JUDGMENT C. L. SONI, J. 1. The appeal is filed under Order XLIII of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ('CPC') against the order dated 12.5.2018 passed by learned 14th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vadodara below application Exh.5 in Special Civil Suit No.569 of 2014. The appellants are the original defendant No.1 and defendant Nos.45 to 47 respectively in the above suit. The respondents no.1 to 6 are the original plaintiffs and the other respondents are the defendants in the suit. The parties shall be referred as per their original status in the suit. 2. The above suit (to be referred as 'the present suit') is filed for declaration that two sale deeds executed on 9.1.2014 by the defendant Nos.2 to 44 in favour of the defendant No.1 for the suit lands are null and void; that whatever documents/ agreements/ power of attorneys and any other writing done by the defendants in collusion with each other since not binding to the plaintiffs are null and void; that the defendants have no right or authority to make any construction or change in the suit lands or to transfer the suit lands to third party or to create any third party interest therein. The plaintiffs have also asked for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from making any construction on the suit lands or changing site situation of the suit lands by earmarking the plots in connection with the scheme known as 'Vallabh Villa' and 'Sumeru Duplex' proposed in the suit lands or from transferring in any manner the suit lands or creating any third party interest by making new writings/ new documents or from doing any activity for development in the suit lands. 3. The case of the plaintiffs in the present suit is that the defendant Nos.10 to 17, 24, 27, 30, 44 and other land owners executed Banakhat (agreement to sell) ( to be referred as 'the agreement ') on 14.08.1997 in their favour for sale of the suit lands and received Rs. 3. The case of the plaintiffs in the present suit is that the defendant Nos.10 to 17, 24, 27, 30, 44 and other land owners executed Banakhat (agreement to sell) ( to be referred as 'the agreement ') on 14.08.1997 in their favour for sale of the suit lands and received Rs. 2,00, 000/ from them; that since the suit lands were new tenure, it was decided to take necessary permission from Government and time of four years was fixed for payment of remaining consideration and during this time necessary permissions were to be taken; that in 1999 the Urban land Ceiling Act (the ULC Act) was repealed but even after repeal of ULC Act, the defendants accepted more amounts and thereby confirmed the agreement to sell; that the plaintiffs came to know that the defendants no.2 to 44 were trying to sell the suit lands to third parties though the plaintiffs were ready and willing to get the sale deeds executed in their favour and therefore to prevent the defendants no.2 to 44 from doing so and to get the sale deed executed for the suit lands, the plaintiffs filed Special Civil suit No.688 of 2013 (to be referred as 'the first suit'); that though the defendants knew that such suit was pending, two sale deeds came to be executed by the defendants no.2 to 44 in favour of the defendant no.1 for the suit lands wherein residential scheme named 'Vallabh Vila' and 'Sumeru Duplex' is proposed, but the sale deeds are not binding to the plaintiffs and the defendants no.1, 45 to 47 have no right to make construction of the scheme on the suit lands and therefore the present suit is filed. 4. In the present suit, the plaintiffs filed application Exh.5 seeking interim injunction similar to the permanent injunction prayed in the suit. By the impugned order, learned Judge has partly allowed the application Exh.5 and ordered the defendant Nos.45 to 47 to produce with affidavit the copies of sale deeds made for 'Sumeru Duplex' and 'Vallabh Villa' (to be referred as 'the residential scheme') till the date of the impugned order and also ordered the defendants of the present suit to maintain status-quo as regards ownership and possession of the houses which are not sold till the date of the impugned order. 5. 5. The plaintiffs no.1 to 5 of the present suit filed first suit for specific performance of contract on the basis of the agreement, wherein they filed application Exh.5 seeking interim injunction similar to the interim injunction prayed in application Exh.5 filed in the present suit. However, the same remained pending till the application Exh.5 filed in the present suit was decided, and was then disposed of as infructuous on the same day when the impugned order was made below application Exh.5 in present suit. 6. Learned senior advocate Mr. Anshin Desai appearing with learned advocate Ms. Venu Nanavaty for the appellants submitted that learned Judge has taken strange approach of granting of equitable relief by deciding the application Exh.5 in the present suit, where there is no prayer made for specific performance of the contract and by declaring the that the application exh.5 in the first suit has become infructuous. Mr. Desai submitted that without any clear conclusion reached as regards prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss and ignoring the conduct of the plaintiffs, learned judge decided to grant equitable relief to the plaintiffs in the present suit where no