Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 1207 (RAJ)

Sayyed Abubakra Naqvi v. State of Rajasthan

2018-05-08

K.S.JHAVERI, VIJAY KUMAR VYAS

body2018
JUDGMENT 1. By way of this appeal, the appellant has assailed the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge whereby learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition preferred by the original petitioners-respondents no.3 to 5 herein. The appellant was respondent No.3 in the original writ petition and challenged the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge whereas, respondents No. 4 and 5, namely-Nida Khan and Sayed Afroz Zaidi (proforma respondents No. 6 and 7 herein) have accepted the order of the learned Single Judge and have not challenged the same. 2. The facts of the case are that appellant was in government service and working as PTI till he took voluntary retirement on 4.2.2016 and thereafter he was nominated as member of the Wakf Board on 9.3.2016 i.e. within a short period of one month after voluntary retirement. The respondents No. 3 to 5 (original petitioners) challenged his nomination as a member of Rajasthan Wakf Board in exercise of powers given under Section 14 (1) (c) read with section 14 (1) (d) of the Wakf Act, 1995 (in short Act of 1995). 3. Counsel for the appellant has taken us to the provisions of Wakf Act and more particularly Section 14 (1)(c) of the Act of 1995 which reads as under:- section 14(1) in The Wakf Act, 1995 (1) The Board for a State and the Union territory of Delhi shall consist of- (a)...... (b)...... (i)... (ii)... (iii)... (iv) .. (c) one and not more than two members to be nominated by the State Government representing eminent Muslim organisations 3.1. (b)...... (i)... (ii)... (iii)... (iv) .. (c) one and not more than two members to be nominated by the State Government representing eminent Muslim organisations 3.1. He contended that in view of the aforesaid provisions, the only requirement is that he must be representing eminent Muslim organization whereas the appellant was Chairman of the 'Muslim Mahasabha Sansthan, Tonk' which is carrying on the activities for the betterment of the Muslim community having its objects as under:- 1& vf'kf{kr eqfLye oxZ ds fy, f'kf{kr cukus dk dk;ZA 2& csjkstxkj eqfLyeksa dks jkstxkj ds fy, ekxZn'kZd cuukA 3& eqfLye vke lHkk djds lekt esa QSyh cqjkbZ;ka nwj djukA 4& eqfLye eksgYyksa esa fofHkUu izdkj ds dSEi yxokdj jkgr igqapkukA 5& fgUnw eqfLye ,drk ij fo'ks"k cy nsukA 6& eqfLye lekt esa ns'kHkfDr iSnk djukA 7& ljdkj ls feyus okys ykHk dh tkudkjh lekt rd igqapkukA 8& eqfLye efgykvksa Nk=&Nk=kvksa dks mPp ,oa rduhdh v/;;u gsrq lgk;rk iznku djukA 10& xzkeh.k o 'kgjh {ks=ksa esa f'k{kk ds izfr tkxj.k iSnk djuk rFkk ubZ rduhdh O;olk; LojkstxkjUeq[k f'k{kk nsuk] fuj{kj O;fDr;ksa o NksVs cPpksa dks f'kf{kr djuk o tutkfr] v0t0tk0] fiNM+k oxZ] vYi la[;d ,oa vf/kd :i ls fiNM+s O;fDr;ksa esa foKku f'k{kk i;kZoj.k o iznq"k.k LokLF; tula[;k fu;U=.k d`f"k f'k{kk ,oa dEI;wVj f'k{kk nsukA 11& vYi la[;d leqnk; ds thou Lrj dks mwWapk mBkuk ,oa jkT; o dsUnz ljdkj }kjk pykbZ tkus okyh ;kstukvksa dks lekt esa QSsykdj tkx`r djuk ,oa mudk vkRefuHkZj cukus esa lg;ksx iznku djukA 12& yksxksa ds fy, f'k{k.k izf'k{k.k dkWyst] f'k{kk rduhdh f'k{kk] fo|ky; uflZax dkWyst] izkFkfed ek/;fed f'k{kk o dEI;wVj foKku] VkbZfiax] flykbZ dqVhj m|ksx dks fl[kkus dh O;OLFkk djukA 13& eqfLye lekt esa O;kIr cqjkbZ;ksa dks nwj djuk o efgykvksa ,oa cPpksa dks tks vlgk;] xjhc] ifjR;Dr efgayk,] rykd'kqnk vkfn ds fy, pykbZ xbZ fofHkUu ;kstukvksa dh tkudkjh izkIr dj mudks lekt }kjk lg;ksx djus ij cy nsuk rFkk muds thou Lrj dks mUur djukA 3.2. He contended that the appellant was rendering his social services for the betterment of Muslims and that organization ought to be considered as eminent as its member are 20,000 in number. He contended that the appellant was rendering his social services for the betterment of Muslims and that organization ought to be considered as eminent as its member are 20,000 in number. It appears that the dispute which is subject matter of the controversy is notification dated 9.3.2016 which came for initiation of proceedings against the removal of illegal encroachment made in the Wakf property and which has resulted into the present petition after one and a half year therefore, he contended that the learned Single Judge has committed an error in entertaining the writ petition after one and a half year where appellant has already been nominated as a member of Wakf Board. 3.3. Counsel for the appellant has taken us to the para no.8 of the reply filed by the State Government which reads as under:- 8. That the contents of para no.8 of the writ petition are not admitted in the manner stated by the petitioners and hence, the same is denied. It is submitted that the State Government, has after going through the impeccable credential of the respondent no.3 to 5 found it fit to nominate respondent no.3 to 5 as Chairman and member of the Wakf Board. It is submitted that notification for nomination of the respondent no.3 has been issued following the due procedure prescribed by law. It is well provided that the member shall be appointed that the member shall be appointed by the Government by notification in the official gazette. The respondent no.3 to 5 are eminent and respected persons and has represented the eminent Muslim organization which is clear from his bio-dates. Thus, having regard to the provisions of section 14(c)(d) of the respondent no.3 has rightly been nominated as member of the Board. The State Government after objectively considering the matter, has nominated respondent no.3 to 5 as chairman and members of the Wakf Board. The petitioners are no justified in questioning the nomination on hypothetical basis. The nomination has been made on the basis of material available with the State Government. 