JUDGMENT : 1. By way of this appeal, the appellant has assailed the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge whereby learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition preferred by the respondent being writ petition No.1105/85. 2. The facts of the case are that the dispute pertains to the land bearing khasra no.1, 683, 688, 686, 685, 684 (well) and 687 (well) sitauted at Village Gatore, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur (Raj.) which was admittedly the ‘Mafi’ land and never remained recorded as Khud Kasht land of Bhenru S/o Birda and Bhenru S/o Govinda. This fact is also not at all disputed that Sonia and his family members were having long possession over the said mafi land rather this fact is admitted by the respondents/defendants in their pleadings/statement. 2.1 On 22.8.1955, a suit for declaration and injunction was filed by Sonia before the Assistant Collector for the cause of action of the dated 4.8.1955 as the defendants tried to dispossess him from the land in dispute by mentioning the fact that he and his family members are cultivating the land since last 40-45 years. The written statement was filed and it is contended that the land bearing khasra no.1, 683 & 688 belongs to Bhenur S/o Birda whereas the land of khasra number 686, 685, 684 (well), 687 belongs to Bhenru S/o Govind and contended that the land was mortgaged to one Shivnath and Shivnath handed over the said land for five years in Samvat 2007 to Sonia and others and the same was returned by Sonia and his family members to Shivnath in the Samvat year 2012. 2.2 On 31.3.1987, the Assistant Collector dismissed the suit by recording such facts which are against the record that the plaintiff is merely tenant of the mortgagee and he failed to plead that he acquired the khatedari rights. On 28.12.1982, the Board of revenue partly allowed the appeal by taking note of the fact that (1) the disputed land is the mafi land and was not the khud kasht land of the defendants. On 28.12.1982, the Board of revenue partly allowed the appeal by taking note of the fact that (1) the disputed land is the mafi land and was not the khud kasht land of the defendants. Mafi was resumed and there is an admission of the defendant that the compensation against the said resumption was received by the mafidar, (2) plaintiff was mortgagee’s tenant and acquired the khatedari rights u/s 8 of Jaipur Tenancy Act, 1945 so far as the land of khasra number 686 and 688 is concerned, (3) in Samvat 2012, the plaintiff Sonia was recorded in possession. So far as the land of khasra no.1 is concerned, since Sonia and Bhinva were found in possession but Bhinva has not filed the suit as such no decree was passed so far as with regard to the land of khasra no.1 is concerned and so far as the land of khasra no.683, 684 and 685 is concerned, the findings of the learned Board was that the said land was let out by Shivnath, the mortgagee, to Chandra and not to the plaintiff, therefore, the claim of the plaintiff was rejected. 3. Counsel for the appellant has contended that learned Single Judge has committed serious error in allowing the writ petition inasmuch as Board of Revenue while considering the matter of the present appellant has considered the case rightly after appreciating the facts and taking into consideration the evidence on record and held in favour of the present appellant. 4. Counsel for the appellant has also contended that they were claiming through Sonia who was found to be a tenant of the mortgaged property however counsel for the respondent has relied upon the order passed by the Assistant Collector and Revenue Appellate Authority and contended that learned Single Judge has rightly allowed the writ petition relying on decisions of Supreme Court holding as under:- No amount of evidence can be looked into in the absence of any pleading to set up any right in the land. A party is expected and is bound to prove the case as alleged by him and as covered by the issues framed. This is in accordance with principle that a party can only succeed according to what was alleged and proved. He will not be allowed to succeed in a case not set up by him. A party is expected and is bound to prove the case as alleged by him and as covered by the issues framed. This is in accordance with principle that a party can only succeed according to what was alleged and proved. He will not be allowed to succeed in a case not set up by him. In this connection, reference may be made to some decisions. In Sidik Mahomed Shah vs. Mt. Saran and ors. AIR 1930 Privy Council 57 (1) the Board approved that:- “Where a claim has been never made in the deference presented no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward.” In Sheodhari Rai and ors. vs. Prasad Singh and ors. AIR 1954 SC 758 , the Apex Court opined the following principle:- Where the defendant in his written statement sets up title to the disputed lands as the nearest reversioner, the Court cannot, on failure of the defendant to prove his case, make out a new case for him which is not only made in the written statement but which is wholly inconsistent with the title set up by the defendant, namely, that the defendant was holding under a shikmi settlement from the nearest reversioner. In Moran Mar Basselios Catholics vs. Thukalan Paulo Avira and ors. AIR 1959 SC 31 , the Court held that:- On the pleadings as they stand and on the issues as they have been framed, it is now impossible to permit the plaintiff-respondent to go outside the pleading and set up a new case that the supermacy of the Patriarch has been taken away by the mere fact of the adoption of the new constitution (Ex. A.M.) or by any particular clause thereof other than those relating to matters specifically referred to in the pleadings. The issues cannot be permitted to be stretched to cover matters which are not, on a reasonable construction, within the pleading on which they were rounded. In the Central Bank of India vs. Hair Prasad Jalan and ors. AIR 1972 SC 1274 the Court observed that:- We are unable to comprehend how the High Court, in the absence of any plea or issue, examined the question whether the goods of the value of Rs.1,04,840/- which are