTON WEST & CO. LTD. V. SUTI MILL MAZDOOR UNION’, AIR 1953 SC 241 , ‘THE AUTOMOBILE PRODUCTS OF INDIA LTD. v. RUKMAJI BALA’, AIR 1955 SC 258 & ‘LAKSHMI DEVI SUGAR MILLS LIMITED v. RAM SARUP’, AIR 1957 SC 82 . LTD. V. SUTI MILL MAZDOOR UNION’, AIR 1953 SC 241 , ‘THE AUTOMOBILE PRODUCTS OF INDIA LTD. v. RUKMAJI BALA’, AIR 1955 SC 258 & ‘LAKSHMI DEVI SUGAR MILLS LIMITED v. RAM SARUP’, AIR 1957 SC 82 . In the case of Ram Sarup (supra) the Supreme Court has held that the Tribunal before whom an application is made under that Section, has not to adjudicate upon any industrial dispute arising between the employer and the workman, but has only got to consider whether the ban which is imposed on the employer in the matter of altering the conditions of employment to the prejudice of the workman or his discharge or punishment whether by dismissal or otherwise during the pendency of the proceedings therein referred to should be lifted. A prima facie case has to be made out by the employer for the lifting of such ban and the only jurisdiction which the Tribunal has is either to give such permission or to refuse it provided the employer is not acting malafide or is not resorting to any unfair practice or victimisation. 10. In ‘ELASTREX POLYMERS PVT. LTD., BANGALORE REP. BY ITS MANAGER – PRODUCTION VS SRI. JANARDHANA, BANGALORE’, 2012 (2) LLJ 813 , the Supreme Court has held that jurisdiction of the Labour Court while dealing with an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act is limited and could not be equated to one under Section 10 of the Act. It has further been held that for granting approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act the Industrial Tribunal has only to consider whether prima facie case of valid domestic enquiry is made out and dismissal of the application on the ground of punishment being disproportionate to gravity of misconduct is not sustainable. 11. In the backdrop of aforesaid well settled legal principles, we may now advert to facts of the case in hand. Admittedly, there were 18 departmental enquiries pending against the respondent. It is also not in dispute that in the departmental enquiry initiated against the respondent, he only cross-examined the witnesses produced by the department and did not adduce any evidence. It is trite law that jurisdiction of a Court depends on terms of the order of remand. Admittedly, there were 18 departmental enquiries pending against the respondent. It is also not in dispute that in the departmental enquiry initiated against the respondent, he only cross-examined the witnesses produced by the department and did not adduce any evidence. It is trite law that jurisdiction of a Court depends on terms of the order of remand. Admittedly, a Division Bench of this Court by an order dated 14.07.2016 passed in W.A.No.30/2015, while placing reliance on decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Martin Burn Ltd., (supra) in para Nos.9, 10, 13 & 14 had held as under: “9. A prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt, but a case which, can be said to be established, if the evidence, which is led in support of the same, were believed. While determining whether a prima facie case has been made out, the relevant consideration is, whether on the evidence led, it was possible to arrive at the conclusion in question, and not whether that was the only conclusion which could be arrived at on that evidence. It may be that the Tribunal considering this question may itself, could arrive at a different conclusion. It has, however, not to substitute its own judgment for the judgment in question. It has, only, got to consider whether the view taken is a possible view on the evidence on the record. 10. The Tribunal, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act, was required to bear in mind the aforementioned principles. They are not supposed to act as a court of appeal. 13. In this case, it appears the Labour Court ha exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act, and, therefore, the order passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge and the order passed by the Labour Court are set aside. 14. We allow the writ appeal and remit the matter back to the Labour Court for reconsideration of the matter in the light of our observations above. 12. 14. We allow the writ appeal and remit the matter back to the Labour Court for reconsideration of the matter in the light of our observations above. 12. Admittedly, the aforesaid order passed by the Division Bench has attained finality and the Labour Court was required to deal with the application filed by the appellant under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act in the light of observations made in the order and its jurisdiction to deal with the application was circumscribed by the findings as well as the directions contained in the aforesaid order passed by the Division Bench. The Labour Court vide impugned order dated 28.10.2016, has answered issue No.1 with regard to domestic enquiry being fair and proper in favour of the appellant. In other words, it has been held by the Labour Court that the domestic enquiry held against the respondent was fair and proper. In paragraph 13, the Labour Court has framed following four issues: 1. Whether domestic enquiry against first party is fair and proper? 2. Whether the Enquiry Officer is justified in holding that charges are proved? 3. Whether the Disciplinary authority is justified in dismissing the first party? 4. To what award or order the parties entitled? Thereafter, from paragraphs 25 to 45, the Labour Court has appreciated the evidence on record in detail and has recorded the findings issue wise. In paragraphs 25 to 45, the Labour Court while recording findings has also taken into account the documentary evidence produced by the respondent for the first time before the Labour Court, which was not produced by him before the Enquiry Officer and has recorded the findings in favour of respondent and has rejected the application filed by the petitioner under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. From close scrutiny of the order passed by the Labour Court particularly paragraphs 25 to 45, it is evident that the findings by the Labour Court with regard to perversity of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and victimization is based on additional material on record, which did not form a part of the enquiry proceeding. The Labour Court, while passing the impugned order has not only traveled beyond the order of remand, but has acted like an Appellate Authority. 13. The Labour Court, while passing the impugned order has not only traveled beyond the order of remand, but has acted like an Appellate Authority. 13. The learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that the respondent only cross-examined the witnesses of appellant in the departmental enquiry and did not adduce any evidence. The respondent for the first time before the Labour Court produced the documents viz., Exs.R1 to R104, which have been considered by the Labour Court. The learned Single Judge has also failed to appreciate that the Labour Court was required to decide the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act in the light of observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in order dated 14.07.2016 passed in W.A.No.30/2015, which had attained finality and was binding on the Labour Court. The learned Single Judge has also not appreciated that the finding with regard to victimization of respondent is based on additional material, which was not part of the enquiry conducted against the respondent. 14. In view of preceding analysis, in our considered opinion, the order passed by the Labour Court as well as the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffer from the error apparent on the face of the record. The impugned orders are accordingly quashed and set aside. In the fact situation of the case, we are left with no option but to remit the matter again to the Labour Court to decide the application preferred by the appellant under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act afresh in the light of observations made by Division Bench of this Court in the order dated 14.07.2016 passed in W.A.No.30/2015 as well as the observations contained in this order. Having regard to the fact that the respondent has already attained the age of superannuation in the year 2010 itself, we direct the Labour Court to decide the application preferred by the appellant under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, as stated supra. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed of. In view of disposal of the appeal, I.A.No.1/2017 does not survive for consideration; it stands disposed of accordingly.