JUDGMENT : K.M. THAKER, J. 1. Heard Mr. Joshi, learned Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Vyas, learned Advocate for the respondent. 2. The petitioner-Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation ("the Corporation" for short) is aggrieved by award dated 19-12-2014 passed by learned Industrial Tribunal at Rajkot in Reference (I.T.) No. 149 of 2006. 3. The brief facts, involved in this petition, can be summarized thus: 3.1. In 2006, the respondent herein raised industrial dispute with regard to : (a) order of penalty passed by the competent authority in December, 1990 (stoppage of 2 increments with permanent effect); (b) order of penalty passed in October, 1992 (stoppage of 5 increments with permanent effect); (c) order of penalty passed in April, 1995 (stoppage of increment for 6 months with permanent effect); (d) order of penalty passed in 1998 (stoppage of increment for 6 months with permanent effect); and (e) order of penalty passed in September, 1999 (reduction of salary by one stage in the applicable pay-scale). 3.2. The said different orders of penalty passed in respect of different misconduct committed at different point of time, came to be challenged after gross delay and the said dispute came to be referred for adjudication by common order of reference passed by appropriate Government in June, 2006. 3.3. At the relevant time, i.e. when the authority passed the orders and imposed penalty in December, 1990 or October, 1992 or April, 1995 or November, 1998 or September, 1999, the claimant did not raise dispute against orders of penalty passed by competent authority and suddenly in 2006, he raised dispute against said orders. 3.4. The order of reference dated 14-6-2006 came to be registered by learned Tribunal as Reference (I.T.) No. 149 of 2006. 3.5. In the said reference case, the claimant filed statement of claim. In his statement of claim, he raised common/similar and identical allegations in respect of said five orders of penalty (i.e. the authority passed orders without granting opportunity of hearing) and the allegations were concocted and he had not committed alleged misconduct and that penalty imposed by the competent authority is harsh and the departmental appeals also came to be rejected arbitrarily. The workman also alleged that he did not commit misconduct and he had offered explanation as to why he did not issue tickets and/or did not collect fare and/or neither issued tickets and nor collected fare, however, the authority arbitrarily ignored his explanation and passed the orders of penalty which should be set aside. 3.6. The Corporation opposed the reference on several grounds. The Corporation essentially opposed the reference on the ground of gross delay in raising industrial dispute. In its reply, the Corporation also denied the allegations. The Corporation claimed that the misconduct of not issuing tickets, issuing tickets and not collecting fare were reported by the squad pursuant to which, charge-sheet were issued and in respect of each instance (charge sheet), domestic inquiry was conducted and the competent authority passed orders at the relevant time after taking into account the gravity of misconduct and service record of the workman. The Corporation also claimed that though the service of the claimant deserved to be terminated in view of such repeated instance of misconduct, the Corporation had taken lenient view and imposed penalty short of discharge or dismissal and in respect of such penalty which was, in any case, short of discharge and dismissal, the learned Tribunal should not and could not have interfered with. 3.7. The learned Tribunal adjudicated the reference and after taking into account material available on record and rival submissions, passed impugned award whereby the learned Tribunal set aside the order dated 26-4-1995 and also set aside the order dated 30-11-1998. The learned Tribunal confirmed the order dated 30-9-1999. 3.8. So far as the orders dated 1-12-1990 and 9-10-1992 are concerned, the claimant, during the proceedings before the learned Tribunal, had withdrawn and dropped the challenge and he declared that he does not press the grievance/dispute and challenge against said two orders. Therefore, reference in respect of said two orders i.e. orders dated 1-12-1990 and 9-10-1992 came to be disposed of as withdrawn. 4. Therefore, reference in respect of said two orders i.e. orders dated 1-12-1990 and 9-10-1992 came to be disposed of as withdrawn. 4. Learned Advocate for the petitioner-Corporation assailed impugned award and submitted, inter alia, that: (a) the dispute raised by the claimant was hit by inordinate and gross delay, and therefore, reference should not have been entertained; (b) the claimant had admitted the legality and propriety of the inquiry, and that therefore, learned Tribunal could not have entered into the dispute or grievance with regard to the penalty; and (c) in view of the fact that orders in question i.e. vide order dated 26-4-1995 and order dated 30-11-1998, the Corporation had imposed penalty which was short of discharge and dismissal, learned Tribunal had no jurisdiction to set aside said orders. 5. Learned Advocate for the respondent-Workman opposed the petition and submissions by learned Advocate for the petitioner-Corporation. He submitted that the objection on the ground of delay is misconceived. He submitted that so far as the orders passed in December, 1990 and October, 1992 are concerned, the claimant had withdrawn the grievance and his dispute/challenge against said orders, and that therefore, question of delay in raising dispute does not survive. He submitted that the Industrial Disputes Act, does not prescribe any time-limit for raising dispute, and that therefore also, the contention should not be entertained. According to learned Advocate for the respondent-Workman, the learned Tribunal did not commit any error in entertaining the reference or in not rejecting the reference on the ground of delay. Learned Advocate for the respondent-Workman further submitted that the learned Tribunal has observed that the workman did not commit misconduct of not issuing tickets after collecting fare and that the claimant had not even collected fare and did not issue tickets, and that therefore, said lapse would, at the most, amount to negligence. He submitted that the learned Tribunal rightly observed that for act of negligence such harsh penalty of stoppage of increment for 6 months with permanent effect should not have been imposed. He submitted that having reached such conclusion, learned Tribunal set aside two orders by the competent authority and said decision by learned Tribunal cannot be said to be illegal. 5.1. He submitted that having reached such conclusion, learned Tribunal set aside two orders by the competent authority and said decision by learned Tribunal cannot be said to be illegal. 