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2018 DIGILAW 1206 (ALL)

GANGA RAM @ GANGA SARAN v. STATE OF U. P.

2018-05-15

J.J.MUNIR

body2018
JUDGMENT : Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J. 1. Heard Sri P.N. Tiwari, learned counsel for the revisionists and Sri Indrajeet Singh Yadav, learned AGA on behalf of the State. 2. This criminal revision is directed against an order passed by Shri R.K. Mishra, the then Additional District and Sessions Judge FTC, Court No. 8, Gautam Buddha Nagar dated 17.11.2003 in Criminal Appeal No. 4 of 2000 partly allowing the revisionists' appeal from a judgment and order of Shri Surendra Pal Singh, the then III Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bulandshahar dated 12.01.2000 in Criminal Case No. 556 of 1999 arising out of Case Crime No. 130 of 1989 under Section 498A and Section ¾ D.P. Act P.S. Dunkaur District Gautam Buddha Nagar (then falling in the District Bulandshahar) and by the said appellate judgment upholding the conviction of the revisionists under Section 498A IPC while acquitting them of the offence punishable under Section 3/4 Dowry Provision Act and sentencing each of the revisionist to suffer one year and six months simple imprisonment for the said offence as ordered by the trial Court. Pending this revision, revisionist No. 2 Hira died. Accordingly, this revision stands abated so far as the revisionist No. 2 is concerned. This revision has been heard now at the instance of revisionist No. 1 Ganga Ram @ Ganga Saran and revisionist No. 3 Phoolwati wife of Hira. 3. The facts giving rise to the present revision are these that the prosecutrix Smt. Kamlesh wife of Ganga Ram @ Ganga Saran revisionist No. 1, and daughter of Bolati Prasad, a native of village Jagupura falling under local limit of P.S. Dankaur, District Bulandshahar, handed over a written application/information on 22.07.1989 to the S.P. Bulandshahar to the effect that the marriage of the prosecutrix and revisionist No. 1 was solemnized about a year ago antedating the said application, the first revisionist being a native of village Achheja Bujurg falling under the local limits of P.S. Dankaur District Bulandshahar, then part of District Bulandshahar, and, at present a part of Gautam Buddha Nagar. 4. It was said by the prosecutrix that her father had lavished the couple with all that he could give away in gift to his daughter and his son-in-law within his means. 4. It was said by the prosecutrix that her father had lavished the couple with all that he could give away in gift to his daughter and his son-in-law within his means. Soon after the marriage, the revisionist No. 1, her husband Ganga Ram, her father-in-law Hira (since deceased), her mother-in-law, phoolwati, her brother-in-law, Pyarelal (Jeth), and, her sister-in-law (Jethani) appeared to be ungratified by her father's contribution to the newlyweds' marriage. It was said in the information by the prosecutrix that all of them last mentioned resorted to taunting remarks about a poor dowry and put forward a demand of Rs.10,000/- in cash, attended with a threat that in case the same was not made good, they would do her to death and find another bride for her husband, the first revisionist. The information also said that the prosecutrix refused the demand of Rs.10,000/- on account of which, within 14 days of marriage, she was turned out of her matrimonial home. It was also alleged in the FIR that her father and grandfather attempted a reconciliation in connection whereof they visited her in-laws place to fulfill the demand of Rs.10,000/- by way of dowry. It was mentioned in the information that thereupon a legal notice was sent by the prosecutrix to her husband (It is not clear what was the notice about but appears to be one for restitution of conjugal right) but the in-laws of the prosecutrix did not change mind to have her back in the company of her husband. Thereafter, on 17.9.1989, it is mentioned in the first information report that her father, her uncle Ram Bhool Singh, brother Chandra Bhan Singh and Bhawani Singh, Chandi Swaroop, Raja Ram and Shukhdev along with the prosecutrix, went over to the house of the revisionist, summoning a Panchayat of members of the community from which the parties hail. The members of the Panchayat asked her in-laws to let the couple stay together, and, under that pressure, the in-laws reluctantly agreed; whereupon, her father left her back at the in-laws place. It is then said in the FIR at her husband's place, her husband revisionist No. 1, mother-in -law revisionist No. 3, father-in-law (since deceased's), brother-in-law and sister-in-law(Jeth-Jethani) beat her up and turned her out of matrimonial home once again on 21.07.1989. It is then said in the FIR at her husband's place, her husband revisionist No. 1, mother-in -law revisionist No. 3, father-in-law (since deceased's), brother-in-law and sister-in-law(Jeth-Jethani) beat her up and turned her out of matrimonial home once again on 21.07.1989. It is alleged that in consequence of the assault suffered at her in-laws place she sustained substantial injury which she had submitted to the medical examination of the Government Hospital, Bulandshahar that was undertaken once she had made it back safely to her parents place. 5. The SP, Bulandshahar by an order dated 07.08.1989 ordered the registration of a case in compliance whereof case crime No. 130 of 1989 was registered on 12.08.1989 against each of the accused, that is to say, Ganga Saran, Husband, Hira father-in-law, Phoolwati mother-in-law, Pyarelal (brother-in-law) (Jeth) and Jag Roshani sister-in-law (Jethani). 