3.4. He contended that the State Government has justified their appointment. The State Government after objectively considering the matter, has nominated respondent no.3 to 5 as chairman and members of the Wakf Board. The petitioners are no justified in questioning the nomination on hypothetical basis. The nomination has been made on the basis of material available with the State Government. 3.4. He contended that the State Government has justified their appointment. Counsel for the appellant has also contended that the appellant has done social work and is closely associated with the welfare of minority community and in view of the decision of Himachal Pradesh High Court in Ali Mohammed v. State of H.P. and ors., decided on 16.3.2016 wherein it has been held as under:- 7. It would be thus clear that public interest can only be entertained at the instance of a bonafide litigant. It cannot be used by unscrupulous litigants to disguise personal or individual grievance as public interest litigation. 8. That apart, this Court cannot be oblivious to the fact that it is dealing with a Waqf, as defined in Section 3 (r) of the Waqf Act, 1995, as amended vide the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2013 (27 of 2013) which "means the permanent dedication by any person, of any movable or immovable property for any purpose recognized by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable and includes- "(i) a waqf by user but such waqf shall not cease to be a waqf by reason only of the user having ceased irrespective of the period of such cesser; (ii) a Shamlat Patti, Shamlat Deh, Jumla Malkan or by any other name entered in a revenue record; (iii) "grants", including mashrat-ul-khidmat for any purpose recognized by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable; and (iv) a waqf-alal-aulad to the extent to which the property is dedicated for any purpose recognized by Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable, provided when the line of succession fails, the income of the waqf shall be spent for education, development, welfare and such other purposes as recognized by Muslim law, and "waqf" means any person making such dedication." It would be evident that the waqf means the permanent dedication of any person of any movable or immoveable property for any purpose recognized by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable and therefore, the scope of public interest litigation in matters of such institutions is extremely limited. This dedication and institution is governed by a particular legislation, which provides for a proper mechanism for its management and it is not proper for this Court to entertain litigation, much less, public interest litigation qua the same. 11. Adverting to the facts, it would be noticed that the entire thrust of the petitioner is that the constitution of the Board is not as per the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act and electoral college has not been constituted by the State and therefore, it should be directed to constitute the same in conformity with Section 14 of the Act and also include one person from the Shia community. 14. It is evident from the perusal of the above notification that it was not reasonably practicable for the State Government to constitute an electoral college from any of the categories mentioned in sub clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (b) of sub section (1) of Section 14 for want of availability of eligible members and it, therefore, exercised powers under sub-section (1) and (3) of Section 14 of the Act and nominated the aforesaid members from the Muslim community as members of the Board with immediate effect. Nowhere in the entire petition has the petitioner disputed this position or even made mention about the availability of any member who may fall within sub clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. 15. That apart, we cannot even find any fault with the action of the respondents in falling back and invoking its authority under sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Act, which provision by virtue of its commencing with non-obstante clause has overriding effect. What is provided therein is only that the State Government has to record its satisfaction in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to constitute an electoral college for any of the categories mentioned in clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act and nominate such persons as members of the Board as it deems fit. It is evident from the notification (supra) that such satisfaction has been duly recorded and this fact has not even been disputed by the petitioner. 16. It is evident from the notification (supra) that such satisfaction has been duly recorded and this fact has not even been disputed by the petitioner. 