JUDGMENT : 1. Heard. 2. RULE. Rule made returnable forthwith. 3. The petitioners/original plaintiffs invoke jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to challenge the judgment passed by the learned District Judge dismissing the appeal filed by them under Order XLIII Rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and maintaining the order passed by the trial Court by which the application (Exh. 5) filed by them praying for temporary injunction was rejected. 4. The petitioners/plaintiffs have filed the civil suit praying for decree for declaration that the Resolution No. 13 passed in the meeting of the Executive Committee of the public trust, held on 17/11/2014 calling upon the explanation from the petitioners/plaintiffs about the alleged misconduct, is null and void. The petitioners/plaintiffs have prayed for decree for declaration that the Resolution No. 7 passed in the meeting of the Executive Committee held on 03/03/2015 regarding removal/termination of the life membership of the petitioners/ plaintiffs, is null and void. The petitioners/plaintiffs prayed for decree for permanent injunction restraining the respondents/defendants from implementing the above referred Resolution No. 7. The petitioners/plaintiffs have prayed for other reliefs. Alongwith the plaint, the petitioners/plaintiffs had filed an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 r/w Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908 praying for temporary injunction restraining the respondents/defendants from giving effect to the above referred Resolution No. 7. 5. The respondents/defendants opposed the application filed by the petitioners/plaintiffs praying for temporary injunction. By order dated 01/10/2016, the learned trial Judge dismissed the application (Exh. 5) filed by the petitioners/plaintiffs recording that the petitioners/plaintiffs have failed to prove their case, prima facie, the balance of convenience does not lie in favour of the petitioners/plaintiffs and that the petitioners/plaintiffs have not been able to point out that they will suffer irreparable loss and injury if temporary injunction as prayed for by them is not granted. This order was challenged by the petitioners/plaintiffs before the District Court in appeal which is dismissed by the impugned order. 6. Amongst various grounds raised by the petitioners/plaintiffs, one of the ground is that the memorandum of association and rules and regulations of the public trust does not provide empower or authorize the Executive Committee of the public trust to remove/terminate the life membership. 7. 6. Amongst various grounds raised by the petitioners/plaintiffs, one of the ground is that the memorandum of association and rules and regulations of the public trust does not provide empower or authorize the Executive Committee of the public trust to remove/terminate the life membership. 7. The respondents/defendants relied on Clause 29 (ix) of the memorandum of association to support their action of terminating the life membership of the petitioners/plaintiffs. Clause 23 (ix) reads as follows: “(23) The executive Council shall have the following functions: (i) …. (ii) …. (iii) …. (iv) …. (v) …. (vi) …. (vii) …. (viii) …. (ix) To approve persons eligible as members.” According to the petitioners/plaintiffs, power to approve membership confers the implied power to remove the life member. To support the submissions, reliance is placed on the judgment given in the case of Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2011) 3 SCC at page 193, specifically para no. 38 of it. 8. The learned advocate for the respondents/defendants pointed out the earlier conduct of the petitioners/plaintiffs from the show cause notice issued to the petitioners/plaintiffs on 22/01/2015, the relevant portion of it being as follows: “(i) That, you had manipulated the inward register by adjusting the entries regarding membership application by adjusting between two entries or at the blank space available at the bottom of the page so as to show that, in all 78 membership applications were received between the period commencing from October, 2005 to January, 2006. (ii) That, the Executive Council meeting dated 02/03/2006 as alleged to have been held by you was never held, as the minutes of the said meeting were written by a person under your direction who was not an employee of the society and, that, such minutes were subsequently prepared. (iii) That, you had fabricated and forged the record of payment of subscription fees of 49 members by showing the entries in the cash book to show that such members had paid the subscription amount on or after 26/04/2006. (iv) That, you have inducted 49 members fraudulently in order to secure majority in the house. (iii) That, you had fabricated and forged the record of payment of subscription fees of 49 members by showing the entries in the cash book to show that such members had paid the subscription amount on or after 26/04/2006. (iv) That, you have inducted 49 members fraudulently in order to secure majority in the house. (v) That, you were legally and morally duty bound not to take policy decision after expiration of the prescribed tenure of the Executive Body and, it was not expected of you to induct 49 members after the expiry of the term of the Executive Council. (vi) That, you crossed the limitations by completely changing the composition of the General Body obviously to retain majority by inducting as many as 49 members as against the then existing General Body comprising of 31 members and adopted all possible tactics to remain in power of the trust. (vii) That, you had fabricated Under Certificate of Posting receipts in respect of meeting dated 23/02/2006. (viii) That, you had fabricated all the documents for induction of 49 members and such induction was made by creating anti dated documents. (ix) That, in the envelopes meant for notice of meeting dated 23/11/2006, you had put the copy of judgment of the Hon'ble High Court, Bench at Nagpur in Writ Petition No. 4342/2005 and had never put the notice dated 23/11/2006 in respect of the General Body meeting to be convened on 03/12/2006 and, thus, you had manipulated the said envelopes of the notices. (x) That, you had manipulated the minutes of the meetings which were never held on 2/3/2006, 12/04/2006 and 3/12/2006.” 9. According to the respondents/defendants, earlier the petitioners/plaintiffs had themselves relied on Clause 23 (ix) of the memorandum of association to terminate the life membership of respondent no. 2/Nitin Ramdas Dhande and therefore, now the petitioners/plaintiffs are estopped from arguing that Clause 23 (ix) of the memorandum of association does not confer power on the Executive Committee to terminate the membership of life member. The learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners/plaintiffs has disputed the factual aspects pointing out that earlier case was not of termination of membership of life member. 