JUDGMENT : 1. We have heard Shri Shashi Prakash Singh, Additional Solicitor General assisted by Shri Apurva Hajela, learned counsel for petitioners and Shri S. K. Pandey, learned counsel for respondents. 3. This writ petition is directed against judgment and order dated 10.07.2015, passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as "Tribunal") in Original Application (hereinafter referred to as "O.A.") No. 456 of 2001. Tribunal has set aside suspension order dated 28.03.2006 and punishment order dated 24.02.2010 and has held that applicant-respondents shall be entitled to all consequential benefits. 4. Brief facts giving rise to present writ petition are, that, respondent-1 was working as Superintendent, Post Office Jaunpur Division, Jaunpur (hereinafter referred to as 'S.P.O.'). He was placed under suspension by Post Master General, Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as "P.M.G.") vide order dated 28.03.2006. Suspension was approved by Chief Post Master General, U.P. Circle, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as "C.P.M.G.") by order dated 17.04.2006. Since departmental proceeding could not be initiated for more than three months, vide order dated 11.07.2006, C.P.M.G. revoked suspension order dated 28.03.2006. By another order dated (11.07.2006), a charge-sheet containing three charges was served upon respondent-1. Copy of charge-sheet is annexed as Annexure-II to the writ petition. Statement of imputation of misconduct (Annexure-II) reads as under:- Article-1 (Charge-1) "Inspite of strict instructions of Directorate, reiteration and emphasis on handling of public grievances on top priority, lack of strict and vigilant supervision by Shri Gopal Ram SPOs Jaunpur Dn. Resulted in increase of number of complaints by leaps and bounds particularly on non-payment of money orders in Jaunpur Division and this phenomena draw attention of the department on high levels. Ultimately the whole episode was inquired by Shri S. M. Zaman, ADPS, O/O Post Master General Allahabad, who in his inquiry found Web-based complaints pending in Jaunpur Division as on 28.03.2006. Inward complaints pendency report of Jaunpur Dn. Ultimately the whole episode was inquired by Shri S. M. Zaman, ADPS, O/O Post Master General Allahabad, who in his inquiry found Web-based complaints pending in Jaunpur Division as on 28.03.2006. Inward complaints pendency report of Jaunpur Dn. Month OB Red during Closed during Total Pending details (Days) Sep-05 598 320 0 918 370 291 176 21 60 Oct-05 918 836 0 1754 426 410 632 204 82 Nov-05 1754 1247 0 3001 836 433 814 632 286 Dec-05 3001 1346 0 4347 547 799 1247 822 932 Jan-06 4347 1301 0 5648 704 597 1259 1334 1754 Feb-06 5648 1382 0 7030 948 579 1192 1411 2900 Mar-06 up to 28.03.06 7030 1993 2329 8694 979 719 893 899 3204 During the course of inquiry, it was also found that most of the case were pending due to non-reply or non-payment of MOs. It is worth while to mention that several instructions were issued to said Shri Gopal Ram, SPOs Jaunpur Dn. Vide RO Allahabad letter/DO letter no. BD/Complaint/Internet/2005-06 dated 09.01.2005, 09.08.2005, 18.03.2005, 06.04.2005, 14.07.2005, 01.09.2005, 27.09.2005, 28.10,2005 and 17.02.2006 for immediate and speedy disposal of Web-based complaints but the said Shri Gopal Ram did not pay any attention towards Web-based complaints as per norms for settlement of complaints circulated vide RO Allahabad, which resulted in heavy increase of Web-based and VIP/DOPG complaints. Thus it is alleged that by his aforesaid acts, the said Shri Gopal Ram failed to follow instructions issued by above letters of RO Allahabad and thereby also failed to maintain devotion to duty as required of him under Rule 3(I)(ii) of CCS(Conduct) Rules, 1964. Article-11 (Charge-II) Shri Gopal Ram took over as SPOs Jaunpur division on 19.09.2005. From the date of assumption of charge of SPOs Jaunpur DN. To 28.03.2006, Shri Gopal Ram failed to visit/ issue of visit remarks of the Post Offices of Jaunpur Division due to which the position of pendency of complaints, non-payment of money orders, supply of funds etc. could not be checked by him. Shri Prabhu Nath Yadav, OA, D.O. Jaunpur has confirmed in his written statement dated 27.03.2006 that no visit remark was received from any Inspecting Officers of the Division. Thus it is alleged that said Shri Gopal Ram did not acted in the spirit of instructions issued vide in Sec.(P) New Delhi letter no. 10-1/88-Inspn(Pt) dated 10.08.1988 and DG(P) New Delhi letter No. 17-7/2001-Inspn. Thus it is alleged that said Shri Gopal Ram did not acted in the spirit of instructions issued vide in Sec.