16. In view of the above, we have no hesitation to conclude that the Waqf Board has been constituted strictly in terms of the Act and the present petition appears to have been filed under ploy on considerations that are extraneous to public interest. The petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands, clean heart and clean objectives. 19. There is no genuine public interest involved in this petition and since the petitioner has abused the process of this Court, he in ordinary circumstances would have been liable for imposition of heavy costs. However, taking into consideration the fact that the notice of this petition has not been issued to the opposite party, we refrain from doing so. But at the same time, the petitioner is warned not to indulge in such misadventures in future. The petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms, so also the pending applications, if any. 3.5. He contended that writ of quo warranto should not be entertained and in support of the same he has relied on following judgments:- (i) Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board Employees' Association and Ors. (28.08.2006 SC) 52. At any event implicit in the finding of the Division Bench that the appointing authority has no right to appeal in quo warranto proceedings is that the Court cannot probe the mind of the appointing authority in a motion for quo warranto. The High Court erred in probing the mind of the government and acted contrary to its own finding on the role of appointing authority in quo warranto proceedings. The reasons felt out by the learned Judges of the Division Bench are not sustainable in law and the impugned judgment is liable to be interfered with in these appeals. The learned Judges are not right in quashing the appointment of the appellant as Managing Director on the misconception that he has been re-appointed to the said office, whereas it was a fresh appointment under the provisions of the Act and in accordance with the prescribed qualification and eligibility under the Act. Further the appointee holds the office during the pleasure of the Government as provided under Section 6(1) of the Act. Further the appointee holds the office during the pleasure of the Government as provided under Section 6(1) of the Act. The learned Judges are not correct in holding that the Government is not affected by allowing the writ of quo warranto against the appointee and observed that the Government ought not have filed the appeal. It is unfortunate that the learned Judges have observed that the Government has filed the appeal at the instance of the appointee. The learned Judges, in our opinion, failed to appreciate that it is the duty of the Government to justify the appointment as such there is no wrong in filing the writ appeal. 53. In the result, we hold: (a) that the appellant was not disqualified for appointment as Managing Director w.e.f. 1.2.2004. (b) There is no bar for appointment to the post in question on contract basis. The Government has absolute right to appoint persons on contract basis. (c) Writ of quo warranto does not lie if the alleged violation is not of a statutory provision. (d) There is no violation of Section 4(2) of the Act and Rule 3 of the Rules because the appellant had experience in administration and capacity in commercial matters before he was appointed as Managing Director on contract basis by the Government. (e) The Government has no doubt power to make contractual appointment until further orders. The power included the power to make appointment on substantive basis temporary, officiating basis, ad hoc basis, daily wages or contractual basis. (f) Writ filed by respondents 1 and 2 is motivated. (g) The petitioners in the writ petition, respondent No. 1 herein which is an unregistered Association under the Trade Unions Act cannot maintain the writ petition. (h) The findings of legal mala fides is unsustainable and has no basis. The finding of legal mala fides suffers from other infirmities as far as placing reliance on the complaints against the appellant without adverting to the orders of the Lokyukta detail examination, the appellant is unequivocal terms in both the cases. 54. For the foregoing reasons, the appeals are allowed and the order impugned in this appeal passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in W.A. No. 86/2006 affirming the judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside. 54. For the foregoing reasons, the appeals are allowed and the order impugned in this appeal passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in W.A. No. 86/2006 affirming the judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside. (ii) Arun Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India and Others (20.01.2000 - DELHC) Service Law - Appointment--Judicial review Appointment to the office of Chairman of Securities and Exchange Board of India in exercise of powers under section 4(4) of Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992--No public interest involved in the controversy relating to appointment for a term of five years as against three years--Highly belated petition--Petition, dismissed with costs. N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose and Ors. (06.05.2009 - SC) 103. Appointment to the post of President of a State Commission must satisfy not only the eligibility criteria of the candidate but also undertaking of the process of consultation. 