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2018 DIGILAW 1177 (GAU)

F. Lalhmingthanga v. Safe Express Pvt. Ltd.

2018-08-09

MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA

body2018
JUDGMENT : MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA, J. 1. Heard Mr. Joseph L. Rentlei, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Roshan Subedi, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 and Mr. Zochhuana, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3. No one appears for the respondent No. 1. 2. The appellant has challenged the impugned Judgment & Order dated 15.07.2016, issued by the MACT, Lunglei in MAC Case No. 3/2014, by which the appellant's claim for payment of cost of repair of his Gypsy has been dismissed, on the ground that the learned Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to entertain a claim for damages caused to a motor vehicle. 3. The appellant's counsel submits that the learned Tribunal erred in dismissing the appellant's claim for compensation for damages caused to his Gypsy due to an accident involving the appellant's Gypsy and the 207 Truck belonging to the respondent No. 1. He submits that the learned Tribunal had wrongly interpreted section 141 & 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and held that the learned Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the appellant. 4. Mr. Roshan Subedi, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 submits that as the respondent No. 2 is the Insurance Company, which insured the owner of the Gypsy, i.e., the appellant, the respondent No. 2 has no comments to make in this matter, as no claim has made against the appellant. He also submits that the learned Tribunal has the jurisdiction and is competent to decide the present issue involved in the appeal. 5. Mr. Zochhuana, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 also submits that the learned Tribunal, Lunglei has the jurisdiction and competence to decide the claim made by the appellant, if fault is proved on the part of the owner and driver of the 207 Truck, which was involved in the accident. 6. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 7. The claim petition was submitted by the appellant for the cost of the repaired damage caused to his Gypsy, due to a collision between the appellant's Gypsy bearing Registration No. MZ O2 A 0276 and TATA (207) RXDI, bearing Registration No. MZ O1 H 3843. 6. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 7. The claim petition was submitted by the appellant for the cost of the repaired damage caused to his Gypsy, due to a collision between the appellant's Gypsy bearing Registration No. MZ O2 A 0276 and TATA (207) RXDI, bearing Registration No. MZ O1 H 3843. There was apparently an agreement made between the appellant and the respondent No. 1, to the effect that the cost for repair of the damage caused to the Gypsy would be paid by the respondent No. 1. The appellant thereafter submitted his bills of repair to the respondent No. 1, which was not acted upon. The appellant thereafter filed MAC Case No. 3/2014 before the MACT, Lunglei. The learned Tribunal however dismissed the appellant's claim petition on the ground that damage caused to the motor vehicle, could not be agitated before the Tribunal, as the definition of property did not include a motor vehicle. 8. Section 145 (e) defines property as follows:- "property" includes goods carried in the motor vehicle, roads, bridges, culverts, causeways, trees, posts and mile-stones." 9. Section 141 of the MV Act, 1988 provides for claiming compensation for death or permanent disability and Section 147 of the MV Act provides for the requirement of policies and limits of liabilities in respect of policy of insurance issued by an insurance company. 10. In the case of Bharat Coop. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. Vs. Coop. Bank Employees Union, (2007) 4 SCC 685 , the Apex Court has held in para 23 as follows:- "It is trite to say that when in the definition clause given in any statute the word "means" is used, what follows is intended to speak exhaustively. When the word "means" is used in the definition, to borrow the words of Lord Esher M.R in Gough v. Gough it is a "hard-and-fast" definition and no meaning other than that which is put in the definition can be assigned to the same. (Also see P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology). On the other hand, when the word "includes" is used in the definition, the legislature does not intend to restrict the definition: it makes the definition enumerative but not exhaustive. (Also see P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology). On the other hand, when the word "includes" is used in the definition, the legislature does not intend to restrict the definition: it makes the definition enumerative but not exhaustive. That is to say, the term defined will retain its ordinary meaning but its scope would be extended to bring within it matters, which in its ordinary meaning may or may not comprise. Therefore, the use of the word "means" followed by the word "includes" in Section 2 (bb) of the ID Act is clearly indicative of the legislative intent to make the definition exhaustive and would cover only those banking companies which fall within the purview of the definition and no other." 11. A reading of Section 145 (e), Section 141 & 147 does not any way restrict the meaning of the word "property". The use of the word "includes" in Section 145 (e), not having restricted the meaning of the word "property", the Dictionary meaning of the word "property", as given in Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language has been looked into in it, wherein the word "property" has been explained and defined, one of which is "that which a person owns, the possession or possessions of a particular persons. The definition given therein does not in any manner restrict the use of the word "property". Accordingly, this Court is of the view that a motor vehicle, which is a moveable property, cannot be said to be outside the ambit of the word "property" as understood under the MV Act, 1988. 12. Section 165 (1) of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 states as follows:- "164. Claims Tribunals.-(1) A State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereafter in this Chapter referred to as Claims Tribunal) for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both. Explanation.-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the expression "claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles" includes claims for compensation under section 140 [AND SECTION 163-a]" 13. A bare reading of the above section would clearly show that the learned Tribunal has the jurisdiction to entertain a claim involving damages to any property of a 3rd party. As this Court has already held that a motor vehicle has to be read into the definition of the word "property", the learned Tribunal has the jurisdiction to entertain the claim for damages made by the appellant against a 3rd party. 14. The above finding of this Court is further fortified by the Judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corp. Vs. Virendrakumar Singh (64), (1985) RajLW 264 (S.B Civil Misc. Appeal No. 56 of 1980, decided on 31.01.1985) wherein the Rajasthan High Court held at para 12 as follows:- "12. A few authorities on the point may be noticed. In Banwari Lal V. Vishnu Narain (1), the accident took place on January 20, 1971 between two motor vehicles. A claim was preferred under the Act in respect of the damages caused to one of the two vehicles. No claim for bodily injury was made. The learned Judges of the Madhya Pradesh High Court took the view that Claims Tribunal under the Act has jurisdiction to award compensation for loss or damages to the property. In Haryana State V. Poosa Ram (2), the accident took place on September 17, 1970 in which five buffaloes were killed by a truck. The claim for damages to property (i.e., the cattle) simpliciter was held within the cognizance of the Tribunal under the Act. In Dadulal Gupta V. Basant Kumar (3), a collision took place between a bus and truck on March 16, 1970. A claim for compensation for damages to the truck was filed under the Act before the Tribunal by its owner. An objection was raised that the claim was not maintainable under the Act. The objection was repelled by a learned Single Judge of this Court and it was held that the Claims Tribunal under the Act has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claim relating to property. An objection was raised that the claim was not maintainable under the Act. The objection was repelled by a learned Single Judge of this Court and it was held that the Claims Tribunal under the Act has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claim relating to property. In the Deputy General manager and Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Hubli V. Jyoti Construction, Mangalore (4), the accident took place between a bus and a truck on April 3, 1972. A claim was filed by the owner of the bus to recover compensation in respect of the damages caused to the bus by the truck. An objection was raised that the Tribunal under the Act had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim. The objection was over-ruled and the learned Judges held that the Tribunal under the Act is competent to entertain a petition merely for damages to property without anything more under section 110(1) read with section 110-A (1) (a) of the Act." 15. In view of the reasons stated above, this Court finds that the impugned Judgment & Order dated 15.07.2016, passed by the learned MACT, Lunglei in MAC Case No. 3/2014 is not in consonance with the provisions of the MV Act, 1988. Accordingly, the same is set aside. The matter is remanded back to the learned Tribunal to re-consider the case of the petitioner on merits. 16. The appeal is accordingly allowed. Send back the LCR.