JUDGMENT : B.N. KARIA, J. 1. The present Appeal has been preferred by the appellant, being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction dated 3rd January 2013 passed in Sessions Case No. 5 of 2012 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jamkhambhalia, District Jamnagar convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Sections 376, 451, 506 [2] of the Indian Penal Code [hereinafter referred to as, “IPC”] and order on sentence whereby, the appellant has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs. 25,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 376; and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years. Appellant has also been sentenced to under rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years for the offence punishable under Section 451 IPC, and for the offence under Section 506 (2) IPC, the appellant has been ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years. All the sentences have been ordered to run concurrently. 2. The facts emerging from record of the prosecution are that, the complainant, a minor girl aged 13 years, resident of village-Bharana, Taluka-Khambhaliya, District-Jamnagar has stated the following facts in her complaint, registered at Vadinar Police Station vide ICR No. 14/2011 dated 10th August 2011, given at 18:45 hrs, in connection with offences punishable under Sections 376, 451, 506(2) IPC and Section 135 (1) of the Bombay Police Act. Free translation of the said complaint reads thus - “I am dictating in person that I have been living at the aforementioned address alongwith my parents. I have two sisters, I am the eldest among three. I have two brothers. Altaf is aged 12 years, Mumtaaz is aged 11 years, Asib is aged 8 years and Sehnaaz is aged 6 years. My father is laborer. My mother Jetunben is housewife. I was engaged to Raheman Gafar Vandha of Bhandariiya village at Bhavnagar district, two years ago. About six months ago, my parents, my brother Asif and sister Mumtaaz and Sehnaaz went to Bhandariya village in Bhavnagar district to inquire about health of my father-in-law Gafarbhai Vandha who was ill. On that night, my brother Altaf went out for labour work therefore I was alone at the house. Someone knocked the door at about 12'o clock in the midnight, I thought that it was my brother Altaf so I opened the door. On that night, my brother Altaf went out for labour work therefore I was alone at the house. Someone knocked the door at about 12'o clock in the midnight, I thought that it was my brother Altaf so I opened the door. Iqbal Juma Vagher, who was knocking on the door, pushed me inside as soon as I opened the door. He came inside and locked the door. He forcefully started touching me, when I asked him not to do so, he took out the knife and threatened me that he would kill me if I start shouting. I was frightened. He caught hold of my hand and threw me on bed. I was wearing Punjabi dress and dupatta. He removed my dress and mounted onto me after taking off his pent, shirt and underwear. He sexually assaulted me. I started feeling pain in vagina. He gassed my mouth with his hands when I tried to shout. After committing this act, he put on his clothes and threatened me that if I tell anyone about this incident, he would kill everyone. I was feeling extreme pain in my vagina. Thereafter I wore my clothes and went for sleep. After two days, I was alone at my home in the night. My brother Altaf went for labour work. At that time, Ikbal Juma Vagher again came to my house in the late night and knocked on the door and made me open the door. He forcefully hugged me and made me lie down on the cot. He removed my clothes and sexually assaulted me. At that time also, Ikbal Juma Vagher was armed with knife. Thereafter, he went away. After five to six days, my parents returned from Bhandariya. After this incident, I have not menstruated. As Ikbal Juma Vagher threatened me, I did not inform my parents in this regard. As I got frightened due to this incident, I was sitting silently Therefore, my mother Jetunben asked me two days before as to, "Why do you sit silently ? Whatever problem you have, tell me." Therefore, I started crying. I informed my mother about this incident while crying. I also informed my mother that I have not been in period since occurrence of the incident. I have come to the police station with my parents today to lodge the complaint. Whatever problem you have, tell me." Therefore, I started crying. I informed my mother about this incident while crying. I also informed my mother that I have not been in period since occurrence of the incident. I have come to the police station with my parents today to lodge the complaint. As Ikbal Juma Vagher of my village sexually assaulted me forcefully, I conceived. Therefore, I declare my complaint against him for taking lawful actions." 3. At the time of incident, the victim-complainant, a minor girl was 13 years old and the appellant-accused was about 40 years old. The victim lodged the complaint. 4. After completion of investigation, Police filed charge-sheet against the accused person under Sections 376, 451, 506(2) IPC and Section 135(1) of the Bombay Police Act. After filing of charge sheet, accused has been supplied copy of police papers, free of cost under Section 207 CrPC. As this case is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Khambhaliya, committed the aforesaid case to the Sessions Court, Jamnagar by passing a committal order vide Exh. 1 under Section 209 CrPC for full-fledged trial. 