JUDGMENT J.B. PARDIWALA, J. 1. This First Appeal under Section-37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [for short The Act, 1996] is at the instance of the original applicants and is directed against the judgment and order dated 19/01/2017 passed by the Judge of the City Civil Court, Court No.8, Ahmedabad in the Civil Misc. Application No.349 of 2008 filed by the appellants herein under Section-34 of the Act, 1996 for setting aside the arbitral award passed by the Sole Arbitrator appointed by this Court in the Arbitration Petition No.20 of 2014. 2. The subject matter of this First Appeal can be gathered from the facts recorded in the award passed by the Arbitrator. I may quote the relevant paragraphs of the award. 2.1 The Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad by its order dated 28-4-2005, in Arbitration Petition No.20 of 2004, appointed the undersigned R.C. Bhatt, as Sole Arbitrator to resolve the disputes in connection with work contract dated 7-5-2001 entered into between the parties. The claimant and respondents were intimated by Regd. A.D. letters to appear before the Sole Arbitrator. 2.2 The Claimant appeared before the Sole Arbitrator and filed Claim Statement Ex.9. The claimant is proprietary concern of Shri Thakkar Pratapkumar Chunilal carrying on business as Government approved Contractor. The contract for removal of Debris from earthquake affected Bachau Town of Kutch District Zone-B was awarded by agreement No.W-9. It is the case of the claimant that the estimated cost of the work was Rs. 1,10,20,000/- and the claimant's cost was Rs. 1,17,80,000/- i.e. 6.89% above. The work order was issued on 7-5-2001 with stipulated period of 45 days and the date of completion was 28-6-2001. It is alleged by the claimant that whatever quantity was offered had been completed and the work was considered as completed on 29-6-2001. The Bank Guarantee of Rs. 5,89,000/- was furnished towards the security deposit which was released on 30-10-2002. 2.3 The case of the claimant is that the amount of Rs. 41,29,053/- had not been paid by the respondents through the work was considered as completed as per the contract. The claimant has alleged that against the tender quantity of 3,80,000/- M.T. the quantity of 2,79,938.439 M.T. was offered till 29-6-2001 with the result, that the quantity of 1,00,051.561 M.T. could not be executed due to breach of contract on part of the respondents. The claimant has alleged that against the tender quantity of 3,80,000/- M.T. the quantity of 2,79,938.439 M.T. was offered till 29-6-2001 with the result, that the quantity of 1,00,051.561 M.T. could not be executed due to breach of contract on part of the respondents. The claimant has alleged that considering the rate of Rs. 31/- per M.T. the work of Rs. 31,01,598.391 could not be executed. It is alleged that at the time of entering into contract, 25% were contemplated towards the profit and as claimant is prevented from performing the contract of Rs. 31,01,598.391, the loss of profit at 25% is required to be paid which comes to Rs. 7,75,399.57. The claimant gave notice dated 9-9-2002 calling upon the respondents to make outstanding payment along with interest at 18% P.A. and to release the Bank Guarantee within the period of sixty days from the date of receipt of notice but the respondents did not pay it and gave reply dt.20-11-2002. 2.4 Hence, the claimant has prayed for the payment of the following amounts from respondents:- (a) Rs. 41,29,053-00 For work done but not paid. (b) Rs. 30,34,853-71 Interested 18 percent per Annum from 28-6-2001 to 31-7-2005. (c) Rs. 7,75,399-57 Loss of profit. Rs.79,39,306-28 Ps. Plus interest at 18% per annum from 1-8-till realization. The claimant has prayed for the award of Rs. 79,39,306-29 in their favor and against the respondents with interest at 18% p.a. from 1.8.2005 till realization and other and further relief as may be deemed just and proper. 2.5 The respondent No.2 Executive Engineer has filed written statement at Exh.13. The respondent No.1 State of Gujarat has not filed written statement. The respondent No.2 has denied that an amount of Rs. 41,29,053/- has not been paid though the work is considered as contemplated as per the contract. It is contended that Rs. 1.55 lacs has been withheld as per the order of the Government and balance amount is considered as doubtful execution as per the primary report of the Departmental Inquiry. It is contended that claimant has indulged in malpractices and preferred the bills with highly exaggerated quantity, that the department has taken action against the erring officials who allowed the claimant in showing excess quantities and officers/staff involved in the same were suspended. It is contended that claimant has indulged in malpractices and preferred the bills with highly exaggerated quantity, that the department has taken action against the erring officials who allowed the claimant in showing excess quantities and officers/staff involved in the same were suspended. It is further contended that the claimant deployed only 50% of Machinery/Equipment as required and stated in the tender, that the notice was issued to submit the details of Machinery/Equipment and to accelerate the progress of the work vide letter dt.17-5-2001. 2.6 It is contended that an expert committee of two Engineers has come to the conclusion that maximum debris of 1.45 lac M.T. could be possible and accordingly payments were made at Departmental Inquiry and C.A.G. report contain the fact that claimant has indulged in malpractices, that the claimant has not submitted any documents confirming his claim as required in Clause 7.1. Mode of Measurements under article of Agreement of tender. 2.7 The respondent No.2 has denied that the claimant was prevented from performing the contract of Rs. 31,01,598-79 and further denied that loss of profit of 25% is required to be paid which comes to Rs. 7,75,399.57. It is contended that the tender was only for estimated quantity, and that there is no provision in the tender agreement about it. It is contended that the amount in question was withheld by the Department and as soon as the orders are received, the same will be released. It is contended that the claimant is not entitled to any interest as the claims of the claimant are not tenable. It is contended that as per clause 12 of the Agreement any disputes arising from the contract should be referred to the Tribunal and hence resolving disputes by appointing the Sole Arbitrator does not arise. It is contended that the claim be dismissed. 