JUDGMENT : VIPUL M. PANCHOLI, J. 1. Both these appeals are filed under Clause15 of the Letters Patent by the appellants–original petitioners against common C.A.V. judgment dated 05.05.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.15817 of 2016 with Special Civil Application No.15818 of 2016, by which the learned Single Judge dismissed both the petitions. 2. As the issue involved in both these appeals is same and as the learned Single Judge has passed common C.A.V. judgment, with the consent of the learned advocates appearing for the parties, both the appeals are heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 3. The facts of the present case in nutshell are as under: 3.1 The petitioners are the heirs and legal representatives of one Gulabji Mohanji. It is stated that Gulabji Mohanji was the deemed tenant of the land bearing Survey Nos.218/5, 218/6, 218/7 and 218/8 situated at Village Lilapur, Taluka Dascroi, Ahmedabad. Respondent Nos.4 to 13 are the original land owners of the aforesaid land. Whereas respondent No.14 is a purchaser of the land from respondent Nos.4 to 13. It is the case of the petitioners that the purchase price of the disputed land was fixed at Rs.1,000/- and the said amount was paid to the original owners. A Certificate under Section 32M of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the Tenancy Act” for the sake of convenience) was issued in favour of the deemed tenant. Accordingly, Revenue Entry No.630 came to be mutated in the revenue record. It is stated that the petitioners are in possession of the land which was cultivated by their predecessor since 1951-52. After the death of Gulabji Mohanji, the names of his heirs have been mutated in the revenue record. Thereafter, distribution of the land in question had taken place between the brothers and, therefore, Entry No.688 came to be mutated on 25.04.1972. It is the grievance of the petitioners that though they are deemed tenants of the land in question, respondent Nos.4 to 13 sold the land in question by registered Sale Deed to respondent No.14 on 22.05.2005 and, thereafter, the respondents filed an application before the Mamlatdar and ALT for deletion of the names of the petitioners from the revenue record. It is the grievance of the petitioners that though they are deemed tenants of the land in question, respondent Nos.4 to 13 sold the land in question by registered Sale Deed to respondent No.14 on 22.05.2005 and, thereafter, the respondents filed an application before the Mamlatdar and ALT for deletion of the names of the petitioners from the revenue record. The Mamlatdar and ALT, by an order dated 21.05.2007, directed the deletion of the names of the petitioners from the second right column. The petitioners, therefore, filed an appeal before the Deputy Collector. The Deputy Collector passed an order on 12.09.2008 and remanded the matter back to the Mamlatdar and ALT. The Mamlatdar and ALT thereafter passed an order on 23.10.2009 in Tenancy Case No.160/2008 (Remand) holding that the tenancy rights of the petitioners are not cancelled and they are entitled to purchase the land under Section 32G of the Tenancy Act. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the same, respondent Nos.4 to 13 preferred an appeal before the Deputy Collector. The said appeal came to be rejected by order dated 23.07.2014. Therefore, the private respondents filed Revision Application before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal (‘Tribunal’ for short). The Tribunal by order dated 09.05.2016 quashed and set aside the order passed by the Deputy Collector. The petitioners, therefore, filed the captioned petition, in which, the petitioners prayed for the following reliefs: “(a) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in nature of certiorari for quashing and set aside the impugned order dated 09.05.2016, passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, in Revision Application No.TEN/BA/186/2014 with all consequential effects. (b) Pending the admission and final disposal of this petition, Your Lordships may be pleased to stay the impugned order dated 09.05.2016 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, in Revision Application No.TEN/BA/186/2014. (c) Grant such other and further relief/s granted as may be deemed fit and proper in the interest of justice.” 3.2 The learned Single Judge by an impugned C.A.V. judgment dismissed both the petitions and, therefore, the appellants–original petitioners have filed the present appeals. 4. Heard learned Senior Counsel Mr. Mehul S. Shah assisted by learned advocate Mr.Hitesh N. Acharya for the appellants–original petitioners, learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. D.M. Devnani for respondent Nos.1 to 3 and learned advocates Mr.Jitendra M. Patel and Mr.Jayraj Chauhan for the private respondents. 5. 4. Heard learned Senior Counsel Mr. Mehul S. Shah assisted by learned advocate Mr.Hitesh N. Acharya for the appellants–original petitioners, learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. D.M. Devnani for respondent Nos.1 to 3 and learned advocates Mr.Jitendra M. Patel and Mr.Jayraj Chauhan for the private respondents. 5. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Shah submitted that Entry No.362 came to be mutated in favour of the predecessor of the petitioners in Village Form No.6 on 14.11.1952 in respect of Survey Nos.218/5 and 218/8. However, Entry No.413 was mutated on 09.08.1956 in respect of Survey Nos.218/6 and 218/7. These entries have not been challenged by the respondents till date. It is pointed out from the application submitted by the private respondents, which is produced at Page 338 of the compilation, that by way of the said application, the private respondents requested the respondent authority to remove the effect of Entry No.413 mutated on 09.08.1956 from the revenue record on the ground that the petitioners were never tenants. However, the said application cannot be treated as an appeal challenging entries made in the revenue record. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge has mainly considered the aspect that the petitioners have failed to produce even a single order or even proceedings holding that the predecessor of the petitioners has been declared as a tenant under the Tenancy Act. No order of the authority is found on record which forms a basis of Entry No.413. However, during the pendency of the present appeals, the original record of Tenancy Case No.39 is traced out by the Office of the Mamlatdar and ALT and the petitioners have obtained copies of the relevant documents referring to the proceedings initiated under Section 32G of the Tenancy Act and copies of the receipts as well as Certificate issued under Section 32M of the Tenancy Act. Learned Senior Counsel contended that from the said documents, now it can be held that the predecessor of the petitioners has paid the purchase price to the original land owners and when the Certificate under Section 32M of the Tenancy Act is issued in favour of the petitioners, the private respondents’ contentions may not be accepted. Learned Senior Counsel contended that from the said documents, now it can be held that the predecessor of the petitioners has paid the purchase price to the original land owners and when the Certificate under Section 32M of the Tenancy Act is issued in favour of the petitioners, the private respondents’ contentions may not be accepted. 5.1 Learned Senior Counsel further contended that the learned Single Judge has though observed that the petitioners have made a Kabulatnama in favour of the private respondents, in which, it has been stated that the petitioners have no objection if Entry No.413 is deleted as it is made mistakenly, the learned Single Judge observed that it is true that such declaration would not affect the lawful status of a tenant provided it is conferred in lawful proceedings by an order of a competent authority and, thereafter, it is observed by the learned Single Judge that in the present case, there is no order by any authority declaring the petitioners to be deemed tenants, the admission of the petitioners by way of declaration and Kabulatnama cannot be disregarded. However, now in view of the fact that the certificate of purchase of land is found on record, the impugned judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge be set aside. 5.2 Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Shah thereafter has placed reliance upon the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shanabhai Ghanabhai Baraiya (Since Decd.) Through Heirs v. Chunibhai Govindbhai (Decd.) Through Heirs & Karta of H.U.F. & Ors. reported in 2017(3) GLR 2399 . Relying upon the said decision, it is contended that merely because the tenant has made a statement before the Mamlatdar and ALT that he was no more tenant and no more in possession and it should be treated as good as his giving up his tenancy rights, is not sufficient but if the termination of tenancy by virtue of surrender if not undertaken by the procedure prescribed under Section 15 of the Tenancy Act, tenancy rights cannot be surrendered by mere Kabulatnama. He has further placed reliance upon the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dayandeo Ganpat Jadhav v. Madhav Vithal Bhaskar and others reported in AIR 2006 SC 93 , wherein also the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if the procedure was not followed, surrender was invalid and the effect of noncompliance would result in all proceedings being vitiated. 5.3 Learned Senior Counsel thereafter has placed reliance upon the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Amrit Bhikaji Kale And Others vs. Kashinath Janardhan Trade And Another reported in (1983) 3 SCC 437 and contended that even if the tenant has relinquished his rights as a tenant, landlord was nonetheless not entitled to recover possession because when the deemed purchaser agreed to handover possession subject to the provisions of Section 15, the land would be at the disposal of the Collector under Section 32P of the Tenancy Act. The landlord even in such a situation is not entitled to be restored to possession without bringing his case under Section 15 of the Tenancy Act. 5.4 Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, therefore, urged that even assuming that during the course of the proceedings, deemed tenants have submitted Kabulatnama or that they have waived their rights in the land in question, it is not sufficient and the tenancy right is to be surrendered as per the procedure prescribed under the Tenancy Act and not otherwise. It is, therefore, urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that the impugned judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge be set aside. 