184. It is difficult to accept the submission of Mr. K.K. Venugopal that such 'consultation' would not be 'concurrence' as like the Collegium in the matter of making recommendation for appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts where the view of he Collegium shall have the primacy. For appointment as President of the State Commission, the Chief Justice of the High Court shall have the primacy and thus the term 'consultation' even for the said purpose shall mean 'concurrence' only. 187. For the aforementioned purpose the Court must bear in mind that the constitutional scheme of independence of the judiciary embodied in Article 50 of the Constitution of India should by no means be allowed to be eroded. 194. Before parting, however, we would place on record that Mr. Ramamurthy, learned Counsel on 5.5.2009 filed a memorandum before us stating that the appellant Shri N. Kannadasan has submitted his resignation. It is, however, not stated that the said offer of resignation has been accepted by the State of Tamil Nadu. Moreover, there is no prayer for withdrawal of the special leave petition. 3.6. In view of the above, he contended that the order passed by the State Government ought not to have been entertained in writ petition. 4. Counsel for the original petitioner-respondent no.3,4 and 5 has contended that the learned Single Judge has gone into details of the case and after taking into consideration the provisions which are applicable has rightly allowed the writ petition. 4. Counsel for the original petitioner-respondent no.3,4 and 5 has contended that the learned Single Judge has gone into details of the case and after taking into consideration the provisions which are applicable has rightly allowed the writ petition. 4.1. Counsel for the respondent has taken us to the judgment of the learned Single Judge more particularly where the learned Single Judge after relying on the judgment of Karnataka High Court in Karnataka Wakfs Protection Joint Action Committee and Anr. v. State of Karnataka and ors., 2014 ILR (Karnataka) 2618 and judgment of the Supreme Court in Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha v. Dhobei Sahoo and ors., (2014) 1 SCC 161 has held as under: The brief facts of the case have already been given thus need not to be reiterated. The respondent No.3 has been nominated under Section 14(1)(c) and the non-petitioner Nos.4 and 5 have been nominated under Section 14(1)(d) of the Act of 1995. Section 14(1) of the Act of 1995 is thus quoted, as otherwise, referred by both the parties : "14. Composition of Board.- (1) The Board for a State and 3 [the National Capital Territory of Delhi] shall consist of- (a) a Chairperson; (b) one and not more than two members, as the State Government may think fit, to be elected from each of the electoral colleges consisting of- (i) Muslim Members of Parliament from the State or, as the case may be, 3 [the National Capital Territory of Delhi]; (ii) Muslim Members of the State Legislature; (iii) Muslim members of the Bar Council of the concerned State or Union territory: Provided that in case there is no Muslim member of the Bar Council of a State or a Union territory, the State Government or the Union territory administration, as the case may be, may nominate any senior Muslim advocate from that State or the Union territory, and] (iv) Mutawallis of the 1 [auqaf] having an annual income of rupees one lakh and above. [Explanation I.- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the members from categories mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iv), shall be elected from the electoral college constituted for each category. [Explanation I.- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the members from categories mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iv), shall be elected from the electoral college constituted for each category. Explanation II.- For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that in case a Muslim member ceases to be a Member of Parliament from the State or National Capital Territory of Delhi as referred to in sub-clause (i) of clause (b) or ceases to be a Member of the State Legislative Assembly as required under sub-clause (ii) of clause (b), such member shall be deemed to have vacated the office of the member of the Board for the State or National Capital Territory of Delhi, as the case may be, from the date from which such member ceased to be a Member of Parliament from the State National Capital Territory of Delhi, or a Member of the State Legislative Assembly, as the case may be;] (c) one person from amongst Muslims, who has professional experience in town planning or business management, social work, finance or revenue, agriculture and development activities, to be nominated by the State Government; (d) one person each from amongst Muslims, to be nominated by the State Government from recognised scholars in Shia and Sunni Islamic Theology; (e) one person from amongst Muslims, to be nominated by the State Government from amongst the officers of the State Government not below the rank of Joint Secretary to the State Government;] (1A) No Minister of the Central Government or, as the case may be, a State