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2018 DIGILAW 1174 (ALL)

Chitra Singh v. Sarva U. P. Gramin Bank

2018-05-09

IFAQAT ALI KHAN, SUDHIR AGARWAL

body2018
Judgement : 1. Heard Sri P.N.Saxena, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Amit, learned counsel for petitioner, Sri R.N.Singh, learned counsel for respondents and perused the record. 2. Petitioner, a Branch Manager in U.P. Gramin Bank (hereinafter referred to as “Gramin Bank”), which is a Rural Bank, sponsored by Punjab National Bank, is aggrieved by order dated 16.8.2013 passed by Chairman, Gramin Bank in the capacity of Disciplinary Authority imposing punishment of dismissal and order dated 26.4.2014 passed by Board of Directors, Gramin Bank, rejecting petitioner’s appeal, communicated to petitioner vide letter dated 15.5.2014. 3. Petitioner has challenged impugned orders basically on the ground that since against conviction of petitioner a criminal appeal is already pending in this Court, therefore, on mere conviction petitioner could not have been imposed punishment of dismissal. 4. Service conditions of officer and employees of Gramin Bank in question are governed by U.P. Gramin Bank (Officers and Employees) Service Regulations, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as “Regulations, 2010”). Petitioner at the relevant point of time was working as Branch Manager in U.P. Gramin Bank, Askaripur, District Bijnor. He was tried in Session Trial No.121 of 2005 under Sections 148, 149, 307, 302, 323, 324 read with 149, IPC and vide judgment and order dated 23.7.2013 passed by Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Court No.12, Moradabad, he was convicted under Sections 302 read with 149 IPC and sentenced for life imprisonment and fine of Rs.10,000/-; under Sections 307 read with 149 IPC for 7 years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.5,000/- and also convicted and sentenced for different terms under Sections 148 324, 323 read with 149 IPC. 5. Against aforesaid judgment of Trial Court, convicting and sentencing petitioner, he along with other co-accused preferred Criminal Appeal No.3360 of 2013, which was admitted on 31.07.2013 and appellants were granted bail. 6. Disciplinary Authority of petitioner, in purported exercise of powers under Regulation 30(3)(a) and (b) of Regulations 2010, imposed punishment of ‘dismissal’ considering conviction and sentence of petitioner in various offenses including “heinous offence of murder” under Section 302 IPC. Thereagainst appeal was filed by petitioner vide memo of appeal dated 11.11.2013, which was not accepted by Appellate Authority, as communicated to petitioner vide letter dated 14.12.2013. Initially Appellate Authority was of the view that till criminal appeal of petitioner is finalized, status quo in respect of petitioner shall be maintained. Thereagainst appeal was filed by petitioner vide memo of appeal dated 11.11.2013, which was not accepted by Appellate Authority, as communicated to petitioner vide letter dated 14.12.2013. Initially Appellate Authority was of the view that till criminal appeal of petitioner is finalized, status quo in respect of petitioner shall be maintained. Then petitioner came to this Court in Writ Petition No.3650 of 2014, which was disposed of vide judgment dated 21.01.2014 and this Court held that appeal was maintainable and Appellate Authority was bound to decide appeal on merits and could not defer the matter till criminal appeal of petitioner is decided and also could not direct bank to maintain status of petitioner as a dismissed employee. Consequently, Appellate Authority has now passed order rejecting petitioner’s appeal. 7. Learned Senior Counsel, assailing impugned order of dismissal, contended that petitioner was not assigned any specific role and mere conviction under Section 302 IPC does not mean that petitioner was guilty of murder. He further contended that before passing impugned order of punishment, no opportunity was given to petitioner and therefore, impugned order of dismissed is in utter violation of principles of natural justice. He argued that impugned orders are also unreasoned and non-speaking, and, in any case, Regulation 30(3)(a) is not attracted in the case in hand. 8. Regulation 30(3) of the Regulations, 2010 reads as under : “30(3) (a) An officer or employee shall be liable to dismissal or to any of the other penalties referred to in regulation 39 if he is committed to prison for debt or is convicted of an offence which in the opinion of the Competent Authority, either involved moral turpitude, or has a bearing on any of the affairs of the Bank or on the discharge by the officer or employee of his duties in the Bank, the opinion in this respect of the Competent Authority shall be conclusive and binding on the officer or employee; (emphasis added) (b) such dismissal or other penalty may be imposed as from the date of his committal to prison or conviction and nothing in regulation 39 shall apply to such imposition.” 