6. On the other hand, learned advocate Mr. Jitendra M. Patel appearing for the private respondents has supported the reasoning recorded by the learned Single Judge and submitted that the petitioners have executed Banakhat in favour of some third party with regard to the land in question and, therefore, looking to the conduct of the petitioners, they are not entitled to claim the reliefs as prayed for. It is further submitted that Entry No.412 deleting the name of the tenant is correct entry. However, mistake has occurred in recording Entry No.413 which was entered on the same day. The said mistake has been admitted by the petitioners by way of Kabulatnama as well as by declaration. It is further submitted that Entry No.412 deleting the name of the tenant is correct entry. However, mistake has occurred in recording Entry No.413 which was entered on the same day. The said mistake has been admitted by the petitioners by way of Kabulatnama as well as by declaration. At this stage, it is submitted that the Mamlatdar and ALT passed an order on 23.10.2009, after the remand, which is without jurisdiction as the proceedings before him were with regard to the entry made in the revenue record. However, he has decided the issue with regard to the tenancy and observed that the petitioners, who are deemed tenants, can pay the purchase price which can be fixed. The Mamlatdar and ALT could not have converted the revenue proceedings into tenancy proceedings and, therefore, the Tribunal has rightly set aside the orders passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT as well as the Deputy Collector and the learned Single Judge has, therefore, rightly dismissed petitions filed by the petitioners. 6.1 Learned advocate Mr. Patel appearing for private respondents would further submit that the original petitioners did not produce any document with regard to the proceedings under Section 32G of the Tenancy Act and Certificate of purchase issued under Section 32M of the Tenancy Act before the respondent authorities. The same were also not produced before the learned Single Judge. However, for the first time, in the present appeals, by way of Civil Applications, the appellants–original petitioners have placed on record such documents and, therefore, at this stage, this Court may not consider the said documentary evidence. Referring to the Certificate issued under Section 32M of the Tenancy Act, it is contended that though the said certificate was prepared but never issued in favour of the petitioners and, therefore also, the petitioners cannot rely upon the said document. Learned advocate Mr.Patel has opposed the Civil Applications filed by the appellants–original petitioners under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“the Code” for short). Learned advocate Mr.Patel has opposed the Civil Applications filed by the appellants–original petitioners under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“the Code” for short). 6.2 Learned advocate Mr.Patel, therefore, urged that in view of Kabulatnama and declaration made by the original petitioners and in view of the fact that the petitioners had failed to produce any document in connection with the proceedings under Section 32G of the Tenancy Act, the learned Single Judge has rightly not believed the case of the petitioners and, therefore, this Court may not entertain these appeals. 6.3 Learned advocate Mr.Patel has placed reliance upon the following decisions in respect of his submissions: (1) Navuji Lalji Vaghela And Ors v. State of Gujarat reported in 2011(4) GLR 3636 (2) Dahyabhai Somabhai v. Ramaji Kesarji reported in 1971 GLR 809 (3) G.M., O.N.G.C. Ltd. v. Sendhabhai Vastaram Patel reported in 2005(6) SCC 454 (4) Baldevbhai Shivabhai Patel (Since Decd.) Through His Heirs And Ors. v. State of Gujarat And Ors. reported in 2017(1) GLR 662 (5) Thiru John v. Returning Officer reported in 1977(3) SCC 540 (6) Dr.Shehla Burney v. Syed Ali Mossa Raza (Dead) By Lrs. reported in 2011(6) SCC 529 7. Learned advocate Mr.Jayrajsinh Chuahan appearing for another private respondent has also supported the reasoning recorded by the learned Single Judge and adopted the submissions canvassed by learned advocate Mr.Jitendra M. Patel. He urged that the appeals be dismissed. 8. We have considered the submissions canvassed by the learned advocates appearing for the parties. We have also gone through the material produced on record. From the record, it would emerge that respondent Nos.4 to 13 are the original owners of the land in question whereas the petitioners are the heirs and legal representatives of Gulabji Mohanji who was the deemed tenant of the land in question. From the Village Form Nos.7 and 12 produced at Pages 34 to 49 of the compilation, it is revealed that Gulabji Mohanji was cultivating the said land since 1951-52 to 1959-60. 9. Entry No.413 came to be mutated on 09.08.1956 in the revenue record with regard to the land in question wherein the name of the predecessor of the petitioners came to be recorded in the second right column. The said entry is never challenged by the original land owners. 