2.8 The claimant filed rejoinder affidavit Ex.14A alleging that till 29-6-2001, 2,79,751.815 M.T. quantity was offered by the respondents which was executed against which an amount of Rs. 45,49,348-60 is paid by the respondents but the payment of Rs. 41,29,053/- is not made wrongly and illegally. It is contended that there was no work which was doubtful execution, that the claimant was not party to the alleged departmental Inquiry and hence not binding to the claimant. 45,49,348-60 is paid by the respondents but the payment of Rs. 41,29,053/- is not made wrongly and illegally. It is contended that there was no work which was doubtful execution, that the claimant was not party to the alleged departmental Inquiry and hence not binding to the claimant. It is contended that the claimant is entitled for the work done as per the record maintained by the respondents i.e. weigh bridge slips register and measurement book. The claimant has produced the copy of the Registers with respect to the entries made on the basis of weigh bridge while original Register is in the custody of respondents. 2.9 The claimant has denied that he has indulged in malpractices and contended that not a single bill is prepared by the claimant, that all running bills including final bill were prepared by respondents on the basis of the record maintained by them. It is contended that the respondents have not taken any action against the alleged erring officials. The claimant contended that the question of deploying 50% of machinery equipment by the claimant did not arise, that the page 6 tender shows that available machinery and whatever machinery was used for the execution of contract has been recorded by the Respondents, that the letter dated 17-5-2001 was written immediately after issuance of the work order and thereafter progress of the work was accelerated by the claimant and therefore, no further grievance was made with respect to progress. It is contended that there is no justification for arriving at the conclusion that maximum debris of 1.45 lac M.T. were possible, that alleged audit objection of contractor auditor general has not been placed on the record. The claimant has denied all the allegations made in the written statement. 2.10 The claimant has contended that agreement does not prohibit for grant of interest and therefore, claimant is entitled for interest as claimed. The claimant has denied the allegation made in para 6 and 7 of the written statement. It is contended that respondents had not allowed the claimant to lift the contract quantity and committed breach of contract. It is contended that claimant is entitled to loss of profit as claimed. The claimant has denied the allegation made in para 6 and 7 of the written statement. It is contended that respondents had not allowed the claimant to lift the contract quantity and committed breach of contract. It is contended that claimant is entitled to loss of profit as claimed. It is alleged in para 5 that by various letters the claimant had requested for payment of outstanding amount, that the respondent No.2 by letter dated 3-8-2001 assured payment on receipt of entire grant from the respondent No.1 and thus had admitted the demand of claimant. 2.11 The claimant has contended that the Hon'ble Gujarat Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Tribunal has no jurisdiction over the subject matter because disputes as to removal of debris is not covered by definition of work contracts as defined in S.2(1)(k) of Gujarat Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Tribunal Act, 1992. The claimant has denied the contentions of respondent No.2 in para 11 of written statement. It is contended that the question of manipulating the quantities by the claimant does not arise. 3. The Arbitrator having regard to the pleadings and the rival contentions of the parties framed the following issues vide Exh.88. ISSUES (1) Whether this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to resolve the disputes in connection with the work contract dated 7th May, 2001 entered between the parties? (2) Does the claimant prove the claim of Rs. 41,29,053/- (Work done but not paid) as prayed in para 11(A) of the claim statement against respondents? (3)(a) Does the Claimant prove the claim of Rs. 30,34,853.71 being interest amount at 18% p.a. from 28-6-2001 to 31-7-2005 as claimed in para 11(B) of the claim statement? (b) If not, to what extent the claimant is entitled to the interest amount and at what rate? (4) Does the claimant prove the claim of Rs. 7,75,399.57 as loss of profit as claimed in para 11(c) of the claim statement? (5) Is the claimant entitled to any interest on the claim proved from the date of award till the date of payment? If yes, at what rate? (6) What order as to costs of these arbitration proceedings? (7) What award and order? 7,75,399.57 as loss of profit as claimed in para 11(c) of the claim statement? (5) Is the claimant entitled to any interest on the claim proved from the date of award till the date of payment? If yes, at what rate? (6) What order as to costs of these arbitration proceedings? (7) What award and order? (7A) Whether the respondents prove that the claimant has indulged in malpractice and has preferred the bills with highly exaggerated quantity for excessive amounts and for the work not at all carried out by the claimants as stated in the written statement? 4. The issues framed by the Arbitrator came to be answered as under:- (1) Not pressed by the respondents. (2) In the affirmative. (3)(a) The claimant is not entitled to interest at 18% per annum but is entitled at 8% per annum; (3)(b) The claimant is entitled to interest at 8% per annum on Rs. 41,29,053 from 9-9-2002 till 31-7-2005 and till date of award. (4) Claimant is entitled to the claim of Rs. 3,10,159/- as loss of profit. (5) The claimant is entitled to claim interest at 8% per annum on Rs. 41,29,053/- from date of award till date of payment by respondents. (6) The claimant is entitled to Rs. 95,500/- as total costs of Arbitration proceedings from respondents. The respondents to bear their own costs. (7) As per final order the award is passed. (7A) In the negative. 