(P) New Delhi letter no. 10-1/88-Inspn(Pt) dated 10.08.1988 and DG(P) New Delhi letter No. 17-7/2001-Inspn. Dated 02-01-2002 and thereby he is also alleged to have failed to maintain devotion to duty as required of him under Rule 3(I)(ii) of CCS(Conduct) Rules, 1964. Article-III (Charge-III) (I) Shri Gopal Ram while functioning as SPOs Jaunpur Dn. During the period from 19-09-2005 to 28-03-2006, received a copy of CAT Allahabad OA No. 1422/05 R. R. Mishra V/s Union of India and others, CAT orders dated 5-12-2005 along with "VAKALATNAMA" on 19-12-2005 sent by Shri Anil Kumar Dwivedi ASC on 15-12-2005 for filing CA within 4 weeks. But the said Shri Gopal Ram SPOs Jaunpur dn. Advanced a sum of Rs. 4000/- (Four Thousand) only to Shri Abhai Kumar, his steno, for pursuing the case in CAT Allahabad through Shri Saurabh Srivastava ASC CAT Allahabad, instead of Shri Anil Kumar Dwivedi though this case was allotted to him by Shri Saumitra Singh SSC CAT Allahabad. A complaint dated 4.2.06 was received from Shri Anil Kumar Dwivedi in this respect. Thus Shri Gopal Ram changed the ASC at his own accord arbitrarily without getting the approval of competent authority. He allowed the payment of the following amounts to Shri Saurabh Srivastava ASC up to the stage of submission of CA only. Bill No. Bill Date Amount Receipt No. Date of payment - - 4000-00 173 12/01/08 275 13/01/2006 3825-00 218 04/03/06 266 21/01/2006 5850-00 196 02/02/06 286 03/02/06 5760-00 213 08/02/06 Shri Ram Shiromani Yadav, O.A. D.O., Jaunpur has confirmed in his written statement dated 25.8.08. recorded by Shri Prabhakar Tripathi, I.I., R.O., Allahabad, about the details of bills, payment and other facts mentioned above. (ii) Similarly in another CAT case no. 1018/02 Shri Harikesh V/s Union of India and others, which was being pleaded through Shri H. C. Dubey, ASC CAT Allahabad & pursued by Shri B. D. Mishra ASPOs Shahganj Sub dn. Jaunpur. But the said Sri Gopal Ram SPOs Jaunpur, on receipt of a letter dated 20.05.2005 from Sri Saumitra Singh SSC CAT Allahabad regarding allotment of the aforesaid OA, without verifying the genuineness of the letter changed, the ASC and referred the case to Sri Saurabh Srivastava ASC CAT Allahabad. Jaunpur. But the said Sri Gopal Ram SPOs Jaunpur, on receipt of a letter dated 20.05.2005 from Sri Saumitra Singh SSC CAT Allahabad regarding allotment of the aforesaid OA, without verifying the genuineness of the letter changed, the ASC and referred the case to Sri Saurabh Srivastava ASC CAT Allahabad. While Shri Saumitra Singh SSC CAT Allahabad vide his letter dated 08.01.2006 conveyed surprise as to how the name of Sri Saurabh Srivastava was included in the CAT judgment in OA No. 1018/02 dated 14.09.2005 and declined to have ever issued any such authority letter in favour of Sri Saurabh Srivastava ASC to plead this case on his behalf. The said Shri Gopal Ram ordered Shri Abhai Kumar, steno to obtain legal opinion from Shri Saumitra Singh SSC CAT Allahabad on the judgment dated 14-9-2005 and bill No. 186 dated 25-10-2005 for Rs. 17365/- (Date of hearing respectively 10-3-2002, 11-9-2002, 14-10-2002, 28-11-2002, 13-12-2002, 8-1-2003, 12-2-2003, 6-3-2003, 30-4-2003, 20-5-2003, 3-8-2003, 25-7-2003, 29-08-2003, 30-9-2003, 10-10-2003, 27-11-2003, 19-12-2003, 12-1-2004, 10-2-2004, 19-3-2004, 13-5-2004,19-11-2004,10-3-200513-4-2005,27-7-2005 and 14-8-2005 was received from Shri Saurabh Srivastava through Shri Abhai Kumar steno by hand which consisted various dates when Shri Saurabh Srivastava was neither ASC nor pleading the case. A sum of Rs 12150/- was charged for hearing unattended by Shri Saurabh Srivastava. Shri Ram Laut Yadav Accountant DO Jaunpur has confirmed in his written statement dated 27.3.06 that he objected on this bill, thereafter, a revised bill no. 210 dated 15.11.2005 for Rs. 18060/- (Dates of hearing respectively 7-1-2004, 11-2-2004, 9-3-2004, 20-04-2004, 24-5-2004, 5-7-2004, 27-10-2004, 21-9-2004, 29-10-2004, 10-3-2005, 13-4-2005, 22-7-2005 and 22-7-2005) was submitted by Shri Saurabh Srivastava through Shri Abhai Kumar steno on 16-11-2005. The said Shri Gopal Ram approved and pass bill for Rs. 6115/- after correction. Shri Mohit Ram Yadav in his written statement dated 27.3.06 and Shri Haera La Yadav, in his written statement dated 26-3-06 and 27-3-06 has confirmed that cases of their branch are being perused through Shri Abhai Kumar. Steno as per order of SPOs, Jaunpur. These statements were recorded by Mohd. Zama, A.D.P.S., R.O. Allahabad. The last hearing in the case was 14-9-2005 on which judgment was passed by the Hon'ble CAT Allahabad which was not shown in