9. Entry No.413 came to be mutated on 09.08.1956 in the revenue record with regard to the land in question wherein the name of the predecessor of the petitioners came to be recorded in the second right column. The said entry is never challenged by the original land owners. It is further clear from the record that for the first time, respondent Nos.4 to 13 submitted an application on 17.12.2006 to the Mamlatdar wherein it was requested that Entry No.413 was mutated in the record on 09.08.1956 and till date, the names of the tenants are reflected in the revenue record in second right column. The names of the tenants were in fact deleted from the said record. However, necessary effect is not given in 7/12 extract and, therefore, the names of the tenants are deleted. In pursuance to the said application, initially, the Mamlatdar and ALT passed an order deleting the names of the petitioners from the revenue record. However, when it was challenged before the Deputy Collector, the said order was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the Mamlatdar and ALT. Upon remand, the Mamlatdar and ALT passed an order in Tenancy Case No.160/2008 (Remand) holding that the tenancy rights of the petitioners are not cancelled and they are entitled to purchase the land under Section 32G of the Tenancy Act. Such order was confirmed by the Deputy Collector and, therefore, the private respondents filed Revision Application before the Tribunal. The Tribunal passed an order in favour of the original land owners. The same was challenged before the learned Single Judge. 10. At this stage, it is required to be noted that during the proceedings before the respondent authorities as well as the Tribunal and even before the learned Single Judge, record of Tenancy Case No.39 was not traceable and, therefore, the Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge have passed an order on the basis that though the petitioners are claiming to be the deemed tenants and though they have paid the purchase price of Rs.1,000/- fixed in the proceedings under Section 32G of the Tenancy Act and though the Certificate issued under Section 32M of the Tenancy Act are issued in favour of the petitioners, they failed to produce the same on record. However, during the pendency of the present appeals, the appellants–original petitioners have filed Civil Application No.2 of 2017 in Letters Patent Appeal No.1064 of 2017 and Civil Application No.2 of 2017 in Letters Patent Appeal No.1065 of 2017 for production of additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code. Though learned advocates appearing for the private respondents have opposed the said application, this Court has allowed the said Civil Applications by order dated 19.09.2018 and thereby the additional evidence produced by the appellants are taken on record. At this stage, it is further required to be noted that we have also called for the original record of Tenancy Case No.39 from the Office of the Mamlatdar and ALT and learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr.Devnani has produced the original record before us. In the said record, proceedings under Section 32G of the Tenancy Act, receipts issued by the original land owners in favour of the deemed tenants as well as the certificate issued under Section 32M of the Tenancy Act, are available. Thus, we have also verified the original record. 11. From the aforesaid record, it is clear that in the proceedings initiated under Section 32G of the Tenancy Act, purchase price was fixed by the competent authority and the said purchase price was paid by the predecessor of the petitioners. The original land owners have received the purchase price of Rs.1000/- and issued due receipts thereof. Thereafter, Certificate under Section 32M of the Tenancy Act came to be issued in favour of the predecessor of the petitioners. Thus, in view of the said documentary evidence, it is clear that the petitioners are the deemed tenants who have paid the purchase price to the original land owners and are having the valid certificate issued in their favour by the competent authority. In absence of the said documents, the Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge have given findings against the present petitioners and, therefore, we are of the view that the orders passed by the Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge are required to be set aside. 12. In absence of the said documents, the Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge have given findings against the present petitioners and, therefore, we are of the view that the orders passed by the Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge are required to be set aside. 