JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioners claiming therein the following substantive reliefs: “(i) That the respondents may be directed to produce total record of the case. (ii) That the impugned order dated 30.11.2010, Annexure P6, being illegal, wrong and without jurisdiction may kindly be ordered to be set-aside and quashed. (iii) That since the outstanding amount as per the claim of respondents No.1 and 2 was deposited by the petitioners in compliance with the orders of the learned trial Tribunal, Chandigarh on 14.07.2008, therefore, it may kindly be held that nothing is recoverable from the petitioners. (iv) That the auction proceedings with respect to the property of the petitioners as carried out by the respondents No.1 and 2 may kindly be declared to be null and void and consequently it may be held that the sale deed in question may be held to be illegal and wrong.” 2. The petitioners took housing loan of Rs.5,00,000/- from respondent No.1 for the construction of house jointly against land bearing Khata Khatauni No. 9/11, Khasra No. 668/348/4 (old) and new Khasra No.1146, measuring 00170 hectares measuring 4 biswa at Mauza Chhakryal, Kamla Nagar, Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P. This loan was sanctioned on 21.11.2002 and was required to be paid within a period of 10 years. The petitioners paid some instalments of the loan. However, in the meanwhile, the respondent-Bank took recourse to the proceedings under Section 13 (2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short ‘Act’). This constrained the petitioners to issue a legal notice dated 11.6.2006 wherein it was pointed out that the petitioners had already made the following payments: (i) 24.05.2006 Rs. 19,500/- (ii) 15.04.2006 Rs. 25,000/- (iii) 18.04.2006 Rs. 50,000/- (iv) 30.05.2006 Rs. 20,000/- (v) 30.05.2006 Rs. 20,000/- (vi) 02.08.2006 Rs. 1,50,000/- 3. It was on the strength of these payments that the petitioners asked the bank to dissociate itself from continuing with such proceedings as they have already received the considerable amount. However, respondents No. 1 and 2 did not concede the demand of the petitioners and ultimately the petitioners resorted to the proceedings under Section 17(3) of the Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh (for short ‘Tribunal’). However, respondents No. 1 and 2 did not concede the demand of the petitioners and ultimately the petitioners resorted to the proceedings under Section 17(3) of the Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh (for short ‘Tribunal’). The Tribunal passed an interim order on 22.08.2006 by directing the respondent-Bank not to dispossess the petitioners if not already dispossessed. However, in the meanwhile, the property was put to sale, but the said sale was set-aside by the Tribunal on the ground that the same had not been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It further directed the petitioners to deposit the entire outstanding dues of Rs.5,07,073/- and the property was ordered to be restored to them. Consequently, the sale deed dated 02.09.2006 was also declared to be invalid and directions were issued to the bank to return the title deed to the petitioners. 4. The order passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal as regards the Bank, has attained finality as it was never assailed by it. However, the auction purchaser, who has been arrayed as respondent No.3 herein, assailed the same before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Delhi (for short ‘Appellate Tribunal’) which was allowed vide judgment dated 30.11.2010 and the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal were ordered to be reversed. It is this order of the Appellate Tribunal that has been assailed by the petitioners before this Court on number of grounds as taken in the petition. 5. The respondents No. 1 and 2 have filed their reply wherein number of preliminary objections regarding the petition not being maintainable as the petitioners have not approached this Court with clean hands, suppression of material facts etc. have been raised. However, the main thrust in the reply regarding the maintainability is that the petitioners being defaulters can be shown no indulgence particularly when respondent No.3 auction purchaser after complying with the provisions of the Act had purchased the property in question. 6. As regards the respondent No.3, he has filed a separate reply wherein, he too, has raised number of preliminary objections regarding non-availing of alternate remedy, the writ not being maintainable on the ground of availability of alternate remedy. 6. As regards the respondent No.3, he has filed a separate reply wherein, he too, has raised number of preliminary objections regarding non-availing of alternate remedy, the writ not being maintainable on the ground of availability of alternate remedy. As regards the merits of the case, it is submitted that the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal is strictly in accordance with law as it has dealt with all the grounds as were taken and also considered the reasons so accorded by the Tribunal while allowing the application filed by the petitioners and it is only thereafter by giving proper reasons based on the record that it reversed the findings of the Tribunal. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the material placed on record. 7. At the outset, it needs to be noticed that the scope of judicial review in such like matters is extremely limited and the same has to be exercised with due care and circumspection. This Court in such like matters cannot act as an appellate authority. 8. As regards the petitioners being defaulters, there can be no quarrel with the same. However, what is a matter of concern for this Court is the manner in which the property of the petitioners has been put to sale. It is not in dispute that the property that was put to sale not only comprised of the land, but also comprised of built up structure. However, when the same was put to sale it was not mentioned that there was a four storied structure standing thereupon as is evident from the averments as contained in para 16 (xiv) wrongly typed as (xvi) which fact has not been denied by respondent No.3 in his reply, though its valuation of Rs.16,00,000/- as put-forth by the petitioners has been denied by this respondent. 9. Likewise, even the Bank has not disputed the existence of four storied structure over the disputed land and only the valuation of the property as put-forth by the petitioners has been disputed. Admittedly, no valuation report was produced by the bank before the Tribunal and the same for the first time came to be produced before the Appellate Tribunal during the course of arguments on 29.11.2010 as is evident from perusal of para11 of the impugned judgment, which reads thus: “11. Admittedly, no valuation report was produced by the bank before the Tribunal and the same for the first time came to be produced before the Appellate Tribunal during the course of arguments on 29.11.2010 as is evident from perusal of para11 of the impugned judgment, which reads thus: “11. The next submission made by the counsel for the appellants was that no valuation report was ever obtained by the bank. The counsel for the bank has submitted a valuer’s report which goes to show that the value of the property in dispute was Rs.8,23,500/- as on 10.04.2006. That report was produced for the first time as per the order passed by this Court. It may be mentioned here that respondents No.1 and 2 have also filed valuation report dated 09.10.2006 which shows that the property was worth Rs.15,33,000/- only.” 10. No doubt, the public money should be recovered and such recovery should be effected expeditiously, but it does not mean that the financial institutions, which are concerned only with the recovery of their loans, can be permitted to act like property dealers and be further permitted to dispose of the secured assets in any unreasonable or arbitrary manner. 11. As observed earlier, even though, there was a four storied structure standing over the land in question, however, in none of the sale proclamations issued under Section 13(2) of the Act, was this fact mentioned. Such notices are available at pages 152 to 154 and the contents thereof are virtually the same and this Court would proceed to reproduce the relevant portion of one such notice, which reads thus: STATE BANK OF PATIALA Regional Office, Near Timber House, Shimla. SUB: NOTICE U/S 13(2) OF SECURITISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY INTEREST ACT, 2002 (HEREINAFTER CALLED THE ACT) Dear Sir(s) You and your guarantors are put to notice u/s 13(2) of the said Act by this Notice to discharge in full your liabilities stated hereunder to the Bank within 60 days from the date of publication of this notice. Your outstanding liabilities (in aggregate) due and owing to the Bank as under mentioned Details of Secured Assets. You are also liable to pay future interest at the contractual rate on the aforesaid amount together with incidental expenses, cost, charges etc. Your outstanding liabilities (in aggregate) due and owing to the Bank as under mentioned Details of Secured Assets. You are also liable to pay future interest at the contractual rate on the aforesaid amount together with incidental expenses, cost, charges etc. If you fail to repay to the bank the aforesaid sum with further interest and incidental expenses, costs as stated above in terms of the notice u/s 13(2) of the Act, the Bank will exercise all or any of the rights detailed under sub-Section (4) of Section 13 and under other applicable provisions of the said Act. You are also put on notice that in terms of Subsection 13 of Section 13 you shall not transfer by sale, lease or otherwise the said secured assets detailed below without obtaining written consent of the Bank. This Notice is without prejudice to the Bank’s right to initiate such other actions or legal proceedings, as it deems necessary under any other applicable provisions of law. DETAILS OF SECURED ASSETS Sr. No. Name of the Account and Branch Name of Security Amount secured. 