JUDGMENT : SUMAN SHYAM, J. 1. Heard Mr. S.K. Ghosh, learned counsel for the appellant. I have also heard Mr. D. Mazumder, learned Sr. counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 2. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 11-05-2007 passed by the court of Civil Judge, Dhubri in Title Appeal No. 06/2004 dismissing the appeal filed by the appellants and affirming the judgment and decree dated 24-12-2003 passed by the court of Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) No. 1, Dhubri in Title Suit No. 27/1998 dismissing the suit of the appellants/plaintiffs. The second appeal was admitted to final hearing by framing the following substantial questions of law: "Whether the learned Courts below erred in law in dismissing the suit of the appellants/ plaintiffs holding the respondent/ defendant to be a non-evictable occupancy tenant under them?" 3. The plaintiffs case, as projected in the plaint, is that they are the owners of a homestead land measuring 1B-3K-19L covered by Dag No. 361 of Khatian No. 283, of village- Mancachar Part- I under Mancachar Circle, which land has been described in Schedule-A to the plaint. According to the plaintiffs, taking advantage of their absence, the defendant had illegally entered into the Schedule-A land and dispossessed the plaintiffs there-from in the early part of April, 1997. The portion of land in respect of which, the plaintiffs have been dispossessed, has been described in Schedule-B to the plaint which land forms part of Schedule-A land. On the basis of such allegation, the plaintiffs had instituted Title Suit No. 27/1998 with a prayer for declaration of their right, title and interest over the B-Schedule land and also for recovery of khas possession of the said land by evicting the defendant. 4. The respondent/defendant had contested the suit primarily taking the plea that he is tenant under the plaintiff and therefore, he could not be evicted since he enjoys the protection of law. According to the defendant he has been in occupation of the suit land since past 35 years and has a Rayati Khatian in respect of land measuring 1K-19L including Schedule-B land. 5. Based on the pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial Court had framed the following issues: 1. Whether the defendant acquired Riyati Status under the plaintiff in respect of the suit land? 2. Whether the defendant is evictable? 3. 5. Based on the pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial Court had framed the following issues: 1. Whether the defendant acquired Riyati Status under the plaintiff in respect of the suit land? 2. Whether the defendant is evictable? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitles to get any relief? 4. Is this suit not properly valued? 6. During trial both parties had adduced evidence in support of their respective cases. Taking note of the evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court came to the conclusion that the respondent/ defendant was a non-evictable tenant and therefore, no decree for declaration of title and recovery of khas possession in respect of the suit land could be granted in favour of the plaintiffs. Consequently, the suit of the plaintiff stood dismissed. The Title Appeal No. 06/2004 preferred by the plaintiffs as appellants assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 24-12-2003 passed in Title Suit No. 27/1998, was also dismissed by the lower appellate court by affirming decree of the Trial Court. Aggrieved thereby, the present second appeal has been filed. 7. At the outset, the learned counsel for the appellant has invited the attention of this Court to the pleadings in the plaint as well as the written statement which goes to show that the B-Schedule land claimed by the plaintiff is covered by Khatian No. 283 of Dag No. 361 of village Mancachar Part-I, under Mancachar Circle, whereas the respondent/ defendant has claimed tenancy right over the land based on Rayati Khatian No. 315 involving Dag No. 3229 (old)/ 2500 (new). As such, there is an apparent discrepancy in the description of the suit land as well as the land claimed by the defendant. 8. Mr. Ghosh, learned counsel for the appellant submits that since the courts below have dismissed the plaintiffs suit holding that the defendant was non-evictable tenant, it was incumbent upon the learned court below to record a finding of fact as to the true identity of the land claimed to be under occupation of the defendant. Since no such finding of fact has been recorded by the learned court below, hence, according to Mr. Ghosh the finding with regard to the issue No. 1 is perverse and calls for reconsideration. 9. Mr. Mazumder, learned Sr. Since no such finding of fact has been recorded by the learned court below, hence, according to Mr. Ghosh the finding with regard to the issue No. 1 is perverse and calls for reconsideration. 9. Mr. Mazumder, learned Sr. counsel appearing for the respondent has fairly submitted that on the face of the record of this case the description of the suit land (B-Schedule land) does not tally with the Riyati Khatian relied by the defendant and to such extend it was necessary to record a finding of fact as to whether both the lands are different or same plot of land. Learned Sr. counsel, however, submits that there are materials available on record to show that both the plots of land are one and the same. 10. I have considered the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the materials available on record. As noted above, the key controversy involved in this proceeding relates to right of the plaintiffs in respect of B-Schedule land which claim was declined by the learned trial court on the ground that said plot land was under possession of the respondent, who is a non-evictable tenant. However, there is no finding recorded by the court below as to whether the defendant is in possession of the Schedule-B land. The discrepancy in the identity of the land, as projected through the pleadings of the parties, prima facie, goes to show that both the lands are not the same plot of land or alternately at least their descriptions projected through the pleadings are not correct. I am, therefore, of the view that the learned court below was not correct in dismissing the plaintiffs' suit without ascertaining the said aspect of the matter. Although, Mr. Mazumder has submitted that there are materials available on record to establish the claim of the defendant, yet, I am of the view that in exercise of power under Section 100 CPC, a second appellate court would not embark upon task of recording any finding of fact for the first time. In such view of the matter, this Court is left with no other alternative but to set aside the impugned decree dated 24-12-2003 and remand the matter to the lower appellate court for a fresh decision of the title appeal. Ordered accordingly. In such view of the matter, this Court is left with no other alternative but to set aside the impugned decree dated 24-12-2003 and remand the matter to the lower appellate court for a fresh decision of the title appeal. Ordered accordingly. Considering the fact that the suit is of the year 1998, the lower appellate court is requested to make an endeavour to dispose of the appeal in accordance with law, within a period of 06 months from the date of receipt of the LCR. Registry to transmit the LCR as expeditiously as possible. No order as to cost