12. The contention raised by the learned advocates appearing for the private respondents relying upon the Kabulatnama and declaration of the petitioners that Entry No.413 is wrongly mutated in the record and they are in fact not tenants and are not in possession of the land in question, cannot be accepted in view of the aforesaid factual aspects emerged on record. At this stage, we would like to refer the decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dayandeo Ganpat Jadhav v. Madhav Vithal Bhaskar and others (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in Paragraphs 23 to 31 as under: “23. Section 15 deals with cases of termination of tenancy by surrender of land by the tenant. It reads as under; "15. Termination of tenancy by surrender thereof. (1) A tenant may terminate the tenancy in respect of any land at any time by surrendering his interest therein in favour of the landlords; Provided that such surrender shall be in writing, and verified before the Mamlatdar in the prescribed manner. (2) Where a tenant surrenders his tenancy, the landlord shall be entitled to retain the land so surrendered for the like purposes, and to the like extent, and in so far as the conditions are applicable subject to the like conditions as are provided in sections 31 and 31A for the termination of tenancies. (2A) The Mamlatdar shall, in respect of the surrender verified under subsection (1), hold an inquiry and decide whether the landlord is entitled under subsection (2) to retain the whole or any portion of the land so surrendered and specify the extent and particulars in that behalf. (3) The land, or any portion thereof, which the landlord is not entitled to retain under subsection (2), shall be liable to be disposed of in the manner provided under clause (c) subsection (2) of Section 32P. 24. In exercise of power conferred by Section 82 of the Act, the State Government framed rules known as the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Rules, 1956. Rule 9 is material for our purpose and reads thus; "9. 24. In exercise of power conferred by Section 82 of the Act, the State Government framed rules known as the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Rules, 1956. Rule 9 is material for our purpose and reads thus; "9. Manner of verifying surrender of tenancy. The mamlatdar when verifying a surrender of a tenancy by a tenant in favour of the landlord under section 15 shall satisfy himself, after such enquiry as he thinks fit, that the tenant understands the nature and consequences of the surrender and also that it is voluntary and shall endorse his findings in that behalf upon the document of surrender." 25. Conjoint reading of Section 15 and Rule 9 makes it clear that a tenant who has become `deemed purchaser' under the Act may surrender tenancy. Such surrender, however, must be as per the procedure laid down in the Act and the Rules. If the surrender is not in accordance with the law, it must be held illegal, unlawful and the status of a tenant as `deemed purchaser' would not get adversely affected. 26. Mr. Sukumaran is again right in submitting that the Act has been enacted with a view to protect tenants and the provisions of the Act, therefore, must be construed in favour of a weaker class of the society to ensure that the object underlying the Act is fulfilled. 27. As held by this Court in Sakharam Shripati Jadhav and Ors. v. Chandrakant and Ors., [1987] 1 SCC 486, the Act has been enacted with a "high purpose of transferring the land to the tillers of the soil". In Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, [1959] Supp 1 SCR 489, it has been held by the Constitution Bench of this Court that the title of the landlord to the land passes immediately to the tenant on the tillers' day and there is a complete purchase and sale between the landlord and the tenant. But in the said decision itself, it has been observed by the Court that the tenant had been given a locus penitentiae and an option of declaring whether he is or is not willing to purchase the land held by him as a tenant. If he fails to appear or he appears and shows his unwillingness to purchase it, an appropriate order can be passed by the authority after following the procedure required by law. 28. If he fails to appear or he appears and shows his unwillingness to purchase it, an appropriate order can be passed by the authority after following the procedure required by law. 28. In Ramachandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare, [1975] 1 SCC 559, a question similar to the one with which we are concerned came up for consideration before this Court. It was held that surrender of tenancy by a tenant in order to be valid and effective must fulfill the following requirements- (i) It must be in writing. (ii) It must be verified before the mamlatdar. (iii) While making such verification the mamlatdar must satisfy himself in regard to two things, namely (a) that the tenant understands the nature and consequences of the surrender, and (b) that it is voluntary. (iv) The mamlatdar must endorse his finding as to such satisfaction upon the document of surrender. 29. The Court considered provision of Section 5(3)(b) as then stood, which was similar to Section 15(1) of the Act, read with Rule 2A, similar to present Rule 9 of the Rules and held that the provision was absolute, express and peremptory. 