5. The charge has been framed against the accused vide Exh. 4. The plea of accused was recorded at Exh.5, wherein, he did not plead guilty and claimed to be tried. 6. To bring home the guilt of the accused [appellant herein], the prosecution examined as many as 18 witnesses. They are : Jaisangbhai Kesubhai Patadiya [PW-1 : Exh. 13]; Karitsinh Khodaji Soda [PW-2 : Exh. 15]; Ibrahim Ismailbhai Murani [PW-3 : Exh. 20]; Amadbhai Mamadbhai Bhagad [PW-4 : Exh. 22]; Aminbhai Amadbhai Gajan [PW-5 : Exh. 26]; Ishaqbhai Haroonbhai Jasraya [PW-6 : Exh. 29]; Gulabsinh Madhavsinh Jadeja [PW-7 : Exh. 30]; Alibhai Amadbhai Gadher [PW-8 : Exh. 32]; Hanifbhai Abdulbhai Bhagad [PW-9 : Exh. 33]; Umarbhai Taiyabbhai Gandhar [PW-10 : Exh. 35]; Complainant [PW-11 : Exh. 38]; Dr. Nitaben Haribhai Rada [PW-12 : Exh. 46]; Urmishbhai Maganbhai Pandya [PW-13 : 55]; Dr. Satyajit Virendra Rajan [PW-14 : Exh. 60]; Mehbood Khan Haiderkhan Pathan [PW-15 : Exh. 69]; Ashok Bhikhalal Gohil [PW-16 : Exh. 61]; Dr. Rakhalchandra Gopeshwar Datta [PW- 17 : Exh. 73]; Hussein Abdulbhai Piperwadia [PW-18 : Exh. 85]. 7. 35]; Complainant [PW-11 : Exh. 38]; Dr. Nitaben Haribhai Rada [PW-12 : Exh. 46]; Urmishbhai Maganbhai Pandya [PW-13 : 55]; Dr. Satyajit Virendra Rajan [PW-14 : Exh. 60]; Mehbood Khan Haiderkhan Pathan [PW-15 : Exh. 69]; Ashok Bhikhalal Gohil [PW-16 : Exh. 61]; Dr. Rakhalchandra Gopeshwar Datta [PW- 17 : Exh. 73]; Hussein Abdulbhai Piperwadia [PW-18 : Exh. 85]. 7. After conclusion of the prosecution evidence, entire incriminating material on record was put to the appellant and his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was recorded in which, he denied the charges and claimed trial. The appellant examined none in his defence. 8. After considering the facts, evidence led on behalf of both the sides and the material on record, the learned Additional Sessions Judge held the appellant guilty for an offence punishable under Sections 376, 451, 506 (2) IPC vide judgment and order of sentence; as indicated above. Hence, the present Appeal has been preferred by the appellant-convict against the impugned judgment and order on sentence. 9. Learned advocate Shri JM Buddhbhati appearing on behalf of the appellant assailed the impugned judgment and order on the grounds stated in the memo of appeal, contending inter alia that the learned trial Court has committed an error while recording the conviction of the appellant. 10. It is vigorously argued by learned advocate for the appellant that the appellant that in the complaint, age of the prosecutrix is stated as 13 years; as incident took place in the month of August 2011. However, while recording her deposition in June 2012, she had declared her age as 18 years which suggests that she was major. That, as per the complainant, offence took place before six months of the complaint which was lodged on 10th August 2011 at 18:45 hours. That, mother of the prosecutrix has given history before the Doctor and the complaint was lodged by her parents. That, even complaint was never read-over to the prosecutrix. That, parents of the prosecutrix were not examined by the prosecution. That, engagement of the prosecutrix was made earlier in point of time with one Rehman and she had an occasion to indulge into intercourse with the said person, and therefore, possibility of her getting pregnant by such relation with Rehman cannot be ruled out. That, parents of the prosecutrix were not examined by the prosecution. That, engagement of the prosecutrix was made earlier in point of time with one Rehman and she had an occasion to indulge into intercourse with the said person, and therefore, possibility of her getting pregnant by such relation with Rehman cannot be ruled out. That, in a birth certificate of child, name of father has been shown as Rehman Jaffar Vanda. That, no DNA test was carried out of the said person with whom engagement of the prosecutrix was fixed, nor he has been examined as a witness by the prosecution. That there are material contradictions in the version with regard to the occurrence, as stated in the complaint as well as in her deposition before the trial Court. That, no explanation was given for delayed lodgment of the complaint. That, Social Worker Ms. Kamlaben who has put her signature in the complaint has not been examined by the prosecution. 12. Learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant, after having declared that the present case is not a case of clean acquittal, but looking to the family condition of the accused and that he has five children and aged mother to look-after, who is unable to maintain the children of the accused so also financial condition of the accused is not sound, he is not in a position to pay the amount of fine imposed by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Khambhaliya. This Court should take lenient view in favour of the appellant by reducing the sentence of life imprisonment into 10 years and reducing the amount of fine. The age of the accused, at the time of committing crime was of 40 years, and at present, he would be around 46 years of age, approximately. 13. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to mention at this stage that learned advocate for the appellant acknowledged, accepted and submitted that the present case is not a case of clean acquittal, however, the appellant would urge that the sentence needs to be reduced. 