5. The Arbitrator upon final adjudication of the dispute between the parties passed the following order:- ORDER In view of my findings, I award and order that the respondents to pay Rs. 41,29,053/- (Rupees forty one lac twenty nine thousand and fifty only) to the claimant with running interest at 8% per annum on it from 9.9.2002 till date of the award and also further interest at 8% per annum from the date of award till realization. The respondents also to pay Rs. 3,10,159/- (Rupees three lacs ten thousand one hundred fifty nine only) as amount of loss of profit. The respondents to bear their own costs. The respondents also to pay cost of Rs. 95,000/- (Rupees Ninety five thousand only) of these proceedings to the claimant and to bear their own costs. The parties were treated with equality in this arbitration proceedings. The award is declared in presence of parties today at Ahmedabad. 6. The respondents to bear their own costs. The respondents also to pay cost of Rs. 95,000/- (Rupees Ninety five thousand only) of these proceedings to the claimant and to bear their own costs. The parties were treated with equality in this arbitration proceedings. The award is declared in presence of parties today at Ahmedabad. 6. The appellants herein being dissatisfied with the award passed by the sole Arbitrator preferred the Civil Misc. Application No.349 of 2008 under the provisions of the Section-34 of the Act, 1996 in the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad. The said application filed by the appellants herein in the City Civil Court questioning the legality and validity of the award passed by the sole Arbitrator came to be rejected vide order dated 19/01/2017. I may quote the relevant observations made by the Court below while rejecting the application under Section-34 of the Act, 1996. 11. Looking to the section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, it transpires that clause (b)(i)(ii), the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. The issue raised before the Arbitrator in his written Statement Exh.13 by the present applicant, during final disposal, same issue was raised in W.S. Exh.13 Section 5 of the agreement, but payment made by the Sole Arbitrator and the Arbitration Petition No.20/2004 was filed by the present respondent and there was not content made by the present applicant and moreover before the evidence led by the present applicants, the applicant no.2 Executive Engineer in his evidence Exh.124 stated that he has verified the record which the respondent does not dispute before the Arbitration Tribunal as per the information of the Government Pleader. Therefore, it transpires that the arbitration is capable for settlement of dispute between the parties under the law. As per second clause of the arbitrator award, conflict with the public police of India. Looking to the present application, the applicants have not mentioned anywhere in the application that the award is in conflict with the Public Policy of India. Therefore, it transpires that the arbitration is capable for settlement of dispute between the parties under the law. As per second clause of the arbitrator award, conflict with the public police of India. Looking to the present application, the applicants have not mentioned anywhere in the application that the award is in conflict with the Public Policy of India. I have gone through the award of the Arbitrator and it transpires that from the arbitration award that the sole Arbitrator had decided the dispute between the parties after concluding and evaluating the evidence produced and submitted by both the parties. The arbitrator has passed the award in accordance with law. The present applicants have failed to prove that the award of the arbitrator is contrary to the rules and against the Public Police of India. Looking to the arbitrator's award and finding given by them, the bills of payment I prepared by the Deputy Engineer and signed by the Executing Engineer, all the records maintained by the Government officers and original report is in possession of the present applicants' officer. 12. During pendency of the contract, the applicants have never given any notice or draw attention of the present respondent that the respondent is indulging into malpractice and fraud and making false bills. After completion of the contract, the present applicants withheld the last bill. The sole Arbitrator has rightly evaluated the evidence and gave finding with cogent reasons under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the Court have limited power to decide the present application and the present applicants are unable to show or prove that the award of the Sole Arbitrator is contrary to the law or against the Public Policy of India. 13. Looking to the provisions of law, Arbitrator has power to grant interest and therefore, the Hon'ble Arbitrator has rightly passed the order of award in favour of the respondent and therefore, in absence of any cogent evidence or reasons, there is no need to interfere in the award of the Arbitrator and therefore, I pass following order. ORDER The present Civil Misc. Application filed under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is hereby rejected. 7. ORDER The present Civil Misc. Application filed under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is hereby rejected. 7. Being dissatisfied with the order passed by the Court below rejecting the application filed under Section-34 of the Act, 1996, the appellants are here before this Court with this appeal under Section-37 of the Act, 1996. 8. The grounds raised in the memo of the First Appeal are as under:- (C) It is most humbly and respectfully submitted that it is the say of the opponent that due to earthquake on 26.01.2001, the opponent had been allotted work by the appellants after inviting tender for the removal of debris from earthquake affected Bhachau Town, Dist.: Kutch and the estimated cost of work was Rs. 1,10,20,000/- and the work was to be completed within the 45 days wherein the work order of Zone-B was allotted to the opponent on 07.05.2001 and therefore the date of completion of work was 28.06.2001. (D) It is further submitted that the tender quantity was 3,80,000 M.T. at the rate of Rs. 31 per M.T. and as the amount of Rs. 41,29,053/- was not paid though the work was considered as completed and therefore raised claim which also includes for not providing quantity of 1,00,051.561 M.T. out of total quantity which caused loss of profit of Rs. 7,75,399.57ps. (E) It is most humbly and respectfully submitted that the Learned Civil Court as well as the Ld. Arbitrator failed to appreciate the fact that the opponent had indulged in malpractice and preferred the Bills with exaggerated quantity and infact expert committee had carried out the inquiry for the work carried out wherein detail inspection were undertaken zone wise and in view of the same the report was submitted which considered various