the bill which proves that Shri Saurabh Srivastava neither attended the Hon'ble court of CAT Allahabad nor pleaded the dependent for sake of justice. These statements were recorded by Mohd. Zama, A.D.P.S., R.O. Allahabad. The last hearing in the case was 14-9-2005 on which judgment was passed by the Hon'ble CAT Allahabad which was not shown in the bill which proves that Shri Saurabh Srivastava neither attended the Hon'ble court of CAT Allahabad nor pleaded the dependent for sake of justice. By this aforesaid enertness the said Shri Gopal Ram is alleged to have failed to observe the provisions of standards of financial propriety as required of him under Rule 60 of FHB Vol.I. It is also alleged that he contravened the instructions issued vide CPMG, U.P. Circle, Lucknow Letter no. LC/Rlg-instruction/01/2005 dated 21-11-2005 and also violated the order of Ministry of Law and Justice, Govt. of India, Deptt of Legal Affairs, New Delhi circulated vide No. F-34(14)/2005/Judl dated 18-7-2005 & No. 27(11)/99-Judl dated 24.9.99 and thereby he also failed to maintain absolute integrity devotion to duty and acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a Govt. servant as required under Rule 3(l)(i)(ii)(iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules,1984. 3. As many as 41 documents were mentioned in Annexure 3 to charge-sheet being documents relied in support of charges. Ten witnesses were shown in Annexure 4 to the charge-sheet, who were to be examined in support of charge-sheet. Sri (Dr.) K.K. Yadav, Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Kanpur City was appointed as Inquiry Officer. 4. Respondent 1 submitted a letter dated 28.02.2007 (Annexure-IV to writ petition) before Inquiry Officer, demanding 11 additional documents. This application was considered by Inquiry Officer on 11.04.2007 and it was held that documents at serial nos. 1, 2, 4, 8 and 11 are irrelevant and only documents at serial nos. 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 were relevant. Presenting Officer, therefore, was directed to produce relevant additional documents on the next date of proceedings. Presenting Officer produced the documents at serial nos. 7 and 10 in oral enquiry and informed Inquiry Officer that documents mentioned at serial nos. 3, 5, 6, and 9 were not available in the office of S.P.O., Jaunpur. 5. After completion of oral inquiry, report was submitted by Inquiry Officer holding charge 1 not proved and charges 2 and 3 fully proved. Copy of inquiry report (Annexure-VI to the writ petition) was supplied to respondent-1 by CPMG, vide letter dated 08.08.2008. 5.1 Respondent-1 submitted reply/representation dated 21.08.2008 to inquiry report. 5. After completion of oral inquiry, report was submitted by Inquiry Officer holding charge 1 not proved and charges 2 and 3 fully proved. Copy of inquiry report (Annexure-VI to the writ petition) was supplied to respondent-1 by CPMG, vide letter dated 08.08.2008. 5.1 Respondent-1 submitted reply/representation dated 21.08.2008 to inquiry report. He attained age of superannuation and retired on 31.10.2008 but disciplinary proceedings continued, under Rule 9 of Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules 1972 (hereinafter referred to Pension Rules 1972) read with Rule 14 of Central Civil Service (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 (hereinafter referred to CCA Rules 1965). Since no final order was passed, respondent-1 filed O.A. No. 109 of 2009 before Tribunal seeking a direction to petitioners to complete disciplinary proceedings initiated vide charge-sheet dated 11.07.2006. Vide judgment and order dated 12.02.2009, Tribunal disposed of above O.A., directing competent authority to conclude inquiry proceedings, expeditiously, as possible, preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of its order. 6. Respondent-1 being group 'A' Officer, before imposing punishment, consultation of Union Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to "Commission") was also necessary. Therefore matter was referred to 'Commission'. Agreeing with the findings of enquiry report, Commission took the view that charges found established against respondent-1, constitute grave misconduct and opined to impose penalty of withholding of 10% monthly pension for a period of five years. 7. President of India is the disciplinary authority of respondent-1. Considering entire record of disciplinary inquiry as also the advice of Commission, it passed order of punishment on 24.02.2010 imposing penalty of withholding of 10% monthly pension for a period of five years. 