Government, shall be elected or nominated as a member of the Board: Provided that in case of a Union territory, the Board shall consist of not less than five and not more than seven members to be appointed by the Central Government from categories specified under sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of clause (b) or clauses (c) to (e) in sub-section (1): Provided further that at least two Members appointed on the Board shall be women: Provided also that in every case where the system of mutawalli exists, there shall be one mutawalli as the member of the Board.]" The question for my consideration is as to whether the non-petitioner No.3 has rightly been nominated under Section 14(1) (c) of the Act of 1995. It is admitted that he has been nominated taking him to be a social worker. It is admitted that he has been nominated taking him to be a social worker. It is not in dispute that his nomination is made by the State Government being a Muslim and, merely for that reason, the scrutiny as to whether he was in possession of required qualification cannot be ousted. It may be that the State Government has made scrutiny of the candidature after taking into consideration the bio-data/resume. The perusal of the bio-data submitted by the petitioners reveals that the non-petitioner was in service as PTI till 04th February, 2016. If the details given in the bio-data are looked into then it would reveal that as a Chairperson, Muslim Mahasabha Sansthan Rajasthan, he worked to connect the Muslim society with BJP, the political party. The detail furnished by him shows projection of the activity with the political party. No doubt, it is true that the non-petitioner No.3 was a General Secretary of the Rajasthan Rajya Karamchari Mahasangh and also President of Rajasthan Prathmik and Madhyamik Shikshak Sangh, Rajsthan, but, no social work undertaken by him has been described. The question is as to whether holder of these two posts can be taken to be social worker. The respondent No.3 has further made disclosure that he was in Muslim Rashtriya Manch and worked as a Director. Learned Additional Advocate General Mr. Shyam Arya was asked as to whether any government servant can have alliance with political party or an organisation, that too, while in service. Mr. Shyam Arya, AAG submits that the government servant can alliance him with philosophy of a political party and can actively participate to get vote for it. He has further stated that social work cannot be defined by the petitioners, respondents, the State Government or even the Court. The statement aforesaid is quite relevant and shows that even the Government of Rajasthan could not define the word "social work" and such constraint has been imposed even on the Court, meaning thereby, without defining the social work, nomination has been made by the State Government. I fail to understand the arguments from the side of the Government to that effect while supporting the nomination of the non-petitioner No.3. The constrain to define the word "social work" has been imposed even on the Court. No employee can take part in the politics. It is not so permissible under Rules of 1971. I fail to understand the arguments from the side of the Government to that effect while supporting the nomination of the non-petitioner No.3. The constrain to define the word "social work" has been imposed even on the Court. No employee can take part in the politics. It is not so permissible under Rules of 1971. The rule aforesaid is quoted hereunder for ready reference : "7. Taking part in politics and elections.- (1) No Government servant shall be a member of, or be otherwise associated with, any political party or any organization which takes part in politics nor shall he take part in, subscribe in aid of, or assist in any other manner, any political movement or activity. (2) It shall be the duty of every Government servant to endeavor to prevent any member of his family from taking part in, subscribe in aid of, or assist in any other manner any movement or activity which is, tends directly or indirectly to be subversive of the Government as by law established and where a Government servant is unable to prevent a member of his family from taking part in, or subscribing in aid of or assisting any other manner, any such movement or activity, he shall make a report to that effect to the Government. (3) If any question arises whether a party is a political party or whether any organization takes part in politics or whether any movement or activity falls within the scope of sub-rule (2), the decision of the Government thereon shall be final. (4) No Government servant shall canvass or otherwise interfere with or use his influence in connection with, or take part in an election to any legislature or local authority; Provided that - (i) a Government servant qualified to vote at such election may exercise his right to vote, but where he does so, he shall give no indication of the manner in which he proposes to vote or has voted; (ii) a Government servant shall not be deemed to have contravened the provisions of this rule by reason only that he assists in the conduct of an election in the due performance of a duty imposed on him by or under any law for the time being in force. Explanation. Explanation. -This display by a Government servant on his person, vehicle or residence of any electoral symbol shall amount to using his influence in connection with election, within the meaning of this sub-rule. Note.