6. The medical examination of the prosecutrix was done at 1:40 in the afternoon hours and after investigation a charge sheet was filed against Ganga Sharan, husband, Hira father-in-law, Phoolwati mother-in-law, Pyarelal, brother-in-law (jeth) and Jagroshani (Jethani) last mentioned under Section 498A IPC and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act by the investigation order. On 7.9.1989 the Court took cognizance of the offence, summoned the accused, and, framed charges against them for offences punishable under Section 498A IPC and ¾ Dowry Provision Act. 7. Each of the accused denied the charges and claimed to be tried. On behalf of the prosecution a total of five witnesses were examined amongst whom, Bolati Prasad deposed as P.W.1. (father of the prosecutrix), Chandrabhan as P.W. 2, Shukhdev P.W. 3, Bhagwan Swaroop, P.W. 4 and Dr. A.K. Dubey, P.W. 5, and, by way of documentary evidence, the written information/ application to the S.P. Bulandshahar dated 22.7.1989 was proved, and, marked as exhibit Ka 1. P.W. 4 Bhagwan Swaroop proved a site plan that was marked exhibit Ka 2, and, charge sheet that was proved, was marked exhibit Ka 3 as well as chick FIR that was marked as exhibit Ka 4, the extract of GD entry was also proved by the same witness, P.W. 4, that was marked as exhibit Ka 5. P.W. 5 the doctor who had examined the injuries proved the injury report, same being marked as exhibit Ka 6. P.W. 5 the doctor who had examined the injuries proved the injury report, same being marked as exhibit Ka 6. At this stage, the statement of each of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded where all the accused denied the charges of demand of dowry or cruelty in connection with demand of dowry or the act of beating up the prosecutrix. They claimed that the prosecution has been instituted out of ill will, and, declined to enter defence. 8. After considering the entire evidence led on behalf of the prosecution that includes the five prosecution witnesses, and, the documentary evidence, the learned Magistrate by Judgment and Order dated 12.01.2012 proceeded to convict revisionist No. 1 Ganga Sharan, revisionist No. 2 Hira, revisionist No. 3 Phoolwati besides the two other co-accused at that time, Pyarelal and Jagroshani, each for offences punishable under Section 498 A IPC and Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act sentencing them each to a term of one and a half years of simple imprisonment, and, for the offence punishable under Section 4 Dowry Provisions Act, to a term of six months simple imprisonment. All sentences were directed to run concurrently. 9. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment each of the five convicted by the Magistrate vide judgment and order dated 12.01.2000 preferred an appeal to the Sessions Judge, Gautam Buddha Nagar, being Criminal Appeal No. 4 of 2000, that came up for determination before the learned Sessions Judge (FTC) Court No. 6, Gautam Buddha Nagar on 17.11.2003. The learned Additional Sessions Judge proceeded to allow the appeal in part and by that acquitted two of the convicts, to wit, Pyarelal and Jagroshani of all the offences whereas in relation to the three revisionists here their conviction and sentence for the offence under Section 4 Dowry Provision Act was set aside. The conviction and sentence under Section 498 for these revisionists was affirmed, and, to that extent their appeal stood dismissed. 10. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 17.11.2003 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in appeal the three revisionist Ganga Ram, Hira and Smt. Phoolwati preferred the instant revision on 06.01.2004 which came to be admitted by an order dated 09.01.2004 to hearing, and, the revisionists were ordered to be released on bail pending decision of this revision. 11. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 17.11.2003 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in appeal the three revisionist Ganga Ram, Hira and Smt. Phoolwati preferred the instant revision on 06.01.2004 which came to be admitted by an order dated 09.01.2004 to hearing, and, the revisionists were ordered to be released on bail pending decision of this revision. 11. It needs no recapitulation that of the three revisionists the second revisionist is no more, and, now this revision has been heard on behalf of the Ganga Ram and Smt. Phoolwati, Respondents Nos. 1 and 3, respectively. 12. There is one feature in the course of events that has given a slightly different direction to the evidence led at the trial and that is that pending trial, and, before she could depose, the prosecutrix, that is to say, Smt. Kamlesh, the wife of revisionist No. 1 passed away due to natural causes while at her fathers place. Therefore, at the trial she was not there to testify before the Court. The Courts below, in particular, the appellate court that is the last court of fact took due note of the short lived marriage between the parties that lasted just 8 to 10 months. During this time she was thrown out of her matrimonial home twice, and, after the second event there was an exchange of legal notices dated 06.04.1989 and 05.05.1989. The appellate court has held that the photocopies of these notices that have been filed are not admissible in evidence. The appellate court after holding the Photostat copies are not admissible, looked at that evidence nevertheless, to draw an interference that once these notices were issued immediately prior in point of time to the occurrence dated 22.07.1989, when the victim was allegedly thrown out of the matrimonial home the last time, are certainly relevant to show that the relationship between prosecutrix, the late Smt. Kamlesh, and, her husband, revisionist No. 1, had turned sour, and, that there was an exchange of legal notices between the husband and wife. 13. To this part of the approach of the learned Sessions Judge, this Court is not much in agreement inasmuch as having held that the Photostat copy of the notices under reference to be inadmissible, it was not open to