relief for specific performance is prayed. Mr. Desai submitted that the alleged agreement was in fact not the agreement to sell (Banakhat), but it was an agreement to do all acts for getting the scheme under section 21 of the ULC Act sanctioned and for implementing the scheme and such scheme was to be executed/ implemented on behalf of the original owners for the benefit of the persons belonging to the weaker section of the society in consonance with the guidelines/ conditions to be observed pursuant to sanction of the scheme, and therefore, it would not create any right or interest in favour of the plaintiff Nos.1 to 5 to ask for the relief of specific performance of the contract. Mr. Desai submitted that as clearly mentioned in the alleged agreement, four years' time limit was provided for completion of the scheme, however the scheme has never seen light of the day. Mr. Mr. Desai submitted that as clearly mentioned in the alleged agreement, four years' time limit was provided for completion of the scheme, however the scheme has never seen light of the day. Mr. Desai submitted that even if the alleged agreement is considered as agreement to sell (Banakhat), the first suit for specific performance of the contract was hopelessly barred by limitation as it was filed after long period of about 16 years, and such time barred suit when the plaintiffs would not be entitled to specific performance of the contract and interim injunction, there was no question of grant of any equitable relief in the present suit where the prayers are only to challenge the sale deeds executed in favour of the appellant No.1. Mr. Desai submitted that the alleged agreement does not appear to be executed by all owners of the suit lands and for such agreement, the plaintiffs could not be given any relief. 7. Mr. Desai submitted that the plaintiff No.6 in the present suit named Hinaben is not the plaintiff in the first suit. He submitted that no details are given either in the first suit or in the present suit as to how the plaintiff No.6 acquired any interest in connection with the agreement. Mr. Desai also submitted that before impugned order was made, the scheme was fully developed with 141 residential units and all residence units except only 10 units and the details of sale deeds for the units sold are already provided to the Court. Mr. Desai submitted that learned Judge has not dealt with the important aspects as regards the nature of the agreement, the rights acquired by the appellants in the suit land, the delay and laches on the part of the plaintiffs, and granted interim injunction contrary to the settled principles for grant of equitable relief and by misdirecting himself on the pleadings and on the material on record and therefore the Court may quash the impugned order in exercise of the powers under Order XLIII of the CPC. 8. Learned Senior advocate Mr. Mihir Thakore appearing with learned advocate Mr. Salil Thakore for the respondents submitted that if the agreement is read in its entirety, it is an agreement to sell for the suit land. 8. Learned Senior advocate Mr. Mihir Thakore appearing with learned advocate Mr. Salil Thakore for the respondents submitted that if the agreement is read in its entirety, it is an agreement to sell for the suit land. He submitted that though as per the agreement, the plaintiffs paid amount of consideration, however the owners of the suit lands went on demanding more money, which the plaintiff paid in a hope that the owners will execute the sale deeds in their favour. Mr.Thakore submitted that acceptance of different amounts by cheques on different dates, details of which are given in the plaint, would go to show that the transactions between the plaintiffs and the original owners continued and in such facts situation, time was never intended to be considered as essence of the contract and therefore the plaintiffs would not be denied relief for specific performance of contract on the ground of delay and laches. Mr. Thakore submitted that when the plaintiffs came to know that original owners asked for permission for conversion of the suit lands from new tenure to old tenure to sell the suit lands to the defendant no.1 and such permission was granted by the Collector, the plaintiffs immediately challenged the orders of the Collector by filing Revision Applications before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, wherein the Tribunal granted interim stay which was confirmed by rejecting the applications for vacating stay filed by the defendant no.1, 45 to 47. Mr. Thakore submitted that since the Tribunal has granted stay against the orders of the collector, the sale in favour of the defendant no.1 would not remain valid and though the sale of the suit lands in favour of the defendant no.1 was invalid, the defendants no.1, 45 to 47 proposed scheme for residence on the suit lands and therefore the plaintiffs filed the present suit to get declaration that the sale deeds are invalid and the defendants have no rights to make any scheme on the suit lands and in filing present suit since there was no delay and since learned Judge found that the plaintiffs have made out prima facie case and that the balance of convenience was in favour of the plaintiffs committed no error in granting equitable relief and therefore this Court while exercising the powers under Order XLIII of the CPC may not interfere with the impugned order. 