SHAMBHUBHAI MOHANBHAI DESAI v. GEMARBHAI MALJIBHIA DESAI
2018-10-08
C.L.SONI
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT C. L. SONI, J. 1. The appeal is filed under Order XLIII of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ("the Code") against the order dated 18.07.2018 passed by learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) below application Exh.5 in Special Civil Suit No.387 of 2017 where learned Judge has rejected the application Exh.5 filed by the appellant original plaintiff. 2. The suit is filed seeking specific performance of contract on the basis of agreement to sell dated 19.12.2013 alleged to have been executed by the respondent No.1 defendant No.1 in favour of the appellant. 3. Learned Judge having considered the document of agreement to sell, the conduct on the part of the appellant and the purchase of the suit land by respondent No.2 by registered sale deed found that the appellant has failed to make out any prima facie case and the balance of convenience is also not in favour of the appellant. Learned Judge has also observed about the undue hardship to be faced by the respondent No.2, if the injunction is granted in favour of the appellant. 4. Learned advocate Mr.Vijay Patel appearing for the appellant submitted that the appellant holds agreement to sell in his favour and since it is not possible to dispute the receipt of Rs. 50 lacs from the appellant at the time of execution of agreement to sell by the respondent No.1, the execution of agreement to sell as also the registered sale deed in favour of the respondent No.2 would not prevail over the right of the appellant to ask for specific performance of the contract. Mr.Patel submitted that the very fact, that the respondent No.2 has purchased the suit land, though the agreement to sell subsisted in favour of the appellant shows that the respondents in collusion decided to deprive the appellant of his right to get sale deed executed in his favour. Mr.Patel submitted that when the appellant has paid the substantial amount of Rs. 50 lac to the respondent No.1, it could not be said that the appellant has not made out any prima facie case for grant of equitable relief in his favour.
Mr.Patel submitted that when the appellant has paid the substantial amount of Rs. 50 lac to the respondent No.1, it could not be said that the appellant has not made out any prima facie case for grant of equitable relief in his favour. Mr.Patel submitted that learned Judge has failed to consider the important aspects as regards undisputed agreement to sell in favour of the appellant, the payment of substantial amount as earnest money, which is part of the consideration, and that though agreement to sell subsists in favour of the appellant, still the respondent No.1 has executed two documents, one is agreement to sell and the another is sale deed to find that the appellant has made out prima facie case for grant of equitable relief. Mr.Patel submitted that if interim injunction is not granted, the appellant will suffer irreparable injury and will be rendered remediless as the suit lands will change hands making it difficult for the appellant to get the fruits of decree. 5. Learned advocate Ms.Megha Jani appearing for the respondent No.2 the purchaser of the suit land submitted that as against the unregistered document of agreement to sell alleged to have been executed in favour of the appellant by the respondent No.1, the respondent No.2 not only held registered agreement to sell executed by the respondent No.1 but purchased the suit land by registered sale deed. Ms.Jani submitted that the respondent No.2 is bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the unregistered agreement to sell in favour of the appellant. Ms.Jani has referred to the provisions of Section 19 of Specific Relief Act as also to the provisions of Section 17, 49 and 50 of the Registration Act to submit that since the respondent No.2 has registered sale deed in its favour for the suit land, it will prevail against unregistered document of the appellant and the appellant shall not be entitled to specific performance of contract. Ms.Jani further submitted that the conduct of the appellant also could not be ignored inasmuch as though the appellant claims to have agreement to sell in his favour, however, for long period of 4 years, he did not assert any right thereon when the appellant had knowledge about the execution of the registered agreement to sell and the sale deed in favour of the respondent No.2.