8. Order of punishment as well as suspension were challenged by respondent-1 before Tribunal in O.A. No. 456 of 2010. 9. Before Tribunal, two grounds were mainly pressed by respondent-1. (i) Disciplinary Authority was directed to complete enquiry within three months vide judgment and order dated 12.02.2009 while punishment order had been passed on 24.02.2010 i.e. much beyond three months period, hence, it is illegal. (ii) Disciplinary Proceedings are vitiated in law since adequate opportunity of defence was not afforded to respondent-1 inasmuch as additional documents which were relied on by Inquiry Officer were not supplied and, therefore respondent-1 was prejudiced. 10. (ii) Disciplinary Proceedings are vitiated in law since adequate opportunity of defence was not afforded to respondent-1 inasmuch as additional documents which were relied on by Inquiry Officer were not supplied and, therefore respondent-1 was prejudiced. 10. Before Tribunal, petitioners, while contesting matter in respect of issue (i) i.e. passing of punishment order beyond three months, pointed out that it had already filed Miscellaneous Application on 18.05.2009 seeking extension of time but no order was passed thereon by Tribunal, therefore, it is contended that disciplinary authority has not committed any illegality in passing punishment order beyond three months. With respect to additional documents at serial no. 3, 5, 6 and 9 which were not made applicable to respondent-1, petitioners contended before Tribunal that no prejudice had caused and same would not vitiate the proceedings. 11. However, on both the aforesaid issues, Tribunal has taken a view in favour of respondent-1, hence, vide judgment and order, impugned in this writ petition, orders of punishment and suspension have been set aside. 12. Learned Additional Solicitor General Shri S. P. Singh assisted by Shri Apoorva Hajela, Advocate contended that there was no deliberate delay on the part of petitioners in finalizing proceedings. Respondent-1 being group 'A' Officer consultation of Commission was necessary. Besides, after receiving reply dated 21.8.2008 of respondent-1 to the inquiry report, matter was considered by Disciplinary Authority and finding a fit case for imposing punishment, it referred to Commission on 27.08.2009 for advice. The Commission tendered advice by letter dated 05.01.2010. Thereafter punishment order was passed on 24.02.2010. It is contended that there was no deliberate or intentional delay so as to vitiate punishment order. He further submits that petitioners took precaution of having approached Tribunal for extension of time by filing a Miscellaneous Application on 18.05.2009, but the said application was never listed before Tribunal and no order was passed thereon for which petitioners can not be held responsible. For its own lapse, Tribunal could not hold petitioners responsible for delay and noncompliance of judgment and order dated 12.02.2009 passed in O.A. No. 109 of 2009 and that should not have been made ground for setting aside order of punishment. 13. Coming to issue with regard to non supply of additional documents at serial nos. For its own lapse, Tribunal could not hold petitioners responsible for delay and noncompliance of judgment and order dated 12.02.2009 passed in O.A. No. 109 of 2009 and that should not have been made ground for setting aside order of punishment. 13. Coming to issue with regard to non supply of additional documents at serial nos. 3, 5, 6 and 9, he submitted that additional documents at item 3 were requested to be supplied by respondent-1 with reference to charge-1 i.e. Annexure-2 of article 1 which charge has not been found proved. Additional documents at item nos. 5, 6 and 9 relates to charge no. 3 i.e. Annexure-2 article 3 which is evident from the judgment of Tribunal also and to the extent the aforesaid documents were required, that part of charge-3 has not been found proved. Therefore, non-submission of aforesaid documents to respondent-1 did not result any prejudice, what so ever, and without considering this aspect Tribunal has recorded findings that respondent-1 was prejudiced on account of non-supply of said documents, hence Tribunal has proceeded in a mechanical manner to hold that non-supply of aforesaid documents has vitiated departmental proceedings. These findings are patently illegal and contrary to law. 14. Shri S. K. Pandey, counsel for respondent-1 on the one hand contended that no application seeking extension of time was ever filed before Tribunal but when confronted that filing of Miscellaneous Application seeking extension of time has been noticed and admitted by Tribunal in the judgment in question, itself, he then argued that it was for petitioners to get the order passed from Tribunal and since petitioners failed to get extension of time, order passed after expiry of three months would be vitiated in law and Tribunal has rightly held so. With regard to non-supply of documents, he submitted that once Inquiry Officer held documents relevant and the same were not supplied, this was sufficient to vitiate the proceedings and nothing further was required to be considered by Tribunal. 