9. 9. The Court having heard learned advocates finds on perusal of the agreement dated 14.08.1997, titled as 'Banakhat', that there is a reference about the order dated 22.9.1987 passed by the competent authority in connection with the declaration Form filled by the original owners under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act. As stated in the agreement, the suit lands were amongst the lands mentioned in declaration Form filled in under the ULC Act and stated to be new tenure lands. As provided in the agreement, the plaintiff Nos.1 to 5 were to get the scheme sanctioned under Section 21 of the ULC Act and were responsible to implement the scheme as per the conditions of the scheme after getting the scheme sanctioned. There are other terms and conditions mentioned in the agreement to be complied by the plaintiff Nos.1 to 5 in connection with the scheme, if sanctioned by the concerned authority for the suit lands. 10. As stated in the plaint of the first suit, the plaintiff No.3 was given one power of attorney to do all acts in connection with the scheme under Section 21 of the ULC Act. On perusal of the power of attorney, it prima facie appears to the Court that the power of attorney was given to get the scheme sanctioned, to make constructions as per the conditions of the scheme and on completion of the construction as per the scheme, to execute the documents of sale as per the scheme and to do other ancillary acts. 11. Section 21 of the ULC Act reads as under:- 21. 11. Section 21 of the ULC Act reads as under:- 21. Excess vacant land not to be treated as excess in certain cases, (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, where a person holds any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and such person declares within such time, in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed before the competent authority that such land is to be utilised for the construction of dwelling units (each such dwelling unit having a plinth area not exceeding eighty square metres) for the accommodation of the weaker sections of the society, in accordance with any scheme approved by such authority as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf, then, the competent authority may, after making such inquiry as it deems fit, declare such land not to be excess land for the purposes of this Chapter and permit such person to continue to hold such land for the aforesaid purpose, subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed, including a condition as to the time limit within which such buildings are to be constructed. (2) Where any person contravenes any of the conditions subject to which the permission has been granted under sub-section (1), the competent authority shall, by order, and after giving such person an opportunity of being heard, declare such land to be excess land and thereupon all the provisions of this Chapter shall apply accordingly. 12. As could be seen from the above provisions of Section 21 of the ULC Act, if the person, who holds any vacant land in excess of ceiling limits, declares that such land shall be utilized for construction of dwelling units for accommodation of the weaker sections of the society, the competent authority may declare such land not to be excess and permit such person to continue to hold such land for aforesaid purpose with conditions as may be prescribed. Thus such person would continue to hold vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit subject to compliance of various conditions as part of the scheme sanctioned under Section 21 of the ULC Act. 13. Thus such person would continue to hold vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit subject to compliance of various conditions as part of the scheme sanctioned under Section 21 of the ULC Act. 13. From the contents of the agreement and the power of attorney, it prima facie appears to the Court that the agreement and the power of attorney given for the suit lands were primarily to get scheme sanctioned and implemented under Section 21 of the ULC Act where under the dwelling units would have been sold to the persons belonging to weaker section of the society and the plaintiffs would have earned some profit. In such context, observations from following judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court need to be referred at this stage: (1) In the case of Her Highness Maharani Shantidevi P. Gaikwad Vs. Savjibhai Haribhai Patel and Others, (2001) 5 SCC 101 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para 27 and 61 as under:- 27. The disputes between the parties arose before the scheme was sanctioned and the plaintiff was put into possession and the agreement and the power were terminated in terms of notice dated 23rd February, 1980 sent on behalf of original defendant No.1. At this stage the suit was filed. In the plaint, the plaintiff states that it is necessary for protection and preservation of his rights that defendant No.1 be restrained from parting with possession of the property. The first prayer of the plaintiff is that it may be declared that the Memorandum of agreement dated 24th March, 1977, the irrevocable power of attorney dated 24th March, 1977 and the affidavit-cum-declaration dated 10th February, 1978 are valid, subsisting and