10. The learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners/plaintiffs has disputed the factual aspects pointing out that earlier case was not of termination of membership of life member. 10. Be that as it may, prima facie, I find that Clause 23 (ix) of the memorandum of association cannot be interpreted to mean that it confers power and authority on the Executive Committee of the public trust to remove/terminate the membership of life member. Clause 23 (ix) of the memorandum of association enables the Executive Committee to approve membership and there is nothing in Clause 23 (ix) of the memorandum of association on the basis of which it can be said that the Executive Committee is empowered and authorized to remove/terminate the membership of life member. The intended action of removing the life member is penal in nature having far reaching consequences on the person who is sought to be removed and such draconian power cannot be read into byelaws/ memorandum of association by implication. The memorandum of association of the public trust is a “scheme” as per the provisions of Section 50A of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950, and as per Section 50A (4) of the Act of 1950, and it has the force of decree (see judgment given in the case of Abdul Aziz Sk. Ismail Choudhari and another vs. Sk. Ahmed Sk. Ameer and others reported in 1980 MhLJ at page 25) and therefore the byelaws of the memorandum of association have to be construed keeping in view this position. In this background, the submission made on behalf of the respondents/defendants that Clause 23 (ix) of the memorandum of association confers the implied power and authority to terminate the life membership cannot be accepted. To support the argument of implied power and authority, the learned advocate for the respondents/defendants relied on Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which lays down that the power conferred by any Central Act or Regulation to issue notifications, orders, rules or byelaws includes the power to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notification, order, rule or byelaw so issued. In the present case, Clause 23 (ix) of the memorandum of association on which the respondents/defendants are relying cannot be equated with any Central Act or statutory Regulation and therefore reliance on Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 will not be permissible. 11. In the present case, Clause 23 (ix) of the memorandum of association on which the respondents/defendants are relying cannot be equated with any Central Act or statutory Regulation and therefore reliance on Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 will not be permissible. 11. The claim of the petitioners/plaintiffs is opposed by the respondents/defendants on the following grounds: “(i) The parties are not entitled for any discretionary relief in view of their conduct and their background as trustees and members of the public trust. (ii) This Court should not interfere with the impugned order while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as the view taken by the Subordinate Courts is plausible view and it would not be open for this Court to dislodge the plausible view and substitute a different view. (iii) The interim relief which the petitioners/plaintiffs are seeking, if granted, it will result in granting final relief, and this is not permissible. (iv) The resolution to terminate the life membership of the petitioners/plaintiffs was passed on 03/03/2015 and the petitioners/plaintiffs are out for more than three years and therefore, it would not be appropriate to consider their prayer for interim relief, at this stage.” To support the submission, reliance is placed on the following judgments: (a) Judgment given in the case of Prestige Lights Ltd. vs. State Bank of India reported in (2007) 8 SCC at page 449. (b) Judgment given in the case of Zilla Parishad, Gadchiroli and others vs. Chandramala W/o Fattu Khobragade reported in 2011 (4) MhLJ at page 605. (c) Judgment given in the case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani and another vs. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi deceased through his heirs and L.Rs. reported in 1996 (1) MhLJ at page 507. (d) Judgment given in the case of Sharad Murlidhar Shukla vs. Shankar Ramkrushna Lakade reported in 2011 (3) MhLJ at page 800. Though the general principles argued by the learned advocate for the respondents/defendants cannot be disputed and the law is well settled on all these points, in the present case, I find that drastic penal action is taken against the petitioners/plaintiffs without there being any power or authority, and if this Court fails to interfere, in my view, this Court will be failing in its duty. I find that the trial Court and the District Court have not taken a plausible view. I find that the trial Court and the District Court have not taken a plausible view. As I find that Clause 23 (ix) of the memorandum of association on which the respondents/defendants rely to support the Resolution dated 03/03/2015, does not confer any power and authority to terminate the membership of life member and as the respondents/defendants have not been able to point out any other provision in the memorandum of association which enables the Executive Committee to terminate the membership of life member, the Resolution dated 03/03/2015 has to be stayed and the application (Exh. 5) filed by the petitioners/plaintiffs before the trial Court has to be allowed in terms of the prayers made in that application. Though I intended to avoid recording specific findings of interpretation of Clause 23 (ix) of the memorandum of association, I am compelled to record the finding in view of the insistence on behalf of the respondents/defendants. 12. In view of the above, the following order is passed: ORDER (A) The impugned orders are set aside. (B) The application (Exh. 5) filed by the petitioners/plaintiffs before the trial Court is allowed. 13. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. In the circumstances, the parties to bear their own costs. At this stage, the learned advocate for the respondents/defendants prayed that the effect and operation of this judgment be kept in abeyance for eight weeks to enable the respondents/defendants to take appropriate steps in the matter. Considering the nature of controversy, the prayer is rejected. C.A.W. No. 2757/2017 and C.A.W. No. 1026/2018 In view of disposal of the writ petition, the civil applications for grant of permission for temporary injunction and grant of permission to hold the General Body Meeting of the respondent no. 1 Society do not survive. They are disposed accordingly.