factors of irregularities and thought the same was submitted before the Ld. Arbitrator, but with due respect the said aspect was not considered in its true spirit by the Ld. Arbitrator as well as by the Ld. City Court. Arbitrator, but with due respect the said aspect was not considered in its true spirit by the Ld. Arbitrator as well as by the Ld. City Court. (F) It is respectfully submitted that in view of the malpractice carried out in performing the work for removing the debris and in view of inquiry conducted by the expert committee, the necessary steps were taken against the responsible officer, even chargesheet was issued, infact the remarks in Audit report by Comptroller Auditor General of India was also been produced but the same was not considered by the Ld. Arbitrator and Ld. Court below. (G) That the Test Check Calculation details were also submitted before the Ld. Arbitrator with detailed statement and hourly movement of the vehicles, which reflects the malpractice of 50.33% more quantity and pointed out in detail that the ld. Arbitrator failed to appreciate the same, but the Ld. Civil Judge also failed to consider the said aspect and instead of examined the details as provided by the appellants, the Ld. Civil Judge confirmed the award of the Ld. Arbitrator. (H) That both the Ld. City Court as well as the Ld. Arbitrator ought to have appreciate the fact that the opponent failed to deployed machinery and equipment's as per the tender requirement as per Clause 3(C) of the tender document and as per statement it clearly established that the opponent had only provided 50% of the machinery/ equipment and therefore, the appellant had also communicated to the opponent on 17.05.2001 for slow progress of work and for not deploying required machinery. (I) It is respectfully submitted that the Learned Civil Court ought to have appreciated the fact that the Ld. Arbitrator had wrongly considered the aspect of loss of Rs. 3,10,159/- looking to the nature of the urgent work allotted to the opponent and such work of removal of debris cannot be measured prior to execution of work and on the part of awarding 8% also the Ld. Arbitrator had erred in granting the same thought there was not provisions for payment of interest and therefore, the same ought not to be allowed in favour of the opponent. Arbitrator had erred in granting the same thought there was not provisions for payment of interest and therefore, the same ought not to be allowed in favour of the opponent. (J) And therefore with profound respect to the Learned Civil Judge, but the learned Judge failed to appreciate the crucial aspect of examination in the present case and therefore the Judgment 19.01.2017 and Award dated 17.03.2008 required to be quash and set aside by this Hon'ble Court. 9. Mr. Patel, the learned AGP appearing for the appellants submitted that his only ground of challenge is that the arbitral award passed by the sole Arbitrator and affirmed by the Court below is in conflict with the "Public Policy of India". According to Mr. Patel, the Public Policy of India has four heads. Mr. Patel wants his case to be brought within the fundamental policy of Indian Law, more particularly, the Wednesbury reasonableness. To put it in other words, according to Mr. Patel, his arguments are on the footing that the findings recorded by the sole Arbitrator and affirmed by the Court below are based on no evidence and many vital evidence has been ignored in arriving at the impugned decision. 10. On the other hand, this First Appeal has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Sukhwani, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, in whose favour the award came to be passed by the sole Arbitrator. 11. Mr. Sukhwani submits that no error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the sole Arbitrator in passing the award and also, the order passed by the City Civil Court rejecting the application under Section-34 of the Act, 1996. Mr. Sukhwani submits that the scope of appeal under Section-37 of the Act is very restricted. To put it in other words, the argument of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent is that whatever was submitted before the Court below was something beyond the scope of Section-34 of the Act. If that be so, then the scope of appeal under section-37 is even more restricted. In such circumstances, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent prays that there being no merit in this First Appeal, the same be dismissed. 12. If that be so, then the scope of appeal under section-37 is even more restricted. In such circumstances, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent prays that there being no merit in this First Appeal, the same be dismissed. 12. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the court below committed any error in passing the impugned order. 13. Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act reads as follows "Application for setting aside arbitral award.- (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and subsection (3). (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if- (a) the party making the application furnishes proof that- (i) a party was under some incapacity; or (ii) The arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or (v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or (b) the Court finds that- (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or (ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. Explanation.-Without prejudice to the generality of sub-clause (ii), it is hereby declared, for the avoidance of any doubt, that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81. (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. (4) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award." This Section in conjunction with Section 5 makes it clear that an arbitration award that is governed by part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can be set aside only on grounds mentioned under Section 34(2) and (3), and not otherwise. Section 5 reads as follows: "5. Extent of judicial intervention.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part." 14. It is important to note that the 1996 Act was enacted to replace the 1940 Arbitration Act in order to provide for an arbitral procedure which is fair, efficient and capable of meeting the needs of arbitration; also to provide that the tribunal gives reasons for an arbitral award; to ensure that the tribunal remains within the limits of its jurisdiction; and to minimize the supervisory roles of courts in the arbitral process. 