JUDGMENT : These miscellaneous first appeals are filed by the Insurance Company challenging the judgment and award dated 3. 10. 2009 passed by the Civil Judge (Sr. Dn. ) and AMACT at Belur, in MVC. Nos. 2 and 3/2008 questioning the liability fastened on the insurance company. 2. The brief facts of the case of the claimants before the Tribunal are that on 8.10.2002 at about 11. 30 a. m. on HassanBelur Road, near Mallikarjunappa gate, towards southern side, the claimant in MVC. No. 2/2008 was talking with Somashekar, the deceased in MVC. No. 3/2008. At that time, the driver of the car bearing Regn. No. KL13D3993 came in a high speed in a rash and negligent manner and dashed against them, as a result of which the claimant Rudregowda sustained fracture of his left leg and injuries all over his body and the deceased Somashekar sustained grievous injuries to forehead, right leg and left hand. Both of them were shifted to hospital for treatment. The deceased Somashekar succumbed to the injuries in the hospital. Hence, the claimant in MVC. No. 2/2008 filed claim petition seeking compensation for the injuries sustained and the claimants in MVC. No. 3/2008 who are the dependants of deceased Somashekar filed claim petition seeking compensation for his death. On service of notice, the 2nd respondent owner appeared, admitted his ownership and also existence of policy of insurance. The 3rd respondent Insurance Company appeared and contended that the petitions are not maintainable. Further that the vehicle was stolen from the residence of the insured on 1. 8. 2002 and the insured had filed a complaint before the police and reported the matter to the RTO and subsequently, the police have also submitted ‘C’ report. Thus, relying on the police document and also the representations made by the insured, settled the claim of the insured for a sum of Rs. 1,10,000/-in full and final settlement and cancelled the policy issued to the said vehicle from 11.08.2002. Further, contended that the Insured had no control over the vehicle from 11.8.2002 and as such the Insurance Company cannot be made liable to pay any compensation as there existed no policy of insurance. The Tribunal has determined the compensation wrongly recording the date on which the policy of insurance was cancelled and proceeded to fasten the liability on it. 3. The Tribunal has determined the compensation wrongly recording the date on which the policy of insurance was cancelled and proceeded to fasten the liability on it. 3. The main contentions of the appellant insurance company in both the appeals are that the Tribunal has failed to take note of the fact that the insured had lost ownership in respect of the vehicle as possession was forcibly taken by the thieves and one Mahamad Abdulla was driving the vehicle and was in possession of the vehicle and he alone caused the accident. He was not an employee or an agent of the insured and as such there is no vicarious liability on the insured to indemnify the tortuous act of Mahamad Abdulla, and consequently the appellant is not liable to pay any compensation. The Tribunal has also failed to take into consideration that the police had filed ‘C’ report to the effect that the vehicle could not be traced and the accident in question had occurred by the use of such a stolen vehicle and the policy of insurance gets cancelled abinitiothe moment the insured loses his legal right and control over the vehicle. The appellant is not required to indemnify either the insured or the person who has stolen the vehicle and caused the accident by using the vehicle after such act. The Tribunal has failed to appreciate both oral and documentary evidence available on record and that the compensation claimed is also excessive. 4. Sri. A. N. Krishnaswamy, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in his arguments has reiterated the grounds urged in both the appeals and further contended that there is no vicarious liability to pay compensation and the question of master and servant liability does not arise in the case on hand. The master is liable for servant only if the servant has acted negligently. Mere use of the vehicle in public place is not a ground and if any person is not liable legally, the insurer is also not liable to indemnify the same. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has also relied upon the decisions reported in AIR 1977 SC 1248 [Minu B. Mehta and another. vs. Balakrishna Ramachandra Nayan and another] paragraphs 23 to 27. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has also relied upon the decisions reported in AIR 1977 SC 1248 [Minu B. Mehta and another. vs. Balakrishna Ramachandra Nayan and another] paragraphs 23 to 27. He has also brought to the notice of this Court the provisions of Section 95 of the Act in support of this contention that for liability of owner or insurance company, proof of negligence is necessary. The learned counsel has also relied upon another decision reported in (2017) 16 SCC 680 [National Insurance Company Limited. vs. Pranay Sethi and others] wherein with regard to judgments rendered prior in time and its bindingness on coordinate benches, it is reiterated that an earlier decision of coequal Bench binds the Bench of same strength. 5. Per contra, the counsel appearing for the claimants has vehemently contended that the counsel appearing for the Insurance Company had addressed similar arguments before this Court in MFA. No. 4614/2011 c/w MFA. 9595/2011 and MFA. No. 10685/2013 c/w MFA. No. 878/2014 and this Court has turned down the aforesaid contentions relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in 2003 (3) SCC 338 [United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Lehru and others] and as such the appellant cannot reagitate similar contentions in these cases also. The counsel has also relied upon the decision reported in (2003) 3 SCC 338 wherein with regard to liability of insurer in respect of thirdparty risk, the defence of insurer against the same under Section 149(7), it was held that the liability does not extend beyond the grounds set out in Section 149(2). 