30. The Court stated "The language of Section 5(3)(b) and Rule 2A is absolute, explicit and peremptory. The words "provided that" read with the words "shall be", repeatedly used in Section 5(3)(b), make the termination of tenancy by surrender entirely subject to the imperative conditions laid down in the proviso. This proviso throws a benevolent ring of protection around tenants. It is designed to protect a tenant on two fronts against two types of dangers one against possible coercion, undue influence and trickery proceeding from the landlord, and the other against the tenant's own ignorance, improvidence and attitude of helpless self resignation stemming from his weaker position in the tenant landlord relationship. Thus, the imperative language, the beneficent purpose and importance of these provisions for efficacious implementation of the general scheme of the Act, all unerringly lead to the conclusion that they were intended to be mandatory. Neglect of any of these statutory requisites would be fatal. Disobedience of even one of these mandates would render the surrender invalid and ineffectual. 31. It was, therefore, held that if the procedure was not followed, surrender was invalid and the effect of noncompliance would result in all proceedings being vitiated.” 13. Neglect of any of these statutory requisites would be fatal. Disobedience of even one of these mandates would render the surrender invalid and ineffectual. 31. It was, therefore, held that if the procedure was not followed, surrender was invalid and the effect of noncompliance would result in all proceedings being vitiated.” 13. Even the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shanabhai Ghanabhai Baraiya v. Chunibhai Govindbhai (supra), has observed in Paragraphs 8, 9 and 12 as under: “8. Having heard learned Counsels appearing for the parties, submissions made by them and perusal of orders passed in two rounds of litigations by Mamlatdar and ALT, Deputy Collector, Gujarat Revenue Tribunal following are our conclusions. a. In the proceedings undertaken by the Mamlatdar and ALT under Section 32(G) of BT & AL Act qua lands bearing Survey No. 1272 admeasuring 2 Acres 29 Gunthas and Survey No. 1542 admeasuring 0.0 Acres 38 Gunthas situated in the sim of Village Changa, Taluka Petlad, District Anand, deceased Shanabhai a tenant no doubt made a statement before Mamlatdar and ALT and it was recorded on 14.10.1962 that he was not cultivating the suit land since 1947 and based on above, the above proceedings came to be dropped. b. Tenancy Appeal No.179/1982 before Deputy Collector, Petlad, though preferred after 20 year, it was allowed and against which Revision Application No.TEN.BA. 2043/82 was preferred before Gujarat Revenue Tribunal came to be allowed vide order dated 03.09.1982 by quashing and setting aside both the orders and remanded the matter to the Mamlatdar and ALT. In the above order of remand by Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, reliance was placed on a decision reported in AIR 1973 Bombay 101 in the case of Bhikubai Bhima Gaidhane and another v. Khandu Daji Pagar and another of the High Court of Bombay, in which it was held as under: “7. The Tenancy Act is brought into operation on account of disputes between landholders and tenants and also for ensuring full and efficient use of lands for agriculture; and to see that landlords do not use devices to evict tenants for some reason or the other. The provision of this Act therefore is to further the interests of tenants who may be ousted by landlords in their own interest. The provision of this Act therefore is to further the interests of tenants who may be ousted by landlords in their own interest. We may have therefore to refer to Section 15 to judge the plea of the landlord who says that the statement of the respondent tenant that he was not a tenant and that he was not in possession of the land should be taken into consideration to decide that he was no more a tenant. Under Section 15 a tenant may terminate the tenancy in respect of any land at any time by surrendering his interest therein in favour of the landlord. Such surrender shall be in writing and verified before the Mamlatdar in a prescribed manner. Where a tenant surrenders his tenancy the landlord shall be entitled to retain the land so surrendered. Mamlatdar also in this connection shall hold an inquiry and decide whether the landlord is entitled to retain the whole or any portion of the land so surrendered and specify the extent and price in that behalf. The landlord also should get an order for getting possession under Section 29 (2). The landlord shall obtain possession of any land held by a tenant only under an order of the Mamlatdar. For obtaining such an order he shall make an application in the prescribed form and within a period of two years from the date on which he becomes entitled to obtain possession of the land. Now. the legislature by enacting these provisions has safeguarded the interest of the tenants who may be ousted by an unscrupulous landlord. But the landlord in the instant case says that because the tenant has made a statement before the Agricultural Lands Tribunal that he was no more a tenant and that he was no more in possession, it should be treated as good as his giving up his tenant's rights. That certainly cannot be accepted. 