the appellate court to have looked into the same at all; even for the purpose that it did. 13. To this part of the approach of the learned Sessions Judge, this Court is not much in agreement inasmuch as having held that the Photostat copy of the notices under reference to be inadmissible, it was not open to the appellate court to have looked into the same at all; even for the purpose that it did. The inference of whatever kind was, therefore, drawn by the appellate court from the Photostat copies of the notices that are inadmissible in evidence and, rightly held to be inadmissible, does not commend itself to this court. With so much said about the exchange of the notices between the husband and wife and the inference drawn therefrom by the appellate court, this Court did not look to the evidence the way the appellate court has viewed it by limiting appraisal to the scope of a revisional perspective. 14. The appellate court in the same vain as the trial court has approached the evidence of the father of the prosecutrix Bolati Prasad where the appellate court has recorded that on the one hand the revisionist, in particular, the husband has filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights, and, on the other, while cross-examining Bolati Prasad P.W. 1, a suggestion has been given to him that his daughter was a person of weak mind (somewhat a mental retard if not of unsound mind) who was not capable to distinguish between right and wrong. Looking to this stand of the accused the courts below, in particular, the appellate court has opined that even if it be accepted that the prosecutrix was a person of weak mental faculty, or even a slightly retarded person in the mind, it was no ground to part ways with her. The appellate court concluded, therefore, that the petition for restitution of conjugal rights, in the back ground of this kind of suggestion at the trial, is clearly a legal device resorted to forestall the consequences that the revisionist knew would follow under the law. The appellate court like the trial court has noticed, as said before, that the prosecutrix being dead, her deposition in the dock could not be recorded. The appellate court like the trial court has noticed, as said before, that the prosecutrix being dead, her deposition in the dock could not be recorded. The appellate court concluded that in those circumstances whatever was said by the prosecutrix in her first information report would have to be read as her speech from the grave, and, to it greater weight would have to be accorded. 15. The appellate court has borne caution that it is possible that the first information report might have carried allegations that are exaggerated statements of the prosecution case but, what the appellate court has believed is clearly discernible; it is the weight of words in the FIR in their wholesome substance that feature the last account of what befell the deceased. It has been substantially believed and given due weight. P.W. 3 Shukhdev has been seen by the appellate court as a non-partisan witness as he is not related to either the side, and, had acted as a panch in a mediation of sorts that was held in the panchayat convened at the behest of the prosecutrix's father in the native village of her in-laws. The said witness has said in his deposition that the prosecutrix had said that her husband, mother-in-law and father-in-law, had beaten her up and thrown her out whereas the revisionist No. 1, her husband, had said that he would not permit her to stay in her matrimonial home unless she brought along a sum of Rs. 10000/-. The appellate court has concluded from the said deposition that in the demand of dowry the acquitted accused, the brother-in-law and sister-in-law (Jeeth- Jeethani) were not involved and so they were not involved in the cruelty, in connection with dowry demand. 16. The appellate court has been conscientiously mindful that the prosecutrix was no longer available to testify, and, has noticed that the statement of P.W. 3 relating to what he had heard the prosecutrix say, is at slight variance from what the prosecutrix herself stated in the FIR, and, from all that the appellate court decided to acquit the brother-in-law and sister-in-law, finding that the case against them was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. 17. 17. However, so far as the revisionists were concerned, that is to say, the husband, the father-in-law and the mother-in-law, the court has acquitted them of the charge under section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act on the evidence of witnesses that a sum of Rs.10,000/- was demanded by the revisionist No. 1 from his in-laws (the parents of the prosecutrix). The appellate court slightly doubted whether it could be said on the basis of evidence, with much certainty that the demand of Rs.10,000/- pressed by revisionist No. 1 drawing upon the resources of his in laws was in connection with marriage, or may be, by way of financial assistance, in which case it would not fall within the definition of dowry. But in the view of the appellate court, the very fact that a sum of Rs.10,000/- was demanded of the wife and her family would fall within the parameters of cruelty. The appellate court has looked into the medico-legal report relating to the injuries, Exhibit Ka 6, that reflects the medical examination under taken on 22.07.1989 at 1:40 p.m. in the afternoon hours in the Government hospital, Bulandshahar, for the prosecutrix, and, there the Court noticed that there were three contusions about which P.W. 5 Dr. A.K. Dubey had testified. The injuries were opined to be simple in nature, and, a day old. It has been noticed that in his cross-examination in reply to a suggestion that this kind of a injury could be caused due to a hard object falling onto the prosecutrix and further that a strong