15. We have examined rival submissions advanced before us at length and perused record. In our view, judgment of Tribunal is patently erroneous, illegal and cannot be sustained. 16. 15. We have examined rival submissions advanced before us at length and perused record. In our view, judgment of Tribunal is patently erroneous, illegal and cannot be sustained. 16. Coming to the first aspect regarding order of punishment having been passed much beyond period of three months, when Tribunal passed such order of on 12.2.2009, first of all, we find that order of Tribunal no-where imposes, strictly and absolutely, three months period for the purpose of passing final order for completion of proceedings. Para 4 of order dated 12.02.2009 passed by Tribunal in O.A. No. 109 of 2009 read as under; "In view of the above, it is clear that the respondents have not concluded the inquiry proceedings, initiated against the applicant, as on today as stated by the learned counsel for the applicant. That being so, it is appropriate and in the interest of justice to direct the competent authority in the respondents' establishment to conclude the inquiry proceedings pending against the applicant as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order." (emphasis added) 17. A perusal of the aforesaid shows that Tribunal decided aforesaid O.A. directing competent authority to conclude inquiry proceedings as expeditiously as possible, and then it says that preferably, it may be done within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of the said order. Tribunal did not fix any particular time in absolute words that competent authority has to conclude inquiry proceedings within three months. Instead direction says that competent authority shall conclude inquiry proceedings as expeditiously as possible and preferably it says three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of the judgment of Tribunal. Therefore direction did not limit the period of three months strictly but gives leverage to authority concerned and stress was that proceedings should be concluded making sincere efforts in three months by authority concerned. Moreover period of three months was to complete from the date of communication of said order to the competent authority. Para 16 of Judgment shows that respondent-1 advanced his arguments treating commencement of three months from the date of order i.e. 12.02.2009 and Tribunal has nowhere referred to that date on which said judgment was served upon competent authority. Moreover period of three months was to complete from the date of communication of said order to the competent authority. Para 16 of Judgment shows that respondent-1 advanced his arguments treating commencement of three months from the date of order i.e. 12.02.2009 and Tribunal has nowhere referred to that date on which said judgment was served upon competent authority. Without looking into time of commencement, Tribunal in para 21 of judgment has held that passing of order beyond three months, renders the order illegal, which, in our view, ignores the fact that unless period of commencement of three months would have been noticed, it could not have been said as to when this three months period completed. If Tribunal relied on the date of order, as argued by respondent-1 before Tribunal as evident from para 16 of the judgment, it is nothing but sheer misreading by Tribunal, of its earlier judgment dated 12.02.2009, which clearly says that direction to conclude inquiry would commence from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order by competent authority. 