binding on the Defendant No.1. There is no prayer in the plaint seeking a mandatory injunction against the authorities directing them to sanction the scheme. It has not been and cannot be disputed that in the event of non-grant of the scheme by the authorities the agreement would have fallen through. Agreement does not contemplate that title in the land would pass on to the plaintiff. Further even the title in the superstructure, i.e., dwelling units to be constructed was to remain with the plaintiff only till such time the same is transferred by him in favour of the allottees or their society. Agreement does not contemplate that title in the land would pass on to the plaintiff. Further even the title in the superstructure, i.e., dwelling units to be constructed was to remain with the plaintiff only till such time the same is transferred by him in favour of the allottees or their society. It is not disputed that the plaintiff could not retain any dwelling unit for his own benefit. 61. It also deserves to be noticed that, strictly speaking, it is not a contract for transfer of the property but is a contract to carry out the scheme which is incapable of being carried out at this stage on account of reservation in the Master plan and also repeal of the ULC Act. It was not and cannot be the case of the plaintiff that in case the scheme had been carried out, he would have enjoyed the property. He would have only enjoyed the specified profits. At best the plaintiff could pray for damages. In the plaint, it was asserted that Rs. 16,75,000/- were spent on execution and/or implementation of the scheme. The plaintiff, for reasons best known to him, has not sought a decree for any damages, even as an alternate relief. (2) In the case of S. Vasudeva Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (1993) 3 SCC 467 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para 34 to 36 as under:- 34. Section 21 also contemplates exemption of the excess vacant land from the operation of the said Chapter but for a purpose other than for the use of the holder of the land. The purpose contemplated there is the construction of dwelling units of the plinth area of not more than 80 sq. mtrs. for accommodation of the weaker sections of the society and in accordance with a scheme approved by such authority as the State Government may specify in that behalf. The person desiring exemption under this Section has further to declare his intention for construction of such dwelling units for weaker sections within such time, in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed. Such declaration is to be made before the competent authority. The person desiring exemption under this Section has further to declare his intention for construction of such dwelling units for weaker sections within such time, in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed. Such declaration is to be made before the competent authority. The competent authority, after receiving such declaration may, after making such inquiry as it deems fit, declare such land not to be excess land for the purposes of the said Chapter and permit such person to continue to hold such land for the aforesaid purpose subject to 737 such terms and conditions as may be prescribed. Where any such condition is contravened, the competent authority has been given power to declare the land to be excess land and on such declaration, the, provisions of Chapter III of the Act are to apply. 35. The distinction between Section 20 and 21 may be noticed at this stage. In the first instance, the power given under Section 20 is to the State Government and not to the competent authority. The power given is to exempt the land, and the exemption is to be granted to a person. The purpose of exemption is either public interest or relief from personal undue hardship. It does not appear to be obligatory on the State Government to prescribe any conditions while granting the exemption. However, if any conditions are specified and if the State Government later satisfied that there is noncompliance of any of the conditions, the State Government is given power to withdraw the exemption. 36. As far as Section 21 is concerned, the power conferred by it is not to exempt the land but to declare it not to be excess for the purposes of Chapter III. The power is given to the competent authority itself. It is to be exercised by it only under one circumstance. That circumstance is that the holder of the vacant land should declare before it within a specified time and in the prescribed form and manner, that he desires to utilise the land for the construction of the dwelling units of not more than the particular size mentioned therein for accommodating the weaker sections and in accordance with any scheme approved by the specified authority. It is the competent authority which is required to make inquiry as it deems fit into such a declaration, and if it is satisfied, to declare that such land shall not be excess within the meaning of the said Chapter. However, it appears that the competent authority is required to prescribe certain terms and conditions while declaring the land not to be an excess land, including a condition with regard to the time limit within which such buildings are to be constructed, and on the breach of any of the conditions, the competent authority is also given power to declare the land to be an excess land. 14. Learned senior advocate Mr. Thakore however submitted that even after the repeal of the ULC Act, the original owners received different amounts at different times in connection with the agreement and therefore, the parties to the agreement clearly intended and have taken the agreement as an agreement to sell for the suit lands. 