15. The intendment of the new Act is to minimize the scope for intervention of Courts in arbitration matters. 15. The intendment of the new Act is to minimize the scope for intervention of Courts in arbitration matters. The Arbitral Tribunal has been given a free hand to deal with the disputes between the parties and to arrive at its resolution. A finality has been attached to an arbitral award under Section 35 of the Act and the law has turned a full circle as an award by itself has become enforceable as a decree of a Court. The award is not open to challenge on the ground that the arbitrator has reached a wrong conclusion or has failed to appreciate the facts. On the other hand, under Section 34 or under Section 9 of the Act, when a Court is called upon to decide the objection raised by a party against an arbitral award or to make interim measures of protection, the jurisdiction of the Court is limited as expressly indicated in the said provisions. It has no jurisdiction to sit in appeal and examine the correctness of the award on merits with reference to materials produced before the Arbitral Tribunal or to issue an order of injunction, which may result in obstructing the proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal. The Court cannot sit in appeal over the views of the Arbitrator by reexamining and reassessing the materials, in exercise of its power under Section 34 of the Act and similarly under the garb of interim measures of protection it cannot put impediments in the progress of the arbitral proceeding. 16. Arbitration is intended to be a faster and less expensive alternative to the courts. If this is one s motivation and expectation, then the ? Finality of the arbitral award is very important. The remedy provided in Section 34 against an arbitral award is in no sense an appeal. The legislative intent in Section 34 was to make the result of the annulment procedure prescribed therein potentially different from that in an appeal. In appeal, the decision under review not only may be confirmed, but may also be modified. In annulment, on the other hand, the decision under review may either be invalidated in whole or in part or be left to stand if the plea for annulment is rejected. In appeal, the decision under review not only may be confirmed, but may also be modified. In annulment, on the other hand, the decision under review may either be invalidated in whole or in part or be left to stand if the plea for annulment is rejected. Annulment operates to negate a decision, in whole or in part, thereby depriving the portion negated of legal force and returning the parties, as to that portion, to their original litigating positions. Annulment can void, while appeal can modify. Section 34 is found to provide for annulment only on the grounds affecting legitimacy of the process of decision as distinct from substantive correctness of the contents of the FAO(OS) No.285/2014 Page 6 of 22 decision. A remedy of appeal focuses upon both legitimacy of the process of decision and the substantive correctness of the decision. Annulment, in the case of arbitration focuses not on the correctness of decision but rather more narrowly considers whether, regardless of errors in application of law or determination of facts, the decision resulted from a legitimate process. 17. In the case of arbitration, the parties through their agreement create an entirely different situation because regardless of how complex or simple a dispute resolution mechanism they create, they almost always agree that the resultant award will be final and binding upon them. In other words, regardless of whether there are errors of application of law or ascertainment of fact, the parties agree that the award will be regarded as substantively correct. Yet, although the content of the award is thus final, parties may still challenge the legitimacy of the decision-making process leading to the award. In essence, parties are always free to argue that they are not bound by a given "award" because what was labeled an award is the result of an illegitimate process of decision. 18. Arbitration under the 1940 Act could not achieve the savings in time and money for which it was enacted and had merely become a first step in lengthy litigation. Reference in this regard can be made to para 35 of Bharat Aluminium Company Vs. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 . It was to get over the said malady that the law was sought to be overhauled. Reference in this regard can be made to para 35 of Bharat Aluminium Company Vs. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 . It was to get over the said malady that the law was sought to be overhauled. While under the old Act, the award was unenforceable till made rule of the court and for which it had to pass various tests as laid down therein and general power/authority was vested in the court to modify the award, all this was removed in the new Act. The new Act not only made the award executable as a decree after the time for preferring objection with respect thereto had expired and without requiring it to be necessarily made rule of the court but also did away with condonation of delay in filing the said objections. The reason/purpose being expediency. The grounds on which the objections could be filed are also such which if made out, the only consequence thereof could be setting aside of the award. It is for this reason that under new Act there is no power to the court to modify the award or to remit the award etc. as under the old Act. A perusal of the various grounds enunciated in Section 34 will show that the same are procedural in nature i.e., concerning legitimacy of the process of decision. While doing so, the ground, of the award being in conflict with Public Policy of India, was also incorporated. However the juxtaposition of Section 34(2)(b)(ii) shows that the reference to "Public Policy" is also in relation to fraud or corruption in the making of the award. The new Act was being understood so [See: Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. Vs. Mehul Construction Co., (2000) 7 SCC 201 (para 4 and which has not been set aside in S.B.P. & Co. Vs. Patel Engineering Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618 ] till the Supreme Court in Saw Pipes Ltd. held that the phrase "Public Policy of India" is required to be given wider meaning and if the award on the face of it is patently in violation of statutory provisions, it cannot be said to be in public interest and such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. In para 37 of the judgment it was held that award could be set aside if it is contrary to fundamental policy of Indian Law or the interest of India or justice or morality or if it is patently illegal. A rider was however put that illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that the award is against the public policy. Yet another test laid down is of the award being so unfair and unreasonable that it shakes the conscience of the court. 