5.1. So as to support and justify his submission, learned Advocate for the respondent-Workman relied on the decision in case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Premgar Kashigar, 2017 (2) LLJ 643. 6. I have considered rival submissions, material available on record, impugned award and the discussion by learned Tribunal in impugned award. 7. At the outset, it is relevant and necessary to mention that during the proceedings before the learned Tribunal, the claimant, in respect of each instance (charge-sheet) and domestic inquiry, filed pursis (Exh. 52) and declared that he admits the legality and propriety of all proceedings of domestic inquiry and he does not challenge the legality of any inquiry. The workman, however, kept open his challenge against the findings of Inquiry Officer and the decision with regard to penalty. 8. From the record, it has emerged that orders of penalty passed in December, 1990 and October, 1992 came to be challenged in 2006 (i.e. after 14 years and 16 years). 8.1. At the time, when the claimant belatedly raised grievance against said two orders of penalty passed by the competent authority, he also raised dispute against the orders of penalty passed by the competent authority in April, 1995, October, 1998 and September, 1999. 8.2. The order of penalty passed by the competent authority in April, 1995 came to be challenged after 11 years (i.e. 2006). Likewise, the order passed by the competent authority in November, 1998 came to be challenged after 8 years, i.e. in 2006, and the order passed in September, 1999 came to be challenged after 7 years, i.e. in 2006. By means of said penalty orders, the competent authority had imposed penalty which were short of discharge and dismissal. 9. It is pertinent to note that before the learned Tribunal, the claimant did not offer any explanation worth its name with regard to the delay caused in raising the dispute. 9.1. He failed to make out any case, much less sufficient cause. 9. It is pertinent to note that before the learned Tribunal, the claimant did not offer any explanation worth its name with regard to the delay caused in raising the dispute. 9.1. He failed to make out any case, much less sufficient cause. The workman instituted the proceedings and conducted the proceedings as if the Act permit the workman to act on impulse and to resurrect dead grievance/dispute and to raise industrial dispute even after gross and inordinate delay that too without offering any explanation for the delay and without establishing that he was incapacitated due to reasons beyond his control, and therefore, he could not raise dispute in intervening period. 9.2. Unfortunately, the learned Tribunal also failed to take into account the Corporation's grievance and the objection on the ground of delay and laches in raising industrial dispute. 9.3. The learned Tribunal ought to have at least examined as to whether the dispute was raised only as an afterthought and whether the dispute should be considered a dead dispute and stale claim when it was raised after such gross and inordinate delay, that too without offering any explanation about the reasons or circumstances which caused such delay. 9.4. Unfortunately, the learned Tribunal failed to consider these aspects and without examining the Corporation's objection and without deciding said objection and without recording its decision with regard to such objection, proceeded to decide the reference case and, ultimately, passed impugned order. 9.5. In this context, it would be appropriate at this stage to take into account the observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department, 2015 (10) SCALE 114 , wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that, the dispute raised after inordinate delay that too without offering any explanation - should be considered "dead dispute", and in absence of satisfactory explanation, such dispute should not be entertained, mechanically, casually and lightly. In the said decision, Hon'ble Apex Court, observed, inter alia, that: "8. From the facts narrated above, it becomes clear that for a period of fourteen years no grievance was made by the petitioner qua his alleged termination. Though, it was averted that the petitioner had approached the Management, time and again, and was given assurance that he would be taken back in service, there is nothing on record to substantiate this. No notice was served upon the Management. Though, it was averted that the petitioner had approached the Management, time and again, and was given assurance that he would be taken back in service, there is nothing on record to substantiate this. No notice was served upon the Management. There is no assurance given in writing by the Management at any point of time. Such assertions are clearly self-serving. Pertinently, even the Labour Court has not accepted the aforesaid explanation anywhere and has gone by the fact that the dispute was raised after a delay of fourteen years. Therefore, keeping in mind, the aforesaid facts, we would decide the issue which has arisen, namely, whether reference of such a belated claim was appropriate. 9. It may be stated that the question is of utmost importance as it is seen that many times, as in the instant case, the workers raise dispute after a number of years of the cause of action. Whether the dispute can still be treated as surviving? Or whether it can be said that the dispute does not exist when the workmen concerned after their say termination kept quiet for a number of years and thus acquiesced into the action? 20. At this stage, it may be pointed out that admittedly the law of limitation does not apply to industrial disputes. The Limitation Act, does not apply to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, and under the Industrial Disputes Act, no period of limitation is prescribed. This is now well settled by a series of judgments of this Court. 21. On the reading of these judgments, which are discussed hereinafter, it can be discerned that in some decisions where the reference was made after a lapse of considerable period, the Court did not set aside the reference, but moulded the relief by either granting reinstatement but denying back wages, fully or partially, or else granted compensation, denying reinstatement. On the other hand, in some of the decisions, the Court held that even when there was no time prescribed to exercise power under Sec. 10 of the Act, such a power could not be exercised at any point of time to revive matters which had since been settled or had to become stale. We would like to refer to these judgments at this juncture. 24. Again in Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. We would like to refer to these judgments at this juncture. 24. Again in Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. State of A.P., 1964 (1) LLJ 622 (AP), the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that reference made nearly six years after in dispute amounted to being inordinate, unreasonable and unjustifiable. 25. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty, 2000 (2) SCC 455 , the Court cautioned that power of reference should be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner and not in a mechanical fashion. It was specifically observed the power to make reference cannot be exercised to revive settled matters or to refer stale disputes in spite of absence of statutory limitation period. The Court not only reiterated that the Courts had power of judicial review, though to limited extent, but also made the following pertinent observations on delay: "6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Sec. 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Sec. 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Sec. 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact, it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed, and subsequently, reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising an industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent. 7. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed, and subsequently, reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising an industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent. 7. In the present appeal, it is not the case of the respondent that the disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in his dismissal, were in any way illegal or there was even any irregularity. He availed his remedy of appeal under the rules governing his conditions of service. It could not be said that in the circumstances an industrial dispute did arise or was even apprehended after a lapse of about seven years of the dismissal of the respondent. Whenever a workman raises some dispute it does not become an industrial dispute and the appropriate Government cannot in a mechanical fashion make the reference of the alleged dispute terming it as an industrial dispute. The Central Government lacked power to make reference both on the ground of delay in invoking the power under Sec. 10 of the Act and there being no industrial dispute existing or even apprehended. The purpose of reference is to keep industrial peace in an establishment. The present reference is destructive to the industrial peace and defeats the very object and purpose of the Act. The Bank was justified in thus moving the High Court seeking an order to quash the reference in question. 8. It was submitted by the respondent that once a reference has been made under Sec. 10 of the Act, a Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court. That is not a correct proposition to state. An administrative order which does not take into consideration statutory requirements or travels outside, that is certainly subject to judicial review, limited though it might be. The High Court can exercise its powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. In National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, 2000 (1) SCC 371 , this Court observed (at Page 393 Para 24): "24. The High Court can exercise its powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. In National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, 2000 (1) SCC 371 , this Court observed (at Page 393 Para 24): "24. It will be thus seen that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when there is an allegation that there is no industrial dispute and none apprehended which could be the subject-matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under Sec. 10 of the Act, Here, it is a question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, which could be examined by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. It is the existence of the Industrial Tribunal (sic. dispute) which would clothe the appropriate Government with power to make the reference and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate it. If there is no industrial dispute in existence or apprehended the appropriate Government lacks power to make any reference." 29. If one examines the judgments in the aforesaid perspective, it would be easy to reconcile all the judgments. At the same time, in some cases the Court did not hold the reference to be bad in law and the delay on the part of the workman in raising the dispute became the cause for moulding the relief only. On the other hand, in some other decisions, this Court specifically held that if the matter raised is belated or stale that would be a relevant consideration on which the reference should be refused. Which parameters are to be kept in mind while taking one or the other approach needs to be discussed with some elaboration, which would include discussion on certain aspects that would be kept in mind by the Courts for taking a particular view. We, thus, intend to embark on the said discussion keeping in mind the central aspect which should be the forefront, namely, whether the dispute existed at the time when the appropriate Government had to decide whether to make a reference or not or the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal to decide the same issue coming before it. 34. We, thus, intend to embark on the said discussion keeping in mind the central aspect which should be the forefront, namely, whether the dispute existed at the time when the appropriate Government had to decide whether to make a reference or not or the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal to decide the same issue coming before it. 34. To understand the meaning of the word "dispute", it would be appropriate to start with the grammatical or dictionary meaning of the term: 'Dispute', to argue about, to contend for, to oppose by argument, to call in question - to argue or debate (with, about or over) - a contest with words; an argument; a debate; a quarrel;" 35. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edn., Page 424 defines "dispute" as under: "Dispute:- A conflict or controversy; a conflict of claims or rights; an assertion of a right, claim, or demand on one side, met by contrary claims or allegations on the other. The subject of litigation; the matter for which a suit is brought and upon which issue is joined, and in relation to which Jurors are called and witnesses examined." 