15. In the first suit filed for specific performance of the contract, the plaintiff Nos.1 to 5 have averred that the owners made frequent demands for payment of more amounts of consideration under the guise that there was rise in the price of the suit lands and in response to such demands, the plaintiff Nos.1 to 5 paid different amounts in cash, which comes to Rs. 21,59,266/-, between 2001 to 2007. The last payment of Rs. 20,000/- in cash is shown to have been made on 31.1.2007. There are other payments referred in the first suit by different cheques shown to have been made by Heenaben Patel- plaintiff No.6 of the present suit, wherein also last payment of Rs. 20,000/- is shown to have been made in the month of January 2007. Heenaben Patel- Plaintiff No.6 of the present suit is not the plaintiff in the first suit. No details are provided in the first suit as to how Heenaben Patel was connected with the agreement. Learned senior advocate Mr. Thakore however submitted that payment of consideration for the suit lands could have come from any source and from which source the amounts came was not the concern of the owners. No details are provided in the first suit as to how Heenaben Patel was connected with the agreement. Learned senior advocate Mr. Thakore however submitted that payment of consideration for the suit lands could have come from any source and from which source the amounts came was not the concern of the owners. However, the fact remains that the plaintiff no.6 of the present suit is not the plaintiff in the first suit and no material is produced on record of the first suit to connect the plaintiff No.6 with the agreement for the suit lands. 16. Learned Judge has focused on main issues concerning the main relief prayed in the first suit for specific performance of the contract. To arrive at conclusion whether the plaintiffs have prima facie case, balance of convenience in their favour and as regards the irreparable loss, learned Judge has observed that though the defendants had knowledge about the agreement executed in favour of the plaintiffs, they in collusion with each other got the sale deeds made for the suit lands just to defeat the rights of the plaintiffs under the agreement; that fight between the parties to the present suit may continue for long time and in such fight between the parties, innocent small purchasers may be trapped and may suffer and therefore interest of justice will be served if for remaining vacant houses, interim order of status quo is made. Learned judge has recorded that there is partly prima facie case and the balance of convenience is also partly in favour of the plaintiffs and the third parties purchasers. Learned judge has further recorded that if interim injunction is not granted, the plaintiffs and the purchasers are not likely to suffer such a loss which could not be compensated in terms of money. 17. Learned senior advocate Mr. Thakore however relied on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Wander Ltd. and Another Vs. Antox India P. Ltd., (1990) Supp1 SCC 727, to submit that the Court while considering the appeal under Order XLIII of the Code is not required to interfere with the order granting equitable relief, except where the order appears to be passed ignoring the principles of law and the view taken by learned Judge is not possible to be taken on prima facie assessment of the material on record. In the said case, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para 14 as under:- 14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the Appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by the court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the Trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph: ... These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osention & Co. v. Johnston the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case. The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle. 18. The Court finds that learned judge has not only taken perverse approach on the pleadings and material on record of the case but has decided to grant equitable relief contrary to the settled principles for granting equitable relief pending the suit. The first suit for specific performance of contract was filed after a period of about 16 years from the date of the agreement and after about six years from 31.01.2007 when the last payment was shown to have been made towards sale consideration. The first suit for specific performance of contract was filed after a period of about 16 years from the date of the agreement and after about six years from 31.01.2007 when the last payment was shown to have been made towards sale consideration. Pending the first suit, the appellant No.1 purchased the suit land on 9.1.2014. Though the appellant No.1 was joined as party in the first suit, the plaintiffs of the first suit did not press for the hearing of the injunction application and they rather decided to file the