willed person would suffer an injury of this kind to manufacture evidence in support of a case like the present one, the Doctor had replied in the affirmative. The appellate court in this connection has observed that the natural sequence of events would show that prosectrix not being back to her matrimonial home there was an exchange of legal notices, and, upon the prosecutrix being reinstated back to her matrimonial home through the panchayat convened in her native village, led to violence at the hands of her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law, who were prediposed to throw her out. At this juncture even if the evidence regarding exchange of notices is not accepted, as this Court found it to be inadmissible, the fact remains that it has been found on evidence established by the two courts below that the panchayat was held at the native village of the in laws, and, in consequence whereof the prosecutrix was placed back, under the authority of the panchayat, in the home of her unwilling husband and in laws who thereafter assaulted her and once again threw the out of her matrimonial home. 18. The fact is that a Panchayat was convened, as already said, at the instance of the father of the prosecutrix leading her to be placed back in her matrimonial home, followed by her final and violent exit from that home when her husband and in laws (including the revisionist here) threw her out causing her injuries. The appellate court has rightly taken note of the facts that there cannot be direct evidence about the cruelty suffered by the prosecutrix, particularly, once she was no more to testify at the trial, inasmuch as in the matrimonial home of a woman, her in laws alone are about and cruelty of the matrimonial kind is not committed in a public place. It has to be gathered from circumstances. 19. The appellate court as well as the Magistrate on the basis of those circumstances have taken a plausible view of the evidence that the prosecutrix was subjected to cruelty in her matrimonial home, at the hands of the revisionists, and, also that there was a demand of Rs. 10000 but the appellate court holding that the demand was not in connection with marriage, has not found it to be dowry; and, on that basis held the offence under Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act is not attracted in variation of the view taken by the Magistrate. However, the appellate court has taken into consideration the circumstances of the demand of Rs. 10000/-, may be as financial assistance from the family of a newly wedded wife and other circumstances of violence, and, has rightly concluded that the offence under Section 498A IPC was clearly established against the revisionists No. 1 and 3 of which they have been rightly convicted. 20. 10000/-, may be as financial assistance from the family of a newly wedded wife and other circumstances of violence, and, has rightly concluded that the offence under Section 498A IPC was clearly established against the revisionists No. 1 and 3 of which they have been rightly convicted. 20. Learned counsel for the revisionist has made a keen attempt to invite the attention of this Court to some kind of re-appreciation of evidence on the issue of cruelty, by a profound ingenuity of his very enchanting submissions. But this Court is aware of the limitations of its jurisdiction, in the matter of treading into the forbidden area of evaluation of the evidence, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. In this connection the circumscribing limits of the exercise of revisional power of this Court have been expressed very eloquently in the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand and others1 thus: "21. In embarking upon the minutest re-examination of the whole evidence at the revisional stage, the learned Judge of the High Court was totally oblivious of the self-restraint that he was required to exercise in a revision under Section 397 CrPC. On behalf of the accused, reliance is placed on the decision of this Court to which one of us (Justice Sabharwal) is a party, i.e. Criminal Appeal No. 523 of 1997 decided on 9.3.2004 [Ram Briksh v. Ambika Yadav]. That was the case in which the High Court interfered in revision because material evidence was overlooked by the courts below. 22. The Revisional Court is empowered to exercise all the powers conferred on the Appellate Court by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 410 CrPC. Section 401 CrPC is provision enabling the High Court to exercise all powers of Appellate Court, if necessary, in aid of power of superintendence or supervision as a part of power of revision conferred on the High Court or the Session Court. Section 397 CrPC confers power on the High Court or Sessions Court, as the case may be, "for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed and as to regularity of any proceeding of such inferior court." It is for the above purpose, if necessary, the High Court or Sessions Court can exercise all appellate powers. Section 401 CrPC conferring powers of Appellate Court on the revisional court is with the above limited purpose. The provisions contained in Section 395 to Section 401 CrPC, read together, do not indicate that the revisional power of the High Court can be exercised as a second appellate power." 21. The authority on this limitation on the revisional jurisdiction of this Court has stayed consistent as would appear from the law in the case of Duli Chand vs. Delhi Administration.2 22. There is thus no reason that this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be drawn by argument, howsoever charming, into doing what the very nature of the jurisdiction forbids. 