14. In view of the aforestated submission by learned advocate for the appellant, as such, it is not necessary to discuss and deliberate, in detail, about the final conclusion by the learned trial Court with regard to the offence and charge against the appellant. 14. In view of the aforestated submission by learned advocate for the appellant, as such, it is not necessary to discuss and deliberate, in detail, about the final conclusion by the learned trial Court with regard to the offence and charge against the appellant. Besides this, after hearing learned advocate for the appellant at length and after careful consideration of entire material and the judgment rendered by the learned trial Court, we are, even otherwise, in agreement with the final conclusion by the learned trial Court. We concur with reasons and conclusions recorded by the learned trial Court. 15. Refuting the arguments so advanced, learned Additional Public Prosecutor Shri Manan Mehta would submit that no valid reasons exist to disbelieve the prosecutrix who has supported the prosecution fully and no material infirmities could be extracted, despite searching cross examination. 16. Learned APP further submitted that indisputably in the Birth & Death register, birth date of prosecutrix has been shown as 8th August 1998. The said birth date was got registered after passing of 12 days of her birth, by her parents, i.e., on 20th August 1998. That, vide Exh. 55, Shri Urmishbhai Maganlal Pandya was examined by prosecution. He was then serving as Sub-Registrar at Sayla Nagarpalika. As per his deposition and copy of register as well as Birth Date certificate of the prosecutrix Exhs. 56 & 57, it is proved that at the time of filing of complaint, age of the prosecutrix was 13 years and 2 days. The date of crime is six months before lodgment of the complaint by the prosecutrix. Thus, the victim was 12 years and 6 months of age, at the time of incident. That, both the documents viz., Exhs. 56 & 57 being public documents, should be accepted as proved. That, in the OPD case papers of JD Hospital [Exh. 47], the prosecutrix had declared her age as 13 years. In the history recorded by the Medical Officer, her age has been shown as 13 years. That, in the medical examination form at Exh. 49, age of the victim is noted as 13 years by the Medical Officer. Likewise, in other documents at Exhs. 64 & 78, the same age has been declared by the prosecutrix, and therefore, there is no question of treating her major, or for entertaining any doubt in this regard as the age is proved beyond doubt. 17. 49, age of the victim is noted as 13 years by the Medical Officer. Likewise, in other documents at Exhs. 64 & 78, the same age has been declared by the prosecutrix, and therefore, there is no question of treating her major, or for entertaining any doubt in this regard as the age is proved beyond doubt. 17. Learned APP further submitted that as per the deposition of prosecutrix herself, she was alone at her residence when the accused committed crime of rape by indulging into forceful intercourse against her will and desire. That, in similar manner, he repeated the offence. That, DNA test produced at Exh. 100 clearly proves that the child delivered by the prosecutrix is result of intercourse between the accused and the prosecutrix. Thus, as per the opinion of DNA test, biological father of the newly born child to the prosecutrix is the convict [present appellant], and therefore, at present to say that no rape was committed upon the victim/prosecutrix is far from truth and beyond the province of doubt. Thus, report of DNA test cannot be ignored by the Court and has rightly been weighed by the trial Court, while arriving at the just conclusion of guilt. That, minor contradictions and omissions; if any, in the deposition of prosecutrix, who was then of tender age, cannot be seriously viewed, when she had successfully come out unscathed from the rigors of cross examination, rendering her testimony qua the incident comprised in her examination in chief to remain unshattered. 18. Learned APP urged that when prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts against the appellant, who had committed house trespass in order to commit an offence of rape and thereby had threatened her to commit murder of her entire family, it was requested by learned APP to dismiss the Appeal and thereby confirm the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jamkhambalia. 19. Lastly, Shri Manan Mehta, learned APP appearing on behalf of the respondent-State has, with considerable force and vigour, contended that the findings of conviction, recorded by the Court below, are based on a mature and balanced appreciation of evidence on record, and hence, do not necessitate interference even on the aspect of curtailing the sentence of fine. 20. 