18. The next premises on which we find it difficult to sustain judgment of Tribunal is that once it has admitted that Miscellaneous Application seeking extension of time for compliance of the order dated 12.02.2009 was filed by petitioners on 18.05.2009, it could not have ignored that application, by observing that since no order was passed by Tribunal for extension of time, therefore punishment order must be held to have been passed after the expiry of stipulated period. When an application is filed before Tribunal, it is Tribunal's duty to get this application listed before it and dispose of the same. Responsibilities of listing of application in Court cannot be shifted upon the parties as it is office of Court or Tribunal which has to list an application for hearing and dispose of. If application was not listed in Court of Tribunal for disposal, lapse cannot be attributed to parties. On the contrary, it shows a failure on the part of Tribunal/Court concerned that application filed before it was not listed. Ignoring its consequences, an adverse order in the matter has been passed by Tribunal taking the view that if application has not been got disposed of, then concerned party has to suffer. This approach is clearly illegal and cannot be appreciated. Ignoring its consequences, an adverse order in the matter has been passed by Tribunal taking the view that if application has not been got disposed of, then concerned party has to suffer. This approach is clearly illegal and cannot be appreciated. Moreover we do not find any provision under Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 or Rules framed there under to show that a party having discharged its duty of filing application in Registry of Tribunal is further required to get it listed by managing things in the office. This amounts to inviting third party interference in the office of Tribunal which neither can be conceived nor expected nor is otherwise in the interest of justice. If any such things is accepted it has its own serious and adverse consequences. This kind of interference or access by parties, to office, can neither be encouraged nor expected. We have no manner of doubt that a Court of law if has issued a direction to an authority to do or not to do something within a particular period, same has to be complied by such authority in words and spirit strictly but then the entire things have to be seen in its entirely. 19. A Division Bench of this Court in Union of India and Another vs. Satendra Kumar Sahai and Another, Writ Petition No. 1056 (ST) of 2009 has observed, when Court or Tribunal prescribe any time limit for concluding inquiry or for a particular act, Government or its functionaries are not at liberty to violate that order. Court has further proceeded to hold, whether delay which has occurred is such so as to nullify entire proceedings, would be a question which has to be considered in the facts and circumstances of each and every case. 20. In a given case where Court finds that delay was not for unjustified reasons or reasons were beyond control of concerned authority, it can condone such delay and hold ultimate order valid. Mere delay by itself would not vitiate final order and the matter has to be examined in each case. Similar issue has also been examined by a Full Bench of this Court in Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi vs. The New India Assurance Company Limited And Others, Writ Petition No. 7179 of 2009 (SS), wherein Full Bench rendered its opinion by judgment and order dated 04.12.2013. Similar issue has also been examined by a Full Bench of this Court in Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi vs. The New India Assurance Company Limited And Others, Writ Petition No. 7179 of 2009 (SS), wherein Full Bench rendered its opinion by judgment and order dated 04.12.2013. Two questions, referred for determination by Full Bench were as under:- "(a) Whether if an inquiry proceeding is not concluded within a time frame fixed by a Court and concluded thereafter, without seeking extension from the Court then on the said ground the entire inquiry proceeding as well as punishment order passed, is vitiated in view of the judgment in the case of P.N. Srivastava; and (b) Whether the law as laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of P.N. Srivastava that if an inquiry proceeding is not concluded within a time frame as fixed by a Court, it stands witiated is still a good law in view of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Chandra as well as a judgment dated 27.07.2009 of a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1056 (SB) of 2009 (Union of India and others Vs. Satendra Kumar Sahai and another)." 