8. Undoubtedly the record shows that the respondent was a tenant of the land from the years 1952-53 to 1964-65. No wonder therefore that the Agricultural Lands Tribunal had started proceedings under Section 32G. Because of the statement of the respondent tenant the Agricultural Lands Tribunal dropped the proceedings. Now the statement of the respondent merely shows that he had surrendered his tenancy and that he has given up his possession. No wonder therefore that the Agricultural Lands Tribunal had started proceedings under Section 32G. Because of the statement of the respondent tenant the Agricultural Lands Tribunal dropped the proceedings. Now the statement of the respondent merely shows that he had surrendered his tenancy and that he has given up his possession. However, his statement will not stop the operation of a social legislation which is for the benefit of tenants and which is to safeguard their interests. Even if, therefore the respondent tenant says that he had surrendered his possession, things ought to have taken place according to law. Termination of tenancy by virtue of surrender should be in accordance with Section 15. Possession by a landlord should be in accordance with Section 29. It cannot be in any other way. It cannot certainly be merely as a result of the statement of a tenant in S. 32G proceedings. It, therefore, cannot be said that the alleged statement of the tenant in the instant case leads only to one inference and that is that he ceased to be a tenant and that he ceased to be in possession of the land.“(emphasis supplied) According to Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, no doubt the statement was made by the deceased tenant to the effect of surrendering his possession before 15 years and even the landlord making statement that tenant had handed over the possession before 10 years, in fact, name of the tenant was shown in the Revenue Record till the time when the statement was made and even thereafter. Though Deputy Collector was justified in setting aside the order passed by the ALT, the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal was of the opinion that the case ought to have been remanded to Mamlatdar and ALT to record the evidence and to decide the matter in accordance with law. Thus, simply because the deceased tenant made a statement and was recorded by Mamlatdar in the year 1962 about not cultivating the land was not sufficient enough according to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. In the above proceedings, no contention with regard to delay of 20 years in filing appeal before the Deputy Collector in the year 1982 against the order of 26.11.1962 was taken and considered. In second round of litigation, based on the above, Mamlatdar & ALT held in favour of tenant and confirmed by Deputy Collector. In the above proceedings, no contention with regard to delay of 20 years in filing appeal before the Deputy Collector in the year 1982 against the order of 26.11.1962 was taken and considered. In second round of litigation, based on the above, Mamlatdar & ALT held in favour of tenant and confirmed by Deputy Collector. Thus, it was not open to GRT to take a different view on the issue of Law in the second round of litigation. Then, thirdly, by Order and communication as per the record, a xerox copy of payment of Rs.9852/made by the successors of the deceased tenant towards purchase price so fixed is produced on record along with Certificate under Section 32(M) of BT & AL Act, 1948 in favour of Becharbhai Shanabhai Baraiya and widow Andarben Chhayabhai Shanabhai. The above Certificate under Section 32(M) of the Act was granted subject to restriction under Section 43 of the Act and not to be alienated in any manner or to create any encumbrance on the said lands namely Survey Nos. 1272 and 1542 situated in the sim of Village Changa, Taluka Petlad, District Anand, without seeking prior permission of the competent authority. 9. The above Certificate under Section 32(M) of the BT & AL ACT remained final as there was no challenge and thus the tenant became the owner of the Land. 10. *** *** *** 11. *** *** *** 12. 9. The above Certificate under Section 32(M) of the BT & AL ACT remained final as there was no challenge and thus the tenant became the owner of the Land. 10. *** *** *** 11. *** *** *** 12. We find force in the submissions made by Mr.Nikhil Kariel learned advocate for the applicant based on law laid down by the High Court of Bombay in the decision of Bhikubai Bhima Gaidhane and another v. Khandu Daji Pagar and another (Supra) that because the tenant has made a statement before the Mamlatdar and ALT and, therefore, he was no more tenant and no more in possession and it should be treated as good as his giving up his tenancy rights, is not correct position of law and duty is cast upon Mamlatdar and ALT to hold proper inquiry and in the above case ALT had dropped the proceedings based on the statement of the tenant that he had surrendered his tenancy and had given up his possession, but at the same time operation of the social legislation, which is for the benefit of the tenants and also to safeguard their interest, will not stop their termination of tenancy by virtue of surrender should be in accordance with Section 15 of the Act at the same time possession of the landlord should be in accordance with Section 29 of the Act. As we are in agreement with the law laid down by the High Court of Bombay in the decision of Bhikubai Bhima Gaidhane and another v. Khandu Daji Pagar and another (Supra), which still holds good, order passed by the learned Single Judge impugned in this Letters Patent Appeal, in view of the above and collective and conjoint appreciation of law as well as facts of the subject, and accordingly the order is quashed and set aside. The Appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. 