19. Lastly, Shri Manan Mehta, learned APP appearing on behalf of the respondent-State has, with considerable force and vigour, contended that the findings of conviction, recorded by the Court below, are based on a mature and balanced appreciation of evidence on record, and hence, do not necessitate interference even on the aspect of curtailing the sentence of fine. 20. Having heard learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respective sides and having considered the material available on the record of the case, at the outset, this Court would like to state that so far as the appellant's contention on the ground that the complaint-FIR was lodged after long delay is concerned, the victim-complainant has explained the cause and circumstances which are found satisfactory by the learned trial Court and the learned trial Court accepted the same. A minor girl, 13 years old, was, as deposed by the victim – complainant was shown a knife and threatened with dire consequences by the appellant, that if she told anything to anyone, he would kill her, her parents, and brother and that out of fear on account of the threat, she had not told anything to her parents for long time. Besides this, when the delay in reporting the matter by the prosecutrix stands duly explained by the prosecutrix comprised in the factum of hers fearing and hers coming to be subjected to threat by the appellant, would not enjoin the Court to draw a conclusion therefrom that the version qua the incident is either premeditated or concocted. In our view, the learned trial Court has not committed any error in believing and accepting the explanation by the victim prosecutrix for the delay in reporting the matter or in not dismissing and rejecting the case of the prosecution on that ground. 21. It is not in dispute that the victim was minor aged about 13 years, and therefore, her consent would not be relevant. The Apex Court has made the observations on this aspect. The provisions of Section 375 (6) IPC provide : Rape - A man is said to commit rape who, except in the case hereinafter excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances failing under any of the six following descriptions:- Sixthly .- With or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age. 22. The provisions of Section 375 (6) IPC provide : Rape - A man is said to commit rape who, except in the case hereinafter excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances failing under any of the six following descriptions:- Sixthly .- With or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age. 22. Therefore, it would be an offence under Section 376 when such an act is committed on minor and the consent would not be relevant at all. Further the victim in her testimony as well as even before the Doctor, while giving history has not suggested about any consent or voluntariness in the act. Therefore, submission made by learned advocate to draw an inference merely because there is no injury cannot be readily believed or accepted. It may be noted that injury is not sine qua non in such cases. 23. The Apex Court in a judgment in case of Dastagir San & Anr. vs. State of Karnataka, reported in [2004] 3 SCC 106 has observed that that the injury is not a sine qua non in every case. It is to be considered with the background of the facts and the circumstances in each case. Thus, there may not be any injury like in the present case, and therefore, it cannot be presumed that there is no offence. The victim may be too fragile to offer any resistance or may have been so overpowered and therefore there may not be any injury. Even under threat [to life, her own life and/or to life of parents], the victim may not be in proper state of mind to resist a male with more physical strength. 24. A useful reference can be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in a judgment in the case of Rajinder alia Raji v. State of Himachal Pradesh, reported in [2009] 16 SCC 69 wherein the same issue was discussed that the medical evidence does not corroborate the case of sexual intercourse or the rape. Further, the submission made that the testimony of the victim may not be accepted without corroboration is also misconceived. The Apex Court in a judgment in case of State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors. Further, the submission made that the testimony of the victim may not be accepted without corroboration is also misconceived. The Apex Court in a judgment in case of State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors. reported in [1996] 2 SCC 384 has observed: "The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury.. . ...Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances." 25. The fundamental principles of law remain settled that the testimony of a victim in a case of sexual offence is taken as vital; and unless there are compelling reasons, corroboration as such is not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. In other words, in a given case, sole testimony of victim may be sufficient to establish the crime of rape even in the absence of corroborative evidence. 26. In the case of State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Sanjay Kumar, reported in [2017] 2 SCC 51, the Apex Supreme Court has reiterated the fundamentals of these principles, as follow : “31. By now it is well settled that the testimony of a victim in cases of sexual offences is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of a statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of a sexual assault alone to convict the accused. No doubt, her testimony has to inspire confidence. Seeking corroboration to a statement before relying upon the same as a rule, in such cases, would literally amount to adding insult to injury. The deposition of the prosecutrix has, thus, to be taken as a whole. No doubt, her testimony has to inspire confidence. Seeking corroboration to a statement before relying upon the same as a rule, in such cases, would literally amount to adding insult to injury. The deposition of the prosecutrix has, thus, to be taken as a whole. Needless to reiterate that the victim of rape is not an accomplice and her evidence can be acted upon without corroboration. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness does. If the court finds it difficult to accept her version, it may seek corroboration from some evidence which lends assurance to her version. To insist on corroboration, except in the rarest of rare cases, is to equate one who is a victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to a crime and thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding insult to injury to tell a woman that her claim of rape will not be believed unless it is corroborated in material particulars, as in the case of an accomplice to a crime. Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion ? The plea about lack of corroboration has no substance [See Bhupinder Sharma v. State of H.P.: (2003) 8 SCC 551 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 31].” 27. The requisites of approach of the Court in the case of present nature has also been laid down by the Apex Court in several of its decisions. For the present purpose, suffice it would be to notice the following observations in the case of State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors., reported in [1996] 2 SCC 384: “21…The courts, therefore, shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.” 28. The equally important corollary propositions of the aforesaid are that the minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the case of prosecution in such cases are immaterial; and marginal mistakes or minor inconsistencies cannot by themselves demolish the prosecution case. 29. As regards the medical evidence, it remains settled that in a case related with the crime of rape, the medical evidence, being that of an opinion, plays only a supporting role; and it is not the requirement of law that the case of prosecution would be accepted only when supported by the medical evidence. It is also settled that the medical evidence by itself is not decisive as regards the question of rape because such a question is to be decided only by the Court on the factual matrix of each case. 30. The judicial quest in the matter of the present nature is of looking for a proof beyond all reasonable doubt. In other words, the criminal charges are required to be brought home beyond any such doubt which may reasonably arise, commensurate with the nature of the offence. 31. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Inder Singh & Anr. vs. The State (Delhi Administration), reported in [1978] 4 SCC 161 pointed out that the principles of proof beyond reasonable doubt were only of a guideline, while observing as under : “2. Credibility of testimony, oral and circumstantial, depends considerably on a judicial evaluation of the totality, not isolated scrutiny. While it is necessary that proof beyond reasonable doubt should be adduced in all criminal cases, it is not necessary that it should be perfect. If a case is proved too perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial; if a case has some flaws, inevitable because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. If a case is proved too perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial; if a case has some flaws, inevitable because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. One wonders whether in the meticulous hypersensitivity to eliminate a rare innocent from being punished, many guilty men must be callously allowed to escape. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish and guilty man cannot get away with it because truth suffers some infirmity when projected through human processes. Judicial quest for perfect proof often Because the Court asks for manufacture to make truth look true? No, we must be realistic.” 32. Further, in the case of Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh & Ors., reported in (1990) 1 SCC 445 , the Apex Court explained as to what implies in the expression “reasonable doubt” in the following : “4. There is a higher standard of proof in criminal cases than in civil cases, but there is no absolute standard in either of the cases. See the observations of Lord Denning in Bater v. Bater but the doubt must be of a reasonable man. The standard adopted must be the standard adopted by a prudent man which, of course, may vary from case to case, circumstances to circumstances. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicions and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let hundred guilty escapes than punish an innocent. Letting guilty escape is not doing justice, according to law. 5. The conscience of the court can never be bound by any rule but that is coming itself dictates the consciousness and prudent exercise of the judgment. Reasonable doubt is simply that degree of doubt which would permit a reasonable and just man to come to a conclusion. Reasonableness of the doubt must be commensurate with the nature of the offence to be investigated.” The present case may now be examined, while keeping in view the principles aforesaid. 33. Learned advocate for the appellant submitted that the learned trial Court has committed error in holding that the victim was minor. On this count, it is necessary to mention that the prosecution established the date of birth of the victim and also established that she was illiterate. 