36. Thus, a dispute or difference arises when demand is made by one side (i.e. workmen) and rejected by the other side (i.e. the employer) and vice versa. Hence, an "industrial dispute" cannot be said to exist until and unless the demand is made by the workmen and it has been rejected by the employer. How such demand should be raised and at what stage may also be relevant, but we are not concerned with this aspect in the instant case. Therefore, what would happen if no demand is made at all at the time when the cause of action arises? In other words, like in the instant case, what would be the consequence if after the termination of the services of the petitioner on 1-4-1985, the petitioner does not dispute his termination as wrongful and does not make any demand for reinstatement for a number of years? Can it still be said that there is a dispute? Or can it be said that workmen can make such demand after a lapse of several years and on making such demand dispute would come into existence at that time. Can it still be said that there is a dispute? Or can it be said that workmen can make such demand after a lapse of several years and on making such demand dispute would come into existence at that time. It can always be pleaded by the employer in such a case that after the termination of the services when the workman did not raise any protest and did not demand his reinstatement, the employer presumed that the workman has accepted his termination, and therefore, he did not raise any dispute about his termination. It can be said that workman, in such a case, acquiesced into the act of the employer in terminating his services, and, therefore, accepted his termination. He cannot after a lapse of several years make a demand and then convert it into a "dispute" what had otherwise become a buried issue. 37. Let us examine the matter from another aspect viz. laches and delays and acquiescence. 38. It is now a well-recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases Courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delays as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the Court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. Doctrine of laches is in fact an application of maxim of equity "delay defeats equities". 39. This principle is applied in those cases where discretionary orders of the Court are claimed, such as specific performance, permanent or temporary injunction appointment of receiver, etc. These principles are also applied in the writ petitions titled under Arts. 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India. In such cases, Courts can still refuse relief where the delay on the petitioner's part has prejudiced the respondent, even though, the petitioner might have come to Court within the period preset abide by the Limitation Act. 40. Likewise, it a patty having a tight stands by and sees another acting in a manner inconsistent with that right and makes no objection while the act is in progress he cannot afterwards complain. 40. Likewise, it a patty having a tight stands by and sees another acting in a manner inconsistent with that right and makes no objection while the act is in progress he cannot afterwards complain. This principle is based on the doctrine of acquiescence implying that in such a case the party who did not make any objection acquiesced into the alleged wrongful act of the other party and, therefore, has no right to complain against that alleged wrong. 41. Thus, in those cases where period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the Court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period, the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over. Likewise, in other cases even where no limitation is prescribed, but for a long period the aggrieved party does not approach the machinery provided under the law for redressal of his grievance, it can be presumed that relief can be denied on the ground of unexplained delay and laches and/or on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced into the act of other. As mentioned above, these principles as part of equity are based on principles relatable to sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time, then such a right is non-existent. 42. On the basis of the aforesaid discussion, we summarise the legal position as under: 42.1. An industrial dispute has to be referred by the appropriate Government for adjudication and the workman cannot approach the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal directly, except in those cases which are covered by Sec. 2-A of the Act. Reference is made under Sec. 10 of the Act in those cases where the appropriate Government forms an opinion that "any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended". The words "industrial dispute exists" are of paramount importance, unless there is an existence of an industrial dispute (or the dispute is apprehended or it is apprehended such a dispute may arise in near future), no reference is to be made. Thus, existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute is a sine qua non for making the reference. The words "industrial dispute exists" are of paramount importance, unless there is an existence of an industrial dispute (or the dispute is apprehended or it is apprehended such a dispute may arise in near future), no reference is to be made. Thus, existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute is a sine qua non for making the reference. No doubt, at the time of taking a decision whether a reference is to be made or not, the appropriate Government is not to go into the merits of the dispute. Making of reference is only an administrative function. At the same time, on the basis of material on record, satisfaction of the existence of the industrial dispute or the apprehension of an industrial dispute is necessary. Such existence/apprehension of industrial dispute, thus, becomes a condition-precedent, though it will be only subjective satisfaction based on material on record. Since, we are not concerned with the satisfaction dealing with cases where there is apprehended industrial dispute, discussion that follows would confine to existence of an industrial dispute. 42.2. Dispute or difference arises when one party makes a demand and the other party rejects the same. It is held by this Court in a number of cases that before raising the industrial dispute making of demand is a necessary precondition. In such a scenario, if the services of a workman are terminated and he does not make the demand and/or raise the issue alleging wrongful elimination immediately thereafter, or within reasonable time and raises the game after considerable lapse of period, whether it can be said that industrial dispute still exists. 42.3. Since, there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute cease to exist. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute cease to exist. Therefore, if the workman is able to give satisfactory explanation for these laches and delays and demonstrate that the circumstances disclose that issue is still alive, delay would not come in his way because of the reason that law of limitation has no application. On the other hand, if because of such delay, dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as "dead", then it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be referred. 