9. The aforesaid Regulation is pari materia to provision contained in Article 311 (2)(a) of Constitution wherein holder of a civil post can be dismissed or removed without holding any departmental enquiry, if he has been convicted and sentenced in a criminal case and after considering his conduct led to conviction. In Regulation 30 of Regulations 2010, power of dismissal has been conferred upon Competent Authority, if a Bank employee or officer is found guilty and convicted in a criminal case of an offence, which, in the opinion of such Competent Authority, either involves “moral turpitude” or has a bearing on any of the affairs of Bank or on discharge of duty by such person. 10. The first question is, whether in the present case petitioner can said to have been convicted in an offence involving “moral turpitude”? 11. The term “moral turpitude” as such has not been defined. In Pawan Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and others (1996) 4 SCC 17 , Court observed that “Moral turpitude” is an expression, which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity. 12. In absence of any definition of “Moral Turpitude” in the statute, we may go to the meaning of term “Moral Turpitude” in different dictionaries : 13. In Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, South Asian Edition, ‘Moral Turpitude’ has been defined at page 1030-31, as under - “Moral Turpitude- 1. Conduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality. In the area of legal ethics, offenses involving moral turpitude - such as fraud or breach of trust - traditionally make a person unfit to practice law. - Also termed moral depravity. 2. Military law. Any conduct for which the applicable punishment is a dishonorable discharge or confinement not less than one year; “Moral turpitude means, in general, shameful wickedness - so extreme a departure from ordinary standards of honest, good morals, justice, or ethics as to be shocking to the moral sense of the community. It has also been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which one person owes to another, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between people.” 50 Am. Jur.2d Libel and Slander § 165, at 454 (1995). 14. It has also been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which one person owes to another, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between people.” 50 Am. Jur.2d Libel and Slander § 165, at 454 (1995). 14. In Mitra’s Legal & Commercial Dictionary, Sixth Edition published by Eastern Law House Private Ltd. and Estate of M. Mitra, word “Moral Turpitude” has been defined on page 590-591, as under : “Moral Turpitude. Conduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality. [Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Ed.] “Moral turpitude” is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to described conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity. [Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana AIR 1996 SC 3300 : JT 1996(5) SC 155: (1996) 2 SCJ 441 : 1996(4) SLR 40 : (1996) 4 SCC 17 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 583]. The term “moral turpitude” is rather a vague one and it may have different meanings in different contexts. The term has generally been taken to mean to be a conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals and contrary to what a man owes to fellowman or to society in general. [Durga Singh v State of Punjab AIR 1957 Punj 97]. NOTE: The basic indicia of moral turpitude are:(i) something contrary to justice, honesty or good morals, involving baseness of mind or attitude; (ii) that which shocks the moral conscience of society in general; (iii) something which will attach a depravity of character to the person guilty thereof. Crime of murder comes within the ambit of moral turpitude. [Sarju Prasad Singh v State of Bihar 1987 Pat LJR 285 (Pat)]. In its application of professionals, wherever a conduct proved against is contrary to honesty, or opposed to good morals, or is unethical, it may be held that it involves moral turpitude. [In the matter of “P” an advocate AIR 1963 SC 1313 : (1963) 2 Cr LJ 341: (1964) 1 SCR 697 .” 15. In Encyclopaedic Law Dictionary (Legal & Commercial) 3rd Edition 2008 published by Wadhwa and Company, word “Moral Turpitude” has been defined on page 1017, as under : “MORAL TURPITUDE. [In the matter of “P” an advocate AIR 1963 SC 1313 : (1963) 2 Cr LJ 341: (1964) 1 SCR 697 .” 15. In Encyclopaedic Law Dictionary (Legal & Commercial) 3rd Edition 2008 published by Wadhwa and Company, word “Moral Turpitude” has been defined on page 1017, as under : “MORAL TURPITUDE. “ ‘Moral Turpitude’ is an expression which is used in legal as also in societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity.” [Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1996) 4 SCC 17 .21(SC)] MORAL TURPITUDE. “.....the term ‘moral turpitude’ has generally been taken to be a conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, good character and morals or contrary to what a man owes to a fellow man or to society in general.” [Chhotu Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 1 WLC (Raj) 308] MORAL TURPITUDE. “Is anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good moral.” [Narayan R. Bhosekar v. Municipal Corporation for Greater Bombay, 2002-II LLJ-170, 173 (Bom)] MORAL TURPITUDE. “Means an Act, which is mean or base. It implies depravity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with particular conduct. It means quality of crime involving grave infringement of the moral sentiments of the community.” MORAL