JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner by way of the present petition has prayed for the following main reliefs : “(A) To pass any order, direction and/or writ quashing and setting aside the decision of the respondent No. 2 of removal of the petitioner from the office of Councillor of Ward No. 18, Rajkot being illegal, unlawful and unconstitutional; (B) To pass any order, direction and/or writ quashing and setting aside the decision of the respondent No. 2 to declare the office of Councillor, Ward No. 18, Rajkot become vacant from 13.08.2018; (C) To pass any order, direction and/or writ directing respondent No. 2 to make reference under S. 12 of the GPMC Act, 1949 to court for appropriate decision.” 2. As per the case of the petitioner, she got elected as Councillor of Ward No. 18 of Rajkot Municipal Corporation as Congress Party candidate in the year 2015. Soon after the election, the petitioner was blessed with a baby girl in the year 2016. However, due to some complications during the period of pregnancy, the petitioner was adviced to take maximum rest. According to the petitioner, because of her ill health, she could not attend the meetings of the Corporation in person. The petitioner thereafter came to know through newspaper reports that a decision has been taken by the respondent-Corporation declaring that the petitioner had ceased to be the Councillor of the Corporation as she had failed to attend the General Body Meetings of the Corporation for consecutive period of six months. The petitioner therefore on 18.08.2018 sent a notice to the Municipal Secretary asking him for explanation of the grounds of removal. As per the case of the petitioner, the petitioner was not served with the notice of the general body meeting to be held on 15.06.2018 and the same was served at the time of serving notice of meeting to be held on 13.08.2018. Hence, the absence of the petitioner was not willful. The petitioner also thereafter made representation on 23.08.2018 requesting the respondent No. 2 Municipal Commissioner to make a reference to the Judge as per Section 12 of the Gujarat Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”). However the respondent Corporation having not taken any decision on the said representation, the present petition has been filed. 3. However the respondent Corporation having not taken any decision on the said representation, the present petition has been filed. 3. The respondent Corporation has resisted the petition by filing the reply denying the allegations made in the petition and contending inter alia that it was a statutory obligation on the part of every Councillor to attend the General Body Meeting of the Corporation and if the Councillor absents himself/herself during three successive months from the meetings of the Corporation, he or she would cease to hold office as such, in view of Section 11 of the said Act. It is further submitted that the Rajkot Municipal Corporation through its Secretary would send the agenda of meeting to every Councillor at the address given by the Councillor, and accordingly for the general meetings held on 19.04.2018, 15.06.2018 and 13.08.2018, the agenda with all details were sent to all the Councillors including the petitioner, however the petitioner did not attend any of the said meetings. It has also been contended that the petition was not maintainable in view of the alternative remedy available under Section 12 of the said Act. The petitioner having ceased to hold the office as Councillor by virtue of Clause (b) of Section 11 of the said Act, the Corporation was not required to follow the principles of natural justice. 4. The learned Advocate Mr. Asim Pandya appearing for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the provisions contained in Clause (b) of Section 11 of the said Act did not apply to the case of the petitioner, inasmuch as the Corporation had failed to hold three meetings in three successive months. According to him, the Corporation was required to hold atleast one ordinary meeting as per the Rules for the proceedings of the Corporation and in the instant case, the Corporation had held meetings in the months of April, June and August, which could not be said meetings held in three consecutive months as required in clause (b) of Section 11. He further submitted that there could also not be an automatic cessation or disability incurred by the Councillor, as there is an exception contained in the said Clause to the effect that in case of temporary illness or other cause approved by the Corporation for not attending the meeting, the Councillor would not cease to hold the office. According to Mr. According to Mr. Pandya there was also gross violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the Corporation without giving any opportunity of hearing had declared that the petitioner had ceased to hold the office, which the petitioner came to know from the newspaper reports. As regards the alternative remedy, the learned Advocate Mr. Pandya submitted that the petitioner had already made a representation on 23.08.2018 for referring the dispute to the Judge as contemplated under Section 12 of the said Act, however the Corporation having not taken any decision on the said representation, the present petition was filed by the petitioner. He further submitted that the Secretary of the Municipal Corporation had no authority to declare that the seat of the petitioner as a Councillor had fallen vacant on account of the petitioner having ceased to hold the office. 