19. The courts have thereafter been inundated with challenges to the award. The objections to the award are drafted like appeals to the courts; grounds are urged to show each and every finding of the arbitrator to be either contrary to the record or to the law and thus pleaded to be against the Public Policy of India. As aforesaid, the courts are vested with a difficult task of simultaneously dealing with such objections under two diverse provisions and which has led to the courts in some instances dealing with awards under the new Act on the parameters under the old Act. 20. The result is that the goal of re-enactment has been missed. 21. The re-enactment was not only to achieve savings in time and prevent arbitration from merely becoming the first step in lengthy litigation but also in consonance with the international treaties and commitments of this country thereto. Since the enactment of the 1940 Act, the international barriers had disappeared and the volume of international trade had grown phenomenally. The new Act was modeled on the model law of international commercial arbitration of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNICTRAL). It was enacted to make it more responsive to contemporary requirements. The process of economic liberalization had brought huge foreign investment in India. Such foreign investment was hesitant, owing to there being no effective mode of settlement of domestic and international disputes. It was with such lofty ideals and with a view to attract foreign investment that the re-enactment was done. If the courts are to, notwithstanding such re-enactment, deal with the arbitration matters as under the old Act it would be a breach of the commitment made under the treaties on international trade. [See:- Delhi Development Authority vs. M/s. Bhardwaj Brothers, (2014) AIR Delhi 147]. 22. If the courts are to, notwithstanding such re-enactment, deal with the arbitration matters as under the old Act it would be a breach of the commitment made under the treaties on international trade. [See:- Delhi Development Authority vs. M/s. Bhardwaj Brothers, (2014) AIR Delhi 147]. 22. The Supreme Court as far back as in Union of India Vs. A.L. Rallia Ram, (1963) AIR SC 1685, held that:- "An award being a decision of an arbitrator whether a lawyer or a layman chosen by the parties, and entrusted with power to decide a dispute submitted to him is ordinarily not liable to be challenged on the ground that it is erroneous. In order to make arbitration effective and the awards enforceable, machinery is devised for lending the assistance of the ordinary Courts. The Courts are also entrusted with power to modify or correct the award on the ground of imperfect form or clerical errors, or decision on questions not referred, which are severable from those referred........The Court may also set aside an award on the ground of corruption or misconduct of the arbitrator, or that a party has been guilty of fraudulent concealment or willful deception. But the Court cannot interfere with the award if otherwise proper on the ground that the decision appears to it to be erroneous. The award of the arbitrator is ordinarily final and conclusive, unless a contrary intention is disclosed by the agreement. The award is the decision of a domestic tribunal chosen by the parties, and the civil courts which are entrusted with the power to facilitate arbitration and to effectuate the awards, cannot exercise appellate powers over the decision. Wrong or right the decision is binding, if it be reached fairly after giving adequate opportunity to the parties to place their grievances in the manner provided in the arbitration agreement." 23. Of course the said judgment being under the Arbitration Act, 1940 proceeds to hold that an award is bad on the ground of error of law on the face of it. However the legislature while re-enacting the arbitration law has removed the ground of challenge of error of law on the face of the award. In Mc. Dermott International Inc., (2006) AIRSCW 3276, also it was held that the parties to the Arbitration Agreement make a conscious decision to exclude the Courts jurisdiction as they prefer the expediency and finality offered by arbitration. In Mc. Dermott International Inc., (2006) AIRSCW 3276, also it was held that the parties to the Arbitration Agreement make a conscious decision to exclude the Courts jurisdiction as they prefer the expediency and finality offered by arbitration. We are bound to respect the said change brought about by the legislature and cannot dogmatically review the awards on the grounds of challenge which have been intentionally taken away by the legislature. 24. Arbitration will not survive, much less flourish, if this core precept is not followed through by the Courts. The integrity and efficacy of arbitration as a parallel dispute resolution system will be subverted if the Courts appear unable or unwilling to restrain themselves from entering into the merits of every arbitral decision that comes before it. The power to intervene must and should only be exercised charily, within the framework of the Arbitration Act. Minimal curial intervention is underpinned by need to recognize the autonomy of the arbitral process by encouraging finality, so that its advantage as an efficient alternative dispute resolution process is not undermined. The parties having opted for arbitration, must be taken to have acknowledged and accepted the attendant risks of having only a very limited right of recourse to the Courts. It would be neither appropriate nor consonant for the Court to lend assistance to a dissatisfied party by exercising appellate function over arbitral awards, save to the extent statutorily permitted. (See: M/s. National Highways Authority of India vs. M/s. Oriental Structural Engineers Pvt. Ltd., (2015) AIR Delhi 79). 25. Let me now look into the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Associate Builders Vs. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 3 SCC 49 , wherein, the Supreme Court has taken the view that the award is assailable before the Court under Section-34 of the Act only when such award is in conflict with the Public Policy of India. The Supreme Court while explaining the heads under which the Public Policy of India may be violated, enumerated, illustrated has observed as under:- Fundamental Policy of Indian Law 27. Coming to each of the heads contained in the Saw Pipes judgment, we will first deal with the head "fundamental policy of Indian Law". The Supreme Court while explaining the heads under which the Public Policy of India may be violated, enumerated, illustrated has observed as under:- Fundamental Policy of Indian Law 27. Coming to each of the heads contained in the Saw Pipes judgment, we will first deal with the head "fundamental policy of Indian Law". It has already been seen from the Renusagar judgment that violation of the Foreign Exchange Act and disregarding orders of superior courts in India would be regarded as being contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law. To this it could be added that the binding effect of the judgment of a superior court being disregarded would be equally violative of the fundamental policy of Indian law. 28. In a recent judgment, ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263 , this Court added three other distinct and fundamental juristic principles which must be understood as a part and parcel of the fundamental policy of Indian law. The Court held- "35. What then would constitute the "fundamental policy of Indian law" is the question. The decision in ONGC [ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 ] does not elaborate that aspect. Even so, the expression must, in our opinion, include all such fundamental principles as providing a basis for administration of justice and enforcement of law in this country. Without meaning to exhaustively enumerate the purport of the expression "fundamental policy of Indian law", we may refer to three distinct and fundamental juristic principles that must necessarily be understood as a part and parcel of the fundamental policy of Indian law. The first and foremost is the principle that in every determination whether by a court or other authority that affects the rights of a citizen or leads to any civil consequences, the court or authority concerned is bound to adopt what is in legal parlance called a "judicial approach" in the matter. The duty to adopt a judicial approach arises from the very nature of the power exercised by the court or the authority does not have to be separately or additionally enjoined upon the fora concerned. The duty to adopt a judicial approach arises from the very nature of the power exercised by the court or the authority does not have to be separately or additionally enjoined upon the fora concerned. What must be remembered is that the importance of a judicial approach in judicial and quasi-judicial determination lies in the fact that so long as the court, tribunal or the authority exercising powers that affect the rights or obligations of the parties before them shows fidelity to judicial approach, they cannot act in an arbitrary, capricious or whimsical manner. Judicial approach ensures that the authority acts bona fide and deals with the subject in a fair, reasonable and objective manner and that its decision is not actuated by any extraneous consideration. Judicial approach in that sense acts as a check against flaws and faults that can render the decision of a court, tribunal or authority vulnerable to challenge. * * * 38. Equally important and indeed fundamental to the policy of Indian law is the principle that a court and so also a quasi-judicial authority must, while determining the rights and obligations of parties before it, do so in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Besides the celebrated audi alteram partem rule one of the facets of the principles of natural justice is that the court/authority deciding the matter must apply its mind to the attendant facts and circumstances while taking a view one way or the other. Non-application of mind is a defect that is fatal to any adjudication. Application of mind is best demonstrated by disclosure of the mind and disclosure of mind is best done by recording reasons in support of the decision which the court or authority is taking. The requirement that an adjudicatory authority must apply its mind is, in that view, so deeply embedded in our jurisprudence that it can be described as a fundamental policy of Indian law. 39. No less important is the principle now recognized as a salutary juristic fundamental in administrative law that a decision which is perverse or so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same will not be sustained in a court of law. Perversity or irrationality of decisions is tested on the touchstone of Wednesbury principle [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] of reasonableness. Perversity or irrationality of decisions is tested on the touchstone of Wednesbury principle [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] of reasonableness. Decisions that fall short of the standards of reasonableness are open to challenge in a court of law often in writ jurisdiction of the superior courts but no less in statutory processes wherever the same are available. 40. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to attempt an exhaustive enumeration of what would constitute the fundamental policy of Indian law nor is it possible to place the expression in the straitjacket of a definition. What is important in the context of the case at hand is that if on facts proved before them the arbitrators fail to draw an inference which ought to have been drawn or if they have drawn an inference which is on the face of it, untenable resulting in miscarriage of justice, the adjudication even when made by an Arbitral Tribunal that enjoys considerable latitude and play at the joints in making awards will be open to challenge and may be cast away or modified depending upon whether the offending part is or is not severable from the rest." 29. It is clear that the juristic principle of a "judicial approach" demands that a decision be fair, reasonable and objective. On the obverse side, anything arbitrary and whimsical would obviously not be a determination which would either be fair, reasonable or objective. 30. The Audi Alteram Partem principle which undoubtedly is a fundamental juristic principle in Indian law is also contained in Sections 18 and 34 (2) (a) (iii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. These Sections read as follows: "18. Equal treatment of parties.