TURPITUDE. “The term ‘moral turpitude’ has not been defined in any statute of India. It is judge made concept. It broadly means any act done, which is contrary to honesty and good morals.” [Lakshman Kumar Mondal v. UCO Bank, 2004-II-LLJ-614, 616 (Cal)] MORAL TURPITUDE. The expression ‘moral turpitude’ or ‘delinquency’ is not to receive a narrow construction. Whenever conduct proved against an advocate is contrary to honesty or opposed to good morals or is unethical, it involves moral turpitude. In re P. an Advocate, AIR 1963 SC 1313 . The expression “moral turpitude” is not defined anywhere. But it means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. Every false statement made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of any private and social duty which a person owes to his felly men or to the society in general Balaswar Singh v. District Magistrate and Collector, AIR 1959 All 71 . “MORAL TURPITUDE--MEANING”. Every false statement made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of any private and social duty which a person owes to his felly men or to the society in general Balaswar Singh v. District Magistrate and Collector, AIR 1959 All 71 . “MORAL TURPITUDE--MEANING”. Any act which is contrary to good morals from society’s point of view will come within ambit of ‘moral turpitude’. Perse an act of murder will not come within the broad concept of ‘moral turpitude.’ Mukhtiar Singh v. State of Punjab., AIR 2007 (NOC) 363 (P & H)” 16. In Lachuram Vs. Inderlal 1966 ILR Raj. 1168, a Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court quoted an American decision in Bartos Vs. United States District Court. for District of Nebraska, C.C.A. Neb., 19 F.2d 722, 724, to explain ‘moral turpitude’, according to which it means, an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity, in the private and social duties, which a man owes to his fellow-men, or to society in genial, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man and conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. Court also said that in its view, no absolute standard or no hard and fast rule can be laid down for deciding whether a particular act should be considered as one involving moral turpitude, as it would mostly depend on the facts and circumstances in which the act or omission is committed. 17. This Court in Buddha Pitai Vs. Sub-Divisional Officer Malihabad and Ors. AIR 1965 All 382 observed that an offence of a certain class may generally be considered to involve moral turpitude. It may not be so if committed in particular circumstances, for example, an offence of murder may ordinarily involve moral turpitude but if committed in a spirit of patriotism or with a laudable object, it may not shock public conscience and instead of being decried by the public, offender may be considered a hero. Further, an offence of theft will generally be considered mean, vile and antisocial and a thief would be simply scorned at. However, if a starving and emaciated person steals food is caught, prosecuted and convicted, people will take a charitable and sympathetic approach for such conduct of offender and his offence is not considered as involving moral turpitude. Further, an offence of theft will generally be considered mean, vile and antisocial and a thief would be simply scorned at. However, if a starving and emaciated person steals food is caught, prosecuted and convicted, people will take a charitable and sympathetic approach for such conduct of offender and his offence is not considered as involving moral turpitude. 18. Thus, every offence will have to be judged in the light of circumstances in which it has been committed and it is not gravity of offence or quantum of punishment which a person may suffer, which will determine such question. 19. In Allahabad Bank & Ors. Vs. Deepak Kumar Bhola (1997) 4 SCC 1 , Supreme Court referred to this Court’s judgment in Baleshwar Singh v. District Magistrate and Collector, Banaras AIR 1959 All 71 and held as under : “The expression ‘moral turpitude’ is not defined anywhere. But it means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or goods morals. It implies depravity and weakness of character of disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. Every false statement made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of any private and social duty which a person owns to his fellowmen or to the society in general. If therefore the individual charged with a certain conduct owes duty, either to another individual or to the society in general, to act in a specific manner or not to so act and he still acts contrary to it and does so knowingly, his conduct must beheld to be due to vileness and depravity. It will be contrary to accepted customary rule and duty between man and man.” 20. A Division Bench of Andhra Court in Regional Manager, Indian Bank, Vijayawada Vs. J. Siva Sankaram 2012 (4) ALT 239 held that all offenses ipso facto may not attract expression ‘moral turpitude’. Every civil wrong is not an offence. There is an essential distinction between civil wrong and a wrong involving criminal culpability. Only acts or omissions involving criminal culpability can be characterized as offences. The elements of moral turpitude are attached to only certain classes of offences, which are considered to be incompatible with a decent social order. Civilised society is not expected to bear the rough of presence of such individuals amongst themselves. 