21. The aforesaid questions have been answered by Full Bench in para 19 of judgment, as under:- "19. In view of the above discussion, we now proceed to answer the question which have been referred to the Full Bench. (A) Question No. (a): We hold that if an enquiry is not concluded within the time which has been fixed by the Court, it is open to the employer to seek an extension of time by making an appropriate application to the court setting out the reasons for the delay in the conclusion of the enquiry. In such event, it is for the court to consider whether time should be extended, based on the facts and circumstances of the case. In such event, it is for the court to consider whether time should be extended, based on the facts and circumstances of the case. However, where there is a stipulation of time by the Court, it will not be open to the employer to disregard that stipulation and an extension of time must be sought; (B) Question No. (b): The judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Suresh Chandra (supra) as well as the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Satyendra Kumar Sahai (supra) clearly indicate that a mere delay on the part of the employer in concluding a disciplinary enquiry will not ipso facto nullify the entire proceedings in every case. The Court which has fixed a stipulation of time has jurisdiction to extend the time and it is open to the court, while exercising that jurisdiction, to consider whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained. The court can suitably extend time for conclusion of the enquiry either in a proceeding instituted by the employee challenging the enquiry on the ground that it was not completed within the stipulated period or even upon an independent application moved by the employer. The court has the inherent jurisdiction to grant an extension of time, the original stipulation of time having been fixed by the Court itself. Such an extension of time has to be considered in the interests of justice balancing both the need for expeditious conclusion of the enquiry in the interest of fairness and an honest administration. In an appropriate case, it would be open to the Court to extend time suo motu in order to ensure that a serious detriment to the public interest. The court has sufficient powers to grant an extension of time both before and after the period stipulated by the court has come to an end." (emphasis added) 22. In the light of aforesaid Full Bench judgment, it was incumbent upon Tribunal to examine whether delay occurred in passing final order was for justified reason or for the reasons beyond control of competent authority and whether such delay deserves to be condoned or not. In the light of aforesaid Full Bench judgment, it was incumbent upon Tribunal to examine whether delay occurred in passing final order was for justified reason or for the reasons beyond control of competent authority and whether such delay deserves to be condoned or not. Having failed to consider this aspect of the matter and declaring punishment order illegal and without jurisdiction, only on account of delay, in our view, Tribunal has clearly erred in law and the view taken by Tribunal on this aspect is patently illegal and cannot be sustained. 23. Moreover as we have already said that Tribunal has misread judgment dated 12.02.2009, which nowhere prescribed only three months time, but that time was preferable, therefore disposal or conclusion of inquiry even beyond three months was implicit in the direction and stress was that the proceedings must be concluded expeditiously. Therefore, application of three months period as a rule of thumb by Tribunal, in the present case, is clearly erroneous and illegal. 24. Now coming to second aspect of the matter, Tribunal has set aside order of punishment on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice for the reason that additional documents at serial nos. 3, 5 6 and 9 were not supplied to the respondent-employee. Discussion of Tribunal is contained in para 22, 23, of impugned judgment. We find that in para 22 of Judgment, Tribunal has clearly mentioned details of additional documents and the relevance with reference to Article / charge. A bare perusal thereof shows that one document was in respect of charge no. 1 and three documents in respect of charge no. 3. As we have already shown and record also fortifies that charge-1 has not been found proved and this finding of Inquiry Officer has been accepted by disciplinary authority as well as Commission. Respondent-1 has not been punished on charge no. 1. Charge 2 has been found proved and none of the four additional documents have any relevance or connection with charge no. 2. Part of charge no. 3 relating to case no. 1018 of 2002 has not been found proved at all. Additional documents at serial no. 9 clearly relate to that part of charge no. 3 which was in relation to case no. 1018 of 2002. This part of charge having not been found proved, even non supply of additional documents at serial no. 3 relating to case no. 1018 of 2002 has not been found proved at all. Additional