14. Keeping in view of the aforesaid decisions and keeping in view the provisions contained in Section 15 of the Tenancy Act, if the facts of the present case are examined, it can be said that the termination of tenancy by surrender can be made only after following the procedure prescribed under Section 15 of the Tenancy Act and not otherwise. Merely because some declaration was made or Kabulatnama is filed by the petitioners, the same cannot be relied upon. Merely because some declaration was made or Kabulatnama is filed by the petitioners, the same cannot be relied upon. In fact, the learned Single Judge also observed in the impugned judgment that "It is true that a declaration would not affect the lawful status of a tenant provided it is conferred in lawful proceedings by an order of a competent authority. In the present case, there is no order by any authority declaring the petitioners to be deemed tenants. The certificate of purchase of the land is not found on record. Coupled with this is the admission of the petitioners that they are not tenants. Under such circumstances, the admission of the petitioners by way of declarations and Kabulatnama cannot be disregarded.” Thus, from the aforesaid observations made by the learned Single Judge, it is clear that the learned Single Judge has considered such declaration and Kabulatnama in absence of certificate of purchase of the land in question and no order of the authority declaring the petitioners to be deemed tenants is produced. However, as observed hereinabove, during the pendency of the present proceedings, such additional documents are placed on record and when we have examined the original record, we are of the view that such finding recorded by the learned Single Judge is also required to be set aside. 15. Learned advocate Mr.Patel appearing for the private respondents lastly submitted that the petitioners have executed Banakhat in favour of the third party with regard to the land in question and, therefore, looking to the conduct of the petitioners, this Court may not grant any relief in their favour. We are not inclined to accept the said submission on the ground that the respondent authority has not initiated any proceedings against the petitioners for alleged violation of the provisions of the Tenancy Act. 16. In the case of Navuji Lalji Vaghela And Ors v. State of Gujarat (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has held that only “person aggrieved” can maintain a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and further held that no person can approach the Court under the said provision to take advantage of his own wrong to gain favourable interpretation of law. 17. 17. In the case of Dahyabhai Somabhai v. Ramaji Kesarji (supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court held that the concerned petitioners purchased the lands in contravention of the provisions of Sections 63 and 64 of the Tenancy Act and their sale has been declared to be invalid. Once sale of land in their favour has been declared invalid, it would follow as a necessary corollary that they have no semblance of title to this land and their possession would certainly be unauthorised. 18. In the case of Thiru John v. Returning Officer (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in Paragraph15 as under: “15. It is well settled that a party’s admission as defined under Secs 17 to 20 fulfilling the requirement of Section 21, Evidence Act, is substantive evidence proprio vigore. An admission, if clearly and unequivocally made, is the best evidence against the party making it and though not conclusive, shifts the onus on to the maker on the principle that “what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so and until the presumption was rebutted the fact admitted must be taken to be established.” 19. We have considered the aforesaid decisions and the other decisions upon which the reliance is placed by the learned advocates for the private respondents. However, in the present case, as discussed hereinabove, the said decisions would not render any assistance to the private respondents. 20. In view of the aforesaid discussion and in view of the fact that the purchase price of the land in question has been paid by the predecessor of the petitioners to the original land owners and when the Certificate issued under Section 32M of the Tenancy Act is issued in favour of the petitioners, the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal has committed an error while allowing Revision Application Nos.TEN/BA/185/2014 and TEN/BA/186/2014 and filed by the private respondents, therefore, the order of the Tribunal is required to be quashed and set aside. Consequently, the impugned judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge in the captioned petitions is also required to be set aside. 21. In view of the aforesaid discussion, both these appeals are allowed and the impugned order of the Tribunal as well as the impugned judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge are set aside. Accordingly, pending Civil Applications stand disposed of.