Ms.Jani submitted that the respondent No.2 purchased the suit land by registered sale deed after NA permission was taken and the respondent No.2 got development permission and Rajachitthi (commencement certificate) to start construction on the suit land and in fact, the respondent No.2 has almost completed construction on suit land and, therefore, it could be said that the balance of convenience is in favour of the respondent No.2 and if injunction is granted in favour of the appellant, respondent No.2 will suffer irreparable injury whereas the appellant could be compensated in terms of money, if ultimately he succeeds in the suit at the end of trial. Ms.Jani has taken the Court to the written statement as also the photographs to show that construction is almost over on the suit land and submitted that since learned Judge has found that the appellant has failed to make out prima facie case and balance of convenience is also not in favour of the appellant, this Court may not interfere with the impugned order in exercise of powers under Order XLIII of the Code. 6. Learned advocate Ms.Mandavia appearing for the respondent No.1 submitted that as per the stand taken in the reply by the respondent No.1, the agreement is wrongly stated to be the agreement to sell but in fact it was taken as security for repayment of the amount advanced to the respondent No.1. She submitted that as further stated in the reply, the amount was repaid to the appellant, however, by taking the respondent No.1 in confidence, the receipt as regards the repayment was not given. Ms.Mandavia submitted that the unregistered document stated to be agreement to sell when clearly appearing to be the document taken as security for repayment of amount, it could not be relied for filing suit for specific performance of the contract. She submitted that learned Judge having found that the respondent No.1 has executed registered document of sale in favour of the respondent No.2 and having considered the conduct on the part of the appellant in filing the suit after a long period of 4 years and having considered that in the meantime, the development on the suit land has taken place, committed no error in finding that the appellant has failed to make out prima facie case for grant of equitable relief in his favour. 7.
7. The Court, having heard learned advocates, finds that as observed by learned Judge, the appellant filed the suit for specific performance of the contract after about 3 years and 9 months from the date or agreement and in the meantime, the registered agreement to sell as also the registered sale deed came to be executed in favour of respondent No.2. It is required to note that under the unregistered agreement to sell, the earnest money stated to have been paid by the appellant is of Rs. 50 lacs but out of Rs. 50 lacs, Rs. 45 lacs is shown to have been paid in cash. 8. The Court from the documents produced on record finds that as rightly submitted by learned advocate Ms.Jani, NA permission, development permission and commencement certificate (Rajachitthi) were issued for suit land. From the photographs placed on record, it appears that the construction is almost over on the suit land. The respondent No.2 in its written statement and reply filed in the suit and the injunction application has clearly stated that after the Rajachitthi was given for commencement of the construction, the construction had started and it is almost on the verge of the completion. 9. Learned Judge has taken prima facie view that the respondent No.2 would not have noticed of unregistered agreement to sell in favour of the appellant, whereas, the appellant could be said to have knowledge of registered agreement to sell and registered sale deed executed by the respondent No.1 in favour of the respondent No.2 and the respondent No.2 since having purchased the suit land for value without notice of unregistered agreement to sell could be taken as a bona fide purchaser. Learned Judge has also considered the conduct on the part of the appellant as regards the delay by observing that after non-agricultural permission was obtained by respondent No.1, the respondent No.2 purchased the suit land and the plaintiff filed the suit at delayed stage after a period of about 3 years and 9 months. The Court finds that learned Judge on prima facie assessment of material on record and on considering the aspects of delay has found that appellant has failed to make out prima facie case and that the balance of convenience is also not in favour of the appellant. 10.
The Court finds that learned Judge on prima facie assessment of material on record and on considering the aspects of delay has found that appellant has failed to make out prima facie case and that the balance of convenience is also not in favour of the appellant. 10. The appeal under Order XLIII of the Code is decided on principles and not on reassessment of material prima facie assessed by the trial court while deciding the injunction application. The interference under Order XLIII of the Code could be called for if it is successfully shown that learned Judge has taken perverse approach on pleadings and misdirected himself in law. The appellant has failed to point out that the learned Judge has taken perverse approach in the matter. 11. In the case of Wander Ltd. and Another Versus Antox India P. Ltd. reported in, (1990) Supp 1 SCC 727, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paragraph No.14 as under: "14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the Appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by the court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the Trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion." 12.
If the discretion has been exercised by the Trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion." 12. The Court finds that the view taken by learned Judge was possible on prima facie assessment of the material produced on record especially having regard the delay occurred in filing the suit and the development on suit land by putting up construction which has come to the stage of completion. 13. In view of above, the Court finds that no interference is called for in the impugned order in exercise of powers under Order XLIII of the Code. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. 14. Since, the appeal is disposed of, civil application for stay shall not survive. It is stated before the Court that the civil application filed for initiating proceedings for breach of injunction may also be disposed of as the Appeal is disposed of. Hence, both the Civil Applications are disposed of accordingly. 15. Learned advocate Mr.Patel, however, requests the Court to direct the trial court to expedite the hearing of the suit and to dispose of the suit preferably within a period of one year from today. The Court finds that it is always open to the appellant the original plaintiff to make such request before the trial court pointing out the facts and circumstances of the case requiring expeditious hearing of the suit. Therefore, the appellant may make appropriate application before the trial court to expedite the hearing of the suit. As and when such application is made, learned Judge may make appropriate order thereon.