stated to have been damaged by floods remained with the Bank and were not delivered to the defendants. AIR 1972 SC 1274 the Court observed that:- We are unable to comprehend how the High Court, in the absence of any plea or issue, examined the question whether the goods of the value of Rs.1,04,840/- which are stated to have been damaged by floods remained with the Bank and were not delivered to the defendants. While plaintiff has failed to prove the case set up by him in his plaint. He did not, after written statement, either amend the plaint or file a rejoinder to set up a plea of becoming a tenant of mortgagee as against the plea of the defendant that he was let in the lands as a Ijaredar of mortgagee, nor any issue was joined whether plaintiff became a tenant (as distinguished from ijaredar) of mortgagee Shivnath Karol and consequently became khatedar on commencement of Rajasthan Tenancy Act. Therefore, no claim could be decreed on that basis. The contention that remains is that notwithstanding an alternative case was not set by plaintiff, still the same can be decreed if defendant admits facts on the basis of which relief on alternative ground can be granted even if relief on such alternative ground is not claimed by the plaintiff. This is on the principle that facts admitted by the defendants are not required to be proved by leading evidence. In this connection reference may be made to the principle approved by the Supreme Court in Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar vs. Mahabir Prasad and ors. AIR 1951 SC 177 wherein a suit for specific performance of a contract, in part performance of which the plaintiff alleged to have paid some money to the defendant, the defendant had denied the existence of such contract by took the plea in defence that he took the plea in defence that he took the money as loan. The Apex Court held that on failure of plaintiff to prove contract, the court may still grant a decree for recovery of money on admission of defendant even tough no alternative claim was made by the plaintiff. The court said that:- The rule undoubtedly is that the Court cannot grant relief to the plaintiff on a case for which there was no foundation in the pleadings & which the other side was not called upon or had an opportunity to meet. The court said that:- The rule undoubtedly is that the Court cannot grant relief to the plaintiff on a case for which there was no foundation in the pleadings & which the other side was not called upon or had an opportunity to meet. But when the alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made, was not only admitted by the defendant in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plaintiff, a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes. A demand of the plaintiff based on the defendant’s own plea cannot possibly be regarded with surprise by the later and no question of adducing evidence on these facts would arise when they were expressly admittedly by the defendant in his pleading. The defendants in their written statement had pleaded that Govind father of Bhairu defendant no.2 had mortgaged khasra no.686 and 688 with Shivlal Karol. Said mortgagee had given the land as ‘ijara’ for five years to plaintiff. On expiry of five years of ijara’, plaintiff returned the land to mortgagee who in turn on redemption handed over the possession to defendant Bhairu. Contention was raised before the Board on the basis of these pleadings that because plaintiff was in possession of the land as a tenant of mortgagee, he became a tenant. A specific plea was also taken in written statement that the plaintiff was not in possession as on the date of filing of the suit, therefore, his suit for more declaration and injuction would not be maintainable without making any prayer for possession. It is in this context that the question of possession as on the date of filing of the suit also become relevant. It is to be noted that no such admission was made by defendant in present case that plaintiff was tenant of mortgagee. Nor the possession of defendant on the land was admitted. It is in this context that the question of possession as on the date of filing of the suit also become relevant. It is to be noted that no such admission was made by defendant in present case that plaintiff was tenant of mortgagee. Nor the possession of defendant on the land was admitted. Thus, there is no admission of such facts made by the defendants, to be raised, could be granted unless evidence was led to the effect that plaintiff was put in possession of land by mortgagee not as Ijaredar but as tenant and that though he was not proved, his possession over the land in question since before 1945 as pleaded by him to acquire tenancy right under Jaipur Tenancy Act, 1945 on its commencement, he entered the possession later on any other date as tenant of mortgagee of defendant and was still in possession of land on the date of filing of suit, so as to maintain a suit for declaration without claiming possession and acquire tenancy rights on commencement of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. In the absence of any such admission of the facts necessary to found relief on alternative claims merely on the basis of some facts, existence of other facts necessary to found such claim, cannot be assumed to exist without requirement of leading evidence to prove such fact on which alternative ground can be substantiated. Hence, the principle that no amount of evidence can be looked into without pleading and issue governs the case at hand. One of the principle for relying and acting on the admission contained in pleadings is such admissions cannot be dissected. For the purpose of acting upon it, such admissions are either to be accepted as a whole or be rejected as a whole. It is not open to accept only the part of admission made in pleadings and to reject other part of it. On that principle if the admitted case of the defendant is taken then it must be accepted that the plaintiff was induced as Ijaredar in respect of two khasras numbers in question by mortgagee Shivnath Karl and the possession was returned to Shiv Ram Karol on expiry of period of ijara by the ijaredar. The mortgagee then returned