ORDER : The petitioner / accused has filed this Revision Petition challenging the judgment and order dated 17.12.2005 passed in C.C. No.49/2004 on the file of the Court of Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.) and J.M.F.C., Sandur and the judgment and order dated 04.01.2011 passed in Crl. A. o.115/2005 by the Court of II Additional Sessions Judge, Bellary. 2. The trial Court by the aforestated judgment and order, convicted the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of I.P.C. and acquitted him of the offences punishable under Sections 337 and 338 of I.P.C. and 187 of I.M.V. Act. The appeal preferred by the accused against the conviction and sentence passed by the trial court was confirmed by the Lower Appellate Court. 3. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned H.C.G.P. appearing for the respondent – State. 4. It is the case of the prosecution that on 28.09.2003 at about 10.30 a.m. within the limits of Sandur Police Station, the accused being the driver of lorry bearing Reg. No.GA-01/U-3249 drove it in a rash and negligent manner endangering human life and safety of others and near Bhujanga Nagar, on account of the rash and negligent driving by the accused, the lorry capsized and fell into the ditch situated by the side of the road. The inmates of the lorry i.e., C.Ws.1, 4 to 6 sustained simple injuries and C.W.14 sustained grievous injuries. Further one of the labourer, namely, Annappa, who was traveling in the said lorry succumbed to the injuries. It is the further case of the prosecution that the accused left the place of incident without intimating the information of accident to the nearest police station. 5. The plea of the accused was recorded by the trial Court for the offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A of I.P.C. read with Section 187 of I.M.V. Act. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to the tried. The prosecution got examined P.Ws.1 to 12 and got marked Exs.P-1 to P-6. 6. The trial Court after considering the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution found the accused guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of I.P.C. and passed sentence as under : i. For the offence punishable under Section 279 of I.P.C., the accused was sentenced to pay fine of Rs.1,000/-; ii. 6. The trial Court after considering the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution found the accused guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of I.P.C. and passed sentence as under : i. For the offence punishable under Section 279 of I.P.C., the accused was sentenced to pay fine of Rs.1,000/-; ii. For the offence punishable under Section 304-A of I.P.C., the accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay fine of Rs.500/-and in default of payment of fine amount, the accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for two months. 7. The trial Court, however, acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 337 and 338 of I.P.C. and Section 187 of I.M.V. Act. As stated supra, the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal filed by the accused and confirmed the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court. 8. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that though the prosecution got examined P.Ws.1 and 3 to 9 as the eye-witnesses and though projected them as injured witnesses, however, the prosecution has failed to substantiate that they sustained injuries in the accident. The Doctor has not been examined and no wound certificates have been produced. Hence, the learned counsel contended that the said witnesses are neither the eye-witnesses nor the injured witnesses. It is further contended that the sketch does not indicate that the lorry in question had capsized. It is the contention of the learned counsel that the accident occurred on account of a person in the cabin falling on the driver and the driving losing control over the vehicle. He further submitted that there is nothing to show that the deceased fell down from the lorry and sustained injuries on account of the accident. On the other hand, he submits that he might have jumped from the lorry and sustained injuries. He submitted that both the Courts have failed to properly appreciate the oral and documentary evidence, and therefore, the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed against the accused is not in accordance with law. It is also submitted that the Courts below ought to have released the accused under the Probation of Offenders Act, considering the age of the accused. Accordingly, the learned counsel seeks to allow the petition. 9. It is also submitted that the Courts below ought to have released the accused under the Probation of Offenders Act, considering the age of the accused. Accordingly, the learned counsel seeks to allow the petition. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following citations in support of his contention : i. 2009(2) Criminal Court Cases 132 (S.C.) [Renu Kunta Mallaiah v. State of A.P.] ii. Copy of the order dated 20.09.2006 passed by this Court in Crl.R.P. No.724/2003 [J. John S/o. J. Joseph v. State of Karnataka] iii. Copy of the order dated 01.12.2011 passed by this Court in Crl.R.P. No.2208/2009 [N. Venkatesh v. The State of Karnataka] iv. Copy of the order dated 09.04.2009 passed by this Court in Crl.R.P. No.1018/2005 [Muttu @ Peerappa v. State of Karnataka] 10. On the other hand, the learned H.C.G.P. contended that both the Courts have concurrently held that the accused is guilty of the offences for which he has been convicted and there is no illegality in the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below. He submits that P.W.1 and 3 to 9 are the injured witnesses. Though the wound certificates are not produced, however, they have supported the case of the prosecution and there is nothing elicited in the cross-examination so as to disbelieve their evidence. He further submits that P.O. Act is not applicable in a case of this nature and relied upon a judgment reported in ILR 1993 KAR 782 in the case of Gangoji Rao Salanke v. State, and seeks to dismiss the petition. 11. It is the case of the prosecution that on 28.09.2003 at about 10.30 a.m. the accused being the driver of lorry bearing Reg. No.GA-01/U-3249 drove it in a rash and negligent manner endangering human life and safety of others and near Bhujanagar, on account of the rash and negligent driving by the accused, the lorry fell into a ditch by the side of the road and inmates of the lorry sustained injuries and one of the labourers succumbed to the injuries sustained by him. 12. The prosecution has examined P.Ws.1 and 3 to 9 who are stated to be traveling in the said lorry. All the said witnesses have supported the case of prosecution and they have deposed that at the time of accident the lorry was being driven in a high speed. 12. The prosecution has examined P.Ws.1 and 3 to 9 who are stated to be traveling in the said lorry. All the said witnesses have supported the case of prosecution and they have deposed that at the time of accident the lorry was being driven in a high speed. The fact that the accused was driving the said lorry is not disputed. It is also borne out from the record that on account of the said accident a person by name Annappa sustained injuries and later succumbed to the injuries. 