present suit challenging the sale deeds executed for the suit land in favour of the appellant No.1. Thus, the plaintiffs of the first suit rest contended with only joining the appellant No.1 as party defendant in the first suit. In the present suit, the interim injunction has come to be granted ignoring the conduct of the plaintiffs in allowing the defendant no1 and defendant no.45 to 47 to exclusively deal with the suit lands and to fully develop the suit lands. As stated above, only 10 units out of 141 residential units constructed in residential scheme remain to be sold and to protect the interest of third parties purchasers, the interim injunction is issued, though learned judge has recorded that the plaintiffs and the third parties are not likely to suffer loss which could not be compensated in terms of money. 19. As held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mandali Ranganna and Others Vs. T. Ramchandra and Others, (2008) 11 SCC 1 , while deciding the application for interim injunction, the Court is not only required to consider three basic principles for grant of equitable relief, i.e. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss, but is also required to consider the conduct of the parties to the suit. The person who had kept quiet for long time and allowed the other person to deal with the property exclusively would ordinarily not be entitled to grant of interim injunction. 20. Learned senior advocate Mr. Thakore however relied on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.), Faridkot Vs. Baldev Dass, (2005) AIR SC 104, especially the observations made in para 10 thereof, which read as under:- 10. Be that as it may, Mr. 20. Learned senior advocate Mr. Thakore however relied on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.), Faridkot Vs. Baldev Dass, (2005) AIR SC 104, especially the observations made in para 10 thereof, which read as under:- 10. Be that as it may, Mr. Sachhar is right in contending that unless and until a case of irreparable loss or damage is made out by a party to the suit, the Court should not permit the nature of the property being changed which also includes alienation or transfer of the property which may lead to loss or damage being caused to the party who may ultimately succeed and may further lead to multiplicity of proceedings. In the instant case no such case of irreparable loss is made out except contending that the legal proceedings are likely to take a long time, therefore, the respondent should be permitted to put the scheduled property to better use. We do not think in the facts and circumstances of this case, the lower appellate Court and the High Court were justified in permitting the respondent to change the nature of property by putting up construction as also by permitting the alienation of the property, whatever may be the condition on which the same is done. In the event of the appellant's claim being found baseless ultimately, it is always open to the respondent to claim damages, or, in an appropriate case, the Court may itself award damages for the loss suffered, if any, in this regard. Since the facts of this case do not make out any extraordinary ground for permitting the respondent to put up construction and alienate the same, we think both the Courts below, namely, the lower appellate Court and the High Court erred in making the impugned orders. The said orders are set aside and the order of the trial Court is restored. 21. The Court finds that the above observations will be of no help to the plaintiffs in the facts of the present case. 22. In the present suit, where no prayer is made for specific performance of the contract, learned judge has granted interim injunction, and the injunction application filed in the first suit is disposed of as infructuous on grant of interim injunction in the present suit. 22. In the present suit, where no prayer is made for specific performance of the contract, learned judge has granted interim injunction, and the injunction application filed in the first suit is disposed of as infructuous on grant of interim injunction in the present suit. Such interim injunction in the present suit is also for the benefit of the plaintiff no.6 who is not the plaintiff in the first suit. Whether to grant relief of specific performance is within the discretion of the Court and while exercising such discretion the Court may consider the aspect of delay and the conduct of the party asking for such relief. Learned judge has found that the plaintiffs and the third parties are not likely to suffer loss which could not be compensated in terms of money if injunction is not granted. As against such consideration, learned judge has failed to consider that the appellants who invested huge amount in purchase of the suit land and in making and completing the construction of the residential scheme on the suit lands, are likely to suffer irreparable loss if the interim injunction is granted. The Court, therefore, finds that the impugned order needs to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of the powers under Order XLIII of the CPC. 23. For the reasons stated above, the impugned order is quashed and set aside. The appeal stands finally disposed of. 24. Since the appeal is disposed of, the Civil Application shall not survive and hence it is disposed of accordingly.