33. Learned advocate for the appellant submitted that the learned trial Court has committed error in holding that the victim was minor. On this count, it is necessary to mention that the prosecution established the date of birth of the victim and also established that she was illiterate. The extract of the Register from the Birth & Death Registration Department was placed on record which reflected the date of birth of the victim [8th August 1998] and that birth was registered on 20th August 1998 and the certificate was issued on 20th August 1998. The Sub-Registrar of the Nagarpalika, who was then serving in Birth & Death Registration Department with the Nagarpalika, was also examined with reference to the extract of the Register and the Birth Certificate. With his deposition, the extract of the Register and Birth Certificate are duly proved. When the Medical Officer recorded the history, the prosecutrix declared that her age is 13 years. In medical examination form also, age of the prosecutrix is recorded as 13 years and even in the medical report, the victim's age is shown as 13 years. Besides above mentioned other corroborating evidence, the Certificate and extract of the Register are cogent, sufficient and satisfactory proof to establish the age of the victim – prosecutrix. The learned trial Court has properly considered and appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence and has not committed any error in holding that at the material time, the prosecutrix – victim was minor. 34. During the course of trial, it appears that two documents at Exhs. 56 & 57 were produced by the prosecution to prove the Birth date of the prosecutrix. Witness namely Urmish Maganlal Pandya, who was then serving as Sub Registrar in Sayla Nagar Palika was examined on oath by the prosecution. It transpires from the document produced on record that the extract of Birth & Death register [Exh. 56] shows an entry no. 536 having been made on 20th August 1998, showing birth of prosecutrix on 8th August 1998 at village Sayla, wherein, name of father of new born baby girl is shown as Ishak Isha Raja and the mother's name is shown as Jetunben. These documents were issued by the Sub Registrar of the Birth & Death Department, wherein, birth date of prosecutrix has been shown as 8th August 1998. The said certificate has been issued on 20th August 1998. These documents were issued by the Sub Registrar of the Birth & Death Department, wherein, birth date of prosecutrix has been shown as 8th August 1998. The said certificate has been issued on 20th August 1998. 35. Moreover, from the OPD case papers produced on record at Exh. 47, the prosecutrix herself has declared her age as 13 years. Even in the history given by the prosecutrix, which came to be recorded by the Medical Officer, she has declared her age as 13 years. Thereafter, she was shifted to Gynecologist, wherein also, in the transfer form at Exh. 47 on page-4 thereof, her age is stated to be 13 years. It also appears from the medical examination form produced at Exh. 49, the concerned Medical Officer has recorded the age of prosecutrix as 13 years. In the said form, after obtaining left hand thumb-impression of her mother Jetunben, all the details were filled-in. Further more, in a medical report of GG Hospital, Jamnagar which is produced on record at Exh. 62, her age has been shown as 13 years. In the said document also, thumb impression of mother Jetunben of the prosecutrix was obtained by the Medical Officer and thereafter necessary details were filled up. If we consider the medical case papers of General Hospital, Nagar Gate, Jam-Khambalia [produced on record at Exh. 64], age of the prosecutrix, as shown therein, is 13 years. Even in the DNA test/case papers at Exh. 80, same age of prosecutrix gets reflected on record. It is nowhere placed on record that prosecutrix was major, or was 18 years or more of age. 36. Thus, from all the documents and testimony of the prosecutrix herself, it is clearly established by the prosecution that at the time of fateful occurrence, the prosecutrix was aged 13 years. Reliance can be placed on the sole testimony of the minor prosecutrix for anviling thereupon findings of conviction against the accused when on a wholesome reading of her deposition, recorded on oath before the trial Court, an ensuing inference enmates therefrom of her testimony being both inspiring as well as credible. 37. Learned advocate for the appellant, then, submitted that the learned trial Court committed error in holding that the appellant is father of the child delivered by the victim. 37. Learned advocate for the appellant, then, submitted that the learned trial Court committed error in holding that the appellant is father of the child delivered by the victim. In this context, it has emerged from the evidence on record and so also from the judgment by the learned trial Court that the prosecution had placed on record DNA Report of the child. The Forensic Science Laboratory conducted test of DNA of the appellant and DNA of the child. On conclusion of the test, DNA report was submitted to the prosecution. The prosecution placed the said DNA report on record. The DNA report give out that “non malnuel alleles of amplified locy” of DNA profile of blood sample Ex-A [of the child] are present in DNA profile of blood sample Ex-C [Iqbal Jumabhai Chamodia]. The prosecution, thereby, established parenthood, viz., that the appellant is father of the child and that the victim -prosecutrix is the mother of the child. The prosecution, thereby also established that the appellant had committed sexual intercourse with the victim whereby she got pregnant and begot the child. The said act by the appellant with minor girl of 13 years comes within the purview of Section 375 [6] [6th Description]. The learned trial Court has not committed any error in relying on the DNA report and in holding that the DNA report established that the appellant is the father of the child [whom the victim – prosecutrix gave birth] delivered by the victim and the said fact, in turn, also establishes the fact that the appellant committed sexual intercourse with the victim. The learned trial Court has, thereupon, held that the said evidence also supports and corroborates the victim's case [complaint] viz., the appellant committed the offence. 