13. It is relevant to see that at the time of accident, there were 7 to 8 persons sitting in the cabin of the lorry. The defence itself had suggested to PW-3 that only 2 persons can sit in the said cabin. However, it is the contention of the defence that those 7 to 8 girls requested the driver and they forcibly sat in the cabin and travelled in the lorry. When it is the case of the defence that only two persons can sit in the cabin, in spite of that the driver of the lorry has allowed 7 to 8 girls to sit in the cabin. From the material on record it cannot be said that the accident occurred on account of one of the passengers falling on the driver and the driver losing control. On the other hand, it is established that on account of the accident, the girls travelling in the cabin, lost control and fell on the driver. There are no contradictions or infirmities in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the Courts below having appreciated the oral and documentary evidence and after giving reasons passed the impugned judgment. 14. The judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Renu Kunta Mallaiah v. State of A.P. reported in 2009(2) Criminal Court Cases 132 (S.C.), is not applicable to the present case, as in the said case, the facts are entirely different and the Hon’ble Apex Court, considering the unsatisfactory nature of evidence in the said case, held that the prosecution has failed to establish the accusations against the accused. 15. 15. Relying on the judgments rendered by this Court in Criminal Revision Petition No.724 of 2003 disposed off on 20th September 2006 and Criminal Revision Petition No.1018 of 2005 disposed off on 9th April 2009, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the present case, the accused was aged about 20 years at the time of accident and therefore, benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, may be given. He further submitted placing reliance on the order passed by this Court in Criminal Revision Petition No.2208 of 2009 disposed off on 1st December 2011 that the sentence imposed under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code be modified into one of fine and compensation may be awarded. This Court in the case of GANGOJI RAO SALANKE v. State reported in I.L.R 1993 KAR 782 at paragraph 9 has held as under: “9. There is no law which lays down that the provisions of the Act cannot be made applicable to the case of an accused convicted for an offence punishable under Section 304-A I.P.C. Section 4 of the Act applies to all the offences except the offences punishable with imprisonment for life or death. The offence under Section 304-A I.P.C. is punishable in maximum with 2 years imprisonment or fine. Therefore, the provisions of the Act can be made applicable even to a person who is convicted of an offence punishable under Section 304-A I.P.C. Whether the benefit of the Act should be given to an accused convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-A I.P.C. will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In the case reported in Aitha Chander Rao vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, the benefit of the Act was given to the accused in that case as there was finding that there was some amount of contributory negligence on the part of the victim and the peculiar circumstances of the case.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of DALBIR SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA reported in (2000) 5 Supreme Court cases 82, while dealing with the case of rash and negligent driving, held at para 11 as under: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on Section 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under Section 304-A IPC, that road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent and the toll is galloping day by day in India, and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarter to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that “more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country”, the saturation of accidents toll was not even half of what it is today. So V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision thus: “Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under Section 304-A IPC and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy duty vehicles and of speeding menaces.” and at para 13 it is held as under: “13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences visiting the victims and their families, criminal courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that a rash driving need not necessarily cause any accident; or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being; or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence; and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence for causing death of a human being due to his callous driving of the vehicle he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the courts can play, particularly at the level of trial courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to callous driving of automobiles.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ANTI CORRUPTION BRANCH, CHANDIGARH V. SANJIV BHALLA AND ANOTHER reported in (2015) 13 SUPREME COURT CASES 444, at paragraph 22 has held as under: “22. It does appear that depending upon the facts of each case, causing death by what appears (but is not) to be a rash or negligent act may amount to an offence punishable under Part II of Section 304 IPC, not warranting the release of the convict under probation. There may also be situations where an offence is punishable under Section 304-A IPC in an accident “where mens rea remains absent” and refusal to release a convict on probation in such a case may be too harsh and approach to take. An absolute principle of law cannot be laid down that in no case falling under Section 304-A IPC should a convict be released on probation. This is certainly not to say that in all cases falling under Section 304-A IPC, the convict must be released on probation-it is only that the principles laid down in Sections 360 and 361 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Probation of Offenders Act should not be disregarded but should be followed and an appropriate decision, depending on the facts of the case, be taken in each case.” Keeping in mind the principle laid down in the aforesaid decisions and also carefully examining the findings recorded by both the Courts below and the material on record, I do not see any justifiable reason, in the instant case, to apply the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act or to reduce the sentence into one of fine. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the sentence imposed by the learned Civil Judge(Junior Division), JMFC, Sandur, in C.C. No.49 of 2004 confirmed by the learned II Additional Sessions Judge, Bellary in Crl.A. No.115 of 2005, is in accordance with law and cannot be said to be harsh. Accordingly, I pass the following order: The Revision Petition is dismissed.