42.4. Take, for example, a case where the workman issues notice after his termination, questioning the termination and demanding reinstatement. He is able to show that there were discussions from time to time and the parties were trying to sort out the matter amicably. Or he is able to show that there were assurances by the Management to the effect that he would be taken back in service and because of these reasons, he did not immediately raise the dispute by approaching the Labour Authorities seeking reference or did not invoke the remedy under Sec. 2A of the Act. In such a scenario, it can be treated that the dispute was live and existing as the workman never abandoned his right. However, in this very example, even if the notice of demand was sent but it did not evoke any positive response or there was specific rejection by the Management of his demand contained in the notice, and thereafter, he sleeps over the matter for a number of years, it can be treated that he accepted the factum of his termination and rejection thereof by the Management and acquiesced into the said rejection. 42.5. Take another example. A workman approaches the Civil Court by filing a suit against his termination which was pending for a number of years and was ultimately dismissed on the ground that the Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the contract of personal service and does not grant any reinstatement. 42.5. Take another example. A workman approaches the Civil Court by filing a suit against his termination which was pending for a number of years and was ultimately dismissed on the ground that the Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the contract of personal service and does not grant any reinstatement. At that stage, when the suit is dismissed or he withdraws that suit and then involves the machinery under the Act, it can lead to the conclusion that the dispute is still alive as the workman had not accepted the termination but was agitating the same; albeit in a wrong forum. 42.6. In contrast, in those cases where there was no agitation by the workman against his termination and the dispute is raised belatedly and the delay or laches remain unexplained, it would be presumed that he had waived his right or acquiesced into the act of termination and, therefore, at the time a when the dispute is raised it had become stale and was not an "existing dispute". In such circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse to make reference. In the alternative, the Labour Court/Industrial Court can also hold that there is no "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Sec. 2(k) of the Act and, therefore, no relief can be granted. 43. We may hasten to clarify that in those cases where the Court finds that dispute still existed, though raised belatedly, it is always permissible, for the Court to take the aspect of delay into consideration and mould the relief. In such cases, it is still open for the Court to either grant reinstatement without back wages or lesser back wages or grant compensation instead of reinstatement. We are of the opinion that the law on this issue has to be applied in the aforesaid perspective in such matters. 44. To summarise, although, there is no limitation prescribed under the Act for making a reference under Sec. 10(1) of the I.D. Act, yet it is for the "appropriate Government" to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The words "at any time" used in Sec. 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the I.D. Act. The words "at any time" used in Sec. 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the I.D. Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay as apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which it is likely to have on the employers' financial arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry." (Emphasis supplied) 10. Another important aspect which has emerged from the impugned award is that by means of common and singular order of reference, appropriate Government referred workman's dispute against 5 different orders of penalty. 10.1. The said order of penalty came to be passed in respect of different misconduct allegedly committed by the workman at different point of time for which separate proceedings (departmental proceedings/inquiry) were conducted (and separate orders came to be passed at the relevant time). 10.2. Differently put, the dispute raised by the claimant in 2006 in respect of 5 different orders of penalty (and the order of reference passed by appropriate Government referred dispute in respect of 5 orders) for which different and separate proceedings were conducted and separate orders were passed and different quantum of penalty were determined and imposed, constituted (misjoinder of causes) and the said Reference (I.T.) No. 149 of 2006 was hit by vice of misjoinder of causes and such reference should not have been entertained. 10.3. Even if it is assumed that the appropriate Government could have passed such common order of reference in respect of separate orders of penalty and separate instance of misconduct and separate domestic inquiry, then also, the learned Tribunal ought to have appreciated that there was little scope to interfere with the orders of penalty passed by the competent authority, inasmuch as : (a) each order against the claimant were short of discharge and dismissal; and (b) in respect of all domestic inquiry, the workman-claimant had admitted legality and propriety of the inquiry. 10.4. 10.4. In such case, i.e: in the cases where : (a) employer conducts domestic inquiry with regard to the charge/misconduct; (b) the penalty imposed (after conducting domestic inquiry) by employer in respect of proved misconduct is short of dismissal or discharge; and (c) the workman does not dispute legality and propriety of domestic inquiry i.e. the workman admits that legal, fair and proper domestic inquiry was conducted, the learned Tribunal could not have interfered with the order of penalty/quantum of penalty determined by the employer more particularly, without recording finding of fact that the quantum of penalty determined by the competent authority was : (i) shockingly disproportionate; and (ii) quantum of penalty determined by the employer was not commensurate with the misconduct, but it was so harsh and disproportionate that it smacks of victimisation; and (iii) quantum of penalty determined by the employer is such that any prudent employer would not impose in such cases. 10.5. In this contest, a profitable reference may be had to the observation by Division Bench of this Court in case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Prabhashanker K. Acharya, 1992 (2) GLH 354 . In the said decision, the Court addressed below-quoted issues: "The moot questions for consideration are : (1) what is the extent and ambit of jurisdiction, of Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal to interfere in finding by the employer - Management regarding misconduct of workman; (2) whether the jurisdiction and powers of the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal under Sec. 11(a) of the industrial disputes act to interfere with the order imposing punishment is confirmed to only the punishment of discharge or dismissal or also extend to the punishments other than the said punishments; (3) if not, whether the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal can interfere with the punishment other than that of the discharge or dismissal passed by the Management under the provisions of Secs. 7, 7a and 15 of the Industrial Disputes Act. If yes, (4) what is the extent of the jurisdiction and power of Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal and under what circumstances the order of such punishment can be interfered with?" The Court, then, observed and held, inter alia, that: "18. 