38. The prosecutrix has deposed as PW-11. Even the sole testimony of the prosecutrix can form the basis for convicting the accused, if her sworn deposition on oath is both inspiring and trustworthy. When she came to depose as a witness before the trial Court, she was permitted to render a version on oath qua the incident on the learned trial Judge having gauged her competence. Even the sole testimony of the prosecutrix can form the basis for convicting the accused, if her sworn deposition on oath is both inspiring and trustworthy. When she came to depose as a witness before the trial Court, she was permitted to render a version on oath qua the incident on the learned trial Judge having gauged her competence. She had, in her recorded deposition on oath before the trial Court, made a disclosure qua the occurrence in tandem with the version as dictated in FIR inscribing that on the mid-night, when her brother Altaf was out for labour work and she was alone at home, someone knocked the door at about 12 O'clock, and she thought that it was her brother Altaf, so she opened the doors. It was Iqbal Juma Vagher, who was knocking on the door and he pushed her inside as soon as she opened the door. He came inside and locked the door. He forcefully started touching her, when she asked him not to do so, he took out knife and threatened her that he would kill her if she starts shouting. She got frightened. He caught hold of her hands and threw her on bed and committed crime of rape and also sexually assaulted her. She has also deposed in her examination-in-chief of the accused having threatened her against disclosing the incident to anyone, in the event thereof, he would eliminate her family. 39. It appears from the record vide Exh. 99, which is a forwarding letter dated 14th May 2012 of Directorate of Forensic Sciences, Gujarat State, Gandhinagar addressed to Police Sub Inspector, Vadinar Marine Police Station, District Jamnagar, the same enclosing therewith a Forensic Examination Report dated 11th May 2012 in connection with C.R/FIR No. I-14/2011 [Exh. 100]. Now, perusing the test results of the analysis of DNA profiles of the samples of Reshmaben, Gulamsabir and Ikbal, it is opined as under : “1. One of the alleles of the amplified loci of DNA Profile of blood sample Ex-A [source of Gulamsabir, S/o. Reshmaben, D/o. Ishak Isha Raja] matches with one of the respective allele in the DNA profile of blood sample Ex-B [source of Reshmaben, D/o. Ishak Isha Raja]. 2. One of the alleles of the amplified loci of DNA Profile of blood sample Ex-A [source of Gulamsabir, S/o. Reshmaben, D/o. Ishak Isha Raja] matches with one of the respective allele in the DNA profile of blood sample Ex-B [source of Reshmaben, D/o. Ishak Isha Raja]. 2. Non maternal alleles of the amplified loci of DNA profile of blood sample Ex-A [source of Gulamsabir, S/o. Reshmaben, D/o. Ishak Isha Raja] are present in the DNA profile of blood sample Ex-C [source of Ikbal Jumabhai Chamadiya]. 40. From the above observations, it is concluded that DNA profiles of Ikbal Jumabhai Chamadiya [source of Ex-C : blood sample] is consistent as biological father of Gulamsabir [source of Ex-A : Blood sample]; S/o. Reshmaben, D/o. Ishak Isha Raja [Source of Ex-B : blood sample]. 41. Considering overall facts, the evidence led by the prosecution and the arguments advanced by the learned advocates for the respective parties, there is no dispute regarding the place of occurrence, the incident that occurred and the conclusion of DNA report. 42. Admittedly, prosecutrix was minor at the time of commission of offence and it was never the case of consent, which should be considered by this Court. The complaint was lodged by the prosecutrix herself before the Police. The prosecutrix was also medically examined by the Dr. Nitaben Hirabhai Rada (PW No.12) and she has also supported the prosecution case vide her deposition at Exh. 46 stating that twice intercourse was committed, as per the history given by the prosecutrix herself, as she was pregnant. Thereafter, child was delivered and is named as Gulam Sabir. From the aforesaid report, it clearly establishes that the accused was biological father of the child-Gulam Sabir. 