23. This Court finds that the courts below, in particular the appellate court, has taken a plausible view on the evidence on record in finding the revisionists guilty of the offence under Section 498 A IPC. There is no jurisdiction, much less reason for this court to disturb this kind of a finding of a fact returned by the two courts below. Accordingly, the conviction of the revisionist for the offence punishable under Section 498 A IPC does not call for interference and deserves to be upheld. Turning to the issue of sentence, the learned counsel has been unsparing in his endeavour to convince this court, looking to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence, and, the character of the offender besides the circumstances of the parties, to find it not a fit case where the parties should be sent back to jail. He submits rather that it is a case where the revisionists are deserving of indulgence to be released on probation of good conduct under Section 4 (1) of the Probation of Offender Act 1958. 24. It may be profitable to refer to the provisions of Section 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 that are quoted and in extenso: "4. 24. It may be profitable to refer to the provisions of Section 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 that are quoted and in extenso: "4. Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct- When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour: Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond." 25. Learned counsel for the revisionist has pointed out that of the two surviving revisionists,Revisionist No 1 Ganga Ram, the husband has already done 5 months 12 days in jail which approximate to a one third of the total term of the sentence whereas revisionist No. 3, who is the mother-in-law of the prosecutrix, is now aged about 73 years. 26. It is true that the decision to release a convict on probation of good conduct to which the revisionists are eligible by the term of Section 4 (1) of the Probation of Offender Act 1958, the circumstances of the case that are to be taken into consideration, amongst others, include the nature of the offence and the character of the offender. 27. 27. There are certain classes of offence which by their nature have been frowned upon by courts as disentitling the convict to the benefit of probation, and, amongst these classes of offences that have been traditionally excluded from the benefit of probation, offences include those under the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, which have the common thread of producing a profound negative impact on the society at large. 28. Likewise offences affecting women such as rape has been held by their lordship of the Supreme Court in the State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Dharam Pal3 to be disentitling of probation. In relation to the offence of the rape which is a big social menace and an offence affecting women, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the State of Himachal Pradesh (supra) while dealing with grant of probation to convicts of rape, disapproved extension of the benefit looking to the nature of the offence being one against the women and held that provisions as to release on probation are designed for persons who can reform and would cease to be a public nuisance in the society. Paragraph no. 6 of the report in State of Himachal Pradash (supra) is extracted below. "6. According to us, the offence of an attempt to commit rape is a serious offence, as ultimately if translated into the act leads to an assault on the most valuable possession of a woman i.e. character, reputation, dignity and honour. In a traditional and conservative country like India, any attempt to misbehave or sexually assault a woman is one of the most depraved acts. The Act is intended to reform the persons who can be reformed and would cease to be a nuisance in the society. But the discretion to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 4 is hedged with a condition about the nature of offence and the character of the offender. Section 6 of the Act makes the provisions applicable in cases where offenders are under 21 years of age, as restrictions on imprisonment of offenders have been indicated in the said provision. In a case involving similar facts, this Court in State of Haryana vs. Prem Chand upheld the judgment of the High Court which extended the benefit of provisions under Section 4 of the Act. In a case involving similar facts, this Court in State of Haryana vs. Prem Chand upheld the judgment of the High Court which extended the benefit of provisions under Section 4 of the Act. Considering the peculiar circumstances of the case and taking into account the fact that on the date of occurrence the accused was less than 21 years old, we feel this is a case where no interference is called for with the judgment of the High Court, though some of the conclusions arrived at by the High Court do not have our approval. The appeal fails and is dismissed." 29. No doubt that the offence under Section 498A IPC is one of the most rampant offences adversely affecting women in society and while it has been misused much by women against husbands and the in-laws for no good reason, it cannot be a case at the end of all determination after trial, and appeal where the husband and his family have been held guilty that there could be the risk of a false implication which is always there in exercise of other jurisdictions at interlocutory stages. But the moot question is whether Section 498A IPC is intrinsically such an offence which by its very nature will universally and absolutely exclude the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to a convict, The question engaged the attention of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent decision in Mohd. Hashim vs. State of U.P. And others .4 where the issue arose in the context of the presecription of a minimum sentence in a case which involved a conviction under Section 498A, 323 IPC and Section ¾ Dowry Prohibition Act since there is a prescription of a minimum sentence of six months under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, though with a proviso, that the Court may for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term less than six months. The issue was dealt with by their Lordships in the context of the Rule of no probation in a case of offences where a minimum sentence is prescribed in profound detail. Their Lordships held thus: "18. The issue that arises for consideration is whether minimum sentence is provided for offences under which the Respondents have been convicted. The issue was dealt with by their Lordships in the context of the Rule of no probation in a case of offences where a minimum sentence is prescribed in profound detail. Their Lordships held thus: "18. The issue that arises for consideration is whether minimum sentence is provided for offences under which the Respondents have been convicted. On a plain reading of Section 323 and 498-A, it is quite clear that there is no prescription of minimum sentence. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that Section 4 of the 1961 Act provides for minimum punishment. To appreciate the said contention, the provision is reproduced below: "4. Penalty for demanding dowry.--If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees: Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months." 19. Learned Counsel would submit that the legislature has stipulated for imposition of sentence of imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months and the proviso only states that sentence can be reduced for a term of less than six months and, therefore, it has to be construed as minimum sentence. The said submission does not impress us in view of the authorities in Arvind Mohan Sinha and Ratan Lal Arora. We may further elaborate that when the legislature has prescribed minimum sentence without discretion, the same cannot be reduced by the Courts. In such cases, imposition of minimum sentence, be it imprisonment or fine, is mandatory and leaves no discretion to the court. However, sometimes the legislation prescribes a minimum sentence but grants discretion and the courts, for reasons to be recorded in writing, may award a lower sentence or not award a sentence of imprisonment. Such discretion includes the discretion not to send the accused to prison. Minimum sentence means a sentence which must be imposed without leaving any discretion to the court. It means a quantum of punishment which cannot be reduced below the period fixed. Such discretion includes the discretion not to send the accused to prison. Minimum sentence means a sentence which must be imposed without leaving any discretion to the court. It means a quantum of punishment which cannot be reduced below the period fixed. If the sentence can be reduced to nil, then the statute does not prescribe a minimum sentence. A provision that gives discretion to the court not to award minimum sentence cannot be equated with a provision which prescribes minimum sentence. The two provisions, therefore, are not identical and have different implications, which should be recognized and accepted for the PO Act. 20. Presently, we shall advert to the second plank of the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. In Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab : AIR 1965 SC 444 . Subba Rao, J., speaking for the majority, opined thus: (AIR pp. 445-46, Para 4) "4. The Act is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology. It is the result of the recognition of the doctrine that the object of criminal law is more to reform the individual offender than to punish him. Broadly stated, the Act distinguishes offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age, and offenders who are guilty of having committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offence. While in the case of offenders who are above the age of 21 years absolute discretion is given to the court to release them after admonition or on probation of good conduct, subject to the conditions laid down in the appropriate provisions of the Act, in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years an injunction is issued to the court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them Under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act." 21. In this regard, it is also seemly to refer to other authorities to highlight how the discretion vested in a court under the PO Act is to be exercised. In this regard, it is also seemly to refer to other authorities to highlight how the discretion vested in a court under the PO Act is to be exercised. In Ram Prakash v. State of Himachal Pradesh AIR 1973 SC 780 , while dealing with Section 4 of the PO Act in the context of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, the Court opined that the word 'may' used in Section 4 of the PO Act does not mean 'must'. On the contrary, as has been held in the said authority, it has been made clear in categorical terms that the provisions of the PO Act distinguishes offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age and offenders who are guilty of committing an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offence. Thereafter, the Court has proceeded to observe (SCC P. 48, Para 7): "7........While in the case of offenders who are above the age of 21 years, absolute discretion is given to the Court to release them after admonition or on probation of good conduct in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years, an injunction is issued to the Court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. (Ratan Lal v. State of Punjab and Ramji Missar v. the State of Bihar : AIR 1963 SC 1088 )." 