7, 7a and 15 of the Industrial Disputes Act. If yes, (4) what is the extent of the jurisdiction and power of Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal and under what circumstances the order of such punishment can be interfered with?" The Court, then, observed and held, inter alia, that: "18. The powers and the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and the Industrial Tribunal to interfere with the finding of misconduct and order imposing the punishment other than the punishment of discharge or dismissal is restricted, even though, the Labour Court or Tribunal had wider powers than revisional powers. It cannot exercise the powers of an appellate authority and re-appraise the evidence and set aside the finding only because the other view is possible or even plausible. The Labour Court or the Tribunal also cannot interfere with the nature or the quantum of the punishment casually because it considers to impose other kind of punishment or to impose lesser punishment than the one awarded by the Management. The Tribunal can interfere with the finding of misconduct or the nature and the quantum of the punishment only under the circumstances as set out above and specifically by various judicial pronouncements. The Tribunal can interfere with the finding of the Management in the following circumstances : (1) want of good faith. (2) victimisation or unfair labour practice. (3) basic error or violation of principles of natural justice. (4) finding completely baseless or perverse. (5) colourable exercise of power or want of bona fide, and (6) punishment shockingly disproportionate regard being had to the particular conduct or the past record or is such that no reasonable employer would ever impose in like circumstances unless he is actuated by considerations of victimisation or natural labour practice. The above circumstances are illustrative and not exhaustive and the Tribunal can interfere with the finding or the punishment in circumstances alike also, but the Tribunal cannot interfere with the finding or nature and quantum of punishment casually or as if exercising appellate jurisdiction." In the said decision, the Court, speaking through Hon'ble Mr. The above circumstances are illustrative and not exhaustive and the Tribunal can interfere with the finding or the punishment in circumstances alike also, but the Tribunal cannot interfere with the finding or nature and quantum of punishment casually or as if exercising appellate jurisdiction." In the said decision, the Court, speaking through Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.M. Ahmadi (as His Lordship then was) observed, inter alia, that: ".....To put it differently, is it within the ambit of the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal's jurisdiction to interfere with the employer's discretion in the field of disciplinary jurisdiction and reduce the penalty imposed by the employer after the charge of misconduct was proved at a properly held domestic enquiry even when the punishment imposed is short of dismissal or discharge and the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the enquiry was in accordance with the principles of natural justice and finding of guilt was not perverse or mala fide? such a power is specifically conferred in cases of discharge or dismissal under the newly inserted Sec. 11(a) by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1971 (45 of 1971) with effect from December, 15, 1971.... ......But this power is specifically confined to cases of discharge or dismissal and not to other case where the punishment imposed is short of that. That would ordinarily mean that the Legislature intended to permit interference in managerial discretion by the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal in cases where the punishment results in termination of employment and not in all cases. In other words, cases of punishment other than discharge or dismissal would continue to be governed by the law laid down by judicial pronouncements prior to the insertion of Sec. 11(a) in the Act. It would, therefore, be advantageous to examine the case law in this behalf as obtaining Sec. 11(a) was placed on the statute book. .....It is therefore, clear from this decision that while the Supreme Court recognised the power of adjudicatory forums to interfere in matters of discipline to the limited extent of the case falling within one of the four stipulations delineated above, it at the same time cautioned that the role of such forums was not of appellate nature, meaning thereby, that it cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the employer even if any one of the four conditions did not exist. In view of this decision and having regard to the recommendation No. 119 of the I.L.O. The Legislature stopped in by introducing Sec. 11(a) on the statute book. By this new provision, the limitation placed by the Supreme Court was sought to be lifted by permitting the adjudicatory authorities to interfere in cases of discharge or dismissal if the concerned authority found that the order was not justified and has entitled the said authority to substitute the punishment. Since, Sec. 11(a) is limited in scope, in that, it governs cases of punishment of discharge or dismissal only, it follows by necessary implication that the Legislature did not intend to clothe the adjudicatory authorities with similar power where the punishment is other than discharge or dismissal. The Legislative intent is obvious, namely, it did not desire that the Managerial prerogative of taking disciplinary action against the erring workmen should be absolute or unlimited even in cases of termination of service presumably because it was apprehended that such extreme, unchecked and unfettered power may not be conducive to maintenance of industrial peace. 