5. However, the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Jani appearing for the respondent-Corporation submitted that undisputedly the petitioner had remained absent in three consecutive meetings held in the months of April, June and August. According to him, the Corporation is required to hold General Body Meeting atleast once in two months and not once every month, as per the provisions regulating the Corporation’s proceedings. He further submitted that admittedly the petitioner had not sought exemption prior or after holding of any of the meetings and therefore cannot get the benefit, and had incurred disability as contemplated in Clause (b) of Section 11. According to him, it was the statutory obligation on the part of the petitioner who was the Councillor to attend the meetings and she having failed to attend the meetings in three successive months, she had automatically ceased to hold the office. 6. Mr. Jani has relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society versus Registrar of Societies reported in 1999 (0) GLHELSC 11415 to submit that the petitioner had incurred automatic disability on account of failure to attend the meetings in three successive months. Reliance was also placed by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Jani on the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan reported in 2000 (7) SCC 529 to submit that nonobservance of the principles of natural justice would not render the decision illegal in all cases, more particularly where the cessation is automatic. Mr. Reliance was also placed by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Jani on the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan reported in 2000 (7) SCC 529 to submit that nonobservance of the principles of natural justice would not render the decision illegal in all cases, more particularly where the cessation is automatic. Mr. Jani also pointed out from the documents produced by the respondent-Corporation along with the Affidavit-in-Reply that as per the practice of the Corporation, all the notices for holding the General Body Meeting were being served to all the Councillors by Registered Post as well as by Public Notice, and it was not believable that the petitioner was not aware about the meeting to be held on 15.06.2018. 7. In order to appreciate the rival contentions raised by the learned advocates appearing for the parties, it would be beneficial to reproduce the relevant provisions contained in Section 11 and 12 of the said Act. The said provisions read as under: “11. Disabilities for continuing as councillor.- A councilor shall cease to hold office as such if at any time during his term of office he : (a) becomes disqualified for being a councillor by reason pf the provisions of Section 10; (b) absents himself during three successive months from the meetings of the Corporation, except from temporary illness or other cause to be approved by the Corporation; (c) absents himself from the meetings of the Corporation during six successive months from any cause whatever, whether approved by the Corporation or not; (d) acts as a councillor or as a member of any committee of the Corporation by voting on, or taking part in the discussion of, or asking any question concerning, any matter in which he has directly or indirectly by himself or his partner any such share or interest as is described in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 10 or in which he is professionally interested on behalf of a client, principal or other person. 12. Questions as to disqualification to be determined by the Judge: (1) If any doubt or dispute arises whether a councillor has ceased to hold office as such under Section 11, such councillor or any other councillor may, and at the request of the Corporation, the Commissioner shall, refer the question to the Judge.” 8. 12. Questions as to disqualification to be determined by the Judge: (1) If any doubt or dispute arises whether a councillor has ceased to hold office as such under Section 11, such councillor or any other councillor may, and at the request of the Corporation, the Commissioner shall, refer the question to the Judge.” 8. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the petitioner has challenged the decision of the respondent-Corporation in treating the seat of petitioner as the Councillor vacant on she having ceased to hold the office, on account of her remaining absent during three successive months in the meetings of the Corporation, as per clause (b) of Section 11 of the said Act. It is not disputed by the petitioner that the petitioner remained absent in the three meetings held by the Corporation on 19.04.2018, 15.06.2018 and 13.08.2016. It is also not disputed that the petitioner had not sought any exemption prior to or after any of the said meetings. The bone of contention raised by the learned Advocate Mr. Pandya is that the Clause (b) of Section 11 would not be attracted in case of the petitioner as the Corporation had failed to hold the meeting atleast once every month and three meetings in three successive months. In the opinion of the Court, the said submission cannot be accepted. As per the provisions regulating the Corporation's proceedings contained in Chapter II of the Rules, the Corporation is required to hold one ordinary meeting in every two months, and in the instant case the Corporation has held atleast one meeting every two months i.e. in April, June and August. The petitioner having remained absent in all the three meetings, the provisions contained in Clause (b) of Section 11 would squarely be attracted. She had ceased to hold the office automatically on her remaining absent during three successive months from the meetings of the Corporation. The said cessation or disability had come into effect by operation of law. 9. So far as non-service of notice of meeting to be held on 15.06.2018 is concerned, as transpiring from the documents, more particularly postal receipts produced by the respondent Corporation, it appears that the said notice was sent by the Corporation through Registered Post A.D. and was also published in the local daily Gujarat Samachar on 07.06.2018. 9. So far as non-service of notice of meeting to be held on 15.06.2018 is concerned, as transpiring from the documents, more particularly postal receipts produced by the respondent Corporation, it appears that the said notice was sent by the Corporation through Registered Post A.D. and was also published in the local daily Gujarat Samachar on 07.06.2018. Under the circumstances, it is unbelievable that the petitioner was not aware about the said meeting. It is also pertinent to note that in Rajkot Municipal Corporation, 33 out of 72 Councillors belonged to congress party and therefore also it is not believable that the petitioner would not be made aware about the meeting to be held on 15.06.2018. The petitioner had also not raised any such grievance even in the next meeting held by the Corporation. 10. The submission of learned Advocate Mr. Pandya that the decision of the Corporation was violative of the principles of natural justice also cannot be accepted. From the plain reading of Section 11(b), it clearly transpires that the Councillor would automatically cease to hold the office as such if at any point of time, during his/her term of the office, he/she absents himself/herself during three successive months from the meetings of the Corporation, except from the temporary illness or other cause approved by the Corporation. As stated herein above, the petitioner had never applied seeking exemption from attending the meetings on account of any temporary illness or for any other cause, and therefore the question of Corporation approving such exemption also did not arise. Such cessation, being automatic by operation of law, there was no question of the Corporation giving any opportunity of hearing or taking any decision as to whether the petitioner had incurred the disability under Section 11(b) of the said Act or not. 11. At this juncture, it is required to be noted that as per Section 12 of the said Act, if any doubt or dispute arises whether a Councillor has ceased to hold the office as such under Section 11, such Councillor or any other Councillor may, and at the request of the Corporation, the Commissioner shall, refer the question to the Judge. Having regard to the said provision, it clearly transpires that it was open for the petitioner Councillor to approach the Judge if she had any doubt or she wanted to raise any dispute as to whether she had ceased to hold office as such under Section 11 or not. Though it is sought to be submitted by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Jani for the Corporation that the petitioner was required to request the Corporation for referring such doubt or dispute to the Judge or the Court as required under Section 12(1) of the said Act, in the opinion of the Court, the petitioner herself could have raised the said dispute or doubt and referred it to the Judge under the said provisions. From the bare reading of Section 12(1) of the said Act, it clearly emerges that the concerned Councillor or any other Councillor may and the commissioner shall at the request of the Corporation, refer such dispute or doubt to the Judge, and therefore it was not incumbent on the part of the petitioner to request the Corporation to refer the dispute to the Judge under Section 12 of the said Act. She herself could have invoked the said provision. The Court therefore is of the opinion that though an alternative efficacious remedy was available to the petitioner under Section 12(1) of the said Act, the petition has been filed without availing the said remedy. It may be noted that the Court had expressed the said view to the learned Advocates for the parties, before hearing the petition on merits, however they preferred to argue the petition on merits also, and hence the petition has been decided on merits. In that view of the matter, the Court does not find any merits in the present petition and the petition is dismissed accordingly. Petition dismissed.