- (i) A Government servant who has reason to believe that attempts are being made to induce him to break the provisions of this rule by or on behalf of an official superior or superiors shall report the facts to the Chief Secretary to Government of Rajasthan. (ii) Proposing or seconding the nomination of a candidate at an election or acting a Polling agent shall be deemed as an action participating in the election." Perusal of the bio-data of the non-petitioner NO.3 shows his political affiliation throughout and at least from the year 2004. It is not so permissible under the Rules of 1971 and, in any case, even if it is ignored to see whether he was has done some social work, no description exists other than of holding the post in same organisations. The State Government was under an obligation to enquire into the matter before nominations are made because it should not be in violation of the provisions of law. There is nothing on record to show that whatever declarations made by the candidates, were subjected to any scrutiny. It cannot be considered to be objective consideration when according to learned Additional Advocate General, social work cannot be defined even by the State Government. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.4 and 5 has also supported the nomination by referring to their qualifications and, more specifically, as Alimma and Molimma. The question is as to whether they have considered to be recognised scholars in Shiya and Sunni Islamic Theology. The word "scholar" has not been defined in the Act of 1995 thus it needs to be taken from the dictionary or from relevant material, which includes, Outlines of Islamic Culture, as was considered by the Karnataka High Court in the case of Karnataka Wakfs Protection Joint Action Committee and Anr. (supra). The word "Theology" was also taken into consideration and it has been decided as to who can be said to be scholar in Islamic Theology in Shiya and Sunni, which are as under : "22. To make a nomination under Section 14(1)(d) of the Act, the person should be a Recognised Scholar in Islamic Tehology. (supra). The word "Theology" was also taken into consideration and it has been decided as to who can be said to be scholar in Islamic Theology in Shiya and Sunni, which are as under : "22. To make a nomination under Section 14(1)(d) of the Act, the person should be a Recognised Scholar in Islamic Tehology. In teh Book titled "Outlines of Islamics Culture" Second Edition, by AMA Shushtery, Professor of Iranian Language and Literature, University of Mysore, it is noted that Theology has been systemized into a science. Under this head, the following subjects have to be studies by those desirous of knowing it for practical purposes : (1) A commentary on Quran (2) Pertaining to tradition (3) Fundamental principles of Muslim Law based on the Quran, the Tradition, consensus of opinion and analogy. (4) Rules relating morals, civil and criminal law. (5) Scholastic theology based on the knowledge of unity of God, His atributes, the word of God, freedom of will, the sacred books, the Prophets, the angels, the punishment and the reward, the resurrection, etc. (6) A brief study of logic." The recognized scholars of any Theology is required for nomination. It cannot on the qualification possessed by the non-petitioner Nos.4 and 5. If their qualifications are looked into, it is not sufficient to be recognised as scholars of Shiya and Sunni Islamic Theology. The Alimma and Molimma cannot be recgonised as scholar in the Islamic Theology. In view of the above, I do not find that nomination of the non-petitioner Nos.3 to 5 under Section 14(1)(c) and (d) of the Act of 1995 is in consonance to the provisions of the law. The scrutiny of the nomination can be made by this Court and can pass appropriate order, if it is not in consonance to the provision of law. The view aforesaid is supported by the judgment referred by Mr. Shyam Arya, AAG in the case of Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha (supra). No doubt, it is true that scrutiny of the qualifications cannot be made in common parlance. From the record, it comes out that the candidates nominated are not in possession of the required qualification, thus intervention can be made by this Court. Here, the question comes about maintainability of the writ petition and delay therein. No doubt, it is true that scrutiny of the qualifications cannot be made in common parlance. From the record, it comes out that the candidates nominated are not in possession of the required qualification, thus intervention can be made by this Court. Here, the question comes about maintainability of the writ petition and delay therein. The writ petition has been filed by non-else but by members of Muslim community concerned to the Muslim Wakf Board. No doubt, it is true that in the prayer clause, the writ of quo-warranto has not been mentioned, but, it is not even for writ of certiorari. What writ can be issued by the Court, can be decided from the facts and herein, if the nominations have been challenged on the ground of qualification, it would be nothing but a writ of quowarranto. It is not necessary that a