1. xxxx xxxx Xxxxx 2. BRANCH SANJAULI Smt. Geeta Kaul W/o Sh. A.K. Kaul, Incharge State Home Khansiwala, Tehsil Nahan, Distt. Sirmour. Ms. Parvati D/o sh. Dhaniram Mehta Niwas, Bhatta Kuffer (Neri Dhar Kamla Nagar, Sanjauli, Shimla-6). Khewat Khatouni No. 9/11, Khasra No. 668/348/4 (New 1146) measuring 0170 Hectares (0.4) Biswa land in the joint names of Smt. Geeta Devi & Smt. Parvati Devi, situated in Mauja Chakkryal, Kamla Nagar, Shimla (Rural), Sanjauli. 571851.17 as on 30.11.05. Dated: 19.01.06 Place: Shimla. AUTHORISED OFFICER. 12. Not only this, even the sale certificate which otherwise pertains to movable property issued in favour of respondent No.3 under Section 13 read with Rule 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, again only makes a mention of the land and not the built-up structure. 13. Likewise, even the proceedings of the auction that have been placed on record clearly reflects that the bidders therein had only offered their bid for auction of the land in question and not for the built-up structure. Obviously, in such circumstances a sale conducted in pursuance of a proclamation containing vague, inaccurate and misleading description of the property or incomplete description of the property is nothing but a farce and seriously prejudice the judgment-debtor and cannot be allowed to stand. Obviously, in such circumstances a sale conducted in pursuance of a proclamation containing vague, inaccurate and misleading description of the property or incomplete description of the property is nothing but a farce and seriously prejudice the judgment-debtor and cannot be allowed to stand. (Refer : Sardar Bhagwan Singh vs. Lala Barkat Ram and another AIR 1943 (30) Lahore 129). 13. Now that only the land has been put to sale and there is no reference of the structure standing thereupon, then obviously the bid so offered is only of the land and not of the structure. Therefore, in the given circumstances, the physical possession of the property could not have been handed over to respondent No.3. 14. That apart, in case a proclamation would had been issued clearly mentioning that the land was being sold along with four lintel standing thereupon, obviously, it would have fetched a much higher price than the one offered by respondent No.3. 15. Not only this, even the complete land along with four lintel could otherwise not have been put to auction as it is more than settled law that only that part of the property can be put to sale that would be sufficient to meet the entire balance owed by the petitioners to the banks. 16. That apart, the bank clearly acted in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner by putting only land to sale without disclosing that there was structure standing thereupon that too for a ridiculously of low price of Rs.8,80,000/-, whereas as per the valuation report submitted by the petitioners, this property was worth more than Rs. 15,00,000/- lacs. 17. In State of Orissa and others vs. Harinarayan Jaiswal and others (1972) 3 SCR 784 : (1972) 2 SCC 36 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a highest bidder in public auction cannot have a right to get the property or any privilege, unless the authority confirms the auction-sale, being fully satisfied that the property has fetched the appropriate price and there has been no collusion between the bidders. 18. The word “value” means intrinsic worth or cost or price for sale of a thing/property (Refer: Union of India vs. Bombay Tyre International Ltd. (1984) 1 SCC 467 and Gurbachan Singh vs. Shivalak Rubber Industries, (1996) 2 SCC 626 ). 19. 18. The word “value” means intrinsic worth or cost or price for sale of a thing/property (Refer: Union of India vs. Bombay Tyre International Ltd. (1984) 1 SCC 467 and Gurbachan Singh vs. Shivalak Rubber Industries, (1996) 2 SCC 626 ). 19. In Haryana Financial Corporation vs. Jagdamba Oil Mills (2002) 1 SCR 621 : (2002) 3 SCC 496 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the sale of property through public auction after placing reliance upon its earlier judgment in Chairman and Managing Director, SIPCOT, Madras and others vs. Contromix (P) Ltd. and another, AIR 1995 SC 1632 : (1995) 4 SCC 595 , held as under: “In the matter of sale of public property, the dominant consideration is to secure the best price for the property to be sold. This can be achieved only when there is maximum public participation in the process of sale and everybody has an opportunity of making an offer. Public auction after adequate publicity ensures participation of every person who is interested in purchasing the property and generally secures the best price. But many times it may not be possible to secure the best price by public auction when the bidders join together so as to depress the bid or the nature of the property to be sold is such that suitable bid may not be received at a public auction. In that event, any other suitable mode for selling of property can be by inviting tenders. In order to ensure that such sale by calling tenders does not escape attention of an intending participant, it is essential that every endeavour should be made to give wide publicity so as to get the maximum price.” 