7. It will be seen from the above discussion that the position in law before and after the insertion of Sec. 11(a) has been consistent insofar as cases other than termination of service by an order of discharge or dismissal are concerned. It is only in cases of discharge or dismissal that the Legislature enlarged the jurisdiction of the adjudicatory forums to interfere with the order of punishment by introducing Sec. 11A in the Act. The tendency of the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal to lightly interfere with the order of punishment, in cases where punishment inflicted is short of dismissal or discharge, as if it were exercising appellate jurisdiction must be deprecated. It must be remembered that the quantum of punishment cannot be measured in golden scales and will offer from individual to individual depending on his notions of discipline, but the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal will not be justified in interfering with the employer's order of punishment merely because it would have visited the workmen with a lighter punishment if it were wearing the employer's shoes. It is only in cases where the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal comes to the conclusion, for areas to be stated in writing, that the punishment imposed is grossly disproportionate to the proved misconduct, that it may interfere with the order of punishment. It is only in cases where the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal comes to the conclusion, for areas to be stated in writing, that the punishment imposed is grossly disproportionate to the proved misconduct, that it may interfere with the order of punishment. Such cases would be far and few. Unfortunately, we have noticed that Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal freely interferes with the quantum of punishment, some of the cases on hand are examples of unwarranted interference, which has been responsible for generating a lot of avoidable litigation. That is why it was thought that the time was ripe for clearly stating the jurisdictional parameters of the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal in such cases. However, a word of caution for the Managements seems necessary, namely, that it must act in a responsible manner in the choice of punishment from the wide range of censure to dismissal if it does not want the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal to interfere on the ground that the severity of the punishment betrays victimisation." (Emphasis supplied) 10.6. At this stage, a profitable reference should also be had to the decision by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of General Secretary, Indian Cashew Factories Workers Union v. Managing Director, Kerala State Cashew Development Corporation Ltd., 2006 (5) SCC 201 , wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that: "16. The Labour Court had earlier held that the enquiry was properly held and there was no violation of the principles of natural justice and that the findings were not perverse. The vitiating facts found by the Labour Court against the enquiry are erroneous and are liable to be set aside. If enquiry is fair and proper, in the absence of any allegations of victimization or unfair labour practice, the Labour Court has no power to interfere with the punishment imposed. Section 11(a) of the Act, gives ample power to the Labour Court to re-appraise the evidence adduced in the enquiry and also sit in appeal over the decision of the employer in imposing punishment. Section 11(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, is only applicable in the case of dismissal or discharge of a workman as clearly mentioned in the Section itself. Before the introduction of Sec. 11(a) in Indian Iron and Steel Co. Section 11(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, is only applicable in the case of dismissal or discharge of a workman as clearly mentioned in the Section itself. Before the introduction of Sec. 11(a) in Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1958 SCR 667 , this Court held that the Tribunal does not act as a Court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the Management and that the Tribunal will interfere only when there is want of good faith, victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. on the part of the Management. There is no allegation of unfair labour practice, victimisation etc. in this case. The powers of the Labour Court in the absence of Sec. 11(a) is illustrated by this Court in Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Management, 1973 (1) SCC 813 . When enquiry was conducted fairly and properly, in the absence of any of the allegations of victimisation or mala fides or unfair labour practice, Labour Court has no power to interfere with the punishment imposed by the Management. Since, Sec. 11(a) is not applicable, Labour Court has no power to reappraise the evidence to find out whether the findings of the Enquiry Officer are correct or not or whether the punishment imposed is adequate or not. Of course, Labour Court can interfere with the findings if the findings are perverse. But, here there is a clear finding that the findings are not perverse and principles of natural justice were complied with while conducting enquiry." (Emphasis supplied) 10.7. It is also appropriate to take into consideration the observation by Hon'ble Apex Court in Para 13 of the decision in case of Union of India v. Manab Kumar Guha, 2011 (11) SCC 535 , wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, thus: "13. It is well settled that High Court while exercising the power of judicial review from the order of the disciplinary authority do not act as a Court of appeal and appraise evidence. It interferes with the finding of Enquiry Officer only when the finding is found to be perverse. We are of the opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court erred in setting aside the order of learned Single Judge and quashing the order of compulsory retirement. It interferes with the finding of Enquiry Officer only when the finding is found to be perverse. We are of the opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court erred in setting aside the order of learned Single Judge and quashing the order of compulsory retirement. The finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer is based on the materials on record and on proper appreciation of evidence which cannot be said to be perverse calling for interference by the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review." (Emphasis supplied) Above-quoted observations make it clear that the evidence is not to be re-appreciated by the Court in the manner the Court would ordinarily re-appreciate the evidence while dealing with and deciding the appeal. Unless the findings by the Inquiry Officer are found to be perverse, the Court should not record contrary finding or disturb the conclusion by the Inquiry Officer. 