6. After having heard the arguments of the appellants’ counsel and also the respondents’ counsel and on perusal of the impugned judgment and award, the point that arises for my consideration is:- “Whether the contention of the insurer that the vehicle was not under the control of the insured and thieves caused the accident and there was no breach on the part of the insured and as such there cannot be any liability on the Insurance Company can be accepted?” 7. Before adverting to the arguments canvassed by both the counsel, I would like to refer to the factual matrix of the case on hand. Before adverting to the arguments canvassed by both the counsel, I would like to refer to the factual matrix of the case on hand. The facts disclose that the accident took place on 08.10.2002 at about 1.30 A. M. on account of rash and negligent driving of the stolen car by one Mahamad Abdulla, which is not in dispute. Further, it is also not in dispute that the case was registered for the theft of the vehicle, ‘C’ report was filed by the police after investigation and the claim of the insured for own damages was settled. Now the contention of the appellant before this Court is that the vehicle in question was not in the control of the insured and there was no negligence or contravention of any law either by the insured or by the employee of the insured. Further relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in Mehta’s case contended that the liability of the owner of the car to compensate the victim in a car accident due to the negligent driving of his servant is based on the law of tort. Regarding the negligence of the servant the owner is made liable on the basis of vicarious liability. Before the master could be made liable it is necessary to prove that the servant was acting during the course of his employment and that he was negligent. Further, the counsel has also relied upon Para 21 which reiterated the very same plea. He has also brought to my notice Para 22 wherein the Apex Court has observed that in order to succeed in an action for negligence, the plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant had in the circumstances a duty to take care and that duty was owed by him to the plaintiff, and that (2) there was a breach of that duty and that as a result of the breach damage was suffered by the plaintiff. The master also becomes liable for the conduct of the servant when the servant is proved to have acted negligently in the course of his employment. The counsel also brought to my notice the principles laid down in the said decision in para 26 wherein it is observed that this plea ignores the basic requirements of the owner's liability and the claimant's right to receive compensation. The counsel also brought to my notice the principles laid down in the said decision in para 26 wherein it is observed that this plea ignores the basic requirements of the owner's liability and the claimant's right to receive compensation. The owner's liability arises out of his failure to discharge a duty cast on him by law. The right to receive compensation can only be against a person who is bound to compensate due to the failure to perform a legal obligation. The counsel also relied upon para 27 wherein it is observed that the concept of owner's liability without any negligence is opposed to the basic principles of law. The mere fact that a party received an injury arising out of the use of a vehicle in a public place, cannot justify fastening liability on the owner. He also placed reliance upon paragraph 29 wherein it is observed that a person is not liable unless he contravenes any of the duties imposed on him by common law or by the statute. In the case of a motor accident, the owner is only liable for negligence and on proof of vicarious liability for the acts of his servant, the necessity to provide effective means for compensating the victims in motor accidents should not bind us in determining the state of law as it exists today. 8. I have already referred to the decision reported in Pranay Sethi’s case, wherein the larger bench of the Apex Court has held with regard to the binding ness of prior coordinate Bench judgment and the concept of binding precedent and observed that an earlier decision may seem to be incorrect to a Bench of a coordinate jurisdiction considering the question later, on the ground that a possible aspect of the matter was not considered or not raised before the court or more aspects should have been gone into by the court deciding the matter earlier but it would not be a reason to say that the decision was rendered per incuriam and liable to be ignored.” 9. The counsel appearing for the claimant also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Lehru’s case referred supra wherein the Apex Court has discussed with regard to Section 149 of Motor Vehicles Act and held that even in such cases the Insurer would remain liable to innocent third parties and may be able to recover the amount from the insured. This Court in MFA. No. 4614/11 and connected case referred supra, referring to the principles laid down in Lehru’s case at paragraph 18 has turned down similar arguments canvassed by the very same counsel appearing for the Insurance Company in this case. Paragraph 18 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lehru’s case reads as under:- 18. Now let us consider Section 149(2). Reliance has been placed on Section 149(2)(a)(ii). As seen, in order to avoid liability under this provision it must be shown that there is a ''breach". As held in Skandia and Sohan Lal Passi cases the breach must be on part of the insured. We are in full agreement with that. To hold otherwise would lead to absurd results. Just to take an example, suppose a vehicle is stolen. Whilst it is being driven by the thief there is an accident. The thief is caught and it is ascertained that he had no license. Can the Insurance Company disown liability? The answer has to be an emphatic "No". To hold otherwise would be to negate the very purpose of compulsory insurance. The injured or relatives of the person killed in the accident may find that the decree obtained by them is only a paper decree as the owner is a man of straw. The owner himself would be an innocent sufferer. It is for this reason that