20. In Anil Kumar Srivastava vs. State of U.P. (2004) 8 SCC 671 : AIR 2004 SC 4299 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the scope of fixing the reserve price and placing reliance on its earlier judgment in Duncans Industries Ltd. vs. State of U.P. (2000) 1 SCC 633 held that reserve price limits the authority of the auctioneer. The concept of the “reserve price” is not synonymous with “valuation of the property”. These two terms operate in different spheres. An invitation to tender is not an offer. It is an attempt to ascertain whether an offer can be obtained with a margin. The concept of the “reserve price” is not synonymous with “valuation of the property”. These two terms operate in different spheres. An invitation to tender is not an offer. It is an attempt to ascertain whether an offer can be obtained with a margin. It also held that the valuation is a question of fact and it should be fixed on relevant material. Thereafter, it was held the differences between the “valuation” and “reserve price” is that, fixation of an upset price may be an indication of the probable price which the property may fetch from the point of view of intending bidders. Fixation of the reserve price does not preclude the claimant from adducing proof that the land had been sold for a low price. 21. In Lachhman Dass vs. Jagat Ram and others (2007) 10 SCC 448 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a right to hold property as well as human right, a person cannot be deprived of his property except in accordance with the provisions of a statute. 22. Similar reiteration of law can be found in the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran vs. M/s Pure Industrial Cock & Chem. Ltd. and others, AIR 2007 SC 2458 and Commissioner of Municipal Corporation, Shimla vs. Premlata Sood and others, (2007) 11 SCC, 40. 23. The legal position on the subject has been lucidly expounded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Kishun and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2012) 11 SCC 511 , wherein it was observed as under: “Recovery of public dues 13. Undoubtedly, public money should be recovered and recovery should be made expeditiously. But it does not mean that the financial institutions which are concerned only with the recovery of their loans, may be permitted to behave like property dealers and be permitted further to dispose of the secured assets in any unreasonable or arbitrary manner in flagrant violation of the statutory provisions. 14. A right to hold property is a constitutional right as well as a human right. A person cannot be deprived of his property except in accordance with the provisions of a statute. 14. A right to hold property is a constitutional right as well as a human right. A person cannot be deprived of his property except in accordance with the provisions of a statute. (Vide Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram 2007 10 SCC 448 and State of M.P v. Narmada Bachao Andolan 2011 7 SCC 639 ) Thus, the condition precedent for taking away someone's property or disposing of the secured assets, is that the authority must ensure compliance with the statutory provisions. 15. In case the property is disposed of by private treaty without adopting any other mode provided under the statutory rules, etc. there may be a possibility of collusion/fraud and even when public auction is held, the possibility of collusion among the bidders cannot be ruled out. In State of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal AIR 1972 SC 1816 this Court held that a highest bidder in public auction cannot have a right to get the property or any privilege, unless the authority confirms the auction-sale, being fully satisfied that the property has fetched the appropriate price and there has been no collusion between the bidders. 16. In Haryana Financial Corpn. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills AIR 2002 SC 834 this Court considered this aspect and while placing reliance upon its earlier judgment in Sipcot v. Contromix (P) Ltd. 1995 4 SCC 595 held that: (Sipcot case, SCC p. 601, para 12) “12. In the matter of sale of public property, the dominant consideration is to secure the best price for the property to be sold. This can be achieved only when there is maximum public participation in the process of sale and everybody has an opportunity of making an offer.” (emphasis supplied) 17. Therefore, it becomes a legal obligation on the part of the authority that property be sold in such a manner that it may fetch the best price. Thus essential ingredients of such sale remain a correct valuation report and fixing the reserve price. In case proper valuation has not been made and the reserve price is fixed taking into consideration the inaccurate valuation report, the intending buyers may not come forward treating the property as not worth purchase by them, as a moneyed person or a big businessman may not like to involve himself in small sales/deals. Valuation and reserve price 18. In case proper valuation has not been made and the reserve price is fixed taking into consideration the inaccurate valuation report, the intending buyers may not come forward treating the property as not worth purchase by them, as a moneyed person or a big businessman may not like to involve himself in small sales/deals. Valuation and reserve price 18. The word “value” means intrinsic worth or cost or price for sale of a thing/property. (Vide Union of India v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd. 1984 1 SCC 467 and Gurbachan Singh v. Shivalak Rubber Industries AIR 1996 SC 3057 .) 19. In State of U.P v. Shiv Charan Sharma AIR 1981 SC 1722 this Court explained the meaning of “reserve price” explaining that it is the price with which the public auction starts and the auction bidders are not permitted to give bids below the said price i.e the minimum bid at auction. 20. In Anil Kumar Srivastava v. State of U.P 2004 8 SCC 671 this Court considered the scope of fixing the reserve price and placing reliance on its earlier judgment in Duncans Industries Ltd. v. State of U.P 2000 1 SCC 633 , explained that reserve price limits the authority of the auctioneer. The concept of the reserve price is not synonymous with valuation of the property. These two terms operate in different spheres. An invitation to tender is not an offer. It is an attempt to ascertain whether an offer can be obtained with a margin. The valuation is a question of fact, it should be fixed on relevant material. The difference between the “valuation” and “reserve price” is that, fixation of an upset price may be an indication of the probable price which the property may fetch from the point of view of intending bidders. Fixation of the reserve price does not preclude the claimant from adducing proof that the land had been sold for a low price. 21. In Desh Bandhu Gupta v. N.L Anand 1994 1 SCC 131 this Court held that in an auction-sale and in execution of the civil court's decree, the Court has to apply its mind to the need for furnishing the relevant material particulars in the sale proclamation and the records must indicate that there has been application of mind and principle of natural justice had been complied with. (See also Gajadhar Prasad v. Babu Bhakta Ratan AIR 1973 SC 2593 , S.S Dayananda v. K.S Nagesh Rao 1997 4 SCC 451 , D.S Chohan v. State Bank of Patiala 1997 10 SCC 65 and Gajraj Jain v. State of Bihar 2004 7 SCC 151 .) 22. In view of the above, it is evident that there must be an application of mind by the authority concerned while approving/accepting the report of the approved valuer and fixing the reserve price, as the failure to do so may cause substantial injury to the borrower/guarantor and that would amount to material irregularity and ultimately vitiate the subsequent proceedings. Decision to sell whole or part of the secured assets 23. In Ambati Narasayya v. M. Subba Rao AIR 1990 SC119 : 1989 Supp (2) SCC 693 (SCC p.696, para 9) this Court dealt with a case where in execution of a money decree for Rs. 2400/- the land was sold for Rs.17,000/-. The Court set aside the sale observing that there is a duty cast upon the Court to sell only such property or a portion thereof as necessary to satisfy the decree. (See also Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi v. Pujari Padmavathamma (1977) 3 SCC 337 and S.Mariyappa vs. Siddappa (2005) 10 SCC 235 ). 24. Thus, in view of the above, it is evident that law requires a proper valuation report, its acceptance by the authority concerned by application of mind and then fixing the reserve price accordingly and acceptance of the auction bid taking into consideration that there was no possibility of collusion of the bidders. The authority is duty-bound to decide as to whether sale of part of the property would meet the outstanding demand. Valuation is a question of fact and valuation of the property is required to be determined fairly and reasonably. Setting aside auction-sale—after confirmation 25. In Navalkha & Sons v. Ramanya Das AIR 1970 SC 2037 this Court while dealing with the confirmation of sale by court, held that there must be a proper valuation report, which should be communicated to the judgment-debtor and he should file his own valuation report and the sale should be conducted in accordance with law. After confirmation of sale, there should be issuance of sale certificate. The court cannot interfere unless it is found that some material irregularity in the conduct of sale has