the possession of the land to defendant on redemption of mortgagee, and the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit land. The mortgagee then returned the possession of the land to defendant on redemption of mortgagee, and the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit land. There was prohibition under the Jaipur Tenancy Act as well as Rajasthan Tenancy Act to recognize the Ijaredar as a tenant, it was not in doubt or matter of contention. As an Ijaredar under both the Acts is assigned special meaning and contain specific provision to exclude an Ijaredar from the definition of tenant. Even otherwise on the basis of material available on record, the trial court opined that the plaintiff has not led any evidence whether the was inducted as a tenant by the mortgagee of the land in question nor there is any evidence on the basis of which the plaintiff could be considered to be in possession of any part of the land on the date of suit in respect of which he has claimed decree in his favour. The relevant date purpose was 9.8.1955 which fall in Samvat Year 2012. The learned trial Judge has referred to khasra Girdawari for Samvat year 2012 in which the cultivation is entered in the name of defendant no.2, the present petitioner. On appeal by the plaintiff, the Revenue Appellate Authority which is the final fact finding authority came to be positive conclusion that in Samvat Year 2012 and 2013 the cultivation was made by Ramsahai S/o Bheru (defendant no.2) and affirmed the finding of the trial court based on the record and as per the Commissioner’s report and as per statement of Mst. Nathi that the land in question was in cultivation of Ramsahai son of one of the defendants. In view of this conclusion, the finding of the trial court was affirmed that on the date of filing of the suit land. Therefore, he could not maintain the suit simplicitor for declaration of his title. As against this the Board of Revenue has upset this finding of fact by reasoning that Ex. B-8 and B-9, which are inspection reports, are not properly interpreted by the Lower Courts. It may be observed that the said inspection reports are not substantive place of evidence. It can be used for appreciating the evidence available on record. The Board of Revenue in second appeal is not to disturb findings of fact by itself reappreciating the evidence. B-8 and B-9, which are inspection reports, are not properly interpreted by the Lower Courts. It may be observed that the said inspection reports are not substantive place of evidence. It can be used for appreciating the evidence available on record. The Board of Revenue in second appeal is not to disturb findings of fact by itself reappreciating the evidence. The Board of Revenue its jurisdiction in reappreciating the evidence and substituting its own finding of fact without there being any ground made out which could vitiate the findings of fact recorded by courts below so as to lose their binding force on second appellate court. Apart from patenent misdirection about the finding reached by two courts below and reappreciating the evidence about the possession of plaintiff Sonia of khasras No.686 and 688, the finding recorded by the Board also does not reach the finding that the plaintiff was not in possession of the land in question upto the date of filing the suit. The material on which reliance is placed by the Board of Revenue is of khasra Girdawari of 2011, which is not relevant to reach a finding about possession of land in question in Samvat 2012 was on record and relied on by the two courts below which has been totally ignored by the Board. Thus, perusal of the record of a date of prior to relevant date by ignoring the record relating to relevant date on the finding of Board stand vitiated and cannot bind this Court. In fact in the facts and circumstances, noticed above the Board fell in an apparent error by augmenting itself the jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence in second appeal when the finding of two court below did not stand vitiated giving rise to a question of law, which alone could enable the Board in second appeal to reach a finding of fact of its own different form the one reached by court below. The relevant day is the date of filing of the suit to which finding about possession of the plaintiff was required to be reached. The possession of plaintiff of any prior date is irrelevant when the evidence about possession on the date of suit was positively against plaintiff and which was relied on by both the courts below. For this reason also, the decree passed by the Board cannot be sustained. The possession of plaintiff of any prior date is irrelevant when the evidence about possession on the date of suit was positively against plaintiff and which was relied on by both the courts below. For this reason also, the decree passed by the Board cannot be sustained. In the aforesaid circumstances, the judgment of the Board of Revenue suffers from manifest errors apparent on the face of the record and cannot be sustained in respect of khasra no.686 & 688. 5. We have heard counsel for the parties. 6. It is very clear that there is nothing on record where it has been proved by the present appellants that they were in possession of the land in dispute on the cut off date in 2012. 7. The learned Single Judge while considering the matter has appreciated the question of fact and law and also power of Board of Revenue and held that the Board of Revenue has committed serious error in reversing the view arrived at by the first two authorities, when it has specifically held that mortgage was written after 5 years. Thus, the contention of the present appellants that without amending the original prayer clause, the suit is not maintainable, is not accepted. 8. The contention of the Jagir land, in our considered opinion, when the same was not raised at initial stage of the proceedings, it will not be appropriate even for the Board of Revenue to allow such contention at second appellate stage so that other side will not get a chance to rebut the same. Hence, even that contention cannot be allowed to raise at this belated stage. 9. The appeal being devoid of merit is hereby dismissed.