the Legislature, in its wisdom has made insurance, at least third party insurance, compulsory. The aim and purpose being that an Insurance Company would be available to pay. The business of the Company is insurance. In all businesses there is an element of risk. All persons carrying on business must take risks associated with that business. Thus it is equitable that the business which is run for making profits also bears the risk associated with it. At the same time innocent parties must not be made to suffer or loss. These provisions meet these requirements. In all businesses there is an element of risk. All persons carrying on business must take risks associated with that business. Thus it is equitable that the business which is run for making profits also bears the risk associated with it. At the same time innocent parties must not be made to suffer or loss. These provisions meet these requirements. We are thus in agreement with what is laid down in aforementioned cases viz. that in order to avoid liability it is not sufficient to show that the person driving at the time of accident was not duly licensed. The Insurance Company must establish that the breach was on the part of the insured. The contention of the appellants is that there was no breach on the part of the insured and also there was no negeligence on the part of either the insured or his employee and accident was committed by the thief, on whom the insured had no control and the vehicle was also not in possession of the insured and when such being the case, the liability cannot be fastened on the insurance company. 10. The Apex Court in Lehru’s case at paragraph 18 while considering the material on record has even considered Section 149(2) and further observed that as seen, in order to avoid liability under this provision it must be shown that there is a ''breach". As held in Skandia and Sohan Lal Passi cases the breach must be on part of the insured. We are in full agreement with that. To hold otherwise would lead to absurd results. Just to take an example, suppose a vehicle is stolen. Whilst it is being driven by the thief there is an accident. The thief is caught and it is ascertained that he had no license. Can the Insurance Company disown liability? The answer has to be an emphatic "No". To hold otherwise would be to negate the very purpose of compulsory insurance. The injured or relatives of the person killed in the accident may find that the decree obtained by them is only a paper decree as the owner is a man of straw. The owner himself would be an innocent sufferer. It is for this reason that the Legislature, in its wisdom has made insurance, at least third party insurance, compulsory. The aim and purpose being that an Insurance Company would be available to pay. The owner himself would be an innocent sufferer. It is for this reason that the Legislature, in its wisdom has made insurance, at least third party insurance, compulsory. The aim and purpose being that an Insurance Company would be available to pay. 11. After having observed the principles laid down in the decisions referred supra, though in Mehta’s case the three Judges Bench of the Apex Court has held that there must be negligence on the part of the insured or his employee, the facts and circumstances of the case on hand is peculiar and the same has to be understood with the legislative intention in enacting Section 149 of the Act. In the case on hand, the claimant and the deceased were talking by the side of the road, at that time, the driver of the vehicle in question which was insured has caused the accident. Whether, he is a third party or whether he is an employee of the insured is irrelevant since the very wisdom of the legislature is to protect the interest of third parties. The Apex Court considering the very provisions of Section 149 in Lehru’s case has discussed taking an example as to what could be result, if the accident occurs when the vehicle is in the custody of a thief. However, in the decision relied upon by the Insurance Company, there is no discussions with regard to the said issue. It is further important to note that this Court has also in the unreported decisions in the MFAs referred supra, taking note of the ratio laid down in Lehru’s case, turned down the very same contentions advanced by the counsel for the Insurance Company. Therefore, the contention of the Insurance Company that it is not liable to pay compensation cannot be accepted in view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Lehru’s case. The factual aspects has to be taken note of and the Court has to decide each case based on the facts and circumstances of the case. 12. Having discussed in detail above, it is the duty cast upon the Court to consider the very object of Section 149 of the Act. The legislature in its wisdom, has made the insurance, atleast third party insurance, compulsory. 12. Having discussed in detail above, it is the duty cast upon the Court to consider the very object of Section 149 of the Act. The legislature in its wisdom, has made the insurance, atleast third party insurance, compulsory. The aim and purpose being that the Insurance Company would be available to pay the compensation to the innocent persons who are third parties. Or otherwise, the injured or relatives of the person killed in the accident may find that the decree obtained by them is only a paper decree as the owner is a man of straw. The observations made by the Apex Court in Lehru’s case is aptly applicable to the case on hand. Hence, am of the opinion that the contention of the counsel appearing for the Insurance Company cannot be accepted and each and every case has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of the case. However, in view of the decision rendered in Pranay Sethi’s case referring to Article 141 of Constitution, there is no dispute that earlier decision of a coequal Bench binds the coordinate bench and also all other Courts. Having considered the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case on hand, the decisions relied upon by the Insurance Company do not come to its aid. 13. In view of the discussions made above, the appeal must fail and accordingly, dismissed.