PIL has to be filed for it, rather, writ can be filed by the individual concerned to the activity of the Board. Accordingly, I find that the writ petition in the hands of the petitioners is maintainable. The issue of delay has also been raised by learned counsel for the non-petitioner Nos.4 and 5. The nomination of non-petitioner Nos.3 to 5 was made on 16th March, 2016. The writ petition for it was filed in the month of July, 2017. The facts available on record, however, show that before filing of the writ petition, the petitioners made an application to the non-petitioners to seek information about non petitioner Nos.3 to 5. It was by maintaining an application under the Right to Information Act 2005. In view of the above, the writ petition was filed after getting the information. It is not a writ petition which can be thrown out on the ground of laches, accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The nomination of the non-petitioner Nos.3 to 5 are set aside. The State Government would, however, be at liberty to make nomination afresh, but, care would be taken to nominate those who qualify in different categories and, while doing so, they would select two female candidates from an amongst those who are in possession of the required qualification in different categories. " 4.2. The State Government would, however, be at liberty to make nomination afresh, but, care would be taken to nominate those who qualify in different categories and, while doing so, they would select two female candidates from an amongst those who are in possession of the required qualification in different categories. " 4.2. Additional Advocate-General for the State Government has supported the case of the appellant and contended that action of the respondent-State Government is just and proper and taking into consideration the requisite qualification, the appellant was appointed therefore original writ petition deserves to be dismissed and order of the learned Single Judge is required to be quashed and set aside and appeal deserves to be allowed. 5. We have heard counsel for the parties. 5.1. Before proceeding with the matter, it will not be out of place to mention that the appellant was a government servant and voluntarily resigned only on the 4.2.2016 and he has been nominated on 9.3.2016. Counsel for the appellant failed to establish the appellant fulfils the criteria laid down under Section 14(1)(c) of the Act of 1995 as reproduced above. 5.2. The points which have been argued regarding cause of action and locus, in our considered opinion, the original petitioner respondents no.2,3 and 4 are well educated and doing their claim for welfare of the community, therefore, the petition which has been entertained by the learned Single Judge on the ground of locus cannot be faulted and it will not be appropriate for us to exercise the powers in appeal to hold it has no locus and regarding cause of action, if the post which is statutory post, if anyone not found eligible, can be challenged within reasonable period before the termination of expiry period. Therefore, both the contentions raised by the appellant are rejected. 5.3. The organization which the appellant claims to be Muslim Organization was never affiliated to any of the Muslim Organizations. There is nothing on record to show that it has been recognized by the Wakf Board. Merely because the organization is doing work for the party in power will not make it eminent organization as laid down under Section 14(1)(c) of the Act of 1995. The meaning of word 'Eminent' as defined in Oxford Dictionary means '(of a person) famous and respected within a particular sphere.' 5.4. Merely because the organization is doing work for the party in power will not make it eminent organization as laid down under Section 14(1)(c) of the Act of 1995. The meaning of word 'Eminent' as defined in Oxford Dictionary means '(of a person) famous and respected within a particular sphere.' 5.4. In our considered opinion, the organization is to be represented by class itself, no doubt 20,000 members are there in the organization claimed by the appellant but in our considered opinion, where eminent Muslim organization would be considered which has been given in the Act, it has to be understood in the true spirit meaning thereby Muslim organization which is doing the activity without any favour even amongst the members of the community irrespective of the sub class whether Siya or Sunny. In our considered opinion, even if it is an organization which is taken to be covered under the Act, in view of the requirement under section 14 (1) (c) of the Act of 1995, it is not recognized by the Wakf Board. Apart from that, it has not come on record that appellant is not doing any work which helps the community at large. In that view of the matter, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is just and proper and no interference is called for. 6. Regarding application (11833/2018) for taking documents on record, in our considered opinion, these documents were not available with the State Government at the time when the appointment was considered, therefore, it is devoid of merit to consider the same in appeal at this stage, hence the application stands rejected. 7. Hence, the appeal being devoid of merit is hereby dismissed. 8. Special appeal dismissed.