21. Only acts or omissions involving criminal culpability can be characterized as offences. The elements of moral turpitude are attached to only certain classes of offences, which are considered to be incompatible with a decent social order. Civilised society is not expected to bear the rough of presence of such individuals amongst themselves. 21. While we examine the matter in the light of above exposition of law, we find that Trial Court has recorded a finding that all accused, in a planned manner, attacked deceased and others causing in death of two persons. True that petitioner is said to carry only lathi, but, he accompanied accused persons who were having arms like firearms, country-made pistil, Tabal, and lathies. Thus it is not a case of sudden provocation or momentary passion or that in self defence aforesaid crime has been committed, therefore, it cannot be said that conviction of petitioner for having committed offence under Section 302 IPC and other provisions, cannot be construed as ‘moral turpitude’. 22. In taking the above view, we are fortified with a Division Bench Judgment in Ran Vijay Chandra vs. State of U. P. 2003 ALJ 1186 where, in para 19 and 20 of judgment, Court held as under :- “19. The offence of murder is a heinous crime. It shows deprave mentality of a man and shocks conscience of any sane person. The society looks at such heinous crime as an act of vileness, mental depravity and wickedness. However, there may be mitigating circumstances which reflects that killing was not an act of moral turpitude e.g. (1) the person had no intention to kill e.g. he want to kill ‘A’ but ‘B’ was killed by mistake, (2) wanted only to beat but the person died under certain circumstances, (3) there was a grave provocation and he lost mental balance, (4) it was done in self-defence, and (5) any other circumstance from which it can be gathered that it was not an act of mental depravity, wickedness or vileness. 20. Normally an act of a man is result of his mental attitude and the Court can examine the relevant factors which led a man to commit crime of murder.” (emphasis added) 23. In Harsukh Rama Vs. 20. Normally an act of a man is result of his mental attitude and the Court can examine the relevant factors which led a man to commit crime of murder.” (emphasis added) 23. In Harsukh Rama Vs. Sarnam Singh 1964 ALJ 1118, Court has said as under :- “‘Turpitude’ is a word of high emotional significance, suggesting conduct of such depravity as to excite feelings of disgust and contempt. The crime of simple hurt does not normally provoke any such reaction and consequently cannot be classed as an offence involving moral turpitude; and it seems to me that there is no logical reason why the offence of murder, which in a sense is only an aggravated form of hurt, should be held necessarily to involve moral turpitude. I am willing to concede that murders which are pre-meditated and planned in cold blood, those which are perpetrated for some base motive and those which are carried out with extreme ferocity and cruelty do involve moral turpitude, as they naturally evoke spontaneous feeling of repulsion and condemnation in the mind. But a murder committed in the heat of a fight or in response to serious provocation could hardly be placed in the same category.” 24. Proceeding further and applying exposition of law in the facts of that case, Court in Ran Vijay Chandra (supra) in para 22 said as under :- “22. In the present case there is nothing to that the offence was committed by the petitioner on provocation by the deceased or any of his family member. The motive assigned to the prosecution was that there was a dispute in relation to contract and the murder was committed in that respect. The Sessions Judge found that even if that part be ignored, admittedly there was a rivalry between two families and bad blood. The murder cannot be said to be in a grave provocation. On the facts and circumstances of the present case the offence committed by the petitioner involves moral turpitude.” 25. The next issue is that petitioner was not given any show cause notice or opportunity. When Regulation permits punishment when employee is convicted by a Court of law, hence requirement of natural justice is not attracted. 26. In the present case, we find that facts are in not in dispute. The next issue is that petitioner was not given any show cause notice or opportunity. When Regulation permits punishment when employee is convicted by a Court of law, hence requirement of natural justice is not attracted. 26. In the present case, we find that facts are in not in dispute. That being so and also in the light of discussions made above, we are satisfied that conviction of petitioner in the present case is with respect to an offence involving “moral turpitude”, hence Regulation 30 (3) is clearly attracted. Hence, it cannot be said that authorities have erred in law in passing order of dismissal. In the admitted facts and circumstances, we are clearly of the view that impugned orders cannot said to be vitiated in law for the reason that no show cause notice or opportunity was given to petitioner. 