been committed. After confirmation of sale, there should be issuance of sale certificate. The court cannot interfere unless it is found that some material irregularity in the conduct of sale has been committed. The Court further held that it should not be a forced sale. A valuer's report should be as good as the actual offer and the variation should be within limit. Such estimate should be done carefully. The Court further held that unless the court is satisfied about the adequacy of the price the act of confirmation of the sale would not be a proper exercise of judicial discretion. [See also Kayjay Industries (P) Ltd. v. Asnew Drums (P) Ltd. AIR 1974 SC 1331 , Union Bank of India v. Official Liquidator AIR 2000 SC 3642 , B. Arvind Kumar v. Govt. of India 2007 5 SCC 745 and Transcore v. Union of India 2008 1 SCC 125 .] 26. In Divya Mfg. Co. (P) Ltd. v. Union Bank of India AIR 2000 SC 2346 this Court held that a confirmed sale can be set aside on the ground of material irregularity or fraud. The court does not become functus officio after the sale is confirmed. In Valji Khimji and Co. v. Official Liquidator of Hindustan Nitro Product (Gujarat) Ltd. 2008 9 SCC 299 , the Court held that auction-sale should be set aside only if there is a fundamental error in the procedure of auction e.g not giving wide publication or on evidence that property could have fetched more value or there is somebody to offer substantially increased amount and not only a little over the auction price. Involvement of any kind of fraud would vitiate the auction-sale. 27. In FCS Software Solutions Ltd. v. La Medical Devices Ltd. 2008 10 SCC 440 this Court considered a case where after the confirmation of auction-sale it was found that valuation of movable and immovable properties, fixation of reserve price, inventory of plant and machineries had not been made in the proclamation of sale, nor disclosed at the time of sale notice. Therefore, in such a fact situation, the sale was set aside after its confirmation. 28. In view of the above, the law can be summarised to the effect that the recovery of the public dues must be made strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Therefore, in such a fact situation, the sale was set aside after its confirmation. 28. In view of the above, the law can be summarised to the effect that the recovery of the public dues must be made strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. The liability of a surety is coextensive with that of the principal debtor. In case there are more than one surety the liability is to be divided equally among the sureties for unpaid amount of loan. Once the sale has been confirmed it cannot be set aside unless a fundamental procedural error has occurred or sale certificate had been obtained by misrepresentation or fraud.” 24. Here it shall also be apposite to refer to a recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the subject in State of Punjab vs. Bandeep Singh and others (2016) 1 SCC 724 wherein the ratio laid down in Anil Kumar Srivastava’s case (supra) has been reiterated and it was held that notwithstanding the fixation of upset price and notwithstanding the fact that a bidder has offered an amount higher than the reserve/upset price, sale even in case it is still open to challenge on the ground that the property has not fetched the proper price and the sale can be set aside. 25. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is that the proclamation of the sale which only discloses the vacant land and does not make a mention of four lintel standing thereupon and thereafter fixation of reserve price is a fundamental procedural error, therefore, the sale in the given circumstances was rightly set-aside by the Debt Recovery Tribunal and the said findings could not have been disturbed by the Appellate Tribunal. 26. The net result of the aforesaid discussion is that I find merit in this petition and the same is allowed and the impugned judgment dated 30.11.2010, Annexure P6, passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Delhi is quashed and set-aside and resultantly the auction proceedings with respect to the property of the petitioners as carried out by respondents No. 1 and 2 are declared null and void and since the outstanding amount as per the claim of respondents No. 1 and 2 was already deposited by the petitioners in compliance to the orders passed by the Tribunal on 14.7.2008, therefore, nothing is recoverable or due from them. Accordingly, respondent No.3 is directed to handover the possession of the land along with structure to the petitioners within a period of four weeks. However, it is made clear that in case the said respondent has carried out any additions/alterations or improvements, in that event, he shall be entitled to recover the same from respondents No. 1 and 2.The parties are left to bear their own costs. The petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms so also the pending applications if any.