43. PW-12 Dr. Nitaben Hirabhai Rada has also opined in her deposition before the trial Court that while examining the prosecutrix, she found her pregnant and the history relating to forcible intercourse on her twice by the appellant herein was recorded by the victim, which fact duly gets corroboration from DNA test results/report at Exh. 100. Thus, it clearly gets proved from the deposition of prosecutrix that the appellant had committed an offence of trespass, rape on the prosecutrix and thereby had administered threat to her life, so also of other family members. This version of the prosecutrix gets due corroboration from the testimony of independent witness PW-12 Dr. Nitaben H Rada. 100. Thus, it clearly gets proved from the deposition of prosecutrix that the appellant had committed an offence of trespass, rape on the prosecutrix and thereby had administered threat to her life, so also of other family members. This version of the prosecutrix gets due corroboration from the testimony of independent witness PW-12 Dr. Nitaben H Rada. This witness was not known to the prosecutrix or the appellant. No reason could be there, for which, the prosecutrix would have enroped the appellant falsely. Definitely, it could not be the case of consent by the prosecutrix, even if it is assumed, for the sake of just argument, that she was a major. The minor discrepancy in the statement of the prosecutrix have to be ignored; as discussed in the judgment. 44. So far as leniency, which requires to be shown to the accused in reducing the punishment is concerned, as per arguments advanced by the learned advocate Mr. JM Buddhabhatti for the appellant, cannot be considered by this Court, as it is a serious offence committed by the appellant-accused against 13 years old minor girl. 45. In our view, the learned trial Court has not committed any error in recording final conclusion. The minor discrepancies between the victim's deposition and the complaint have to be eschewed having regard to the other clinching evidence viz., the Birth Register, Birth Certificate, DNA Report, Medical Officer's Report, History given by the victim before the Medical Officer, etc. The appellant has failed to make out any case and has failed to establish any error in the conclusions and findings recorded by the learned trial Court. 46. In view of the submissions by learned advocate for the appellant, we are, as such, required to consider the decision with regard to the sentence. 47. So far as the sentence is concerned, we cannot overlook the fact that the victim, at the relevant time, was merely 13 years old and the appellant was 40 years old i.e., age of victim's father took disadvantage of the offence of the parents of the prosecutrix and threatened the minor girl of 13 years' age with dire consequences. The appellant who has children, one or two of them are probably age of prosecutrix committed such act with minor girl of 13 years. The appellant who has children, one or two of them are probably age of prosecutrix committed such act with minor girl of 13 years. It also cannot be overlooked that the victim is now obliged to raise the child borne out of the said act/offence by the prosecutrix. The physical and mental torture undergone by the appellant is beyond words of imagination. That is coupled with the plight which the victim will have to undergo while raising the child. 48. So far as imposing of Rs. 25,000/- towards compensation by the learned Trial Judge and if we accept the statement of the learned advocate Mr. Buddhabhatti that the accused is a father of five children and out of them, one child has died and neighbours of the accused’s family are helping them, and therefore, amount of fine may be reduced by this court and instead of fine amount of Rs. 25,000/-, it can be reduced to Rs. 5,000/- and same shall be paid to the victim, failing which the accused would further be convicted for more 6 (Six) months' simple imprisonment. 49. Learned advocate for the appellant drew attention of this Court towards Notification of Home Department, Gandhinagar, being No.GG/01/2016/SR.2/COM/132011/GAD/165605, dated 2nd January 2016, a copy whereof is produced and taken into consideration by this Court. 50. Considering this Notification and scheme framed by the Central Government/State Government, it is directed to pay the compensation to the prosecutrix at Rs. 1 lac towards compensation. 51. Accordingly, for the reasons recorded hereinabove, there is no material on record, on the basis of which, this Court may take a different view or conclusion from the court below, so far as the sentence part is concerned. We do not find any force in this Appeal, and hence, it is dismissed. However, taking into consideration the prayer made on behalf of the appellant, the compensation awarded to the victim at Rs. 25,000/-, which is payable by the convict, is hereby reduced to Rs. 5,000/-. Thus, instead of Rs. 25,000/-, the appellant shall now pay token compensation of Rs. 5,000/-; and in default thereof, the accused shall have to undergo further simple imprisonment for a term of six months. This amount shall be deposited by the appellant within one month in the trial Court and it shall be released to the victim, after due notice. 52. 25,000/-, the appellant shall now pay token compensation of Rs. 5,000/-; and in default thereof, the accused shall have to undergo further simple imprisonment for a term of six months. This amount shall be deposited by the appellant within one month in the trial Court and it shall be released to the victim, after due notice. 52. As the compensation awarded to the prosecutrix is not sufficient, the Member Secretary, State Legal Services Authority shall decide the quantum of compensation to be awarded to the prosecutrix of this case, under the Scheme framed by the State Government for approving compensation to her and pay the same to the prosecutrix within a period of two months from today. It is clarified that the amount of compensation shall, in no case, be less than Rs. 1 lakh.