documents at serial no. 9 clearly relate to that part of charge no. 3 which was in relation to case no. 1018 of 2002. This part of charge having not been found proved, even non supply of additional documents at serial no. 9 also is of no consequence. Additional documents at item no. 5 and 6 relate to O.A. No. 1422 of 2005, alleging that Senior Standing Counsel of Tribunal, Saumitra Singh had allotted case to Anil Kumar Twivedi, Additional Standing Counsel but Respondent-1 sent matter to Saurabh Srivastava, Additional Standing Counsel, changing counsel on his own. Presenting Officer in respect of aforesaid documents said that they were not available in the office of S.P.O. Jaunpur. It has not been found by Tribunal that documents were available but deliberately not supplied to Respondent-1. Further Respondent-1 was found to have allotted the case himself to another counsel though cases are allotted to different counsels by Senior Standing Counsel and respondent-1 did not place any evidence to show that he got the case conducted through Saurabh Srivastava since it was allotted to him by Senior Standing Counsel. Thus the factum that Respondent-1 allotted the case to a different counsel who was not authorized by Senior Standing Counsel, was not disputed by Respondent-1 himself and that being so, mere non production of documents at Serial No. 5 and 6 cannot be said to have any illegal consequences since fact of allotment of case by Respondent-1 to a different counsel than the one who was authorized by Senior Counsel was not in dispute. In fact Respondent-1 had the onus to prove that he was justified in allotting case to Saurabh Srivastava, Additional Standing Counsel though Senior Standing Counsel of Tribunal allotted the case to Anil Kumar Twivedi, Additional Standing Counsel. The burden was to be discharged by Respondent-1 since allotment to a counsel not authorized by Senior Standing Counsel was in fact not disputed by him. The Tribunal unfortunately has not taken into consideration, the aforesaid aspect and therefore has erred in law. 25. Moreover non supply of documents by itself cannot vitiate departmental proceedings which has been otherwise conducted validly, unless it is shown that some prejudice has been caused to delinquent employee. On this aspect, we find that judgment of Tribunal is totally silent. The Tribunal unfortunately has not taken into consideration, the aforesaid aspect and therefore has erred in law. 25. Moreover non supply of documents by itself cannot vitiate departmental proceedings which has been otherwise conducted validly, unless it is shown that some prejudice has been caused to delinquent employee. On this aspect, we find that judgment of Tribunal is totally silent. In our view, on the question of non supply of additional documents and its impact upon punishment order, approach of Tribunal is patently erroneous and illegal, hence, impugned judgment cannot sustain. 26. Looking to the entire facts and circumstances, it cannot be said that there was any unjustified delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings particularly when disciplinary authority had sought opinion of Commission also. In the entirety of facts and circumstances, we find that Tribunal has committed manifest error of law in interfering with the order of punishment and appeal. 27. Now coming to next aspect, whereby Tribunal has set aside order of suspension dated 28.03.2006, we find that the said order of suspension was already revoked by CPMG vide order dated 11.07.2006. This fact was mentioned by respondent-1 himself in para 4.5 of O.A. which reads as under:- "4.5 That the Chief Post Master General, U.P. Circle, Lucknow revoked the suspension of the applicant on 11.07.2006 with immediate effect under rule 10(5)(c) of C.C.S. (C.C.A.) Rules, 1965. Copy of the order of revocation of suspension dated 11.07.2006 is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No. A-3 to this Original Application in Compilation No. 2." 28. When order of suspension stood already revoked and was not in existence at the time when O.A. was filed before Tribunal, we find no logic as to why Tribunal issued the aforesaid directions. Revocation order dated 11.07.2006 had attained finality. The order of Tribunal to this effect also cannot be sustained. 29. In the result, writ petition is allowed. Impugned order passed by Tribunal dated 10.07.2015 is set aside. The matter is remanded to Tribunal to treat Original Application No.456 of 2007 as restored and pending. Tribunal shall decide the same afresh expeditiously and in the light of observations made above in accordance with law.