22. We have referred to the aforesaid authority to stress the point that the Court before exercising the power Under Section 4 of the PO Act has to keep in view the nature of offence and the conditions incorporated under Section 4 of the PO Act. We have referred to the aforesaid authority to stress the point that the Court before exercising the power Under Section 4 of the PO Act has to keep in view the nature of offence and the conditions incorporated under Section 4 of the PO Act. Be it stated in Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana ( AIR 2000 SC 1677 ) it has been held that Parliament has made it clear that only if the Court forms the opinion that it is expedient to release the convict on probation for the good conduct regard being had to the circumstances of the case and one of the circumstances which cannot be sidelined in forming the said opinion is "the nature of the offence." The Court has further opined that though the discretion has been vested in the Court to decide when and how the Court should form the opinion, yet the provision itself provides sufficient indication that releasing the convicted person on probation of good conduct must appear to the Court to be expedient. Explaining the word "expedient", the Court held thus: (SCC p. 86, Para 9-10). 9......The word "expedient" had been thoughtfully employed by Parliament in the Section so as to mean it as "apt and suitable to the end in view". In Black's Law Dictionary the word "expedient" is defined as "suitable and appropriate for accomplishment of a specified object" besides the other meaning referred to earlier. In State of Gujarat v. Jamnadas G. Pabri : AIR 1974 SC 2233 a two- Judge Bench of this Court has considered the word "expedient". Learned Judges have observed in para 21 thus (SCC p. 145): "21. Again, the word 'expedient' used in this provisions, has several shades of meaning. In one dictionary sense, "expedient" (adj.) means "apt and suitable to the end in view", "practical and efficient"; "politic"; "profitable"; "advisable", "fit, proper and suitable to the circumstances of the case". In another shade, it means a device "characterised by mere utility rather than principle, conducive to special advantage rather than to what is universally right" (see Webster's New International Dictionary). 10. It was then held that the court must construe the said word in keeping with the context and object of the provision in its widest amplitude. In another shade, it means a device "characterised by mere utility rather than principle, conducive to special advantage rather than to what is universally right" (see Webster's New International Dictionary). 10. It was then held that the court must construe the said word in keeping with the context and object of the provision in its widest amplitude. Here the word "expedient" is used in Section 4 of the PO Act in the context of casting a duty on the court to take into account "the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence...". This means Section 4 can be resorted to when the court considers the circumstances of the case, particularly the nature of the offence, and the court forms its opinion that it is suitable and appropriate for accomplishing a specified object that the offender can be released on probation of good conduct." 23. We have highlighted these aspects for the guidance of the appellate court as it has exercised the jurisdiction in a perfunctory manner and we are obligated to say that the High Court should have been well advised to rectify the error. 24. At this juncture, learned Counsel for the respondents would submit that no arguments on merits were advanced before the appellate court except seeking release under the PO Act. We have made it clear that there is no minimum sentence, and hence, the provisions of the PO Act would apply. We have also opined that the court has to be guided by the provisions of the PO Act and the precedents of this Court. Regard being had to the facts and circumstances in entirety, we are also inclined to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the Respondents that it will be open for them to raise all points before the appellate court on merits including seeking release under the PO Act. (Emphasis by the Court) 30. The guidance of their Lordships in Mohd. Hashim (supra) places the present case which is one of a conviction Section 498A IPC not in the category of those kinds of cases, like the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act or the Prevention of Corruption Act. However, looking to the nature of the offence the idea of probation is abhorrent. The guidance of their Lordships in Mohd. Hashim (supra) places the present case which is one of a conviction Section 498A IPC not in the category of those kinds of cases, like the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act or the Prevention of Corruption Act. However, looking to the nature of the offence the idea of probation is abhorrent. In fact, in Mohammad Hashim (supra), there was a conviction for an offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act whereas in the present case conviction under Section 4 has been set aside in appeal; the charge that has stuck is one under Section 498A alone. Thus, the difficulty that their Lordships in Mohammad Hashim encountered is not at all involved in the present case. 31. Section 498A IPC prescribes a term of imprisonment which may extend to three years and prescribes fine also. There is however under the said section no prescription of a mandatory minimum sentence. Section 498A IPC reads as follows. "Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.