27. Last argument is that impugned appellate order is non speaking. 28. Here we find that Appellate Authority is not an individual person but a collective body of several persons i.e. Board of Directors. In such a case, where more than one person are considering the matter and pass resolution, their individual mind may act differently and in such cases, law of meetings clearly suggest that there cannot be any detailed reasoned order but ultimate inference and decision taken by all such person has to reflect on record. 29. A similar issue was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Dr. Bishambhar Dayal Gupta Vs. The Visitor/President of India, 2006 (1) AWC 608 . In para 11 of the judgment, questions, which were considered by Division Bench, have been formulated as (a), (b) and (d), are reproduced as under: “(a) Whether the orders passed by the Executive Council and the Visitor are unsustainable in the eyes of law as they do not record separate reasons. The Visitor/President of India, 2006 (1) AWC 608 . In para 11 of the judgment, questions, which were considered by Division Bench, have been formulated as (a), (b) and (d), are reproduced as under: “(a) Whether the orders passed by the Executive Council and the Visitor are unsustainable in the eyes of law as they do not record separate reasons. (b) Whether it was necessary for the Executive Council to have recorded a finding of guilt in respect of the charges found proved by the Enquiry Officer in its resolution dated 16/17th May, 1989 by imposing punishment, even after the enquiry report was accepted earlier under the resolution of the Executive Council dated 28/29th March, 1989, where under the Executive Council had specifically held that the charges against the petitioner were proved and the enquiry report was accepted.” “(d) Whether in the facts of the present case, this Court would exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in favour of the petitioner.” 30. Referring to the provisions whereby decision was to be taken by Executive Council of University, Court in paras 23, 25 and 31 held as under: “23. From the provisions, which have been quoted herein above, it is apparently clear that the decision to dismiss a teacher of the University from service on the ground of misconduct, is to be taken after following the procedure prescribed under Clause (c) of the said statute by the Executive Council. The said Section does not require recording of reasons for such a decision. Even otherwise, where a collective decision by a body of person is required to be taken (like in the facts of the present case), it is neither practically possible nor legally required that opinion of all the members participating in the delibeartions must be recorded, inasmuch as the decision of such bodies are collective in nature, and only the decision as a whole, is required to be recorded in writing and not the deliberation which had to be such a decision. The deliberations which took place in the meeting of the Executive Council, are, therefore, not necessarily to be recorded in its decision.” “25. In these circumstances, the first contention that the order of the Executive Council as well as of the Visitor, being not supported by reasons in writing is unsustainable in the eyes of law, and therefore, rejected.” “31. The deliberations which took place in the meeting of the Executive Council, are, therefore, not necessarily to be recorded in its decision.” “25. In these circumstances, the first contention that the order of the Executive Council as well as of the Visitor, being not supported by reasons in writing is unsustainable in the eyes of law, and therefore, rejected.” “31. This Court has no hesitation to record that decision taken in the meeting of Executive Council cannot be faulted with and does not call for interference in the writ proceedings. Issue No. (b) is answered accordingly.” (Emphasis added) 31. The Division Bench clearly said, when there is collective decision of a larger decision making body, consisting of several persons, unless law specifically requires, ultimate resolution passed by such Body is sufficient and it is not necessary that deliberations which took place in the meeting of Body, should also form part of record or part of decision. Thus, in absence of any such provision, collective decision taken by a collective body, in our view, cannot be assailed on the ground that decision of such collective body communicated to concerned employee is not a speaking one. 32. We are also fortified in taking the above view by a Division Bench judgment of which one of us (Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal,J.) is also a member, in Writ -A No.478 of 2014 (Jaibir Singh Vs. Purvanchal Bank Thru’ Chairman and Another) decided on 17.5.2018 and a Single Judge judgment in Writ A. No.35095 of 2006 (Salim Ahmad Khan Vs. Director, U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd. and others) decided on 29.4.2014, wherein also principles laid down in Dr. Bishambhar Dayal Gupta (supra) has been followed. 33. In the circumstances, all the issues raised by learned counsel for petitioner are answered against him. 34. No other point has been argued. 35. The writ petition lacks merit. Dismissed. 36. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.