- The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity to present his case. * * * 34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.- (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if- (a) the party making the application furnishes proof that- (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; " 31. Application for setting aside arbitral award.- (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if- (a) the party making the application furnishes proof that- (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; " 31. The third juristic principle is that a decision which is perverse or so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same is important and requires some degree of explanation. It is settled law that where- (i) a finding is based on no evidence, or (ii) an arbitral tribunal takes into account something irrelevant to the decision which it arrives at; or (iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision, such decision would necessarily be perverse. 32. A good working test of perversity is contained in two judgments. In H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons, (1992) Supp2 SCC 312, at p. 317, it was held: "7. ...................It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." In Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 , at para 10, it was held: "10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 33. It must clearly be understood that when a court is applying the "public policy" test to an arbitration award, it does not act as a court of appeal and consequently errors of fact cannot be corrected. It must clearly be understood that when a court is applying the "public policy" test to an arbitration award, it does not act as a court of appeal and consequently errors of fact cannot be corrected. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his arbitral award. Thus an award based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on this score[1]. Once it is found that the arbitrators approach is not arbitrary or capricious, then he is the last word on facts. In P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. v. B.H.H. Securities (P) Ltd., (2012) 1 SCC 594 , this Court held: "21. A court does not sit in appeal over the award of an Arbitral Tribunal by reassessing or re-appreciating the evidence. An award can be challenged only under the grounds mentioned in Section 34(2) of the Act. The Arbitral Tribunal has examined the facts and held that both the second respondent and the appellant are liable. The case as put forward by the first respondent has been accepted. Even the minority view was that the second respondent was liable as claimed by the first respondent, but the appellant was not liable only on the ground that the arbitrators appointed by the Stock Exchange under Bye-law 248, in a claim against a non-member, had no jurisdiction to decide a claim against another member. The finding of the majority is that the appellant did the transaction in the name of the second respondent and is therefore, liable along with the second respondent. Therefore, in the absence of any ground under Section 34(2) of the Act, it is not possible to re-examine the facts to find out whether a different decision can be arrived at." 34. It is with this very important caveat that the two fundamental principles which form part of the fundamental policy of Indian law (that the arbitrator must have a judicial approach and that he must not act perversely) are to be understood. 26. It is with this very important caveat that the two fundamental principles which form part of the fundamental policy of Indian law (that the arbitrator must have a judicial approach and that he must not act perversely) are to be understood. 26. I find it extremely difficult to take the view that the award passed by the sole arbitrator is based on no evidence or the arbitrator has ignored vital evidence in arriving at its decision. It is not permissible for this Court in appeal under Section-37 of the Act to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at different conclusion by holding that the arbitral award is against the Public Policy. I called upon Mr. Patel, the learned AGP to point me out something palpable from the evidence on record on the basis of which it could be said that there is an error apparent on the face of the record. However, Mr. Patel in his attempt to reply entered into re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record. 27. In the aforesaid context I may quote the observations of the Supreme Court as contained in Paragraph-19 of the decision in the case of Swan Gold Mining Limited Vs. Hindustan Copper Limited, (2015) 5 SCC 739 . 19. The words "public policy" or "opposed to public policy", find reference in Section 23 of the Contract Act and also Section 34(2)(b) (ii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. As stated above, the interpretation of the contract is matter of the Arbitrator, who is a Judge, chosen by the parties to determine and decide the dispute. The Court is precluded from re-appreciating the evidence and to arrive at different conclusion by holding that the arbitral award is against the public policy. 28. In the overall view of the matter, I have reached to the conclusion that no case is made out for interference in this First Appeal under Section-37 of the Act, 1996. 29. In the result, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. 17/10/2018 - FURTHER ORDER After the judgment is pronounced, Mr. Rakesh, the learned AGP, submitted that the State may take a decision to challenge this judgment and order in the Supreme Court. In such circumstances, he pointed out that the decreetal amount which the State has deposited should not be allowed to be withdrawn by the respondent for some time. Mr. Rakesh, the learned AGP, submitted that the State may take a decision to challenge this judgment and order in the Supreme Court. In such circumstances, he pointed out that the decreetal amount which the State has deposited should not be allowed to be withdrawn by the respondent for some time. Mr. Sukhwani, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, submitted that he would see to it that his client does not pray for disbursement of the deposited amount for a period of three months from today. Mr. Sukhwani, the learned counsel, has vehemently opposed the request made by the learned AGP appearing for the State. However, as the State has yet to take any decision, I am inclined to accede to the request made by the learned AGP.