--For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means-- (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any properly or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand." 32. The nature of the offence and the punishment for it no doubt is one that has a social purpose and that is curbing cruelty to women in the matrimonial home by the husband or relatives of the husband. Cruelty has been defined under Clauses (a) and (b) of the explanation appended to Section 498A IPC. 33. The nature and gravity of the cruelty within the parameters of the two explanations would vary a lot based on facts. Cruelty has been defined under Clauses (a) and (b) of the explanation appended to Section 498A IPC. 33. The nature and gravity of the cruelty within the parameters of the two explanations would vary a lot based on facts. In the present case, this Court finds that cruelty, inferred from circumstances by the two courts below is one that is so much on the fringes that conviction on the accompanying charge of dowry demand under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act has not found favour with the appellate court. The appellate court has opined to uphold the conviction under Section 498A IPC for acts of cruelty which though in no way pardonable, intrinsically are not so depraved or so pernicious to the society that these may be kept out of the purview of reform under the Probation of Offenders Act, altogether. This is particularly so as in contemporary context, the approach of the law to an offence under Section 498A IPC is always to attempt reconciliation between parties through alternate dispute redressal mechanism, such as mediation, which in the day when the offence was committed were unknown. The outlook about the matrimonial offence under Section 498A IPC has not essentially changed but the approach has shifted from retribution to one of redemption and peace. It is unfortunate that the wife passed away due to natural causes even before an end of the trial and that put curtains down on a possible rehabilitation at some point of time. However, looking to the nature of the offence of which the revisionists stand convicted in the background of facts found, particularly, by the appellate court, this Court is of opinion that it is not an offence where benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act should not be considered a possibility. 34. So far as the character of the offenders is concerned, there is nothing on record to show that any of the revisionists bear a bad character or they have any history of crime. They are men and women hailing from an ordinary background of an average Indian struggling to make his/her ends meet. The second revisionist is a widow of 73 years and not apparently an educated or independent woman. Revisionist no. 1 is the husband, a man who belongs to the main stream of law abiding citizens. They are men and women hailing from an ordinary background of an average Indian struggling to make his/her ends meet. The second revisionist is a widow of 73 years and not apparently an educated or independent woman. Revisionist no. 1 is the husband, a man who belongs to the main stream of law abiding citizens. The circumstances in which the offence appears to have been committed is more on account of a out-moded social outlook, which perhaps the revisionist as said already learnt to change the hard way after all these years of protracted legal proceedings in three courts. Revisionist no. 1 the husband has already done five months and 12 days in jail, which approximates to a one-third of the term of sentence imposed. 35. Thus, looking to the overall circumstances of the case, in particular, the fact that the appellate court has not found an offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act established against the revisionist, the fact that the offence at the time it was committed appears to be more on account of a changing social attitudes on the one hand and lack of avenues to reconcile on the other, the fact that revisionist no. 1, the husband has undergone nearly a one third of the sentence imposed while revisionist no. 3, the mother-in-law is an old woman of 73 years now, the fact that the revisionists have also been through a punishing and protracted criminal litigation commencing with the registration of a crime in the year 1989 with a journey through three courts, and, the fact that the revisionists are otherwise respectable and law abiding citizen in the mainstream of life, it would be under the facts and circumstances of the present case in the fitness of things to release the revisionists on probation under Section 4 of the U.P. Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. 36. Accordingly, this revision is allowed in part. The conviction under Section 498A IPC is upheld; the sentence awarded to the revisionists stands modified. It is ordered that the revisionist Ganga Ram @ Ganga Saran S/o Hira and revisionist no. 3 Phoolwati widow of the late Hira be released on probation under Section 4 of the U.P. Probation of Offenders Act on each of them executing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. It is ordered that the revisionist Ganga Ram @ Ganga Saran S/o Hira and revisionist no. 3 Phoolwati widow of the late Hira be released on probation under Section 4 of the U.P. Probation of Offenders Act on each of them executing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 20,000/- on the condition that they will maintain the peace and be of good behavior for a period of one year. 37. Upon breach of the aforesaid condition the revisionist shall be taken into custody to serve out the sentence awarded to them. 38. Personal bonds shall be filed to the satisfaction of the trial court. Upon execution of personal bonds as directed here, bail bonds executed by the revisionists in connection to the bail pending revision shall stand cancelled and sureties, if any, furnished shall stand discharged. 39. The revisionist is directed to appear before the trial court within three months of date to comply with this order. 40. They are ordered to do so. 41. Let this order be certified to the trial court forthwith.