10.8. In light of said observations in above-mentioned decisions, it is necessary and appropriate, so far as present case is concerned, to take into account that: (a) misconduct of collecting fare and not issuing tickets and/or not collecting fare and not issuing tickets were reported against the claimant; (b) as many as 5 instances were reported against the claimant for which impugned action were taken by the competent authority; (c) the (past) service record brought out and established that the default card showed entries of similar misconduct; (d) in respect of each instance, separate domestic inquiry was conducted and said domestic inquiry were conducted; (e) the domestic inquiry were conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice and applicable rules; (f) the case before learned Tribunal, undisputedly, discloses that in respect of reported misconduct, legal and fair inquiry was conducted and the penalty imposed by the employer was short of discharge or dismissal; (g) the legality and propriety of the inquiry was admitted by the workman and there was no dispute on that count; and (h) in respect of none of the order of penalty, learned Tribunal reached to the conclusion that all or any particular order of penalty passed by the competent authority constituted shockingly disproportionate penalty and/or quantum of penalty was so harsh which would tantamount to and reflect victimisation. In respect of none of the orders of penalty, the learned Tribunal could record finding that the employer acted out of victimisation or mala fide. 10.9. In respect of none of the orders of penalty, the learned Tribunal could record finding that the employer acted out of victimisation or mala fide. 10.9. In this view of the matter, there was no scope for learned Tribunal to interfere with the order of penalty which were short of discharge or dismissal. 11. It would not be out of place to mention that the learned Tribunal failed to appreciated that having regard to the nature of the activity of the Corporation, the action : (a) not collecting fare; (b) not issuing ticket and/or (c) not collecting fare and not issuing ticket would not only amount to misconduct, but it would also amount to dishonesty in respect of Corporation's business whereas the action viz. not issuing ticket even after collecting fare would also tantamount to theft of Corporation's property (inasmuch as the fare paid by the passenger would become Corporation's property and the conductor holds it in trust). Such conduct does not amount to mere or simple negligence, but it is dishonesty and in discharge of duty. When a conductor is aboard the bus and is on duty, he is assigned the duty of issuing ticket after collecting fare (depending upon the distance of their journey) from the passengers and he holds the post of trust and confidence and acts as trustee (of the employer) and it would be his duty and obligation to ensure that Corporation is not put to suffer any loss in revenue/income. This duty becomes more honorary in case of public road transport corporation i.e. where public money and public exchequer are involved. The loss of revenue/income to the Corporation ultimately translates into loss to the State and public exchequer. If the conductor indulges in acts of not collecting fare and not issuing tickets to friends and relatives, then the Corporation would be put to suffer heavy loss. Such conduct cannot be viewed and dealt with lightly or casually and in any case, it cannot be brushed aside or condoned by treating it "mere negligence". Even if such conduct is considered negligence, it should be treated as "culpable negligence" or "gross negligence" towards duty and obligation. 11.1. Such conduct cannot be viewed and dealt with lightly or casually and in any case, it cannot be brushed aside or condoned by treating it "mere negligence". Even if such conduct is considered negligence, it should be treated as "culpable negligence" or "gross negligence" towards duty and obligation. 11.1. Unfortunately, the learned Tribunal failed to appreciate the said aspect and even after having found that in respect of all instances (where order of penalty came to be passed) more particularly in respect of orders of penalty dated 26-4-1995 and 30-11-1998, the claimant had not collected fare and not issued tickets, the learned Tribunal casually brushed aside and ignored said conduct by branding it "mere negligence" and condoned the said misconduct by invoking theory that it was a bona fide mistake and the claimant had no intention to not collect fare or to commit misconduct. The learned Tribunal erred in dealing with the claimant's misconduct with the observation that if he had collected fare and not issued tickets, then only the action would amount to misconduct, but not collecting fare and not issuing tickets would not amount to misconduct but it would, at the most, tantamount to bona fide mistake. 11.2. The approach which the learned Tribunal adopted and the manner in which the learned Tribunal dealt with the instance in question are hit by vice of non-application of mind. The learned Tribunal has shown undue and undeserved sympathy, and that therefore, such decision by learned Tribunal cannot be sustained. 11.3. So far as the decision on which learned Advocate for the petitioner placed reliance is concerned, the set of facts involved in the said decision are on different footing and are not comparable with the facts in present case. Therefore, said decision does not render any assistance to the petitioner. 12. 11.3. So far as the decision on which learned Advocate for the petitioner placed reliance is concerned, the set of facts involved in the said decision are on different footing and are not comparable with the facts in present case. Therefore, said decision does not render any assistance to the petitioner. 12. For the reasons mentioned above, the decision by learned Tribunal with regard to the order of penalty dated 26-4-1996 and order of penalty dated 30-11-1998 (passed by the competent authority) is unjust and unsustainable and the impugned order by learned Tribunal overlooks the decision of this Court in case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Prabhashanker K. Acharya, 1992 (2) GLH 354 , as well as decisions by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department, 2015 (10) SCALE 114 , and in case of General Secretary, Indian Cashew Factories Workers Union v. Managing Director, Kerala State Cashew Development Corporation Ltd., 2006 (5) SCC 201 . In the first place, the challenge against the orders of penalty which was raised after gross and inordinate delay, should not have been interfered with. In any case, there was no justification to interfere with the orders of penalty dated 26-4-1995 and 30-11-1998 and learned Tribunal committed material apparent and manifest error in interfering with the said order of penalty. The learned Tribunal exercised jurisdiction arbitrarily and with material irregularity as well as without application of mind to relevant facts and circumstances. The decision by learned Tribunal does not deserve to be and cannot be sustained and the petition deserves to be granted. Therefore, following order is passed: (A) The impugned award dated 19-12-2014 and the impugned decision by learned Tribunal (so far as it relates to order dated 26-4-1995 passed by the competent authority and the order dated 30-11-1998 passed by the competent authority) are set aside. (B) The learned Tribunal's decision with regard to the order of penalty dated 30-9-1999 is not disturbed. With aforesaid observations and direction, present petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute to aforesaid extent. Interim relief stands vacated.